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Introductiofl 
The close of the 15th century 
witnessed the explorations 
of Columbus and the beginnings of 
the systematic penetration of 
Europeansinto the western hemisphere. 
While it may not have 
been appreciated at the time, this 
encounter heralded a new era 
of human development, one which 
has been variously described as 
'the dawn of the modern period", 
"the birth of capitalism", and 
tthe rise of the New World". Today, five 
centures later it is 
no exaggeration to claim that the 
situation in the Caribbean is 
it least as pivotal as that of any 
other region in determining 
whether as a spècies we nuclear 
self_destruct, or advance to a 
more humane civilisation, where 
among other things there would 
be no poor and powerless among us. 
Situated in the geo-political 
backyard of the United States, 
the world's leading capitalist 
power, at a period of intense confrontation 
with what the Reagan 
administration describes as "international 
commufliSm' 1aces 
like Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Haiti, Suriname, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guyana and the Dominican 
Republic conjure images of momentous 
social upheavals of global 
proportions. This book attempts 
an analysis and interpretation 
of the course of ecronomic development 
of the region since World 
War ii. However, given the 
variety and complexity of the region 
as well as the need to make 
the subject matter manageable I have 
resorted to a number of 
methodological devices some of which 
I refer to at the outset, as 
I believe this would aid the 
reader's appreciation of the direction 
and thrust of the book. 
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To begin, while this ib a study of economic change the 
target audience is not economic specialists, (although it is 
hoped that this category of readers would find the book useful). 
The audience I have aimed at is the large number of persons 
with 
no specialist training in economics, but who nevertheless 
realise 
that in order to comprehend contemporary Caribbean reality, 
it 
is imperative to have a grasp of how the economic and 
material 
basis of the region's societies is organised and reproduced. 
It 
is therefore intended that a iide range of persons would 
find the 
text useful either as a point of departure for further 
studies, 
oras reference material. Among these I would include 
trade 
unionists; workers and activists in non-governmental organisations 
(churches, professional associatiofls, community and cooperative 
groups, etc); students; managerial and executive peronnel in 
both the private and public sectors; activists of political 
parties 
and social movements such as, women's groups, peace groups, 
human 
rights organisatior, environmental protection bodies, etc; 
participants in the decision making structures of regional 
and 
multilateral institutions either exclusively concerned with 
the 
area or having regional programmes; Caribbean people who live 
outside the region and sustain an active interest in developments 
within the region; and social scientistsgenerally. From this 
rather long list it should be evident that the book ,is 
designed 
to serve an educational role among intellectual workers, 
this 
category being construed in its broadest meaning, that 
is, as 
comprising all those persons who regardless -of their level of 
formal training deal with ideas, either as part of their liveli- 
hood, or as an expression of their commitment to some voluntary 
social activity. 
The reader may conclude from this that the book is simply 
written for the "lay-person". While in a sense this is true, 
I would caution however, that this does not mean it is by design 
either simplistic, or intellectually illiterate. No ffo:'t, has 
been made to dilute the presentation of any of the ideas or 
insights which I might have to offer. The process of simplification 
has been by and large confined to keeping the technical language, 
jargon of economics, and statistical detail to the barest minimum. 
One of the major reasons why I have found that this task has not 
been as daunting as it might at first appeir is that a standard, 
compartmentalized "economic" analysT of Caribbean would be 
truly meaingless. The force of historical ..ircumstances has 
made it impossible to separate politics, sociology, law, culture, 
science and technology, and history itself from the analysis and 
interpretation of economic issues. The primary method of the 
study is therefore multi-disciplinary, or as it is sometimes 
described I have used a "political economy" approach. Because 
of this multi-disciplinary, or political economy approach, I 
believe that almost all the persons in the groups listed above 
would find that from the standpoint of their own experience and/or 
training, that there is one or more vantage points of familiarity 
from which to follow the contents of the book. 
A second poInt of method I wish to refer to, is that as 
the title of the book suggests the point of departure is the 
interests of the poor and the powerless. The reason for this 
is simple. Throughout the region's recorded history these groups 
have always made up thé majority of the population. As the saying 
goes "the poor have always been with us", but while this is the 
stark truth, the poor have taken many forms over the past five 
centurics: the indigenous inhabitants of the area, the early 
waves of European Immigrant settlers, African slaves, indentured 
workers, the small peasants, urban and rural workers as well as 
the unemployed of the post-slavery period. By the powerless, I 
refer to all those groups in these srcieties who under prevailing 
social and institutional relations have been unablè to xercise 
control over the machinery of state or other established 
institutions of authority. In other words they do noii make up 
the dominant or ruling political group(s) or class(es). With 
rare exceptions, throughout the region's recorded history the 
dominant class(es) has always comprised a small fraction of the 
population, and the powerless the vast majority. 
Within the region, it may be argued that by and large 
the poor and the powerless have always made up the same constututenc3 
of persons. It should not, however, be inferred from this that 
the position taken in this book is that the poor do not make up 
a powerful social group. To the contrary, because they have 
always comprised the bulk of the work force, the producers of 
social wealth, they command a tremendous amount of social power. 
Except, however, for a few very brief insurrectionary interludes, 
over the past five centuries and more this has not been trans- 
lated into their taking control of state power as a necessary 
step in the direction, of re-ordering social priorities with the 
view of eventually securing a permanent end to their continued 
poverty and subjugation. 
Because for so much of the region's history it has been 
colonized by one or other European power and then later fallen 
under the domination and sway of the United States, powerlessness 
has to be conceived at both the national level (in the sense 
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that the colonial and imperial powers have historically oppressed 
all groups and classes in a given territory depriving them there- 
with of effective control of the machinery of state) and at the 
internal social level or class level, where in this structure 
some groups and classes are better placed than others. This and 
other aspects of the poor and the powerless will be taken up 
more fully in the text. 
A third point of significance in the method of this work 
is that the analyses and interpretations offered are explicitly 
oriented towards raising the consciousness of another or 
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alternative path of development for the region. Such an 
objective, however, has had to confront the well recognized 
truth that in order to comprehend the present, let alone plan 
or conceptualize the future as we aspire to do here, one must 
be thoroughly grounded in an understanding of the past. This 
places a premium on the historical method. Here this is 
attempted,but not with a view toproviding historicaL 
detail or insights as ends in themselves, but as a way of infusing 
the analysiswith a sense of historical direction. Without this 
I believe that the major continuties and discontinuities of the 
present and futire cannot be comprehended, and we shall find 
ourselves repeating past errors as many before us have. 
One might argue that it is this historical sense which 
in the last analysis justifies the treatment of the Caribbean as 
a legitimate area of social study, and this observation1 brings 
us to our fourth point of method. Some measure of the difficulties 
and complexities which this approach encounters can be gleaned 
from the fact that while we seek to advance a regional or area 
approach, the contradiction of reality is that no other part of the 
world boasts the sanie degree of fragmentation and balkanization 
as the Caribbean area! In addition, the almost continuous 
entanglement of the region as an actual war zone in the struggles 
between East and West (as well as North and South) adds further 
difficulties to our project. Consider the following examples. 
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First, frequent. daily reference is made to the English-speaking 
Caribbean. This, however, constitutes the following: 
The Caricom territories as a core group (Antigua- 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, 1Trinidad- 
Tobago and Montserrat). These 13 countries have a population 
of 5 million people. 
The United Kingdom dependencies: Anguilla, British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, the Turks and Caics, and 
possibly Bermuda. 
The United States Virgin Irlands. 
When examined closely we find that this linguistic grouping 
includes Guyana and Belize which are not islands. It also 
includes the dependences of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, although all the Caricom territories with the exception 
of Montserrat obtained independence from Britain during the 
past two and a half decades. It also ignores the special status 
of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Within this grouping there is also 
the "Caricom group of countries't, sometimes referred to as the 
Commonwealth Caribbean or the West Indies. Thi is also another 
very loose piece of terminology since it is never clear whether 
the UK dependencies (except Montserrat) are included. What 
clearly emerges therefore, is that an exclusively linguistic 
determination of the area of social study is inadequate and must 
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be combined with other elements: cultural, economic, geographical, 
political and historical. 
A second example is the frequent attempt at a geographjal 
determination of the area of social study. This approach defines 
the Caribbean as the islands of the Caribbean Sea and as such wouid 
include all the islands listed above, together with Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, the French overseas - 
dertments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as the Dutch 
Antilles. The '»trictly geographical definition would then comprize 
22 zountries and about 28 million people. This definition is so 
'severely limited t1iat it has been conventional to add to it the 
four non-island territories of Guyana and Belize (part of the 
English-speaking grouping), Suriname and the French overseas- 
derartment, Cayenne. II' the mainland four are added we have 26 
cointries and approximately 30 million people. 
This definition of the area of social study has limited 
usulness, however, because it ignores the different levels of 
naUon building arrived at in the region. It includes countries 
raiing from socialist Cuba, non-søcialist independent states of 
1oi standing, and sevral of very recent vintage, as well as 
suiiving European and American colonies. The limitations of a 
unitimensional definition of the area of social study are again 
realed in this example. 
At present the US inspired rotion of Caribbean Basin 
is the concept with the widest usage, except possibly for the 
more traditional culture area of the West Indies which generally 
refers to the Caricom grouping of countries. This definition 
includes all the countries mentioned above, plus all of Central 
America (including Mexico and Panama), as well as Colombia and 
Venezuela. This leads to 36 countries and over 150 million people. 
This conception owes much to the US governments view of its 
strategic-cum-geo-political concerns Th the area. As we shall 
see later in the text, in its Caribbean Basin Initiative (C.B.:..) 
the US government has sought to give this conception programmatic 
economic content through its external aid, trade and investment 
relations. 
As a strictly geographical definition this concept ii1ud 
states in Central America (even where they do not have a Caribbean 
coastline) and excludes the US (which has one). This is sinii1i, 
to some conventional geographical definitions which exclude 
'venezuela which has the largest Caribbean coastline. In the 
programmatic aid, trade and investment strategy of the C.B.I. the 
tast-West conflict emerges in the exclusion of countries like 
uba and Nicaragua and the bias in favour of places liké Jamai 
nd El Salvador. 
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All these complexities raised here reflect the earlier 
observation concerning the extent of fragmentation and balkanizatio 
in the area. Additional problems, however, also emerge. On of 
these is that a certain level of aggregation the numbers of 
societies and separate nation states to cover became too large 
to be handled by one scholar in one volume. The sheer variety 
of territories is likely to lead an all embracing treatment of 
the region in a single general study into a simple gazeteer or 
compendium of data with little indepth analysis. ?nother problem 
is that at a certain stage of their development ne territories 
acquire a distinctivenes of their own (even witIin the region) 
and this necessitates an analysis from a single country focus. 
The best example of this is Cuba, where the radical alteration of 
class and other social relations which followed on the revolution 
makes it impossible to study that country exclusively or even 
primarily, from the perspective of a general treatment of the 
Caribbean qua region. 'This, of course does not rule out the 
isolation of particular themes and issues in Cuban development 
for treatment from a general Caribbean perspective. 
The approach of this text eombines two elements. On 
the one hand it was necessary to blend historical, cultural, 
lingustic and geographical features to help define a meaningfiil 
area of study. On the other, a judgement had to be made about 
the strength and direction of regional consciousness among the 
population at large in the various territories. The judgement 
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exercised here is that despite its many weaknesses 
(which are 
identified later in the book) the regional integration 
effort 
of Caricom reflects the ares of greatest potential 
and immediate 
cohesiveness within the Caribbean. It would 
be true to say that 
at' this historical juncture, all the major classes, 
groups and 
strata in these territories, as part of their 
social consciousness 
share and/or compete over a view or views of the 
Caribbean in ways 
which are important to the pursuit of tbeir 
interests. This 
demonstrably influences their group behaviour 
quite significantly. 
In no other significant grouping of territories 
in the region 
(except possibly Central America which I believe 
should not be 
treated together with the Caribbean for the purposeí 
at hand) 
is this community of interest as far advanced. 
It is out of these consideratiOiS that Jhave chosen 
the Commonwealth Caribbean or the caricom Group 
of;courítries or 
the traditional West Indies as the core territori for 
purposes 
of study and analysis. Having indicated this, 
I should 
immediately stress that in dealing with 
many of the thematic 
issues, for both comparative and analytical reasons, 
the treatment 
embraces wider definitions of the area. Examples 
of these are 
the treatment of the historical forces shaping 
the early formation 
of the region's economy, the pattern of the 
region's industrializatio; 
the role of plantation and peasant agricult 
e in the food systems 
of the region, the dominance of transnat nal 
corporations in the 
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region, the militarization of the area, the effects of East- 
West confrontation, etc. I should also stress that the argument 
of the previous paragraph has been reinforced by the additional 
consideration that most of the states in the core group 
identified here are recent post-colonial states. By this I mean 
much 'flore than that they were formally subjected to "colonial office 
rule" and have recently acquired "political independence"0 The 
distinction is based on the treatment of co1oñ1zat1on as an 
inherently distinctive process which has shaped these societies, 
and the potential for a "break" with this process wh is 
inherent in independeice which at tl'ie least makes it o longer 
legally possible for colonial dominabion to mediate itself 
through all the important structures of the society. 
Despite thc limited area constituted by the core group 
of this ztudy, it nevertheless combines territories of enormous 
complexity, with both unifying and disintegrating tendencies. 
Perhaps by definition an area study tilts the balance in favour 
of unifying tendencies, Lowever, the fact that these territories 
have evQlved out of British colonialism into separate and 
indepennt nation states means that local diversities in resource 
availability and its management, economiL opportunity, location, 
leader5blp, as well as factors such as historical accident cannot 
be ignoid. In the region a continuous tension exists between 
unity an further fragmentation and this is reflected in the 
tension between unifying and disintegrating tendencies at the 
theorethal base of this book. 
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In concluding this introduction I would like to draw 
attention in a preliminary way to a couple of other recurring 
themes whichare at the base of this work. One of these 
is that in my evaluation of the historical past I have recognised 
the region as having gone through three fundamental periods of 
transition. The first is associated with the break-up of the 
systems of forced labour (slavery and indenture), the second with 
the liberation and independence movements of the Spanish speaking 
countries, and the. third has been the impacting 01 ti;: gopal 
economic and political crises of the l93Os and Wc.;i War II on 
the region in general and the core-group of countries in particular. 
The third was the immediate precursor of the independence movements' 
in the core group of countries. The further point however, should 
be stressed and that is that I interpret the present historical 
conjuncture as comprising elements with the potential for an 
equally fundamental transition as those which have already occurred. 
This judgement has given my task a certain immediacy, if not 
urgency. 
The second theme was raised earlier in an indirect 
manner when I referred to the fragmentation and balkanization 
of the region, and that is, the issue of size and scale. When 
defined in terms of any appropriate combination of population, 
geographical area and size of national market, all of the 
territories of the Caribbean are small. Despite this, however, 
it ShoLld be borne in mind that ven within the sub-group of 
the Commonwealth Caribbeari, there are remarkable variations in 
size. Thus in terms of area the countïies range from Guyana 
with 83,000 sq. miles to Montserrat with 33, Jamaica with lÇ1411 
square miles accounts for 40% of the group' population and 
along with Trinidad-TObago (1,980 square miles) these two com- 
prises about two-thirds its population. Meanwhile, Trinidad- 
Tobago alone accounts for 60 % of the regionaliiarket. Given 
sich jrcumstaflces, the issues of SiZE and scale must necessarily 
arise in a continuous way throuhout the study. 
Looking at the broad swep of human history, arguably, the 
threci most powerful vehicles of cultural penetration and dissemin- 
ation have been migration, trade, and investment. Nowhere else 
in the world have these been as highly developed, in rela.ive 
ternis, as in the Caribbean. While in the text I deal extensively 
with trade and investment, the continued role of the movement 
of people in shaping the area should always be kept at the fore- 
front. The migration of Europeans to the region arid the enforced 
movement of millions of slaves and indentured labotirers in one 
of histOry's most despicable enterprises is too well known 
to be overlooked. The abolition of leally enforced labour, 
however, did not bring to an end this process of tremendous 
movement of people. While, from time to time occurrences such 
as the flood of West Indian migrants to Britain in the 1950's 
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and 1960's, and later the Mariel boat-lift and the plight of 
the Baitian boat people have brought world focus- to this 
movement, it has been since the abolition of slavery a continuous 
feature of the area. Movement within the region (the building 
of the Panama canal, oil refineries in Curacao, sugar plantation-s, 
in Cuba; the migratory movement of workers from the Windward 
Islands to Barbados, Haiti to the Dominican Republic, Grenada 
to Trinidad-Tobago), and from the region to countries overseas 
coistitutan important characteristic of the regiin and has 
therefore helped to shape tile underlying theoreticl structure 
of this study. 
Part I : Roots 
This part of the study contains three chapters. 
Chapters 1 and 2 diret attention to the major historical forces 
which have shaped the contemporary political economy of the region. 
The discussion here is organized around four periods, namely, 
the period of European conquest, plunder and penetration from 
the end of the .15th century up to the middle of the 17th century; 
the period of colonial settlement and the consolidation of 
slavery which followed after and lasted until the early 19th 
century; the period of collapse of the colonial slae system and 
the rise of the peasantry which lasted until the end of the 19th 
century; and finally the 20th century up to World War II. The 
last period witnesses the consolidation of modern imperialism, 
the development of a clearly defined periphery and center in the 
capitalist world economy and the rise of mass movements in the 
3eriphery, noticeably in the core group ofCaribbean countries. 
hese two chapters do not pretend to offer an historical 
narrative, let alone a coherent history of the region. I have 
simply exercised my own judgement and isolated what I think are 
the principal interpretative/analytical themes, vital to the 
later analysis of the text. The third chapter offers a brief 
sketch of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the West 
Indies as we approach the end of the decade of the 1930ts and 
World War II. Taken together the three chapters indicate the 
roots of the contemporary political economy of the region. 
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CHAPTER 1: CONQUEST, SETTLEMENT AND SLAVERY 
THE MAKINGS OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
Prior to European penetration and conquest of the 
Caribbean, early forms of communal subsistence economy based on 
fishing, hunting and shifting agriculture dominated the area. 
Even with the low lewels of technology prevailing at the time 
the region could be considered then as being generally under- 
populated. There was at the time also, a certain nount of inter- 
island, inter-territorial movement of persons and coimodities 
based on the Amerindian canoes. There were no dev'loped forms 
of private property relations and the notion of possessions out- 
side of the group or tribe was barely known. It was into this 
situation of communal subsistence economies with limited exchanges 
between groups that the European arrived and transformed the 
Caribbean forever more. In this chapter we shall briefly identify 
the main forces shaping the formation of the Caribbean economy 
ring two periods: the period of conquest, pliIer and early 
s. tiement, and the subsequent period where the colonial economy 
ws consolidated in its main essentials, slavery and the 
plantation. 
I: The Treasure of the Inuies: Conquest, Plunder and Rivalry 
As Gordon Lewis has aptly remarked, what passes for 
Caribbean recorded history comprises a remarkable admixture of 
1/ 
legend, myth, and distortionT From the so-called "discoveries 
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of Columbus" right up to today's tourist brochures which depict 
the region as an "earthly paradise" the tendency has been to 
project a romantic view of the area. But behind this romantic 
mask there has always lain a brutal system of economic exploitation 
of the region and the peoples associated with it. From its 
earliest recorded history the Caribbean has witnessed some of 
the worst excesses of humankind: unrelieved plunder, genocide, 
slavery, indentured imhiigration, and other unspeakable barbarisins. 
Thus under the layers of myth of Columbus' "genius and visionary 
character" lay an enterprise for commercial gain financed by 
Spanish monarchs and tieir moneyed allies. As "sodis of 
fortune" the romantic conquistadores were really promoters of 
genocide, and while the English buccaneers were romanticised 
as "bearers of protestant liberty in the struggle against Catholic 
tyranny" they were in truth after their piece of the action: 
the slave trade and other people's territoryi. 
The colonization of' the Caribbean was part of the first 
of modern colonisation. The inner drive behind the voyages 
o xploration was to expand the sources of wealth for its 
f ancie'sin light of the disruption of the traditional 
Mediterranean routes to the East produced by the Turks, the 
Crusades, and the strategic domination of that area by the city- 
states of Venice and Genoa. The early emphasis was on plunder 
and trade, that is reaping the benefits of the hoarded treasures 
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of native peoples either through so-called exchanges or force 
of arms. There was, however, a built in limit to this system 
of simply appropriating the produce of others - the stock of 
wealth already possessed and the capacity of these groups to 
produce surpluses. With the low level of prevailing technology 
among the Amerindian inhabitants, further extortion depended 
on the installation of a system of production in the region which 
could expand the source of gains for the colonizers. This system 
was the seed .frùn'. which the contemporary economies 'f the region 
grew, and it is therefore important that we nderstand thc. character 
of what was implanted. For the purposes of this study. I identify 
nine elements of this period as crucial to the later formation 
of Caribbean eJonomy. While this listing is not complete and 
ome of the elements clearly overlap for our purposes we can 
onsider these to be: 
European confrontation with the original Tamo - Arawak 
b Indian peoples of the area which resulted in the latters 
mation and the marginalization of the simple communal 
mies which they practised, produced a situation in which the 
peans were operating with a "clean slate" as it were. Unlike 
r colonized areas, e.g. India, they did not iave to build on 
indestructible indigenous bases or preserve extensively, 
indigenous forms of economy for their own use. s Sidney Mintz 
observed: 
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"The Caribbean colonies were not European 
imperial possessions erected upon massive 
indigenous bases in areas of declining great 
literate civilizations, as was true in India 
and Indonesia, they were not mere ports of 
trade, ike Macao or Shanghai, where ancestral 
cultural hinterlands cou].d remain surprisingly 
unaffected ... they were not 'tribal' mosaics, 
within which European colonizers carried on their 
exploitation . .. they were in fact, the oldest 
'industrial' colonies of the West outside Europe, 
manned entirely with introduced populations, 
and fitted to European needs with peculiar 
intensity and permissiveness", 2/ 
The system of production that was installed, was frou the outset 
oriented almost exclusively towards serving the needs of European 
expansion and development and the factor which made this possible 
was ultimately Europe's decimation of the indigenous peoples of 
the region and the removal of their culture. 
ii) Because the original peoples were nearly all klled off, 
production and development within the region depended almost 
xclusively on labour imported into the region. Thus Europeans 
DIll the North and South, Africans and Asians were to form 
c ntually the bulk of the labour force. Initially, it was 
e pected that Europeans would settle the area and those fleeing 
religiou and political persecution in Europe made up the bulk 
of the work force, along with the surviving Amerindian inhabitants. 
As it bebame obvious, however, that these numbers were too few 
for the rapidly growing enterprise of producing and exporting 
tropical staples to Europe, other sources of -labour were resorted 
to. Here the Portuguese exploration and conquest of the West 
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African coastline which staited as early as 1415 waatobe of 
immense strategic significance, as it formed the basis for the 
slave trade as a solution to the lebour shortages. The 
combin- 
ation of an immigrant labour force nd enforced labour were 
therefore among the most distinctive :atures of the early 
organization of Caribbean economy. ihib meant that although the 
processes of penetration and development ufthe region were first 
fuelled by the development of a capitalist ii entum in Europe, 
(and that later this.vaS t become a mutually elf inforcing 
sequence as the Caribbean made further capitalist elopment 
in Europe possible), the line of development pursued in 
the 
Caribbean was different from that of uropein one of its most 
fundamental essentials, i.e., the character and organization 
of the work force. This feature was later to be of immense 
significancé to the evolution of contemporary Caribbean economy. 
1) The Caribbean was not, and indeed could ot have been 
quered and settled in one go. In some instances centuries 
e to elapse before a colonial power could guarantee 
ective possession of a territory against the ambitions of 
rai colonial powers. This consideration, together with the 
niturally drawn out processes of physical exploration and 
acquisition, helped to generate within the region. a sense of a 
continuously moving frontier. Thus the Spanish used the discovery 
of the islands as initial points of plunder and exchange, then 
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later reserved these as areas of protection of its sea lanes as 
the frontiers of its colonization moved to the mainland. Each 
new territory before it was exhausted seiued inexhaustible in 
its riches and this view reinforced a speculative outlook on 
Caribbean ventures. However, because the gains of conquest were 
held to be high, it fostered intense rivalries and wars among 
the European powers. All these developments combined to produce 
significant effects on the early development of the region's 
economy, but one that has been of long run importance is that 
they have proauced an uneven character in the region's development. 
Vriations in geographical position, resources, size and sometimes 
the sheer accidents of history in a region seen as a moving 
frontier alone would have ensured this. This charabter of the 
region's uneven development was, however, compounded by the 
historically observed tendencies of capitalism as aieconomic and 
social system to grow unevenly through time and space. 
i' During the early periods of colonisation, the situation 
c insecurity of economic ventures in the region, combined with 
the remarkable swings in the fortunes of individual territories 
which accompanied this, was further complicated by the exceptional 
degree of physical terrorization which characterized day to day 
living in the Caribbean right up to the end of the 17th century. 
For most of this period the buccaneers operated as serious 
predators, preventing the consolidation of settled forms of 
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economic life. Thus Parry and Sherlock 
report that during the 
six years of Morgan's ascendancy (1655-1661), 
as many as 18 
cities, towns and nearly 0 villages 
were sacked; several more 
than once. This estimate does 
not include English expeditions 
after 1670, nor French pillaging. 
It was not until the end 
of the 17th century that such activities 
were more or less 
brought under control, and without 
this settld forms of economic 
enterprise could not have become triumphant. 
y) The social cleavages 
inherent in enforced labcur and 
a system of different racial 
groups enjoying unequal access to 
society's wealth and power combined 
withthe shifting fortunes 
of the territories and made it 
impossible to forge societies 
with common concensual values. 
Inevitably, therefore an extra- 
ordinary role carne to be played by 
force, terror, fear, fraud 
and idelogy in shaping the r'egioii. 
Authoritarianism was 
essential to those in control, 
and along with this attempts to 
sow the systematic internalization 
within the majority of the 
population of beliefs, values, and 
ideas which rationalized 
their continued sbserVency and dependency. 
In opposition to 
this, oppressed groups developed 
attitudes of unremitting 
resistance to servitude. 
Insurrections ad revolts occurred 
almost on a continuous basis, 
thereby forcing the considerable 
iversiOfl of resources into 
the development of local militas , as 
well as the back-up forces of 
the colonial military machines. 
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vi) The development of early capitalism 
in Europe and the 
drive to create a world market in the 16th and 17th 
centuries 
would not have resulted in the successes which 
occurred if 
developments in science and technology did not 
match the aspirations 
of the European merchants and monarchs. Improvements 
in nautical 
technology (maps, compasses, quadrants, ships, 
etc) were necessary 
for the explorations of the West African coastline 
to take place 
and the later crossing of the Atlantic and the 
slave trade. 
To establish and sustain their domination 
the Europeanshad a 
comparatively well developed armflent3 industry 
and systems of 
logistical support. Similarly improvements in medical 
technology 
were essential to the success of transporting 
slaves in the 
millions as was done under the inhumanly cramped 
conditions of 
the typical slave ship, without the regular 
decimation of slaves 
and crew from disease. Although mortality 
ratios were s high 
as 3 in 10 in the Atlantic crossing, 
because slaves were 
packed in holds where they had less living space 
than a typical 
coffin, the survival rate was an achievement only 
possible 
because of advances in medical sciences. Similarly, 
the high 
mortality rate on the plantations (as much as 
one-third in three 
years) should-not obscure the advances in the 
medical sciences, 
without which the situation would have been far worse. 
If the early development of European science and 
technology was central to the conquest of the 
region, their 
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subsequent evolution was also central to shaping the fortunes 
of the area. Thus the fortunes of ports like St. Thomas and 
Castries, St. Lucia, which depended on their terminal roles 
in the Atlantic trade where the mode of travel depended on coal, 
ended when this was later replaced by oil. Similarly the number 
of quick fortunes reaped in Barbados and the Bahamas was much 
reduced when shipwrecks became less frequent as advances in 
navigation and metereology were achieved. Perhaps of greatest 
importance is the fact that few of the region's indigeneous 
plants and domesticates were initially developed to a level 
where they cûuld feed the growing populations. Without develop- 
ments in the agricultural and animal sciences the sLcessful 
transference of new plants and domesticates into the region would 
not have been possible. As we shall see, however, because the 
scientific and technological efforts were from the outset directed 
towards substituting indigenous plaflts and domesticateswith 
imported material, this has had a tremendous effect on shaping 
the subsequent course of scientific and technological change in 
the region. Thus by the 16th century the sugar cane plant (an 
import into the region) had become the most profitable agricultural 
.activity of plantations in Santa Domingo (Hispamola), Puerto 
Rico and Jamaica (then a Spanish possession), and is production 
was geared towards export to Europe. 
vii) Because the territories were all colonies of one or 
other imperial power, positions taken by the imperial state were 
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important to the fortunes of the individual territories. 
Each imperial state sought to protect the interests of its 
ruling class in Europe and therefore promoted the development 
of the territories in so far as this contributed to it. To 
ensure that the contributions were positive a number of devices 
were put in place by various imperial states to ensure that the 
benefits of colonization were kept to itself; hence the infamous 
Navigation Acts of Britain in the 16th century. The intense rivalry over 
colcnial possessions inevitably produced a remarkable succession 
of wars. The initial Spanish monopoly of colonies was challenged 
early by Portugual and the Pope's effort through a series of 
Papal Bulls to arbitrate between two colonizing Catholic powers 
was of little real effect. Later, other less developed powers 
were to challenge both Spain and Protugual in the region. 
Despite these developments, however, by the end of the 6th century 
the Spanish monopoly remained by and large intac1, with the only 
fully settled colonies in the West Indies being Spanish. It 
therefore took more than a century for its monopoly position to 
seriously disintegrate. 
It as because practically every European nation 
fought for and controlled territory in the Caribbean including 
such lesser powers as Denmark which held the Virgin Islands 
until 1917 and Sweden, St. Barthelemy up to 1877 that the process 
of balkanization referred to in the introduction was set in tran. 
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This tended to breed a certain insularity in the outlook of 
the territories which was reinforced by the fact that the 
developed communication of the time was by sea and this focussed 
on linking the imperial center to its own island possessions with 
little consideration of inter-territorial links in the area. 
The inter-island commerce and brade using canoes which was 
practised by the original inhabitants of the area was swept 
aside to meet the demands of European conquest of territory 
abroad. The in3ecuiy which flowed from continuous European 
rivalry and war with each other also meant thLt in each local 
territory the inhabitants could not be sure which power would 
be in control and for how long and also what reribution would 
follow when a terriitory changed hands. Nevertheless, the 
practice was that each colonial power sought to promote its own 
cultire in its possession, if only as a means of cementing ties 
with the mother country. Thus the promotion of Barbados as 
Little England, Martinique as the French Antillean jewel, and 
Cuba and Puerto Ricb as the pride of the Philip 1± of Spain. 
viii) If the imperial state fought to protect its own interests 
in the region, the colonial states which arose during this perio& 
mediated these interests to they local population. Dspite the 
apparent anarchism and lawlessness of the period of conquest and 
plunder, the colonizing forces had sought early to establish 
various forms of governmental authorities. Thus early in the 
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16th century territories like Jamaica (1509), Cuba (1511) 
and Puerto Rico (1512) boasted the rudimentary forms of Spanish 
town government - the cabildo. The striking feature of the 
states of this period was the naked way in which they sought 
to promote the interests of the imperial power and the dominant 
local class of planters and colonists. To ensure this, the vast 
majority of the population had to be dispossessed of all claims 
to exercise governmental authority. The colonial state therefore 
played a vital role in cementing the economic realities of the 
time. Later, some of these local states ran into conflict with 
the imperial state as they sought to represent more and more 
the interests of the local ruling class. This was in many instances 
to give way to open revolt and secession from Empire (the united 
States), and to fuel the struggles for liberation from Europe 
(Spanish America). 
ix) The period covered by this section has usually been 
described as the commercial phase of capitalist development in 
Europe. This is because of its emphasis on market expansion, 
the simple exchange of commodities already produced, and the 
seizure of treasure and surplus produce from others. In this 
phase the Caribbean had undoubtedly played an important role 
as a source of primitive accumulation for the expansion and 
deepening of capitalist development in Europe. The changes 
forced upon the New World were so profound (the decimation of 
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the people and the destruction of 
their culture, the continued, 
if not systematic loss of precious 
metals and tropical produce 
to Europe, the creation of white 
settler colonies mainly in North 
America, the conversion of territory 
into trading posts and 
ports in order to facilitate European 
appropriation, and the early 
growth of the slave trade and slavery 
as the white zettlers and 
indigenous inhabitants proved to 
be too few)that external factors 
seemed to be the overriding consideration 
in the development of 
the area. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that the more 
local settlement was consolidated 
and the local populations began 
to grow, the more factors internal 
to the territories of the 
region began to play imprtaflt roles 
in their evolution. 
the conquest and early settlement 
of the region can therefore be 
said to represent the first primary 
moment in the evolution of 
the Caribbean as a region, then 
the process should not be inter- 
preted pne-sidedly as it is sometime5 
done. It must be seen as 
a continuouS situation of the 
dynamic interaction of both external 
and internal factors. The internal 
forms of economic exploitation 
and domination of the region have 
from the inception been in 
substance exceedingly complex, 
despite their simple appearances. 
While as these societies expanded 
economic factors manifested 
themselves, they invarisbly 
occurred in an exceptionally fluid 
manner. Additionally, the potent 
admixtures of class and non- 
class factors which have shaped 
the development of the region 
particUl3.r]Y race and religion, 
have made the social understanding 
of these societies very difficult 
indeed. Thus the well 
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known Protestant/Catholic struggles 
of the time were to combine with the struggles of the slaves 
to 
preserve their ancestral religious survivals, to give a 
complex configuration to religious issues in the region. 
Similarly, the ideologies of racism which were developed to 
justify the economic enterprise of capitalism and slavery 
in the 
Caribbean became so deeply interwoven into the fabric of the 
society, that they were to take on a life of their own, often 
times in apparent direct contradiction to the pursuit 
of the 
economic interests of the ruling group. 
II: Colonial Settlement Slavery and the Rise 
of the Plantation 
While the period covied in the previous section 
coincided with the commercial phase of capitalist development 
in Europe, the period of this section (from the middle of 
the 
17th century to the early 19th century) covers 
the industrial 
revolution in Europe which saw capitalism advance to a new 
stage. Inevitably, this development produced new demands on 
the enterprise of empire building. Thus within the Caribbean 
this period witnessed the transformation of land and 
property 
relations from the communal/tribal structures of the indigenous 
inhabitants to one predominantly based on private ownership. 
This development created the legal basis for the emergence 
of 
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plantation agriculture as the major form of activity in the 
region. At the same time, the commercial basis for this develop- 
ment derived from the links these territories had to the rapidly 
growing industrial needs of Europe. The crucial resource bottle- 
neck was of course a more reliable and abundantly available labour 
force than that which characterized the earlier period, and it 
was out of the pressures created by this that slavery and the slave 
trade developed to the mind-boggling proportions they did. Since 
plantation agriculture was a commercial enterprise in which 
systematic production (and the reproduction of the conditions 
for further production) of products for export took place, it 
created the basis for the introduction and widespread use ¿f 
money in the region, both as a means of exchange and as a storJ 
of value. However, because the pre-colonized societies had 
no developed commercial activity and industry (sInce productive 
activity centered heavily on subsistence economy based on the 
production of corn, potatoes and bread, with some tobacco, cotton 
and tropical fruits, and no domestic animals), the curtailment 
of output by native producers to give way to commercial forms 
of agriculture did not assume the same proportions as in other 
colonized areas. 
In this period also, unlike the previous, the Dutch 
and later the English were the most important colonizing powers. 
The commercial agriculture which they established was initially 
based on a succession of tropical staples, with sugar eventually 
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assuming dominance in the English and French territories by 
about the middle of the 17th century. In the Spanish Caribbean, 
however, other products remained important: tobacco, cotton, 
cocoa, spices, dyes, meats and hides. Everywhere, however, 
production was principally based on forced labour. The pace 
of this development was fastest in the British territories where 
the isiands were of greater importance than 
the 
mainland possessions. 
The phenomenon of slavery in this period is perhaps 
sufficiently familiar that there is no need in a work such as 
this to elaborate on details. The main features which I would 
like to stress from the point of view of the purposes of the 
text are the following. First, the sheer scale of the operation 
should be fully recognised. The slave trade lasted for nearly 
four centuries, and although estimates vary, it involved the 
movement of no less than 13-15 million people to the Caribbean 
and North America. This colossal movement was an enterprise 
borne principally by four of the European countries: Britain, 
France, Holland and Portugual, all of which held slaving bases 
in West Africa. The object of these bases wast secure a 
monopoly of slaves, both for their own possessions and for sale 
to the Spaniards. The dave tradewas based on a triangular 
movement of people and products with a cycle of about one year. 
Thus slaves would leave Europe with "trade goods" (textiles, 
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weapons, tools pots, pans, trinkets etc) and take about four 
months to reach West Africa, where slaves were acquired in 
exchange for the "trade goods". As quick a journey as was 
possible would then be made along the infamous Middle Passage 
to the islands. Several weeks would be spent in the Caribbean 
selling slaves, resting and recuperating as well as acquiring 
cargoes of sugar, hides, tobacco, cotton, etc for taking back 
to Europe. 
As Eric Williams has pointed out: 
"The siave trade kept the wheels of metiopoliiiian 
industry turning; it stimulated navigation and 
shipbuilding and employed seamen; it raised 
fishing villages into flourishing cities; it 
gave sustenance to new industries 1ased on the 
processing of colonial raw materials; it yielded 
large profits which were ploughed back into 
metropolitan industy; and, finally, it gave 
rise to ah unpecedential commerce in the West 
Indies and made the Caribbean territories among 
the most valuable colonies the world has ever 
known". / 
As an example as he points out that for the period 17114 - 1773 
it has been calculated that one-fifth of Britain's imports came 
from the British West Indies and these territories absorbed one- 
sixteenth of its total exports. The triangular trade accounted 
for 21% of Britain's imports, 8% of its expo'ts, and ik% of 
its total external trade. Indeed no less a source than a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry has pointed out that: 
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"In the eighteenth century indeed the owner- 
ship of sugar estates in the West Indies was 
the main foundation of the fortunes of many 
wealthy British families. West Indian Colonies 
were regarded by the state-craft of the day as 
an asset of the first importance; hence the 
prominent part played by expeditions to the 
Caribbean in the naval warfare between France 
and Britain". 5/ 
Settlement when it did develop was widely organized around 
the 
tropical plantation. This has led many scholars of the region 
to see as key to understanding it, an appreciation of the internal 
structure and dynamics of the plantation. Today the phrase 
plantation economy or plantation society is still widely used 
as ashorthand description of West Indian society. While 
acknowledging the importance of the plantation, it is neverthe- 
less important that we do not misrepresent its significance. 
Since this issue is key to later interpretations of the region's 
history, I shall devote the remainder of this section to a 
discussion of this topic. 
It is important at the outset that we recognize that 
seyeral factors led to thé choice of the tropical plantation 
as the vehicle of sugar cultivation. First, costly overheads 
were 
required to produce sugar commercially in the Caribbean. The 
land had to be prepared, water control systems had to be set in 
place, factories had to be established near the fields as the 
loss of sucrose in the sugar cane plant is rapid once It Is cut 
and transportation facilities for moving the sugar cane plant 
35. 
after reaping to the factory, and the sugar from the factory 
to the point of export had to be acquired. Second, outlays 
in 
the acquiring control of the technology of the sugar production 
process had to be undertaken. Cultivation of the sugar cane 
plant and its ratoon system required careful knowledge of the 
plant, soil types, etc. Extraction of the sugar also required 
fairly elaborate processes from rnillng and crushing, 
through 
clarification, filtering, crystallization, etc, to drying, bagging 
and weighing. Third, because these outlays were costly the 
scale of operations had to be large to be profitable. ihis in 
turn required investments in slaves, livestock and food supplies 
to feed all persons on the plantations, buildings to 
house them, 
associated agricultural implements and machinery etc. Fourth, 
operation on a large scale was possible only because sugar 
was 
produced for sale to the rapidly expar'ding markets of Europe, 
so that the industry was from the outset exclusively 
export ori- 
ented. Fifth, this large scale operation permitted the 
eploitatior 
of certain economies of scale: land utilisation, access 
to credit, 
better bargaining position on freight and shipping costs for 
sugar exports as well as imported inputs, and so on. 
Because of the scale of operation and the fact that 
sugar required a large proportion of relatively unsJ>illed 
labo.ir 
under the close supervision of a small skilled labour 
force, 
the attraction to slavery referred to earlier as a 
solution of 
the work force problem was obvious. The planters pursued 
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the production of sugar with single minded fervour and in the 
process in many territories they consolidated a mono-crop 
agricultural export economy. Because sal.3 were taking place 
in overseas markets, some form of control over these markets was 
always implicit to the arrangement. In practice this frequently 
took the form of a colonial preference given by the colonizing 
power to the produce o its own colonies. This practice conformed 
to the mercantilist view of trade and external economic relations 
among countries. 
It would be an error to deduce from these considerations, 
however, that the plantationTS true significance to the region at 
the time lay in the fact that it could, and did provide the 
large amount of skill, technology and capital outlay required 
for a commercial agriculture. What is of deeper significance is 
the fact that the plantation was itself a capitalist institution. 
T'iis was expressed in its internal structure as well as in its 
dependence, as an institution, on the development of capitalism 
on a world scale. In the latter regard, it is important to 
remember that it was the development of capitalism in Europe 
which created a large work force divorced from agriculture which 
was to constitute the mass consumption outlet, and hence market 
for the profitable disposal of large scale sugar production. 
It was also the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few in 
Europe in which created the possibilities of large amounts of 
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surplus available for ovrseas investment in both the capture 
and use of slaves and the provision of the physical inputs 
required for large scale sugar cane cultivation, processing and 
distribution. It was the development of industry, science and 
technology in Europe which created a market for the smaller, 
but increasingly significant indutrial uses of sugar, while 
this same development also made possible the production of inputs 
of equipment, machinery and raw materials needed in sugar pro- 
duction. Finally, it Europe's industrial base which pro- 
gressively made possible the systematic developnieiit and application 
of science and technology in the search for "cheaper" ways to 
produce tropical staples. 
While the process of capitalist transformation on a 
world scale and its impact on the region were the dominant factors 
in consolidating the institutional forms of the plantation, the 
plantation in itself, did not constitute a separate and historic- 
ally distinct 'mode of production'. It did not grow out of either 
the communal or slave forms of production which preceded it, nor 
was it derived from feudal origins in Europe. The plantation was 
no more and no less than the institutionalization of the dominant 
form of production. It was in other words the basic producing 
unit, and as such it was one socio-economic form of the period, 
and like others, e.g. the state, it has existed both during 
slavery and after - albeit with important changes in its 
characteristics. 
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The distinction made here is not purely sematic. To 
define Caribbean economy as a plantation economy because of the 
dominance of the plantation as the producing mit for sugar 
would be to leave the analysis at a primarily institutional 
level. To understand the essential mode of producing the 
means 
of livelihood in society we need to know more than the 
institutional form of .production. Thus no one would 
think today 
of equating capitalism simply with the joint-stock company 
or 
the trans-national corporation. If to do so would be method- 
ologically incorrect, so too would be to restrict the definition 
of Qaribbean society to the plantation, even at that time. 
Elsewhere I have argued that a more accurate specifi- 
cation of the region at this time would be to define it 
as a 
't colonial slave mode of production". Two sets of reasons 
support this description. "First, despite the existence 
of 
a small number of petty commodity producers, and 
the survival 
of a natural economy among the indigenous kmerindian 
inhabitants, 
slave labour was the legal and customary status of the 
over- 
whelming majority of direct producers". This status, allows. 
for what can be described as an "extra-economic" appropriation 
of the surplus. That is the appropriation of the produce 
of 
the diréct producers did not inhere to the workings 
of a market 
economy. Thus although commodities were produced for sale 
on 
the market, labour itself was not a commodity, in that 
it was not 
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normally bought and sold. In this sense the status of the 
direct producers of wealth was distinctly different than in a 
capitalist economy. The second set of reasons is 
the process 
of colonization itself. This process mediated the ways in 
which 
capitalism in Europe impacted itself on the region, and 
produced 
distintive forms. Thus while the plantations were profit- 
producing enterprises, the manner of acquisition of profits and 
its use was subject to colonial influences. So we find that 
in 
spite of the heavy overheads in plantation agriculture which 
should orient the owners towards long term gains, the planters' 
outlook was essentially speculative and short-term. Frequently 
also the profits obtained were "consumed" in the purchase of 
peerages, estates and other forms of conspicuous consumption in 
Europe. Profits therefore did not constitute the same "driving 
force of self-expanding value", which is the chief characteristic 
of capitalism. Similar tendencies are found in the ways in 
which 
science and technology were utilized and the forms of expansion. 
Generally extensive rather than intensive methods were preferred 
and this was rational because the extra-economic appropriation 
of the surplus diluted the economic impact of payments to the 
direct producers on costs and profits. It is in the combination 
of forced labour (slavery) and colonization as an all prevading 
process that e therefore find the key to the determination of 
the mode of production at that time. Hence the description 
"colonial slave mode of production". 
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If the distinction between the plantation and the 
determination of the prevailing mode of production I have tried 
to raise is appreciated, we can then conclude this section with 
some further comments on the plantation, qua institution, as this 
would aid our understanding of points developed later in the text. 
It is importantÍnterpretiñg. the role of the plantation in this 
period against the background of a dominant colonial slave mode 
of production, that certain features of this institution be kept 
to the forefront. First, it has to be placed at all times i thé 
larger context of the colonization process, where it can be seen 
to be concretely expressed in two forms. One was the link already 
referred to, of the mass consumption requirements of sugar being 
sdtisfied by the European masses and the other was the simultanous 
integration of the local planter class into the merchant classes 
and later the emerging industrial bourgeoisie.of Europe. As we 
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shall see, it was out of this link that grew the basis for the 
modern forms of dependency which prevail today. Second, this 
integration with Europe was aided by, and reflected in, the 
direct colonial administration of territories in the region. 
This in turn had two further aspects of note. One was that the 
high degiee of centralization of political authority associated 
with colonial rule, was mirrored in the political power of the 
planter class which came to dominate these economies. Indeed, 
in the West Indies, one may argue that right up to the mass 
movements for national independence which began in the 1950's 
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the plantocracy exercised a dominance over the control of the - 
local state machinery. The other aspect of note is that the 
export trade of sugar was highly dependent on economic policies 
in Europe. As indicated before, in the early mercantilist 
phase an elaborate system of colonial preference was administered 
to protect the interests of the planter class. But later, as 
Europe industrialized, and the industrial capitalists of Britain 
rose into world prominence, they clamoured for free trade. 
The result was eventually a Sugar Act passed in i846 which led 
co the eventual abolition of preferences. The whole movement 
away from mercantilist policies to free trade created severe 
crfses in the region, forcing alterations in major aspects of 
plantation activity. In the process, however, the vulnerability 
of local sugar interests to the dominant tendencies in the 
International economic system was exposed. A vulnerability 
which remains as marked today. 
A third feature is that sugar cane cultivation where 
it took hold, was pursued to the virtual exclusion of all other 
productive activities, with the result that many of these 
territories developed overspecialized mono-cultural cropping 
systems. The demands of sugar cane production brooked no 
alternatives. Thus even in extremely marginal areas such as the 
growth of perennial fruit trees, these were not permitted even 
though they could be left unattended and utilize estate lands 
which would otherwise have been idle. Whatever the rationalization 
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offered, the planters felt committed to the single-minded pur- 
suit to the activity of sugar-cane cultivation and processing. 
Thus such flimsy excuses were offered as: 
"The absence of trees upon the 'dams', or 
walks, and particularly in the extensive 
frontlands, is attributable to the fact 
that the slaves systematically robbed the 
original mango and other fruit trees, which 
were in consequence abolished by the planters". 8/ 
Fourth, the labour force in the plant ition at that time was 
highly stratified. Dominated by capital, a sharp distinction 
between owner-supervisor and worker existed. The former through 
control of capital virtually monopólised political, economic 
and social authority. The latter was, at worst a slave, and 
at best a "freed" labourer in a system where the tradition of 
authoritarianism and coinmandist social relations was long and 
all pervasive. This system of sharp and rigid class different- 
iation wa also integrated into a system of sharp and rigid 
racial differentiation, accompanied by the physical separation 
of the various ethnic groups. The slaves were initially all 
African and the supervisors European. It was not until after 
emancipation, that oth;r racial groups were dded in large 
numbers to the work force. 
Fifth, ideology and culture have played important 
roles in rationalizing the obvious defects of the system. Thus 
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to take the most dramatic examples: "white supremacy" as an 
ideology developed to justify putting men into bondage and to 
sustain the structures of inequality in the plantation. The 
dispossessed classes also created elaborate social mechanisms 
to cope with this reality, including in some cases r"flight 
from reality". Thus to explain the present day paradox of 
selective labour shortage on the estates, in economies with 
substantial unemployment Patterson offers the following viewpoint 
of the social structure of the Caribbean sugar economy: 
"Do we ask the Jew to live and work in the 
concentration camps in. Germany? Do we ask 
a recently released prisoner who has been 
unjustly imprisoned for the better part of 
his life to continue living in his cell? 
Do we expect him to like it? Is it not 
natural for him to loathe it and despise. 
it? Why then is it that when the ex-slaves 
and their descendants express an abhorrence 
for the siigar e3tate we do not accept the 
obvious explanation?" 9/ 
Sixth, the physical hardship of sugar cultivation combined with 
the high incidence of malnutrition and debilitating disease 
associated with the poverty of the rural population cannot be 
overstated as aspects of plantation life. Cane cultivation was 
s 
so arduóus that Adamson noted that in Guyana: 
"A disturbing reflection Ofl the exhausting 
conditions of field labour emerges from 
a 
report that an attempt was made to use 
horses for plowing, but it was found that 
they had a short life span and could 
only 
work a few hours per day" çj/ 
The final feature of the plantation 
to note here is its general 
pattern of accumulation and resource 
use. To develop the point 
made earlier, althoUgh heavy investments 
in overheads for water 
control systems and slaves were required, 
the outlook of the 
early planters was largely speculative. 
Instead of the "normal" 
association of a small, but steady 
yield on long term infra- 
structural investments for agricultural 
production, the planter 
always looked forward to the big 
bonanza whei. prices sky 
rocketed. The object here was to 
make a "killing" which would 
then compensate for the leaner 
intervening years. As we shall 
see more clearly in the next 
section this approach to investment 
had three important components 
to it. First it emphasized the 
extensive exploitation of labour. 
Instead of seeking to raise 
productiVitY per man hour the emphasis 
was on acquiring more 
labourers. Slavery and later 
indentured immigration made this 
possible. Second, the land was 
also exploited extensively. 
,ExpansiOfl of new acreage rather 
than new methods and better 
farming practices accounted for 
most of the increase in output 
'right up to the Second World 
War. Thirdly, this extensive use 
of land and capital was reflected 
in the relatively low level 
of development and application 
of technology. 
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The ownership structure of the plantation reflected 
some of these tendencies referred to. Thus instead of a 
settled resident farming population, by th. end of the period 
under consideration an absentee landlord structure dominated the 
industry in the West Indies. These overseas owners relied on 
managerial staff exported from Europe on periods of contract to 
run the estates. The owners themselves later developed other 
interests connected directly or indirectly with sugar, e.g. 
shipping, procurement of supplies etc, and these cflnections were 
to provide eventually, as we shall see, the basis for the diversi- 
cati'n of plantation activity at the expense of the region. 
Eventually, the resident owners in Europe were to be closely 
linked to the development of capitalism. This development, 
however, occurred after the period under consider.ion here. 
The colonial slave mode of production which became 
fuUy formed during this period was essentially the product of 
the impact of colonialism on the Caribbean. It took root in 
the specific conditions of geographic environment and cultural 
adaptation to a new world of African slaves and European slave 
master locked in deadly antagonism with each other. In practice 
this produced an orientation of these economies towards serving 
the cpital expansion requirements of Europe. This orientation 
prevented the development of an internal momentum strong enough 
to ensure that the surpluses produced in the region were ploughed 
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back into the region. One of the central features of the modern 
character of dependency therefore emerged during this period, 
that is the region's resource ownership and use led 
to the 
production of commodities (sugar and tropical staples) 
which 
were not consumed at home and the importation of products con- 
sumed at home (clothing, food, housing etc). This systemic 
divorce between consumption and production was reinforced by 
the systemic divorce between the consumption of products 
and 
the basic needs of the broad mass of the population. In this 
context the scope for indigenous technolocal development was 
non-existent as neither social pressures (satisfaction 
of 
domestic needs) nor material pressures (reflected in the alien 
ownershiP and direction of resource utilization) were enough 
to generate the "necessity" for domezic invention. Consequently, 
the true resource structures of the region remained largely 
unknown, as the rhythm of discover and use of these resources 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSITION: FROM COLONIAL SLAVE 
ECONOMY TO CENTRE - PERIPHERY RELATIONS 
In this chapter we consider in outline the circum- 
stances related to the two fundamental transformations 
which have 
occurred in the recorded history of Caribbean economy. 
The first 
is associated with the process of disintegration 
of the colonial 
slave economy and the spread of independence movements, 
parti- 
cularly in the Spanish Possessions. This process 
started early 
in the 19th century with the abolition of the slave 
trade and 
later led to the abolition of slave'y beginning 
with the British 
territories in the 1830Ts. Concurrently, following 
on the 
successful war of independence in thc USA, a wave of 
independence 
movements developed in the Spanish possessiOns : Argentina 
(1816), 
Colombia (1819), Peru, Mexico an( Venezuela (1821). 
By then 
Haiti (18014) had already succeeded in declaring 
itself indepen- 
dent of France. The second transformation took 
place during 
the 20th century in the period leading up to World War 
II. 
During this period the capitalist worlcT system matured 
and the 
roots of what has become known as modern imperialism 
were firmly 
implanted. Within the Caribbean, the economies took 
on more and 
more the classic configurations of underdeveloPment an 
its 
associated dependency. While the roots ofthis development 
originated with the first European encounters 
with the region, 
the period under consideration here forms a watershed 
between 
the old colonial forms of economic domination and 
the neo- 
colonial forms which prevail today. 
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I: Collapse of the Colonial Slave Economy 
and the 
Rise of the Peasantry 
In 1803 Denmark halted the slave trade, to be followed 
by Britain in 1807, France in 1817, Holland i8i8 and Sweden 18214. 
Slavery was abolished in the British colonies 
in 1833, Sweden 
in 18146, France in 18148, Holland in 1863, Puerto Rico 
in 1873, 
and Cuba in 1880. Whij-e much controversy surrounds 
the causes 
of these events, one factor stands out indisputably, 
and that 
is, if it can be argued that the slave 
trade and slave production 
in the Caribbean contributed sutantia1ly to 
the formation of 
capital in Europe thereby helping greatly 
to finance the 
industrial revolution, then the rise of industrial 
captialism 
in Europe in turn served to undermi-ne 
the advantages of slavery 
as a system of economic organization. 
The point advanced here 
is not intended to suggest that external 
factors, either alone, 
or princiaPllY, accounted forthe collapse of 
slavery. Tothe 
contrary, the position I adopt is that the 
limitations internal 
to the colonial slave mode of production 
dynamically interacted 
with external factors at all phases of 
its existence, and in 
particular in the period culminating 
with its final disintegration. 
The internal limitations of the slave based system 
of 
production in the Caribbean were many 
sided. Despite their 
insertion into a rapidly evolving capitalist 
world system, we 
have already pointed out in the -previous 
chapter that the 
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planters approach to their enterprises was largely pre-caPitalist. 
Increased production for them was an extensive activity, 
that is, 
acquiring more land, more slaves, inre equipment, 
machinery, 
buildings, etc with little attention paid to improved 
productivity 
of either the individual or the combined factors 
engaged in 
production. The method of extensive cultivation led 
to loss in 
overall soil fertility, and reduced yields as more arid 
more 
marginal lands were brought into production as output 
increases 
were sought. More intensive use of existing land 
through 
improved cultivation practices and better varieuies of 
plant 
were more or less treated as secondary avenues of 
productive 
increases. This approach set in train a continuously 
desperate 
search for newer and larger territories to colonize, 
thereby 
raising the costs of colonial enterprise. Furthermóre, 
although 
sugar production was a scientificäll7j based activity, 
the 
speculative, consumption oriented approach of the 
pianters of 
the period did not meet the requirements of 
careful attention 
to research and development or even the early application 
of 
technological innovations and advances developed 
elsewhere. 
0i overriding importance, however, was the constant 
pressure on costs created by the struggles of the slaves 
to free 
themselves. After all the slaves accounted for 
the overwhelming 
bulk of the capital invested in the plantations. 
This situation 
forced the planters to carry military overheads to 
contain 
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populations in which slave numbers were growing 
much faster 
than they. Each revolt disrupted production, 
sometimes putting 
years of work into ruin. Additionally, sabotage, 
and with it 
indifference to their own levels of productivity 
was creating 
a situation in which slave output was not 
rising. At the same 
time the cost of maintaining slave labour was 
±ncTeasing, both 
on account of the need, to 'bribetT off possible 
agitation by 
giving more rations and because of demographic 
changes in the 
sla;e population (morechildrefl, more elderly, 
and more females). 
As FraginalS points out: 
"At first, the demographic structure of the 
slave-based plantations was eminently 
efficient: 70% male, and all slaves, male 
and female, between the ages of 1 and 
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that is, optimally productive. But when the 
plantations, as was inevitable., developed 
into a society, in spite of low fertility 
and high mortality rates the numerical im- 
balance between the sexes, tijan the pro- 
ductivity per slave fell, and the cost of 
his upkeep increased. Barbados offers a 
typical example: towards the end of the 18th 
century it was producing about the same amount 
of sugar as a hundred years before, but using 
almost twice as many slaves to do so. The 
same held true for Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, 
St. Kitts ...". 1/ 
Despite the uneven development of these 
tendencies, on the eve 
of emancipation, Caribbean sugar productivity 
was declining, 
with the exception of Cuba which had become 
the world's largest 
sugar producing area. Cheaper suppliers 
of cane sugar from 
India and Brazil and beet farmers in 
Europe were making serious 
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inroads into the traditional Caribbean markets. While the 
planters fought to protect their traditional markets, by then 
it was too late as external considerations no longer favoured 
slavery as a system of production. In the first instance the 
Caribbean was no longer as important to a rapidly inìdustrializing 
Europe of the 19th century, as it was in the 17th and i8th cen- 
turies. Secondly, th development of industry, particularly 
in Britain, led to the rise in prominence of interests which 
favoured free trade. With Britain able to out-compete the rest 
of the world, in manufactures, free trade and not the protect- 
ionist mercantilism of old was to its advantage. Even key sugar 
interests in Britain: shippers, refiners, important port cities 
like Liverpool, etc, were in favour of cheaper sugar imports 
and as such backed free trad against the continued subsidization 
of planter interests in the a:hean, ihich by that time had 
become necessary. 
At the political level three important developments 
were also taking place in Europe, and most noticeably in Britain. 
One of these was the transfer of political power from the landed 
aristocracy to the industrial bourgeoisie. The French Revolution, 
the reform bills in Britain, even the defeat of the South by the 
North in the U.S. Civil War, attest to this transformation. 
The second was the growth of the industrial prolelariat in 
Europe which produced new champions for the cause of democracy 
at home, and to a lesser extent abroad. Thus historians have 
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highlighted the role played by the industrial towns of Britain 
and France in the political agitation against slavery. Thus 
Eric Williams quotes Joseph Sturge the Quaker abolitionist as 
saying in 1833: Ttthe people must emancipate the slaves for the 
government never will". The third developmeiit was the 
humanitarian agitation for emancipation which affected much of 
the consciousness of the period. 
It was these factors, therefore, internal and external, 
socio-economic and pclitical, which interacted to break-up a 
Caribbean economy founded on colonial slavery. In the process 
of thse developments the foundations of 20th century Caribbean 
economy were clearly established. After the break-up of slavery 
the transition of these economies involved evera1 elements. The 
most important, however, were undoubtedly those associated with 
the birth of the Caribbean peasant'y, the p: í'essive growth of 
local labour markets, and the conversion of the planter class 
into an absentee proprietor group and later into a genuinely 
capitalist class. 
Immediately after the abolitioh of slavery in many 
territuries within the Caribbean region an important phase of 
rural development took place. This was reflected in the 
rapid growth of African villages as the movement 
of the freed slaves off the estates took place. Thus it is 
estimated that in Guyana where this village movement 
cations, 
generate enough 
forced to enter 
very plantations 
inforced by the 
inaccessibility of some areas, 
and so on, did not 
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and taxes and this could only 
be done if they participat"d in 
the cash economy. 
Despite the compensation paid by 
Britain at the time 
of abolition to the slaveowflers 
and not to the slaves, the 
immediate impact of this 
abolition was to plunge the plantation 
economy into deeper crisis. 
Induced by the shortages of labour 
on account of the slaves abandoning 
the sugar estates, waged 
levels rose. This pressure 
on costs was then combined with 
lower prices on sugar as the protectionist 
pricing system of the 
merCantilist period gave way to 
free trade. Thus Britain passed 
a Sugar Duties 
Act in i8'46 which brought an end 
to the protection 
has acquired much fame, the population 
of Africans in these 
villages was 16,000 in 18L12 and 
that six years later this had 
nearly trebeled to ,000 persons. 
The freed slaves there 
acquired lands through two main 
forms of tenure, namely, the 
communal purchase of land and individual 
proprietorships. 
peasant production, lacking adequate 
overheads and a marketing 
capacity to export suar successfully, 
developed largely as a 
system of agriculture based on 
the emerging domestic market. The 
small size of this market, 
however, combined with' poor comxnuni- 
income for producers. Consequently, 
peasants were 
into the labour market as wage 
earners on the 
they were freed from. This tehdency 
was re- 
fact that owning land meant the 
payment of rates 
which in the end 
transition. The 
of the peasantry 
changes in land holding policies, the 
planters 
the freed slaves access to land. 
Their direct 
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afforded the British West Indian SUi lanters in its domestic 
markets. Caught between the scisorc ci rising 
costs and 
declining prices two basic developments 
occurred within the 
planter class. One of these was the final 
elimination of the 
paternalist resident planters who 
still lived in the Caribbean. 
An absentee landlord class initially 
deveioped,but later this 
was to give way to the 'formation of 
the limitediiabilitY/jot 
stock companies as the main form of 
ownership of 'Caribbean 
plantations. The second was a process of land 
and capital conoii- 
dation. Thus again to take the 
example of Guyana, from having 
OO separate estates just after 
abolition, by i904 these had 
been reduced to L6, with the four 
largest of these controlling 
nearly 60 percent of the industry. 
The planters did not, however, accede 
to these 
economic changes readily. They 
resisted bitterly and used their 
control of the colonial state to 
pursue three lines of development 
served to considerably protract the period 
of 
first of these was to hinder the development 
Through various combinations of taxes and 
soug)it to deny 
onslaught on the 
communal land purchases where they 
occuri'ed led to the uneconomic 
fragmentation of peasant holdings 
which placed the peasants in 
an unequal relation to the plantation. 
Also of great significance 
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is the fact that it also fostered among the peasants an 
aggressive, and often irresponsible individualism. Where land 
was available and the planters could not sufficiently stem the 
flight of labour from the estates, they promoted a policy of 
indentured immigration as a substitute for slavery. The main 
period of this immigration into these territories was between 
1837 and 1917. Immigrants from Germany, Malta, Brazil, China, 
Madiera, Mauritus, Europe, Africa, other Caribbean territories, 
and India were sought and the last became the principal source. 
Thus in Guyana, between 1835 and 1918 there were 
341,491 immigrants of which 234,205 were East Indians. In total 
750,000 East Indians, mainly from the North-East of India, 
and to a lesser extent Madrae were brought to the region. In 
addition to those cited as going to Guyana, 144,C30 were brought 
to Trinidad-Tobago, 78,0C ti't. irench territories of Martinique 
and GuadelouPe, 36,000 to Jamaica and 34,000 to Suriname with 
amounts under 5,000 going to other territories: St. Lucia, 
Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Kitts. These immigrants were not 
surprisingly compelled by their contracts to work for longer 
hours and less pay than that which prevailed before their entry. 
What was worse, their legal conditions of servitude hampered the 
formation of working class associations. 
- The third line of defence of the planters was to use 
the state they controlled to initiate legislation to protect 
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their privileged control of land and labour. 
Thus laws were 
passed preventing the joint purchase of land, forcing 
the dis- 
bandonment of holdings in the communal ownership 
of 10 or more 
persons, as well as raising its price and minimum 
size of land 
to be sold. Laws were also passed to finance 
indentured 
immigration out of public funds. Moreover 
severe labour 
regulations were introduced in the region which progressively 
lii-ted the freedom of movement and association of 
the direct 
producers, particularly where indentured 
immigratiou existed. 
All these were of course designed to undermine 
the operations 
of a "free labour market" and protect their 
extra-economic means 
of appropriating the wealth of these societies. 
One of the immediate effects of' abolition w to 
f'orce 
the planters to write-off the bulk of t}eir 
capital (liv) 
It is therefore, not surprising that dung this period the first 
systematic efforts were made to intensify their 
usage of productive 
factors. Significant improvements were introduced 
in the machinery 
and techniques used on the plantations. In 
Cuba iron mills run 
by steam engines were already being used. 
Other improvements, 
noticeably in the factory and ;transport systems 
of the estates 
could also be found. The result was that the 
sugar industry took 
on a dual character, that is án increasingly 
mechanized system 
of sugar cane processing was combined with a 
comparatively back- 
ward system of sugar cane plant cultivation. 
This dichotony - 
was to survive well into the 
20th century and today remains a 
key constraint to the transformation 
of the agrarian system of 
the region and the ending of its 
underdeVelOPment. 
The 19th century did not, however, 
only witness the 
great struggles for the abolition of a 
slave based mode of 
production in the Caribbean. In 
many territories also it witnessed 
heroic struggles for their liberation 
from European domination. 
The liberation of Haiti in 18011 was 
the most complete victory 
for slave resistance to colonialism 
and slavery. In the Spanish 
territories which later became liberated, 
this factor, together 
with the resentment of the white 
colonials and settlers which 
outnumbered the slaves to their 
continued domination, convorged 
to produce an independence movement. 
The hirces of griev.nce 
pf the whie colonials were many. They reented 
the ec1uive 
control which the mother country 
sougiit u exercise as i1 served 
royal interests and draIned wealth from 
their territories to 
Europe. This they campaigned tirelessly 
against the monopoly 
of the slave trade which each 
colonial power imposed through 
various systems of licences and 
asientos, since they argued 
this kept up the price of slaves. 
Similarly, thoy felt that 
religicus limitations and decrees 
on their treatment of Indians 
hindered their scope for exploiting 
this source of labour. The 
restriction on the movement of 
non-slave foreigners from one 
territory to another also restricted 
their, access to skills and 
capital, while the various duties 
and levies imposed on them 
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to finance the Royal Exchequers were 
a source of grevioUs resent- 
ment. Out of all this a desire for 
greater political autonomy 
grew and as thé -arlier revolt of 
the American colonies showed 
this group constituted a powerful 
source of resistenCe to Europe. 
Such grievances and resentments were 
also felt by the white 
colonials in the British, French 
and Dutch territories, but 
there the fear of the black masses 
which far outnumbered them, 
was greater than their desire for independence, 
and so the 
logic of this conflict was not 
pursued to its final resolution. 
This was a task to be taken up by 
the mass movements which cime 
to be formed in the next period 
of our historical survey. 
II: Imperialism, Dependency an 
the Rise of th: 
Mass Movements 
The mar developrileiiU. which occurred in the r,'1bbean 
economies after the break-up of 
slavery (the rise c the kjeasantry, 
the early growth of a wage labour 
system, the transformation of 
the planter class, and the qualitative 
shift in the role of the 
colonial state in these territories) 
were themselves tu undergo 
such a dramatic transformation in 
the 20th century up to World 
War II, as to warrant the 
description of its being the second 
of the two fundamental transitions 
which have occurred in West 
Indian historY. The driving 
forces behind this development 
were also both external and internal. 
Externally, capitalism 
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as a worlu system had been transformed into a global system of 
imperialism. This came about because a new stage of capitalism 
had been reached in Europe, and in Britain in particular. Thus 
in Britain we find during this period that internally its industrial 
structure had become highly monopolistic in form, thereby creating 
the basis for the emergence of the post World War II oligopolistic 
transnational corporate structures which today dominate its 
economy. In this structure national capital more and more came 
to iew beir operations on a gloha] s1e. Its surplus 
peasantry was also almost entirely proletarianised. The growth 
of the industrial working class had led to the formation of well 
established worker rganisatio and trade unions. The tenacious 
hold of the landed gentry on the political system and the state 
was broken, as political power was during this period firmly placed 
in the hands of the economically domixianU financial and industrial 
bourgeoisie. In their external relatins, Britain ri the rest 
of Europe promoted a rapid growth of capital exports abroad, in 
order to finance the development and export of primary, agri- 
cultural and mineral produce overseas. Out of these developments 
overseas countries helped to produce food for the growiug working 
class of Europe, provide raw materials for its industry. and 
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opened up markets for its industrial exports. 
Not unexpectedly this development led to scramble for 
overseas possessions and set in train a new wave of colonisation. 
The effect was intense political and commercial rivalries which 
contributed to two world wars. 
Despite the scramble for new colonies, a fundamental 
shift had in fact occurred in the relation of Europe to empire. 
The primary emphasis was now on both direct and indirect control 
of foreign resources and markets. Traditional colonial control 
of territory was not a necessary condition for exploitation - 
even though where it existed this was a sufficient basi.s for 
expLoitation. Increasingly, trade, investment, technology, und 
finance operating through the "normal" mechanisms of the cap-italist 
world market were enough to create the basis for appropriation 
of surpluses abroad. Legally imposed sanctions of one form or 
another and the exaction of "national tribute" through direc,t 
political control were no longer the primary mechanms of global 
exploitation. It is because of these global developments that many 
have argued that the period witnessed th' clear emergence of a 
comparatively small group of countries at the "center" of the 
world capitalist system and another much larger group of countries 
comprising the "periphery", the former being the principal 
beneficiary of the operations of the system. This system as a 
whole responds to the rhythm of growth and development dictated 
by the course of accumulation the the "center countries". In 
contrast, the "periphery" is dependent on the system since its 
growth is largely a reflex of developments internationally. 
This dependent relation was not a political one in any formal 
sense. Both colonies of the British, French and Dutch in the 
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West Indies as w'l1 as the independent states such as Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic, functioned as integral elements of the 
periphery during this period. 
Internally, it became obvious to the ruling class of 
the region that the produ'tion system could not be sustained on 
variants of enforced labour and other forms of servitude. Thus 
with indenture finally ended in 1917, the planters, without 
abandonfliflg their efforts aimed at containing the growth of the 
ex-slaves as a socio-economic force, set tbout in a ijiore or less 
systematic manner to adapt the plantations to the new requirements 
of a "free" labour market. Crucial to this as their introduction 
of innovations and new techniques on a far wider scale than ever 
before. Thus in both field and factors, sugar produion wit- 
nessed many major changes: the use of fertilizers in the field, 
steam pumps were used for drainage and irrigation, the generalised 
use of steam power in the factories became the practice, evapo- 
rators, centrifugal driers for separating molasses from sugar, 
juice clarifiers, the use of chemists in the factory, as well 
as changes in the lay-out of cane fields were some cf the many 
innovations which became standard in this period. This recom- 
position of techniques reflected a more industril and capitalistic 
orientation to sugar production. Alongside of this, processes 
of concentration and centralization of land and capital in the 
industry continued. Acreages were expanded on each estate as 
economies of scale were sought and the smaller estates were 
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increasingly eliminated through sale and purchase. 
In many 
instances private planter ownership was transferred into a 
corporation, reflecting the decisive shift away 
from the old 
speculative venture approach of earlier planters who 
saw in the 
Caribbean a source of quick fortunes. In this development, 
those 
estates linked to the mercantile houses in Europe were 
best 
placed to put into early effect this transformtiofl, and these 
estates emerged as thé dominant ones in the region. 
The strengthed link to the mercantile houses, however, 
set the stage for the first efforts at diversification 
of 
plantation activity. This interests in shipping, insurance 
and finance, provisi-on of estte supplies, etc, developed in some 
of these corporations. While they were seen for much,of 
this 
period as a buf,f or against the lean years when prices 
fell, 
later tI2ey were o beeoiii the flucius for the growth of trans- 
nationals, as th'- companies widened their range 
of investments 
activity and began to diversify nut only within the region 
tut 
in Europe itself and in other countries in the 
periphery. At 
the same time other new industrial and agricultural 
activities 
were being developed in the region. Among the most 
important 
were bauxite, petroleum, bananas and rice.4 These 
new industrie 
created new openings for the region's population 
and led to 




This transformation which was paralleled by the 
development of labour markets in the region, produced innumerable 
labour-capital conflicts which led directly to the formation of 
trade unions and other working class organizations. 
In the long run this development was crucial to the grDwth and 
vitality of the mass movements which sprang up across the region. 
During this period the peasantry also continued to develop, but 
the process of their diversification into other activities was 
not as striking, although new major crops, e.g. rice, bananas, 
citrus, cocoa, coffee were cultivated during this period. The 
peasants remained, by and large, poorly organized and this weak- 
ness resulted in their having as a group, the least organized 
influence on the course of developments in the region. The 
rise of political parties, however, was ventually to become the 
major vehicle they sought to use for the redress of their 
.2 
grievances. 
One important consequence of these developments was the 
growth of a certain degree of differentiation in the class 
structure of the Caribbean. We have already noted the rise of 
the working class, anc the emergence of a peasantry. The growth 
of the labour market brought with it open unemployment as a 
social category. The expansion of the peasantry was accompanied 
with increasing stratification, creating in its wake indigenous 
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forms of landlordism, exploitatinn and extensive peasant 
indebtedness. In addition to these, a local class of merchants 
and traders who dealt in retailing, wholesaling, and the provision 
of transport and financial services was brought into existence. 
While as a class these groups shared property interests with the 
economically dominant plantation interests, ultimately they were 
excluded from it on racial grounds. This perio also witnessed 
the formation of a gráup of educated people who achieved much 
social mobility through their education. This group concentrated 
on teaching, public service, and professions such as laT and 
medicine. They were to constitute the corps from which the local 
political elite was to be .irawn. In order to pursue its political 
interests this group forged an alliance with the masses to 
struggle for constitutional reform under a widened frarthise. 
Evntually this was to merge into the larger demand for independence 
a ' World War II. 
By the 1930's the Caribbean had became a part of th 
more generalized peripheral capitalist formations of the time 
with their own specific characteristics. First, and most 
obviously, like all of Latin America, Africa and Asia the region 
was clearly a part of a group of 
by countries which comprised the 
countries politically dominated' 
center. Second, because its 
patterns of resource use, production, exchange, consumption and 
class relations had been, and continued to be mediated through 
colonial domination, a self-centered, autonomous development of 
66. 
its productive factors was not possible. The dynamic of pro- 
duction internalized to a higher level the systemic divorce of 
domestic output from consumption already referred to. Indigeneous 
resources were brought into use exclusively at the dictates of 
capital accumulation in the center. What was consumed through 
the market was by and large imported and did not reflect the basic 
needs of the broad mass of the community. No indigenous science 
and technology existed, and the continued dependence of the region 
on a few primary products made it extremely vulnerable to the 
course of wcrld trade. 
The s4ystem of domination, therefore, combined both an 
imperialist divisionof labour and an internal class structure and 
pattern o social relations in which the reproduction of the 
system of domination w the predominant, but not exclusive 
purpose. Summing up, we can say that the underdevelopment of the 
region's econoT1y was &aracterized by two sets of basic features: 
j) the perpetuation of distorted economic structures, 
(i.e. the limited development of industry, the limited different- 
iation of agricultural production, the secondary role the internal 
markets played indeteiTnining resource use, a pattern of domestic 
consumption which did not reflect the needs of the broad mass of 
the popuation, low, levels of indigeneous technological develop- 
ment combined with the impOrt of high-level technology for those 
sectors most integrated into the center, and as a consequence 
marked disparties in labour productivity in the two sectors). 
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ii) a rhythm of economic expansion which depended mainly 
on the expansion of capital in the center. In other words the 
absence of autonomous, internally regulated sources of capital 
accumulation ensured that within the region, more often than 
not, its development was essentially a reflection of the pace and 
direction of accummulation in the center. 
During this period the colonial state underwent important trans- 
formatiohs of importance to he subscrìt evolution of the 
Caribbean economy. The rot impurtant of these wes the aband- 
onment of laisser - faire ideology and the development of a concern 
with issues of economic production and organisation. Thus the 
state took on many social functions performed by such private 
groups as the churches anu pantations e.g. nealth and education). 
In addition the economic functions it nreviously performed were 
significantly improved, ;he1 these the postal services, 
providing a legal framework for joint stock company operations, 
or regulations governing banking and commerce, laws to guide the 
operation of associations and trade unions, etc. In some territori 
the state took over responsibility for infrastructural works: 
roads, drainage, irrigation, etc, which was more ofter.. than not 
previously provided by the plantations. The result of all this 
was that the state was becomLg increasingly the most important 
local institution affecting the organisation and development 
of the Caribbean economies. 
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In this period the movement of Caribbean peoples con- 
tinued. As one of the three major forms of cultural 
penetration 
this development was crucial for the region. The 
major direction 
of movement was in this period inter-territorial, particularly 
during the years 1885 - 1920. The main cause of this was labour 
required to builci the Panama Canal, to construct railroads 
and 
banana plantations in Central America, and to build 
the Bermuda 
dry docks. In addition new opportunities were 
sought by many in 
the Unt>ed States. Between 1920 and 1940 the outlets 
for 
migration were limited and the muvement of persons 
was substantially 
reduced. What movement took place was mainly confined 
to the 
oil fields in Venezuela and the oil refinery in 
Curacao. Avail- 
able data show that between i885 - 1920, net population loss from 
the British West Indies was 130,000. Between 1902 
- 1932, 121,000 
Jamaicans went to Cuba. Between 1900 - 1920, 10-12,000 
Bahamians 
went to Miami, and between 1904 and 1914, 60,000 Barbadians 
went 
to Panama. 
Even though for most of the period under consideration 
in this section Britain was the leading capitalist nation, it 
was 
already in relative decline as new powers such as Grmany 
and in 
particular the USAI rose into promience. Thus 
while Britain's 
share of world industrial prcuction wa 32% in 1870 it 
was down 
to 14% before World War I and 9% just preceding the 
crisis of 
the 1930's. For the same periods the US' share 
was 23, 38 and 
42 percent. Similarly, Britain's share of world trade 
was 
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one-fifth in 1880, one-sixth in 1913 and one-eighth by World 
War II. Meanwhile the US had grown tremendously during 
World War I. 
It was this expansion and growth of the USA which 
provided for the inyestments in the region that occasioned much 
of the Caribbean migration of that time. The rise into prominence 
of the USA and Germany marked a differentiation within the "center" 
of the capitalist world system. Reflecting its newly acquired 
economic might the US began to articulate its own policies within 
the region. Basically we can argue that US policy at that time 
was governed by two primary considerations. One was to neutralize 
European influence and presence in the hemisphere, while the other 
was to promote the development of client ts.s withir the area. 
Scores of military interventions took place with th '1ect of 
keeping I!friend1yt governmen3 in power. iese repeated inter- 
ventions and occupation of countries, along with seizures of 
land for US bases (as occurred in Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic) were to have a tremendous impact on the formation of 
Caribbean economy. The ultimate design of these developments 
was to create full freedom of movement for US capita in the area 
and the development of its trade. - The efforts to neutralize 
European influence during his period were not entirely success- 
ful, for many European colonies still remained in the area. 
However, World War II was to change the balance of power 
dramatically in favour of the U.S. and as we shall see more fully 
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later in the text, geo-political considerations would later 
transform relations in the area, as the contest between East 
and West proceeded and America's determination to protect its 
backyard by holding the status quo against both externally and 
internally impelled movements for change grew. 
In concluding this section of the historical survey 
of the roots of Caribbean economy, it is important to recognize 
that along With class differentiation in the Tegicn there was 
also increased cultural and racial mixing. While antagonisms 
and conflicts existed there was also emerging at the same time, 
even if only out of the force of circumstances, a more or less 
indigenous system of values, thought processes feelings, and 
characteristic ways of viewing things. In other woras, a regional 
social consciousness. This is rfiected in the region's art, 
literature, scientific writ±ns, and folk reJigions. Thus in the 
case of the latter we find the mixing of cath.iic, protstarit 
and African religions has produced original indigenous religious 
forms: shango, tamboo bamboo, camboulay, pocomania , voodoo, 
sant eria. 
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2HAPTER 3: REVOLT AND WAR: THE CARIBBEAN CIRCA 
WORLD WAR II 
This study started with the encounter between Europeans 
and the native inhabitants of the New World. Having outlined 
the development of the area over four and a half centuries, 
in 
this chapter we seek to paint a brief portrait of the Caribbean 
towards the end of the 1930's and World War II. To place this 
portrait in its true context, it is important to recall the 
momentous nature of the original encounter. As Wong has observed 
both the father of "orthodox" and"radicat" economics have agreed 
on the monumental significne of this event. Thus he points 
out that Adam Smith has assessed it in this way: 
"The discovery of America, and that of a 
passage to the East Indies by the Cape 
of Good Hope, are the two greatest and 
most important events recorded in the 
history of mankind". 2/ 
Later Marx too was to claim that: 
"The discovery of gold and silver in America, 
the extirpation, enslavement and entombment 
in mines of the aboriginal population, the 
beginning of the conquest and looting of the 
East Indies, the turning of Africa into a 
warren for the commercial hunting of black 
skins, sigralised thea rosy dawn of the era 
of capitalist production. These idyllic pro- 
ceedings are the chief momenta of primitive 
accumulation. On their heels treads the 
commercial war of the European nations, with 
the globe for a theatre". 3/ 
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The capitalist world system which was created alongside 
this project of colonial enterprise has throughout its entire 
history always combined expansion with crisis. These crises have 
taken on a more or less definite periodic forms with short waves 
(recessions) combining with long waves (depression) and occurring 
a crucial phases in the process of capitalist accumulation. 
These crises are the product of many conflicts and circumstances 
which are inherent to the rhythm of capitalist growth, but as 
Beaud has pointed out in general outline they stem from four 
fundamental contr.dictions: 
the contradiction between capital and labour, 
that is, concretely between capitalist companies 
and the working classes; 
- the contradiction between.capitalists (either in 
the same sector or between sectors); 
- the contradiction between national capitalisms; 
- the contradiction between dominant capitalisms 
and domiated peoples, countries, or regions". / 
During the last quarter of the 19th century these contradictions 
converged to produce a long depression of economic activity which 
eventuated with World Wai I. By the 1930's an even greater crisis 
was at hand, and this too was to lead to world war. In this latter 
crisis many important economic factors made themselves manifest 
as its cause. Among the more important were: 
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the decline of the industries on which the initial 
industrialization of Europe was based and the rise of new industries 
(chemical, automobile, electrical, mechanical) and along with it 
new industrial companies and industrial nations, particularly 
the USA; 
the fact that national rivalries were made more self- 
destructive by the circumstances inherent in (1); Thus àt the 
time the world was carved up into carefully demarcated zones of 
influence: American zones the "British" Commonwealth, the French, 
Dutch, and Belgian Empires, the Japanese sphere of influence in 
Asia, and the USSR. The commercial struggle or areas of 
influence was a war in which no quarter was given; 
the more effective organization and militancy in 
workers organisations which had developed by then and which put 
pressure on profits. This mlitancy was reflected in the advances 
made by communist parties and the revolution in the USSR; 
)4) the absence of international institutions to provide 
a framework for trade, financial, and capital flows globally, 
as well as foreign exchange rate and currency management. With 
national rivalries at a peak this led to a host of"beggar-my- 
neighbour' policies: competitive devaluation, dumping, protectionism, 
etc. 
5) the injuries created to the world economy by efforts of 
the victorious powers in the l9l1-l9l8 war to exact 
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tribute and reparations from a defeated Germany. This promoted 
a complicated, and unprecedented era of price inflation. 
The great depression of the 1930's and later World War II was 
a period of crisis everywhere, and nowhere rnoreso than in the 
Caribbean. The integration of the world's productive system 
which started with th& commercial expansion of Europe in the 
15th and 16th centuries had produced a situation in which no 
country could isolate itself from the cataclysmic changes in 
Europe. In the then British West Indies this period was marked 
by the widespread outbreak cf revclts and disturbanoes. In 
May-July l93'1 there were disturbances on the sugar estates in 
Trinidad; in January ir35 similar disturbances in St. Kitts; 
inMay 1935 strikes and disturbances in Jamaica; in. September- 
Octuber 1935 disturbances at several sugar estates in Guyana; 
in October 1935 rioting in St. Vincent; in June 1937 disturbances 
in Trinidad and the next montI (July) disturbances in Barbados; 
inMay-June 1938 general disturbances in Jamaica and again in 
Guyana in February 1939. This "Thurricane of protest" as it was 
called forced the British government to appoipt a Royal Commission 
of Inquiry.. The Moyne Commissiont as it has come to be known 
did not have its report published until after World War II. 
This reports however, contains the best description of the social 
and economic situation in the region at that time. In this 
chapter, I will highlight some of the descriptive material in 
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order to provide, as it were, a portrait of the region at 
this 
time. Before I do so, however, it is necessary to offer a 
few 
analytical observations of relevance to an understanding 
of the 
situation at that time. 
First, the merging of the wiespread revolts of the 
1930's into the outbre.k ofWorld War II makes it 
irnossible to 
separate their influences on the subsequent evolution of 
the 
post-World War II Caribbean economy. This point is reinforced 
when we place the former set of events in the context 
of the 
Great Depression of the 1930's, itself a major element in the 
disintegration of Europe and the movement towards war. 
Indeed 
the pressure of linking these events was so great that 
it was in 
191 in the midst of World War II that the 
first national 
election under universal adult .3uffrage was held in Jamaica. 
This 
act, which in effect conceded the right of the West Indian 
peoples 
to manage their own affairs, is often seen as the dating 
of the 
modern period of the region. 
Second, although as we previously noted, there was 
a rapidly growing US influence in the region, World 
War II 
provided for the legal entry of the US military into the 
British 
West Indies. As far back as the Monroe doctrine of 1823 
the US 
had always made it a cornerstone of its foreign policy 
that 
interference by a European power in the hemisphere 
would be 
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considered an "unfriendly act". On this basis successive 
US 
governments arrogated to themselves the right "to 
protect" the 
region both from outsiders and those hostile to the 
status quo 
within. This was the basis for numerous invasions, 
threats and 
forced treaties which were used to further US interests 
in the 
hemisphere. While the "big stick" period of Theodore 
Roosevelt 
gave way to the "dollar diplomacy" of Taft (1912), 
the purpose 
of substituting "dollars for bullets" was the 
same - to consolidate 
US hegemony in the hemisphere. Thus although 
Franklin Rossevelt's 
good neighbour policy was propagandized on the 
renunciation of 
armed intervention, the threat and use of force by 
the US continued. 
As the war between Britain and Germany got worse the 
British 
government entered into lend-lease arrangements 
with the US in 
which military bases were given to the US in 
some of its 
territories in the Caribbean in exchange 
for war material. 
Third, World War II itself had a major impact on 
the British West Indian economies. The construction 
of the US 
bases and other wartime facilities in particular 
gave a tremendous 
filip to economic activity in the region. Apart 
from the employ- 
ment and income which this generated, it was also an 
important 
means of training the labour force in a wide range 
of construction 
skills. The impact of the war in disrupting colonial 
export and 
import links to domestic production, gave a 
tremendous filip to 
domestic output serving the local market. Thus 
to take one 
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example in Trinidad-TObaO, food production at the 
end of World 
War II was 2 times the 1939 figure. In addition 
a wide range of local industries were 
established during this period. While we return 
to this topic 
later in Chapter 5 the range of import-subStitUt1]. 
activies which 
developed at this time included large scale 
secondary industries 
producing for the domestic market and also exporting 
regionally 
(lime and limestone, matches, industrial gases); 
secondary 
industries serving the local market (food, 
drink, tobacco, 
clothing, household items, etc); and local handicraft 
and artisan 
output. 
Because the war disrupted the region's trade, all of its 
traditional export industries were very adversely 
effected. In 
the case of the major export commodity (sugar), the 
situation 
as so serious that th Pritish government Th 
2ce at the end 
of the war massive rehabilitation schemes for the 
industry. Of 
great importance to the future of the region also, 
Wct5 that on 
account of Germany's threat to UK shipping, as well 
as the 
diversion of UK industry to the war effort, North America 
began 
to replace the UK as the traditional source of 
supply of the 
region's imports, as well as to become a 
sizeable marke1 for its 
exports. 
The final analytical observation which should be made, 
is that while specific circumstances in each territory 
undoubtedly 
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affected the timing, nature and course of revolt in 
the region 
in the 1930's, there were common underlying 
factors which gave 
rise to this situation. Among the more important of 
these are 
the collapse of the colonial economy in the wake 
of the depression. ThiB underscored the extreme vulnerability 
of the region's economy to world events which had developed 
on 
account of its over_concerntrated dependence on 
the production 
of one or two primary commodity exports sold in 
a narrow range 
of metropolitan markets; 
the long endured grievances of the peasants ainst 
plantation interests, which were there, always looking 
for 
opportunities to make themselves felL.; 
the growth of working clàss organization, 
consciousness, and agitation for better pay and conditions 
of 
work, which was a hallmar1 of the 20th century, 
and which became 
urt.larly evident in the 1930's in te face of the decline in 
rcr1 omes and the further depression of already 
sub-human 
staJfds of living; 
the growth among the population of nationalist 
sentiment and ideas in favour of independence and 
self-government 
which served as a counter to the autocratic) 
authoritarian, 
repressive ideology of the Crown Colony governmental 
system with 
its unresponsive, and unrepresentative character; 
y) the educating and socializing experiences which 
some sections of the population acquired as a result 
of their 
migration abroad and return. This very often 
led them to perceive 
that tha entrenched colonial system in vogue, was 
incapable of 
securing and delivering to them socio-eCOnOmiC mobility 
on the 
scale required. The impact of these persons was 
particularly 
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noticeable in the leadership of industrial, social and political 
organisations; 
the effect of the spread of the school system and 
education generally among the population on their outlook and 
expectation. While the colonial authorities expected the school 
system to inculcate loyal empire values(and it did so among many) 
it also opened windows to other areas of learning and values, and 
these were to give articulation to the protest against the 
colonial condition of he region; 
the growth of towns during the 20th century, 
combined with the depression arid the capitalist wage system which 
was now entrenched in the region, gave rise to a new social 
phenomepon: the open unemployed. As these numbers grew, so they 
joined the ranks of the protesters and those agitating for improved 
conditions of life; 
finally, the conflicts produced by the factors 
outiThed above, combined with a situation in which there was a 
woefully inadequate level of social welfare provision. No relief 
therefore existed for the broad mass of the population exposed 
to these unrelenting pressires. 
Some of the causes identified here were referred to in the Moyne 
Commission Report. This Report was a tru}y remarkable colonial 
docurnent. For its time, it do'cumented in an unparalleled way the 
poverty and powerlessness of the West Indian masses in the 1930's. 
It was unfortunate, although understandable, that its recommend- 
ations did not match the accuracy of its recommendations since in 
the main, these were neither revolutionary, nor radical, in the 
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sense that they consistently avoided attacking the root causes 
of the people's distress. In keeping with the labour - "Fabian" 
socialist outlook of the time, its recommendations focussed on 
the need for improved social services, making pleas for more 
financial aid to the region from London, arguing the case for 
better access in Britain for the region's aricultural produce, 
and insisting on land settlement schemes as a meais of heading 
off confrontation between the peasants and the plantation over 
access to land and other resources. As a package these recommend- 
ations were the precursor to the paternalistic Colonial Develop- 
ment and Welfare Committee which was established by the British 
government after World War li to cope with the difficulties cf 
the region. 
For the remainder of this chapter we shall briefly 
describe t12e broad social and eonomic state of the region as 
identified in the Moyne Commission's Report. To begin with in 
the area of population, the Report noted the rapid increases which 
started at the turn of the century and which had been brought 
about by improvement, albeit limited, in public health which 
had resulted in a decline in the death rate. This population 
increase put pressure on public and social services available, 
while at the same time intensified the pressure on land, and 
became a contributory factor in the increasingly evident open 
unemployment. In the area of industry, the Report noted that 
there was very little development. What there was, was confined 
to mining (oil in Trinidad-Tobago; bauxite, gold and diamonds 
gloomy: 
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in Guyana); agro processing, (coconut used for making oils, lard 
margarine, soap etc, biscuit and bread manufacture, fish 
preserving, aerated drinks); a limited range of consumer goods, 
(cigarettes, matches, tailoring, woodworking, printing, etc); 
transport and utilities, (electricity plants, horsedrawn carriages 
canoes and small wooden boats); and the processing of export 
staples, mainly sugar. 
Not surprisingly agriculture was the subject of a 
specialist report. Thus it was graphically pointed out: 
"The general level of agriculture in these 
Colonies is low in technical knowledge, 
business organisation and management eff 1- 
ciency; systematic agriculturc, by which is 
meant mixed farming on a plan suited to the 
inherent circumstances of the area, is un-. 
known. The basic types of agriculturA in the 
West Indian Colonies are shifng cucivation, 
under which land may be used for, perhaps, two 
years in ever' eight or ten, and the continuous 
growing of one crop on the same land over a 
long period. Livestock are never the effective 
complement of crops and the connection between 
them is frequently adventitious or totally 
absent. So long as these methods continue it 
will be impossible for agricultural production 
to provide even the essentials of life for the 
growing popultion of the West Indian Colonies 
sand comprehensive reform of existing agri- 
cultural methods is therefore inevitable". 5/ 
In respect to export agriculture the picture painted was equally 
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"It will be apparent from this survey that 
the present outlook for the export agri- 
culture of the West Indies, apart from the 
sugar industry, is extremely discouraging. 
Only the citrus industry offers a reasonable 
hope, and that a highly uncertain one of 
material expansion. A diminishing volume of 
employment is the prospect in most of the 
other branches of agriculture, and the out- 
look for the two most important of them, the 
Jamaica banana industry and the cocoa industry 
of Trinidad and Grenada, is grave in the 
extreme". 6/ 
Paradoxically, these conclusions aided a renewed emphasis on 
suir and as we shall see after World War II a major process 
was sot in train to rehabilitate the region's sugar industry. 
The Repoit's descriptionon social condit6ns was particularly 
striking. Thus the educational system was scathingly described 
as follows: 
'Scondary schools exist in the West Indies 
'many of which provide an excellent classical 
education, but they provide for only a very 
small proportion even of the children who 
pass through the primary schools. As it is, 
unemployment is rife among the products of 
secondary education, owing to the lack of 
suitable 'white collar' jobs and the dis- 
inclination of the pupils to take employment 
in agriculture as at present organised". 8/ 
This educational system evolved from slavery where virtually no 
education was provided. After emancipation thea churches played 
the leading role in providing some education to the ex-slaves. 
In line with the poverty of the times schools were crowded as 
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buildings and facilities were inadequate and trained teachers 
were insufficient in number. There was a virtual neglect of 
vocational training and no university or other tertiary 
educational institutions existed. The educational system was 
unintegrated and in addition to the observations made in the 
quotes about the curricula, it should be stressed that virtily 
no Caribbean materials were available, let alone used in the 
schools. 
In the area of health the situation was no less 
distressing. There were high infant mortality rates and high 
maternal mor'ality rates in most of the territories, but 
especially so in Guyana. A high proportion of the diseases were 
prventible: hook worm, dysentry, enteric fever, malaria, 
deficiency diseases such as rickets, scurvy, ben-ben etc. Thus 
statistics on medical expenditure cited in the report bear out 
this gloomy picture. (See Table 3.1) 
The root causes of this situation lay in the poverty 
of the broad mass of the population, the limited education in 
health and sanitation which was afforded them, and inadequate 
public services such as pure water supply, sanitation services, 
etc. In all the territories this situation appeared to be 
worse in the urban than in the rural areas. 
TABLE 3.1 
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In the area of housing the Report draws the following picture: 
"It is not an exaggeration to say that in the 
poorest parts of the most towns anlin many of 
the country districts a majority of the houses 
is largely made of rusty corrugated iron and 
unsound boarding; quite often the original floor 
has disappeared and onlj the earth remains, its 
surface so trampled that it i.s impervious to any 
rain which may penetrate through a leaking roof; 
sanitation An any form and water supply are un- 
known in such premises, and in many cases no 
light can enter when the door is closed. These 
decrepit homs, more often than not, are seriously 
overcrowded, and it is not surprising that some 
of them are dirty and verminous in spite of the 
praiseworthy efforts of the inhabitants to keep 
them clean. In short, every condition that tends 
to produce disease is here to be found in a 
serious form. The geneially unsanitary ervironment 
gives rise to malaria, worm infection and bowel 
diseases; leaking roofs, rotten flooring and lack 
of light encourage the spread of tuberculosis, 
respiratory diseases, worm infections, jigger 
lesions and rat-borne diseases; overcrowding which 
is usually accompanied by imperfect ventillation, 
is an important agent in contributing to the high mci- 
yaws, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and, 
to a certain extent, leprosy". (P.i74) 9/ 
The tradition of poor housing went back to the slave plantations 
where the planters sought to minimize the costs of keeping 
slaves. With emancipation and the later development of large 
villages and towns, migration to these areas led to a cerain 
amount of overcrowding. The complete absence of a coherent 
public policy in this area of social life served to confii'm this 
reality. 
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Given the above descriptions it is easy to picture 
the unrelenting misery of the social situation. There were 
virtually no programmes for social welfare sponsored and 
administered by the governments. What existed was church 
sponsored and administered, or came out of voluntary social 
organisations like the Salvation Army, YWCA and YMCA. Leisure 
and recreational activities had no organic place in th social 
life of the times. The orphaned child, the iidigent, the 
mentally ill, the physically handicapped all lived off the 
crumbs of the society, and they were few of these. Women were 
systematically discriminated against, and as mothers, left to 
carry a disproportionate share of the burdens of parenthood. 
Again the Commissioners' Report sums it up well: 
"Little can be saLd for the social conditiois 
which exist in the West Indies today. The 
child. so often reared in an ill-built and 
overcrowded home, passes from it to what is, 
all too frequently, an overcrowded school. 
If he has been fortunate enough to continue 
his education until school-leaving age, which 
is usually 14 in the towns and 12 in the rural 
districts, he enters a world where unemployment 
and under-employment are regarded as the common 
lot. Should he find work as a manual labourer, 
his wages often provide only for bare maintenance 
and are far from sufficient to enable him to 
attain the standard of living which is set before 
him by new contacts with the outside world. If 
he is fitted by education and intelligence for 
clerical posts, competition for which is intense, 
he will have the prospect, at best, of a salary 
on which, even in Government employment, he will 
find it a serious struggle to keep up the social 
position and appearances which he and his friends 
expect. He will have leisure hours but few 
facilities for recreation with which to fill them. 
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The posit ion of women is more unfortunate 
Generally she has a large family, and, when- 
ever employment is available, must work to 
support them or to eke out the slender earnings 
of her man. Most commonly her work is in the 
fields; after feeding her family she must start 
out from her home in the early morning, often 
leaving little or no food in the house for her 
children whose main meal may have to wait for 
her return in the evening. Her difficulty in 
securing work is at least as great as that 
with which the West Indian man is faced. If 
she alone is responsible for the support of a 
family, her position is indeed difficult and there 
can be littlT cause for wonder that a combination 
of economic eixcumstanceS and natural irrespon- 
sibiit' for several illegitimate rhildren to 
seek the uncertain help afforded by association 
with yet another man) although she nm'st realise 
only too well the temporary nature or that 
assistance and that eventually, perhaps after 
her responsibiliti?S hay? been increased, she 
may again be abandonedt'. 10/ 
The Report was also detai±ed in its description f labour 
conditions. As was to expected the bulk of e work force 
was agricuIal or rur based. A significant category of 
female empioyment was domestic ¿ervants, reaching as high as 
25% in Barbados and 15% in Guyana. One of the legacies of 
slavery - indenture was that a large proportion of the work 
force was paid on piece-rates. Payment by the-length of time 
worked was rare. Disputes over 
the* size of tasks, length of 
time needed to perform these, etc, were therefore a constant 
source of friction between employer and employee. Most of the work 
force was underunionised, and much of this was due to the 
existence of legal restraints against trade union activity. 
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Only in Guyana wer trade unior protected from paying damages 
consequent upon strikes and in Jamaica peaceful picketing was 
accepted as legal. Because many employees resided in quarters 
owned and provided by their employers and subject to eviction 
without notice this served as a powerful means of keeping 
labour intimidated. 
Large sections of the labour force fell into the 
categories of theunemployed, underemployed, and seasonally 
employed. This provoked the Commission to ioint out: 
"The plight of the unemployed, aggratedas 
it is by the seasonal character of employment, 
is serious to the point of desperation". 11/ 
There was of course no social welfare programmes for the un- 
employed to fall back on. 
All of the above circumstances were aggravated by the 
colonial domination of the region. Although some measure of 
internal self-government existed, this was limited as up to the 
end of the 1930's the franchise was still extremely narrow. 
Thus to take two examples in rinidad-Tobago and Barbados in 




I have cited this Report at some length because 
its detailed description of social life in the British colonies 
of the Caribbean at this time is unmatched. The generalization 
of poverty in the population is found in every aspect of its 
social life: working, housing, education, medical services, land 
availability, leisure and recreation. Its powerlessness in 
relation to established authority is clearly seen in the limited 
franchise and virtually non-existent local government institutions. 
it even as t1iey remained poor and powerless the power of the 
masses as a social group was felt everywhere during this period 
as revolts, riots, strikes, and disturbances shook the foundations 
of Britain's colonial power in the area. Four and a half centuries 
after the first encounter with Europeans, this was the legacy of 
the Caribbean on the eve of its modern period of history. 
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Part 2: IndependenCe and the Nationalist Alternatives 
This part of the study traces the impact of the independence 
movements on the formulation of economic strategies, alternative 
to those of the old colonial order. By the 1970's, which rarks 
the end of the period under consideration, despite the rapid 
expansion of some sectors (manufacturing, tourism, off-shore 
finance, etc), the region is gripped by fundamental economic dis - 
locations These can be traced to the world economic crisis and its 
impçf.t on an area that is still basically vuincrable, and the 
exhaustion of the possibilities ThhoPflt .n i-- nationalist economic 
strategy. The ideology and p'actice of nationalism which fed the 
independence moamentr, could riot contend with the roots of a 
colonial economy formed in the way it was in the Caribbean and developed 
over four ad a half centuries. By the end of the 1970's therefore, 
despite important changes in form, the main content of the region's 
economy was the continued dispossession of the majority of its 
peoples, the poor and the powerless. 
Chapter prsents in outline the colonial office view of developrtflt 
and the nationalist alternative. Chapter 5 traces one of the main 
pillars of 
this al ternat ive, namely, the stratej of "industrial ization by invitation". 
In 
Chapter 6 we examine the policy of natural resource development while 
Chapter 
7 looks at the conflict between plantatonS, peasants, 
and the state for land 
and other resources and its impact on the rural econoiry. Chapter 8 investigates 
the region' s search for new "poles of growth": tourism, and 
off-shore banking. 
Chapter 9 cciclude5 this part of the study with an examination of the 
role 
played by the state in the organisation and administration of the 
region's 
economy. The period ends with the crisis of the 1970's. 
CHAPTER 14: COLONIALISM AND NATIONALISM: 
ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
In this chapter we examine and compare the colonial 
strategy of development as it crystallized after World War II and 
the evolving nationalist model of development which accompanied 
the struggle for independence0 The latter formed the bedrock 
of overnment policies in the region, at least ip to the crisis 
of the 1970's. 
1: The Colonial Office View of Development of.the 
British West Indies 
In attempting to present a concise view of the colonial 
office view of development.in the region I run the risk of 
suggesting a greater coherence of understanding and purpose on 
the part of the major actors than might have been the case at 
the time. More frequently than not, participants inahistorical 
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process do not see their actions with the 20-20 vision offered 
by hindsight. In portraying this picture, therefore, it is 
important that readers bear in mind that I am presenting a 
synthesized or idealized view of colonial office practice 
in the region. 
Simply put the Colonial Office generally propagandized 
its colonial mission as one of "trusteeship". In this view the 
aim of good colonial administrat was to foster and encourage 
a progressive and orderly moveme to representative self- 
government. Independence, for the West Lidies, at least up to 
World War II, was definitely beyond the horizon of the time. 
This policy of trusteeship was administered in the face of 
constant protest and agitation While the main source of 
resistence was the mass of poor people and powerless of the region, 
everywhere the leadership of this protest when organized was 
assumed by the educated professional middle class and other 
intermediate strate which had developed under colonial tutelage. 
By and large this leadership channelled the protest into demands 
for larger and larger areas of local self-government and a wider 
and wider franchise than the Colonial Office was willing to 
tolerate. As these struggles became more intense and increasingly 
violent the Colonial Office responded by reversing the direction 
of constitutional advance. Thus in 1953 Guyana, which had 
distinguished itself by producing after its first election 
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based on universal adult suffrage the first freely. elected 
Marxist government in the Empire, had its constitution suspended 
after only 133 days of rule, and the country occupied by 
British forces. Given this type of response, and more importantly 
what had preceeded it, genocide and four centuries of 
slavery and a continuous history of protest and agitation, it is 
hard to hold anything else but the most cynical view of this 
trusteeship ideal. Despite this, however, it did fvour the 
formal administration of the coloni.ál economy of the region and 
in quite a few instances came to be believed by major participants 
in the drama of these times. 
Despite the attraction to the wealth of the Caribbean 
which fed the first waves of conquest and colonisation, by the 
time Industrial capitalism had become firmly entrenched in Europe 
and with it new demands on colonies and overseas possessions 
which aided the latterTs transformation into peripheral societies, 
the view rapidly gained ascendancy that the region had exhausted 
its potential. Small tropical countries, peopled in the main 
by non-Europeans could never be industrialized and hence there 
was already exhausted limit to their growth and development. 
Severai theories were advanced to justify this view. First, 
there were the racal theories based on the alleged "inferiority" 
of non-European peoples which condemned them to live in, and 
reproduce, only backward social systems. Thus in partial 
explanation of the absence of industrial development the view was 
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expressed by an industrial expert who visited the area to 
advise on industrial development that the temperament of the 
West Irlian worker was Iteasy going, unambitious and casual". 
Allied to this is the over-population theory which explained the 
poverty and backwardness of societies in terms of high population- 
to-land ratios in small economies, which when combinedwith 
rapid demographic growth (high birth rates and rapidly declining 
death rates) and a highly dependent population structure (large 
numbers of people outside ti working age> of the population) 
made them incapable of fasTyr' growth and development. Later to 
this was added a certain type of geographical determinism in the 
view of the area and its developmental possibilities. Limitations 
of soil, climate and natural resou:rces made it impossible, it 
was argued, for tropical countries to grow. In thall economies 
these arguments wre expecteñ to hold ,a fortiori, since given a 
random distribution of resourees, the smaller th& country, the 
more likely than not that its natural resources would be limited. 
The limitations of tropical locations were seen as primarily a 
debilitating climate (at least for Europeans), poor soil types 
and unknown resources. 
The problems of geographical determinism, when compounded 
by the small size and scale of the territories, made smallness an 
absolute constraint on development possibilities in the region. 
Additionally, in terms of the Ricardian-type comparative advantae 
theories of trade which then prevailed, it was argued that the 
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region should focus on those areas for which its relatively 
abundant endownment was already revealed, that is tropical staples 
and minerals. The possibility that these revealed endownments 
may have been the historical product of early mercantilism and 
later a perspective of an integrated )Empire with London as both 
center and apex was never raised at the time. Indeed the deter- 
ministic aproach was also often expressed in cultural terms. 
That is the institutidnof these societies were described as 
traditional, stagnant and unchanging. As a result they put a 
brake on the modernism which the colonial authorios and Europeans 
sought to introduce. The consequence was a cert.n k2nd of 
dualistic economic stricture with the growing part being 
modern and the stagnant part being traditional. 
All these theories imply a certain phflubuphical 
acceptance of the enduring state of underdeveloprent in the area. 
Among "pragmatists" it led to varying claims about how these 
economies were restrainer in their development by limiting 
factors (capital, skill, entrepreneurship, work ethic, etc). 
Whatever their individual lines of argumentation, however, all 
these theories have a common methodological unity, in that they 
all purport to explain underUevelOPmeflt as a phenomenon 
independent of the historical process. They are all, therefore, 
fundamentally ahistorical theories, explaining poverty and 
powerlessness in terms of the innate characteristics of people 
and their environments or self-perpetuating cycles of poverty. 
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Given the wealth which attracted Europeto the Caribbe".n, this 
was indeed an ironic historical development. 
Views such as these, were of course strongly oriented 
against serious efforts at industrial development in the 
region. As we shall see later, this became the focal point of 
nationalist opposition to the colonial office policies of 
development in the area, since the view became more and more 
widely accepted that a country could not break oi't of the 
"vicious circles of poverty" or "the disequilibrium traps of 
underdevelOpmeflt and dependence unless it became diversified 
and differentiated through the development of a oroad based 
manufacturing sector. From the more positive standpoint, however, 
the theories and views held by the Colonial Office led them 
to dvocate the following as the main avenues for expansion and 
2/ 
gro.th in the Caribbean. - 
i) Population Control: We have already seen in Chapter 3, 
that the Myone Commission had identified rapid population growth 
as a serious source of pressure on the resources of the region 
and 
a major cause of the rapidly growing 
open unemployment. The 
view was held then that non-whites were culturally and 
temperamentlY inclined to be repoductively prolific and this 
was the main cause behind the rapid population growth of the 
area. To facilitate the demographic transition to smaller familles, 
policies designed under the broad heading of "family planning" 
were advocated and put in place. 
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ii) Agricultural production: Agriculture was seen as the 
sector best suited to the region. However., it was accepted that 
historically the agrarian structure had evolved into a certain 
duality. On the one hand these was a high1 concentrated large 
scale plantation producing structure, while on the other, there 
co-existed a large number of small and landless peasants engaged 
in a mix of subsistence agriculture, food production for the dom- 
estic market, and participation in the export cash crop economy.. 
To tackle the problems four measures were advocated and pursued. 
First land settlement schemes were introduced. The land settle- 
ment prorosal was an old one. The Moyne (qmmision in its 
Report noted that the Royal Commission of 1897 had advanced the 
view that this was "the only way of meeting the fundamental 
requirements of the British West Indies, and the Sugar Commission 
of 1930 endorsed their views" The objectives of this 
proposal wei explicitly economic and social. On economic 
grounds it was argued that land grants would help to relieve 
population pressure on the land, particularly if unused lands were 
the main source of these grants. Secondly, it was felt that 
by expanding occupational activities in the rural areas it would 
not only halt migration to the towns, but encou'age a reverse 
flow of persons. In this way open unemployment, as well as 
underemployment in the rural areas would be redùced. At the 
social level it was expected that this policy would reduce some 
of the existing extreme inequalities in the distribution of' land 
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holdings in the region. In addition it would set in train 
a 
more general process of improvement in the complex 
land tenure 
arrangements of the area. Finally, it was seen as a means 
of 
correcting an obvious abuse, that is the practice of 
plantations 
operating with "tied house" systems where labourers 
lived 
on plantation land and in plantations houses whose 
facilities 
were patently sub-human, there being the absence of 
drinking 
water on the premises, poor sanitation, inadequate 
ventilation, 
overcrowding, etc. 
Wherever possible, peasant production was linked eith'r 
to newly created state marketing agencies, or cooperatives 
were 
introduced to ensure adequate regulation and 
supervision of land 
use and the distribution of output. In practice as we 
shall see 
in Chapter 7, the latter has produced a considerable 
"outside 
leadership" in the rural areas which has negated rather 
than 
promoted cooperative, self-help and self-reliant relations 
in 
the rural economy. 
Addttionally the Colonial Office 
recommended and put in 
place a number of technical complements to agricultural 
production. 
Thus in many parts of the region government 
departments concerned 
w±th agriculture and land policies were either established 
or 
where they already existed, re-organized. These agencies 
developed 
extension net-works to supervise!aia/advise the farming 
communities. 
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Agricultural institutions concerned with the provision 
of credit 
were also established as well as agencies to ensure 
the flow of 
fertilizers, machinery, technical advice, and so on 
to the 
peasant producing areas. Finally, since plantation 
agriculture 
generally dominated these economies, great efforts 
were made to 
rehabilitate, modernise, and reorganise these 
producing units. 
Usually this meant providing considerable subsidies 
to the 
plantation owners in order to facilitate the 
recomposition of their 
run-down capital stock and allow them to pursue 
wage and employ- 
ment policies which would stabilize the flow of 
labour to the 
estates. Thur in the case of sugar, after Word War II special 
funds were created, with the object of rehabilitating 
the industry, 
supporting stable wage payment policies in it, 
and providing 
buffer or stabilization funds to compensate for 
the widely 
fluctuating price of s.gar in the world market. The 
latter was 
buttressed by the policy of protected entry of the 
region's sugar 
into the UK market, and the price support this 
offered to the 
relatively high cost producing structures which the 
plantation 
in the region had developed into. 
In the agricultural economy the focus on plantation 
export agriculture was primary. The result was, 
thateven in 
situations as prevailed in Guyana, where the 
coloniál authorities 
promoted the production of rice as a peasant crop 
on a large scale, 
they did so in a manner to ensure that the labour 
and other inputs 
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of this crop did not compete with, but instead complemented 
the 
requirements of the plantation producing sector. 
Infrastructural facilties: One of the major de.fi.cienies 
of the region's economy identified by the colonial authorities 
was 
an inadequate infra-structure . Much emphasis was therefore 
placed on the. provision, through state financing, of an adequate 
infrastructure for private production. These encompassed land 
reclamation shcemes, drainage and irrigation works, roads and 
counicatio3,as well as the usual public utilities: 
electricity, 
sanitation, pure water supply etc. This development 
favoured an 
enhanced role of the state in creating the conditions for 
private 
economic activity in the region. 
Foreign capital inflows: Consistent with the coonia1 
office's view of the region's developmental capacity was its 
insistence, that whatevér development was attained would depend 
a great deal on an inflow of foreign finance, enterprise, 
skills, 
know-how and technology - whether on a private or international 
agency basis. As far as possible it was felt that the unification 
of the markets of individual territories with that of 
the UK 
would be a major incentive to the flow of capital. In this 
regard the views of the colonial office in Britain coincided with 
their counterparts in France and Holland. In the British 
territories the currency and banking arrangements established 
in 
103. 
the region produced an effective unification of individual 
capital markets of the region with that of Britain. Since 
the 
direction of this unification was exclu.Avely vertical and not 
horizontal, it promoted the progressive integration of the market 
of the individual territories of the region into the UK market, 
and it was only as a by-product of this that it facilitated a 
certain levelof horizonal exchanges within the region. Later, 
the inconveniences of having to administer a multiplicity 
of 
small and mini-etates, encouraged the view that some form of West 
Indian integration might serve the purpose of all concerned. 
In the attitude to foreign capital there was a quaint 
blend of the old mercantilist views on the promotion of empire 
and efforts to exploit Ricardian comparative advantages taken 
as already revealed the regionts productive structure. 
The 
result of the policies, however, was to foster the increasing 
transnational corporate (TNC) domination of the region's economy 
and reinforce the centre - periphery relations inherited at the 
end of World War II. In this sense therefore,this approach 
of the colonial office sought to reverse the tendencies towards 
breaking commercial links between the region and Britain. 
which had developed to some extent during World War II. 
y) Colonial development and welfare: As we had noted 
in 
Chapter 3 when discussing the Moyne Corrimission Report, a certain 
welfarism (in part an adjunct to the trusteeship view) was 
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elaborated, particularly in "liberal" and labour circles of the 
Colonial Office. This led to some emphasis on reform and the 
better provision of social services, investments in public 
utilities, and the promotion of trade union legislation in the 
area. 
vi) Trade: The emphasis here was on reciprocal preferences. 
The region was a high cost producer and without protected access 
to the UK market ±ts factor endownmen: which 'was suppose to 
favour agriculture did not yield compe ve prices. The subsidy 
required was to borne by the British coisumer. In return Britain 
maintained preferential access for her manufacturers and other 
exports to the region. It was hoped, if not expected, that 
protection of the UK makret would be a transitional means of 
support for theregion an in this sense the policy was not a 
simple reversl3n tc £L The emergence of North 
America as the major trading partner for veral of the territories 
was not very overtly resisted. The expectation was that the US 
and Canada would share the costs of subsidized production in the 
region by also giving preferential access to Caribbean exports. 
In light of this a policy of "oflTh:ially" discourag Canadian 
and US exports to the region could not have been vigorously 
pursued. 
vii) Migration: One of the paradoxes of the empire was that 
citizens of the United Kingdom and the colonies in theory enjoyed 
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the same rights of citizenship. With the pressures on living 
standards in the region and the attraction of relief in the UK 
many of the poor and the powerless sought refuge in large waves 
of migration to Britain. Between 1955 and 1959, estimates show 
that between twenty and thirty-three thousand West Indians went 
to the UK annually. In the two year period before this migration 
was effectively halted by the Commonwealth Immigration Act passed 
in Britain in 1962, 168,000 West Indians entered the UK. Migration 
also took place to other areas, especially the USA, where between 
1951 - 1960 about 200,000 persons went there, and between 1961 - 
1970 as many as half-a-million. 
viii) Industry: The bias against industrialization has already 
been remarked on earlier. He.re it is pertinent to note that an 
important phase of industr1 development had in fact occurred 
in the region, largely as -iU of the closing off of access 
to the UK market caused by World War II. Table Lt.l gives an 
indication of this range in the case of Trinidad-Tobago. The 
colonial authorities did not believe that this occurrence was of 
any particular significance a.id continued to hold the view that 
industry should b largely ned to local craft production, 
and small scale manufacturing activities which were in the main 



















5. General Industries 
Acetylene 







List of Industries in Operation in Thinidad in 1942/43: 
Part I: Large Scale Secondary Industries Manufacturing Goods Both for the 
Domestic Market and for Export: 
Angostura Bitters 
Carbon Dioxide Manufacture 
Industrial Gases 
Matches 
Line and Limestone 
Part II: Secondary Industries of an Adnced Kind ProducingGoods.for 
ocalConsurrption but not to aiy SuL'stantial Extent for Export 
1. Food, Drink and Tobacco 
Coconut Oil (Edible) 
Coconut Mal (animal Food) 
Confectionery (sweets) 






Toilet Preparations, etc. 
Medicinal Preparations 
Methylated Spirit s 
General Engineering 
Laundries 







Jams and Jellies 















Tath stone s 
yre Repairing (re- 
treading and vulcanizing) 
Part; III: Minor Industries and Crafts Conducted Principally in the Hones of 
of the Workers: 
Basketry 
Boot s and Shoes 












Source: Industri 1 Devèlopment in the British Territories of e Caribbean, 
Vol. II, pp. 10/11. 
Jewellery Tinware 
Lairip shade s 
Barrels 
Novelties (including wooden toys) 
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When taken together these various policies of the colonial 
authorities produced three major consequences. First, they 
explicitly sought to reinforce a particular rhythm of production 
giichl have referred to in Part 1 and which I have also described 
elsewhere as suggesting that the historical evidence shows: 
"that there is a crucial feature in the com- 
bination of smallness and underdevelopment 
[which] when dynamically applied and expressed 
in terms of objective, material phenomena 
consists of the fact that the conjunction of 
production relations and productive forces is 
of such a character that the measure of structural 
dependence, underdevelopment, and the economic 
backiardness of the process of production which 
is important above all others is on the one hand, 
the lack of an organic link, rooted in an 
indigenous science and technology, between the 
pattern and growth of domestic resource use and 
the pattern and growth of domestic demand, and 
on the other, the divergence between domestic 
demand and the needs of the broad mass of the 
population". 4/ 
This produces an economic system in which the lack of systematic 
material linkages between labour-resourc es-technology-demand-needs 
is but a reflection of a system of' social relations in which the 
ownership and use of' productive factors and the pattern of 
consumption yield output which is not oriented either to domestic 
consumption as expressed through the market, or the domestic 
needs of the population, as reflected in the continuing real 
shortages of food, clothing, shelter, recreation and leisure 
products. 
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The colonial strategy of tne period took this condition 
as more or less "naturally ordained", reflecting the given 
state-of-the-artS and a social reality that was inevitable and 
irreversible. 
The second consequence was that before independence, 
this rhythm of production was not mediated to any exceptional 
degree through the local state. As independence approached, 
and after independence, the state assumed a lar:er and larger 
role in economic organization and production, with the 
eventual 
result that today it is the dominant internal institutional 
factor in the region's economy. This is not to say that the 
colonial office had a strictly laisser faire view of the state. 
To the contrary, state functions developed, but lacking the 
political and social influences produced by the 
nationalist, 
movement its mediation of colonial policies was not of the same 
order as was to be the case in the later period. 
Thirdly, the economic structures of the region began 
to take on more and more of the definitive characteristics of 
poverty, underdevelOPmeflt and dependence. Thus we find the 
5/ 
following: 
- overspecialization in the production of a na'row 
range of primary products produced mainly for export, 
and with sales confined to a narrow range of over- 
seas markets. 
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- considerable instability in the prices of these 
products when sold abroad, leading to a 
situation 
in which wide fluctuations in the domestic 
levels 
of income, employment and prices were regular 
features of economic life. 
- an open economy produced by the combination 
of the 
two featuies listed above and the region's 
heavy 
independence Ofl imports and foreign capital 
inflows 
to feed the population, service industry 
and finance 
internal capital expansion. 
- a predominant role played by foreign 
decision-making 
and expertize in economic activity. 
- highly developed mechanisms for the drain 
of the 
domestic surplus abroad (the currency 
board and 
commercial branch banking mechanism of the period, 
strict adherence co the sterling exchange 
standard 
system, absence of all forms of regulation or 
con- 
tol on capital mobility in nd out of the country, 
and so on) . 
- predominantly agricultural and mining 
economies 
with limited diversification of output, and 
occupations. 
- widespread poverty, malnutrition, inadequate housing 
and social services such as educatiOn,.health, 
and 
sanitation. 
- backward agrarian systems with marked inequalities 
in land ownership and acceBs. 
- the absence on any significant scale of the 
major 
classes of this historical era (industrial 
protelariat 
and a local industrial-financial bourgeoisie), and 
along with this the underdevelOPmeflt of 
their part- 
icular institutions (political parties, trade 
unions, 
etc) 
Th above listing is not exhaustive, but primarily. indicative. 
To it, however, should be added the complicating circumstances 
produced by the small size and scale of these economies, as well 
as the racial stratification of economic functions in the area. 
Bcause colonial policies were designed to perpetuate 
some variant or te other of colonial domination, despite 
some benefits produced here and there, ultimately they stood in 
otposition to the interests of the broad mass of the region's 
peoples. The main beneficiaries were in general, the large scale 
plantation owners and foreign capital. Efforts at redressirg 
the twin scourges of peasant Jisposession and large scale 
unemployment were largely tenative and in the main politically 
motivated the concern being to defuse pressures and agitation 
for independence. In this sense therefore, these measures were 
desigied to demobilize rather than release the creative energies 
of the broad mass of the population whose continued poverty and 
powerlessness these policies woild certainly ensure. 
II: National Independence and Economic Strategies 
Thc basic feature of the period after World War II was 
the growth and spread of the national independence movement in 
the region. As In other areas of its social life, this development 
was uneven. However, by the 1960's independence had come to 
sorne territories: Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados. 
While it 
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was the broad mass of the population of the 
region, particularly 
the peasants, workers, and unemployed who 
produced the main 
pressu'es against the colonial system, it was 
the petty- 
bourgeoisie, the professionals and other 
such intermediate 
strata which exercised leadership over these 
mass movements. It 
was these strata therefore, which negotiated 
the mecharicS of 
the independence settlements. This situation, 
should not lead 
us to have any doubt that the struggles 
for a widened franchise 
more local autonomy, improved access to 
rtsrces for the local 
population, better pay and conditions of labLir, 
better prices 
for agricultural produce, more security of 
living standards, and 
ultimately the struggle for independence 
itself represented an 
exceptionally important period in the development 
of populist 
politics in the region. Two very important 
considerations 
emerged out of this period of Caribbean developent. 
First, 
the growth of mass politics and the mobilization 
of the population 
which this entailed, produced to an unparalleled 
degree the 
legitimization of politics and the state in the 
history of the 
region. The inference of this was that 
the post-colonial state 
was qualitatively different from its predecessor 
despite the 
continuation of certain real constraints to 
its growth: economic 
structure, geo-political context, size, 
etc. The period up to 
and after independence therefore marked a 
real as distinct fxm 
a merely symbolic turning point in 
the functioning of the state 
in economic life of the area. While 
in many thstances, parti- 
cularly on the left, this produced an over-expectation 
on the 
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capacity of these states to transform inherited 
structures and 
to alleviate the poverty and powerlessness of 
the broad mass 
of the population without these states themselvel 
undergoing a 
transformation of their content, the state as an 
economic 
institution became a decisive factor in the 
prospects for local 
development. 
Paradoxically, howver, this consequence coincided with another 
development which significantly 
affected the way in which this 
potential was exploited. That is the leadership 
of the independence 
movements, having taken state power, sought after independence 
gene- 
rally to demobilize and de-politicize the 
masses thereby 
restraining the deepening of mass politics within 
the society 
at large. The most extreme examples of this 
are Gairy's Grenada 
and Burnham'S Guyana. This development emerged 
out of the fact 
that the petty-bourgeoisie and intermediate 
strata which led 
the mass movement were essential colonial 
creations with limited 
objectives. Their growth derived from the preferred 
access to 
education, the professions, and to a lesser extent 
land, which 
limited sections of the population enjoyed. This 
group resented 
their secorid-claSS status in colonial society and 
expected that 
with independence they would either be bequeathed 
by the colonial 
authorities, or seen by the masses, or both, 
as the logical 
inheritors of the colonial office's "right-to-rule" 
. This meant 
that their struggles were not oriented towards 
a revolutionary 
reversal of power relations in favour of the 
poor and the 
powerless. The independence settlement therefore became a 
mechanism for excluding the masses from effective power. Again 
the most extreme example of this was Guyana where as a result 
of 
a British government, USA-CIA manoeuvre Burnham was brought to 
power and the Peoplets Progressive Party which had won the 
victories at the poll as the first elected Marxist government 
in the western hemisphere was removed from office. 
With this background the strategies pursued by the 
"nationalist3't would clearly follow certain predictable lires. 
In sum these would lead to certain important changes, all of 
which, 
however, fell far short of real economic dependence. These 
policies followed six major lines, each of which forms the 
substance of a separate chapter in this Part of the Study0 
Tiese 
are: 
j) Industrialization based on a capital 
import model 
allegedly aived from Puerto Rican experience, and one which 
emphasiseS protection, capital subsidisation and a leading role 
for TNCs in alliance with the emerging local business elite 
(Chapter 5). 
ii) Natural resource development through 
TNCs (Chapter 6). 
jii) A restructuring of the traditional 
agricultural export 
sector and domestic agriculture (Chapter 7). 
iv.) The diversification of economic 
structure in the 
direction of development of a significant services sector, 
particularly tourism (Chapter 8) and the creation of off-shore 
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financial havens (Chapter 8). 
y) The introduction of new economic institutions and the 
restructuring of exiting ones ('Chapter 9). 
'vi) The promotion of a certain form of economic integration 
in the region to overcome the limitations of small size. This 
forms the substance of discussion in Chapter 12. 
As each of these policies are dealt with at some length later, 
we can close the discussion of the basic features o the nationalist 
alternatives at this point. 
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Societiest, Monthly Review Press, and Heinemann, New 
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CHAPTER 5: PUERTO RICO TO THE RESCUE: INDUSTRIALIZATION 
- BY INVITATION 
The "boom" in economic activity which was experienced in 
several of the Caribbean territories from the early and middle 
1950's to the late 1960's, was in large measure fuelled by 
unprecedented developments in three sectors: manufacturing, mining 
(oil and bauxite-alumina) and tourism. Development of the first 
sector forms the substance of the discussion in this chapter. 
However, the link between developments in this sector and the 
other two should be constantly borne in mind since in at least 
orle crucial area, namely, foreign exchange availability, the growth 
of the manufacturing sector could not have taken place to the 
extent it did without the expansion of the other two sectors which 
supplied much of the foreign exchange it consumed. 
I: The Rationale 
is we have already noted in the previous chapter, at 
the end of World War II the Colonial Office viev was that 
industrial development was uneconomic and undes'eable, (if not 
impossible to achieve), in the small tropical colonies of the 
Caribbean. This was in fact an old view, since the West India 
Royal Commission of 1897 had earlier stated that "there was no 
prospect for manufactured industries being established on any 
considerable scale"0 21 It was this view the Moyrie Commission 
reiterated when it denounced "speculative industrial enterprises" 
in the region - although certain exceptions were conceded if 
I, 
British firmou1d be "induced" to participate, .g. cement. ,- 
As we have also noted in the previous chapter the war years had 
stimulated economic activity in the Caribbean, particularly an 
expansion in mining output, construction associated with military 
facilities built during this period by the US, and domestic food 
output. In the wake of these, there was also noticeable expansion 
of manufacturing activity, and a list of the industries in 
Trinidad-Tobago was presented in Table 3.1. This latter develop- 
ment combined with nationalist denounciations of colnial rule 
as stifling the growth of the ar led to the fcll: that 
industrialization was possible in the region if th2 right 
combination of circumstances could be created. As it turned out, 
Sir Authur Lewis was to provide a theoretical rationale, periaps 
unintended by the author, for these aspirati'ms and tus name 
(not altogether deservedly) has been more close±y associated 
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with the policies whici 
other. 
The theoretical basis of Lewis' approach built on the 
work of two earlier economists, Ricardo and Colin Clark. 
The latter's empirical work had indicated the positive relation 
between the share of manufacturing output and the wealth of 
nations. In addition, Lewis' own observations of the region 
had led him to recognize a truth, that is, primary agriculture 
could not provide sustained development of the area, and indeed 
could not even provide jobs in adequate numbers for the rapidly 
1: L_Lt effect, than any 
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gro.wing population. Ricardo's studies had also led him to a 
similar conclusion about 19th century Britain. It is from these 
two streams of thought that Lewis developed the argument that: 
"the policy which seems to offer most hope of 
permanent success is for the islands to follow 
in the footsteps of other agricultural countries 
in industrialization ... No other policy seems 
to offer such permanent prospects as the develop- 
ment of local industries". 3/ 
The point has been iado, howev. that Ricardo's worL- from which 
Lewis drew so much inspiration, i.d seriously underestimated the 
role of international trade and had focussed almost exclusively 
on the effective home demand for agricultural products in his 
arguments against the possibilities of development and trans- 
formation through agricultural activity. 
Be that as i Li' arguments were rt as un- 
guarded as it has been popularly assumed. Certain elements in 
his rationale were later ignored by policy makers and it is 
important to our later evaluation of these policies that we state 
them here. The first of these is that Lewis' conception was that 
industry plays the pivotal transforming role in the process of 
development, but that this was not as an alternative to agricultural 
diversification development but instead was its complement. 
The failure to recognize this element of his formulation led to 
the siOUS neglect of West Indian agriculture, as we shall see 
In Chter 7. The second element which was ignored was that 
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Lewis' model was based on the coming 
into existence of a dynamic 
class of industrialists (much as in 
Ricardo's time) who would 
control and utilize t e surplus, as 
well as play a leading role 
in the political development of the 
region. As we shall see a 
new class of business 
ersonas in fact created and their political 
impact has been substantial. This class, 
however, has lacked an 
adciate command over financial resources, 
science and technology, 
skills and know-how and consequently 
has had to expard as junior 
partnerS or surrogates of transnational 
firms. e third element 
which was ignored was Lewis' insistence 
that tne in.üstries which 
were to be developed should reflect 
resource availabilities ¡factor 
endowflmefltS/C0mP'atJ advantages 
which for the region meant 
labour intensive industrial activities, 
based on the relative 
abundance of labour supplies (and 
conseque:tly low wage rates), 
and the relative shortages of natural re'rceS 
and capital. LS 
we EJall see the policies puiued sought L Tbsidize 
capital 
and not labour. Finally, problems 
of size and scale were recognised 
the result that opposite characteristics 
emerged in the industrial 
structure of the region. 
As events turned out, it was the 
much touted industrial 
"successes" of Puerto- Rico in 
the late l90's and early 1950's 
which formed the practical model 
for the industrialization 
by Lewis and from the outset 
this prompted his advocacy for a 
regional approach to industrialization, 
as well as an export 
orientation in industry. In 
practice these were also ignored with 
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strategies which evolved in the West Indies. As it has been 
aptly put: 
"Since 19147 Puerto Rico has been transformed into 
a laboratory of corporate organisation, pinning 
its hopes for development and gearing its social 
and economic policies to one objective; attratng 
US capital. Using the unique circumstances of 
the island's colonial relationship with the United 
States and its condition as a relatively poor 
Third World country, a succession of Puerto Rican 
administration5have offered investors a corporate 
paradise where wages are low, government docile 
and taxes virtually nonexi:tent". 14/ 
The Puerto Rican model should not be intrepeted as a fixed or 
static conception, since it has gone through several stages of 
evolution since World War II. We are concerned here with its 
first phase of evolution which was aimed at attracting US investors 
and depended on two major factors to do so. One was an industriai 
incentives law which was passed in 19147 and which gave tax 
exemptions and other subsidies to foreign industry, and the other 
was the activities of its development agency (FOMENTO) which were 
directed towards luring foreign investors to the country with 
the pranise of cheap labour, unlimited trade with the US market, 
weak unions, and political stability guaranteed through its 
colonial refationship with the US. The strategy attracted a 
number of small and medium sized labour intensive companies with 
an aveige investment under $1 million per plant in such areas 
as textiles, clothing, food-processing, and leather goods. 
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This model exhausted itself in the 1960's when a 
number of factors inherent to Puerto Rico's colonial relationship 
to the US created obstacles to further expar3ion. One was the 
extension of the US federal minimum wage to Puerto Rico as the 
US labour movement feared the "cheap and underunìonized labou.r 
competitiont' from Puerto Rico. As a result between 1950 and 
1960 the median wage in Puerto Rico more than doubled (from 42 
to 9I cents per hour), while that ïn the US grew by only 53%. 
Another was the significant increase in maritime tariffs for US 
Puerto Rican shipping which occurred - an increase of 29% in 
1q58. s part of the US, Puerto Rico could not resort to cheaper 
foreign carriers and had to maintain its US carriers which had won 
the increase in rates. Finally, the growth in union activity 
which was taking place in Puerto Rico, partly in imitation of 
similar developments in the US, put pressure on wages while at 
the same time decreasing its attractiv ness as "a docile labour 
market". 
To combat these developments the policy of capital 
imports was further intensified as a new incentives law was 
passed in 1963. This law increased the tax exemption period 
from 10 to 16 years and more in certain circumstances, parti- 
cu1ar1 in the case of heavy industry, which it assumed was 
oriented towards long term profits. This gave some impetus to 
a shift to the heavy industry stage of development, a process 
accelerated by the US administration's approval of special 
quotas expanding cheaper foreign oil imports 
to Puerto Rico. 
This was an incentive to expand the local 
petro-chemical industry. 
As events turned out this industry was to 
become the center piece 
of expansion in the second phase of the 
Puerto Rican model which 
lasted until the mid-1970'5. As Portojas 
Garcia observed: 
"The new petrochemical complex became the ful- 
crum of industrial development through the 
mid 
1970's ... the years after 1965 saw the arrival 
of an entirely new group of multinationals linked 
to the petrochemical sector, as well as other 
representatives - such as pharmaceuticals and 
electronics - of big monopoly capital. The focus 
of accumulation shifted, as light labour 
intensive 
industry was displaced by hevy capital intensive 
operations ... by 197k 110 of the Fortune 500 
were 
operating in Puerto Rico. They ran a total of 
336 subsidiarieS, of which 333 had received 
special 
(and free) factory construction, t: ning, 
financing, 
or legal assistance from FOMENTO". j/ 
As ie goes on to point out by 1979 as many 
as 139 of 
Fomento promoted factories on the 
resulting in US effective control 
sectors in the island. 
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island in i971, 99 were US, 
of the most dynamic industrial 
Despite the popularity of the model it has been 
and 
continues to be the subject of many trenchant 
criticisms. Thus 
it has been pointed ut that over the 
course of time this 
strategy has increased the colonial dependence 
of Puerto Rico in 
the US. The new class of businessrso1aPita1iS 
wh0 developed 
the Fortune s operated there. 
Cf the total of 1,720 
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under it, and replaced the older rural oligarchs,waS 
neither 
more nationalist in their outlook nor more concerned 
with the 
poor and the powerless than their predecessors. 
Moreover, in 
the process of creating this class, indigenous 
entrepreneurship 
was destroyed, traditional crafts, skills, and 
technical know- 
how had become marginalized, and the society 
became more 
oriented to the consumer ethic of its metropolitan 
patron. It 
is true that a relatively better-off industrial 
ro1etariat came 
into existence, but this class was surrounded by 
a sea of unemployed 
and survived through the steady stream of 
migration of Puerto 
Ricans out of their homeland and into the 
US. Thus as much as 
one-quarter of the population migrated out of Puerto 
Rico during 
the 1950T s, while unemployment throughout this 
period stood above 
20% of the labour force. Foreign domination 
of the country's 
tangible and reproducLble assets was such 
that only percent 
of it was held by Puerto Ricans. It's orientation 
to the American 
market was so complete that in l97, it produced "0% of all para- 
xylene consumed in the US, as well as 30% of 
the cyclohexane, 
26% of the benzene, 2% of the xylene, 23% of the propylene, and 
12% of the vinyl- chloride. Forty-four percent 
of all electrodes 
uscd in the US came from Puerto Rican factories". 
6/ 
In other words Puerto Rico was the most important site 
of direct US investment in all of Latin 
America. Finally, it 
should be noted that two practices began. to emerge 
among corp- 
orations attracted to Puerto Rico. One 
was to close companies 
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when the tax exemption period expfred, and the other was to 
invest tax exemption profits in liquid assets in Puerto Rico 
rather than re-investment in manufacturing. The latter occurred 
because of the orientation of the system towards tax exemption 
of profits. Thus Portojas Garcia ites the Tobin Report which 
showed that a typical subsidiarj iintained as much as 80% 
of its assets in financial form. bout one-half of investments 
in Puerto Rico was composed of Îiincial assets, allowing the 
rate of return on'physical assets to be as high as 35 - 60%. 
Thus it was possible in 1977 for a group of mu1ixiaionals such 
as Pepsi Cca, Union Carbide, Digital Equipment, Abbott Labor- 
atories, Eli Lilly, Smith Kline, Motorola and G.D. Seale to 
obtain over one-fifth of their g1al profits from Puerto Rico. 
In all, except Eli Lilly,, Union Cabide, and Pepsi Cola, the 
proportion of profit obtained in Berto Rico exceeded one-half. 
The brief outline of the Puerto Rican model given here, 
is necessary if we are to comprehcd the theoretical rationale 
which emerged among the nationaiit leaders in the West Indian 
territories as justification of tt line of industrialization 
which eventually took place. In the next section I shall indicate 
how this policy was put into practical operation and in the third 
section we turn to an evaluation of it performance. 
II: The Practice 
West Indian practice in the approach to industrialization 
ciosely patterned itself after the first phase Puerto Rican import 
capital model. Incentives were offered to investors both local 
and roreign with emphasis on the latter. By 1960 all the 
territories had incentive legislation and schemes 'in operation. 
Usually, these comprised the following: 
Stat.e provision of basic infrastructuralservices: 
harburs, airports, roads, telecommunications, etc. In all the 
territories it was seen as the government's duty to finance these 
and there local funds were insufficient, recourse was made to 
secure grants and loans overseas. 
Protective import tariffs were levied and quota re- 
striztións on imports put in place in orde' to protect local 
operators from foreign competition. 
Income and property taxes were adjusted in order to 
prozide accelerated depreciation allowances to firms which invested 
locfly. 
Income tax holidays were given to new investors or 
thou which expanded operations. 
y) The state also financed the construction of factory 
shellls which were then put on sale or lease in the form of 
indutria1 parks. These sites usually included the provision of, 
siteroads, water supply, sewerage, lay-out, electricity, refuse- 
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disposal, landscaping, maintenance, postal, 
telephone, and 
telex services. 
The state also established training facilities 
for 
the local work force in the form of 
technical/POlYtechnical 
institutes, University, etc., and 
To regulate this progralT1lfle the various 
governments 
put in place what were termed Industrial Development 
Corporations 
(IDCs). 
A typical example of these IDOs is 
the one in Barbados which has 
been created to provide eleven functions: 
- to supply s.ocio-eêOnOmiC informaton to prospective 
investors; 
- to explain the opeatiOflS of the fiscal incentive 
legislation aid to give assistance in the 
preparation 
of applicatiOr for these; 
- to give advice to investors on factory erection; 
- to provide factory space on lease, purchase, or 
rental basis; 
- to undertake prefeasibilitY studies for prospective 
investors; 
- to provide assistance in coordinating joint ventures 
between local and foreign interests; 
- to liase between prospective investors and appropriate 
government departments; 
- to act as consultant to investors during the initial 
phases of negotiations with private sector organi- 
zations; 
- to assist in recruiting and training suitable labour; 
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- to assist in making applications for work permits 
for personnel brought in by firms established under 
this programme. 
In Barbados the income tax and customs duty exemption which are 
given is based on a 3-10 year grace period on the following terms: 
if local value added is 50% + the grace period is 
10 years 
if local value added is 25-50% the grace period is 
8 years; 
if local value added is 10-25% the grace period is 
6 years. 
In cases of what have been termed enclave and highly capital 
intensIve industries, a 10 year grace period is provided. The 
IDC of Barbados currently administers lfl parks and up to today 
the operation of its incentive schemes is based on the Fiscal 
Incentives Act passed in 1971, which 'nded the Industrial 
Incentives Act 1963, anç the Industrial Development (Export 
Industries) Act, 1969. 
The two territories where this process of industrial- 
ization ts most developed in the West Indies is Jamaica and 
Trinidad-Tobago. It would be therefore very useful to review 
briefly their experiences. In addition the experience of one of 
the smaller territories (St. Lucia) where this process is most 
advanced is also outlined in this section. 
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At one level the process of industrialization has 
led to a noticeable variety in products - given the small 
size 
of Jamaica's population. In 1950, rum, sugar, and molasses 
manufacturing accounted for 28% of value added in manufacturing 
in Jamaica. By 1970 this was down to 2% A number of new 
industries developed,to create a certain diversification: 
food, 
beverageS tobacco, textiles, footwear, garments, furniture, 
fixtures, wood products, printing, publishing, paper products, 
cement and clay prodoi;s, rnei;l products and chemicals. In 
1950 manufacturing acountG Tnr only 11% of GDP, but by the 
later 1970's a burst in activity had taken this to close to 20%. 
In real terms the annual growth of this sector between 1950 - 
1968 was 7.6%. After 1968 it declined to 5.2% (1969-1973) and 
3.8% (197k-1978). In 1978, 79,000 persons, or aboui10% of the 
employed labour force, and 10% of total merchandise.exports 
were 
provided by manufacturing. 
The role of incentives in the 1950's and up to the mid- 
1960's was critical to this result. While in the early years 
these took the form mainly of income tax exemptions, duty free 
imports of raw materials and machiner7, t- free dîidends, and 
generous depreciative allowances, increasingly, quantitative 
restrictions on imports anc other trade and exchange policies 
overtook these. At the time of independence there were 50 items 
on the restricted list in Jamaica. By 1979 the total was 
3311. 
Even this large numerical increase however understates the extent 
of this new policy development, as some of the items 
listed as 
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individual items cover a tremendous range 
of products. Thus 
"clothing - all types and materials" constitute 
a single entry 
on the list! 
Ayub in the study cited above has pointed out 
that 
most of the items on the restricted list were 
consumer items, 
and that these "incentives now appear excessively 
generous". 
The tax exempt period in Jamaica was also 
considered by him as 
being too long and the policy of tax exemptions 
on dividends 
dicouraged profit retention for reinvestment. 
As he ccncludes: 
"In short, quantitative restrictionsand the 
accompanying import quotas have provided an 
unusually generous incentive for import sub- 
stituting firms, the benefits of which far 
exceed those accruing from the industrial 
incentives and other policy measures". 8-/ 
LLtring the period 1970-1973, 0% of all 
the companie: tablished 
were wholly owned or controlled by foreigners. 
This comprised 
33% of the firms established under 
the industrial incentives 
legislation and 68% of the firms under the 
export industry 
encouragement legislation. Joint ventures itere 
significant, 
accounting for 35% of the former and 9% of 
he latter category. 
While there was a theoretical recognition of 
the need 
to encourage the export of manufacturers, 
in practice very little 
concrete support was given thiS. As a 
result two lines of expoit. 
activity developed. One was the 
export of manufacturers to the 
131. 
Caricom market. This occurred largely because, as we shall see 
in detail later, the Caricom treaty was generous in its definition 
of the origin of goods for the purpose of regional exports. In 
addition there was as a result of Caricom a common external tariff 
and free intra-regional trade in force. Because of cultural and 
social links this regional market also required the least effort 
in terms of promptional activity, packaging, contents, etc, to 
exploit. Until the disruptions of Caricom market brought about 
in large measure by the economic crisis after the mid-1970's 
this was by far the most important export outlet of the 
Jamaican manufacturing sector. The other export effort was in 
the form of industrial sub-contracting within the expert processing 
zones. Unuer this arrangement, and located in factory space pro- 
vided by the Jamaica Industrial Corporation a number- of firms 
in electronics and clothing were encouraged to set shop and 
exploit the low wages prevailing in Jamaica. Th firms 
assembled products imported into Jamaica with the sole intent 
of re-export to the parent firms. In practice these were very 
footloose firms, and we shall see the deteriorating political 
situation in Jamaica after the nid-l97O's, as well as the erosion 
of its wage advantages, firms established uJer these arrangements 
have fled to greener pastures, often other parts of the same 
region. 
The experience of Trinidad-Tobago was broadly similar. 
Incentive legilsation with the usual tax exemptions, accelerated 
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depreciation allowances and duty free imports and 
which was 
passed in 1950 was the cornerstone of the system. 
This was 
stepped up in the series of goveriment five year 
plans which 
stressed the following: 
- development of infra-structure and supporting 
facilities for industry; 
- the creation of technical schools to train labour, 
and a Management and Productivity Centre in 1968 
to train management; research was also catered for 
through the establishment of the Caribbean Industrial 
Research Institute in 1971; 
- the establishment of an industrial deveiuinent corp- 
oration (1958) which was charged with securing the 
necessary institutional supports for the 5dustrial- 
ization process; 
- the creation of a Bureau of Standards in 1972; 
- and, finally, in the early years the level of pro- 
tection was raised to levels "prevailing in 
competing countries". 
In dditnn to the above a series of special measur were 
intro- 
duced to deal with specific large investments. Among 
these were 
the Cement Industry Development Ordinance 1951, Nitrogenons 
Fertilizers Industry (Development) Ordinance 1958, Lube Oil and 
Greases.DevelOPmeflt Ordinance 1961, Petrochemicals Industry 
Development Act 1962, Tyre Manufacturing Industry Development 
Act 1967 and an International Marketing Corporation in 1971. 
As in Jamaica there was a spurt of new business and a 
anufacturiflg sector, albeit of a special type, began to 
emerge. 
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Thus a survey showed that up to February 1959, 56 pioneer industry 
establishments were in existence with an investment of TT$LIO.2 
million, emplying 2,713 persons. By 1968 during the second five 
year plan (l96-l968) the number reached was 139 with an invest- 
ment of TT$257.8 million and employing 6,921 persons. Between 
1951-1961 the annual rate of expansion of the manufacturing sctor 
was 9.7%. During the Third Five Year Plan the sector grew by 
7% per annum. 
As in the case of Jamaica most of the manufacturing 
growth has been in the direction of textiles and clothing, food 
processing and the assembly of consumer durables (cars, radios, 
telegrams, workers, refrigerators etc). As Ln Jamaica also 
import substitution was given priority over export romotion there- 
by generating difficulties whe the relatively "easy phase" of 
the domestic market was exhausted. As these emer more and more 
discussion centered on export promotion, and in this context the 
relatively captive Caricom market was again the starting point. 
The process of industrialization in Trinidad-Tobago was however 
complicated by its possession of oil resources. Prior to 1973 
oil traditionally supplied 25-30% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), as well as government revenues. After the oil bocm when 
prices quadrupled, the share in GDP grew to 48% in 1975. As a 
consequence even though manufacturing grew, while it averaged 
between 9-10 of GDP between 1950 and 1970, it fell to 6% in 
1975 and has hovered in the range of 6-7%, ever since. 
l3 
Because of favourable resource configurations, 
mainly 
natural gas and petroleum, and as a consequence 
foreign exchange 
availability, the government has sougut to 
overcome the inherent 
limitations of the simple assembly of consumer 
goods, food 
processing, etc, by seeking to develop a 
heavy industry complex 
based in Point Lisas. This is a major 
venture involving several 
complex joint venture arrangements, consultancies, 
marketing 
and technology deals with foreign transnationals. 
The major 
activities to date are the production 
of iron and steel, natural 
gas, electricity, fertilizers, methanol, 
and other industrial 
Themicals. Still at the planning 
states are an aluminum 
company utilizing Guyana and/or Jamaica's 
bauxite and Trinidad- 
Tobago's natural gas, and a liquified 
natural gas enterprise. 
Eric St Cyr has summed up this new emphasis 
aptly: 
!tFor more than thirty years the cream of the nation's 
intellect and the vast bulk of its public invest-. 
ment have been concentrated, first on the develop- 
ment of import substituting industries, later 
on 
export promotion industries based on imported 
inputs, 
and most recently on resource in the energy 
based 
industries at Point Lisas. This effort we 
hasten 
tostate, has been carried out with tremendous success 
in trie sense that what it was stated would 
be done 
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has been done. However, the hoped for dynamic 
has not come about: the economy still functions 
very much as it did historically being export 
staple propelled, and most of its basic problems 
remain". 10/ 
As events have turned out the Point Lisas project has 
been plagued by a number of bad business decisions. These have 
included overoptimistic market forecasts, weak cost estimation 
leading to huge cost overruns, and getting into pre-feasibility, 
feasibility, production and market arrangements with TNCs whose 
interests are otherwise than those stated and expected of a 
"partner". A major difficulty is that the new industries must be 
export oriented at the scales of plants constructed. Apart from 
weak market forecasts other problems have arisen, the most 
daunting in its implications being the charge by US steel companies 
that steel exported to the US by Trindad-Tobago is being "dumped" 
Since then the US authorities have put imports on "hold". At 
this stage, because of serious declines in oil revenues the 
question has been raised as to whether the government should 'throw 
good money after bad and persist with these investments. 
We shall return to this issue latter in the text, bu» 
it is clear from all the circumstances that one motivating factor 
in this development has been the desire by the authÙrities to 
find a path of development and hence industrialization which can 
create a clean break with the typical staple export dependence. 
In this instance the effort is to transform within the economy 
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an abundant raw material into major products of contemporary 
heavy industry. 
Although the favourable circumstances created by the 
oil boom in Trinidad-Tobago was unprecedented, the phase of 
Jamaican industrialization under consideration here was also associ- 
ated with the expansion of a major mineral, in this instance, 
bauxite-alumina. The relatively bouyant economic conditionc 
created by this, as well as the surplus which it yielded, 
(particularly in the form of foreign exchange) facilitated govern- 
ment activity in this field. The importance of this consideration 
can be seen in the fact that since the foreign exchange crisis 
has emerged in the late 1970's, the resulting shortage of foreign 
exchange in Jamaica has been the single most important brake on 
the continuation of this type of industrialization process. 
Similarly, the decline of oil revenues in recent times has 
seriously called into question Trinidad-Tobago's heavy industry 
thrust. 
Although we have used the examples of Jamaica and 
Trinidad-Tobago primarily, the experience in other parts of the 
West Indies is not dissimilar. Thus in St. Lucia, apart from 
th3 constraints of its smaller size and a less favourable foreign 
exchange situation (because tourism was not as bouyant as oil 
or bauxite), the pattern of its industrializationhas been 
broadly similar to that of the two larger territories. The 
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process there began with the simple processing of raw materials: 
bay rum, copra products, clay, furniture and soft drinks. When 
in the early 1970's the governments of the four Windward Islands 
and a Venezuelan firm (Papelera Industrial) entered into a joint 
venture to establish a corrugated carton manufacturing plant, this 
led to a spurt of new investments. Over 80 enterprises wejr'e 
established producing items like: plastic, beer,, industrial gases, 
toilet paper, batteries, garments, and electrical compnents. In 
addition to passing the usual incentive legislation, the govern- 
ment also established a development corporation in 1972 which 
has received loans to build industrial estates and factory skills. 
This corporation presently operates four estates comprising 
230 acres with 150,000 square feet of factory space. Export 
processing firms have also been established in textiles (Hong 
Kong and US investors) diving suits (US), and electronic 
components (US). Altogether the new sector was estimated to be 
employing 3,000 persons by the end of the 1970's and earning 
about US$12 million in foreign exchange. 
As in the other territories much of this ground to a 
halt in the wake of political uncertainty, depression, and the 
world crisis. 
Table 5.1 gives a general indication of the size of the 
manufacturing sector of the West Indian countries and other 
selected Caribbean territories. 
TABLE 5.1 
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY AS 0% OF GDP 
Most Recent 
1975 1980 Year 
Antigua 9.1 6.1 1.2 (1983) 
Bar'Qados 10.3 10.9 13.3 (1983) 
Belize 13.7 10.5 N.A. 
Dominica 4.2 5.0 7.0 (1983) 
Grenada 4.5 2.4 N.A. 
Guyana 13.6 10.7 10.8 (198)4) 
Jamaica 17.1 16.1 18.9 (198)4) 
Montserrat 6.1 6. 8.8 (198)4) 
St. Kitts 2.3 1)4.9 13.5 (1982) 
St. Lucia 7.1 8.9 10.4 (1983) 
St. Vincent 6.6 14»1 12.0 (1982) 
Trinidad-Tobago 5.5 5.6 68 (1985) 
Cuba 31.2 32.1 33.1 (1982) 
Dominican Republic 20.9 15.2 15.6 (1981) 
Haiti 13.7 17.8 N.A. 
Suriname 6.2 8.6 10.0 (1983) 
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Source: UNECLA and the Caribbean, Agricultural Statistics, 
Vol. Vi, 198)4 LC/CAR/G.132, and Government tatistics 
of the various territories. 
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While overall the data show quite modest levels of industrial- 
ization for the West Indian countries, ratios of manufacturing 
activity to GDP should be interpreted with caution. To begin 
with the territories are inconsistent in the way the simple 
processing of sugar and other agricultural products produced 
for exports is treated (e.g. rice). In Guyana the ratios 
indicated include this type of processing as well as the operations 
of certain public utilities e.g., water and e1ectric'ty. Secondly, 
a high ratio in a particular year may principally reflect declines 
in total output brought about by low volumnes or sales of their 
very unstable export crops and mineral produce. The ratios also 
masks the comparative depth and variety of manufactiring activity. 
Thus the low ratio of 7% in Trinidad-Tobago reflects partly the 
heavy weight given to petroleum expors in its GDP and also 
mask the fact that the variet,r of industry there, as well as 
the depth of the industrialization process achieved is in 
advance of a territory such as St. Kitts where the ratio is twice 
as large. In some of the territories, however, e.g. Barbados, 
St. Lucia, and Jamaica the ratios are representative of the 
weight of these sectors in their national economies. Finally, 
the contrast with Cuba should be noted here, as the high ratio 
found there (33%) reflects a qualitatively higher level of 
industrial development than anywhere else in the Caribbean. 
III: The Results 
After more than three decades of this process 
of 
industrialization, what judgement can be 
fairly given? In this 
section I have drawn together and present 
serially all the major 
weaknesses which have been identified in 
the process of industrial- 
ization in the region. As it will be 
observed the weaknesses 
are many; the order of presentation, 
however, does not reflect 
ary form of ranking. 
i) Import_substitution and export 
discouragement. 
As we have already noted in the review 
of experiences in 'Jamaica 
and Trinidad-Tobago, the industrialization 
prcess was essentially 
orientad around captive domestic markets. 
These markets being 
small and the concentration of roductiofl 
being geared to the 
3nmption requirements of a small minority 
of the population, 
in ,he high income and largely urban 
population, (the groups 
best placed to bring in consumer durables 
after "visits" 
abroad) it was not surprising that 
these markets soon became 
exhausted. Caricom then became a 
significant outlet for the 
larger producers. This development was 
based on its common 
external protective policies and the 
willingness of the TNCs 
which figured largely in this development, 
to facilitate regional 
exports of their products. To the 
extent that this development 
could be relied on it placed a 
brake on the willingness of the 
TNCs to duplicate facilities in the 
various territories of 
the region. This import substitution 
approach proved in practice 
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to be very import intensive (often more so than in the case 
of the final product which it sought to replace), thus making 
availability of foreign exchange, a critical factor in the 
sector's survival. Th only export activity which was favoured 
was that linked to the operations of export-processing 
zones. 
ii) High Capital intensity. The subsidies provided 
in the industrialization strategy favoured capital as against 
labour, with the result that capital intensive and not labour 
intensive industrie;prollferated. Thus in Jamaica after 114 
years of this policy by 1965 only 9,000 jobs were created 
11/ 
despite the comThg into existence of over 150 new industries. - 
In Trinidad-Tobago less than 5,000jobs were created between 
1950 and 1963. - In trc foimer case the labour force was 
growing by 20,000 persons annually and in the latter it expanded 
by 100,000 persons ovrr the period 1950-1963. The labour absorption 
fore 
rate of this new manufacturing sector has there averaged between 
one-tenth to one-eight of the labour force increase. Contrary 
to the optimistic expectations when these policies were first 
put in train, industriali'zation has been unable to cope with the 
natural increases in the population and labour force of the region 
and the backlog of unemployment which existed at its commencement. 
Indeed, labour absorbed in these sectors could not even match 
the rate of displacement of labour in other sectors brought about 
through mechanization (e.g. sugar) or the ruination of traditional 
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sectors following the introduction of these new industries: (e.g. 
traditional crafts such as shoe-making, furniture making, seam- 
stresses, production of local preserves and swe&ts etc). 
The exposure of bias in favour of capital and the rich is 
further revealed when account is taken of the pitiful levels of 
relief afrorded to the poor and the powerless in the region: e.g. 
sickness benefits, old-age and retirement payments, the total 
absence of unemployment insurance, and so on0 Indeed to obtain 
what little exists, the poor are required to make disclosures about 
their circumstances far in excess cf that required of investors 
about their operations, even though they have been given tremendous 
amounts of relief financed by West Indian tax payers. This 
situation is worsened in so far as these companies even after they 
have been established do not provide the minimal disclosures required 
by law and custom. This is possible because frequently these firms 
have one large stock-holder who in effect controls the company. 
This reduces annual meetings to simple rituals and the election of 
directors and other office-bearers to a mere charade. Thus in the 
Jamaica Daily Gleaner (May 12, 1985) we find the following report: 
"kst companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
iave one larger stockholder that controls 
each company ... Because of this situation, 
annual general meetings are clear cut, directors 
re re-elected unopposed and the old ways continue 
nabated. Not many. directors think it important 
th keep stockholders abreast of company develop- 
rents. They send out financial statements when 
they feel like it". 
]j4 3, 
iii' Capacity under-utilization0 Surveys have shown 
that many of the industries established under these programmes 
operate with significant excess capacity. Thus Ayub in the study 
referred to earlier has found that 80% of the firms in Jamaica 
operate on the basis of a single shift, reflecting both the 
small size of local arkets as well as TNC restrictions on 
export sales, at least outside the Caricom area. 
iv) Domestic Value Added and Linkages. The industries 
which proliferated in the early years were basically organized 
around the final assembly of imported components where the 
techrlogy involved was hardly more advanced than that of an 
ordinary screwdriver. The result of this was that value created 
locally by these products remained) very low. This situation 
reinforces the earlier observation about the critical dependence 
of this sector on foreign exchange. Because of the extensive 
reliance of this sector on imported inputs, linkages with the 
internal economy were notdeveloped to any significant degree. 
The growth effects therefore of this sector for the national 
economy were largely confined to wages received by workers in 
the sector, and profits received by the local business persons. 
y) Monopoly. As Ayub observed in his study of Jamaica 
"The degree of industrial concentration in terms of the number of 
firms in each subsector indicates that production 
is monopolistic 
or oligopolistic'.t. This has produced a 
number of disastrous 
results. First, the levels c protection afforded 
these industries 
is extremely high. Because domestic value added 
is so low, the 
effective protection conferred by tariffs is much 
higher than the 
nominal rate of the tariff. This therefore gives 
excessive scope 
for these companies to pass off inferior quality 
products, to 
institute a usurious system of consumer financing, 
and to maintain 
quite poor after-sales servicing facilties. 
This was also 
facilitated by the absence of any meaningful 
statutory or other 
regulatory agencies concerned with the standards 
of products in 
these industries. As a result, the products of 
the TNCS which 
produce in the area are reputedly quite inferior to 
their counter- 
part production at home or in other industrialized 
countries. 
This has led to a certain kind of consumer resistance 
and a 
preference for imports. Second, because 
tiit ±evel of protection 
was so high and the monopoly power so great, the 
pressure to find 
export outlets was reduced. Third, the same 
combination of 
circumstances makes for high profitability despite 
high costs due 
to uneconomical scales of production. Rates of return 
on US 
invesGment in the region are considered to be 
substantively higher 
than elsewhere. Thus Barry et al indicate a 
rate of return of 
30.5% in 1980, compared with a Latin 
America average of i.8% 
and a world average of 1)4.3%. For six countries 
where they had 
data, it was shown that duri-ng the period 1976-1981 
TNCs withdrew 
four times the amount they brought in, in the 
form of new invest- 
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ments (Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica and 
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Trinidad-Tobago) - 
vi) Export-processing Zones. Two efforts have been made 
by Caribbean governments to counter the limitations of their reliance 
on this kind of import-substitution industrialization. The first, 
which is discussed here, has been to promote the formation of export 
processing zones In these zones investment takes place either through TNC 
subsidiaries or as joint ventures. Ijpica1ly, a sub-contract is entered into 
between the TNC/joint venture and eiher a local firn, one of its own subsidiaries, 
another foreign fii'iri speci1 izing in this business, or a 1ocfl agn who further 
sub-contracts to operators who work from their homes. This pattern of investment 
differs from the direct investment in agriculture, minerals, and manufacturing for 
the home market which preceded it1 and depends on the ability of the TNC to 
fractionalize its production lines and manage its production in different locations 
by taking advantage of advances in transportat1.on and telecommunications. At the 
moment the preferred industries are hù with high product standardization (which 
facilitates fractioning) and those with different levels of labour intensity at 
different stage$ of production (which facilitates the exploitation of wage cost 
differences). The best exaxrles are electrical goods, electronic material, clothing, 
toys and sporting goods, and office machines. 
The development of this export processing activity is very dependent on 
marketing arrangements which allow the TNCs to minimize taxes and levies on this 
activity in their home country. In the region the narketing arrangements between 
the African_Caribbean-Pacific Group of countries and the European Economic (oniainity, 
the provisions of regulations 806.3 and 807 of the import regulations of the USA, and 
mast recently the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Ga4ba, the proposed Canadian- 
Caribbean trade arrangement s,have been decisive in encouraging this development. 
'I1s regulation 806.3 arid 807 place duties only on the value added to products from 
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verseas production operations, while the CBI expands the range of duty free items 
'rom the area. 
The export processing zones are literal enclaves which focus exclusively 
)n the processing of iiorted inputs for direct re-export to Western Europe, North 
merica and Japan. The two major products produced in the region are textiles 
ii-id electronics. Being enclaves, the finns are free from the administration of. 
:he various national customs authorities. In general the evidence shows that many 
Df these finns are both foreign owned and managed. Location near the US market, 
low wages, and adequate infrastructure bave been the main attractions of the area. 
uper-exploitatiofl of the work force, particularly the largely female 
ne, is the order of the day. Over the past decade some of the most 
erocius industrial onslaughts against trade unionism, often with 
he ci1nivance or tacit support of governmental authoritie3 in the 
'egion, have grown out of this sector. Generally these industries 
)perate in a manner where they can literally "close-shop" and move 
lsewhere in a matter of days, and with so many competitive offerings 
rom the various countries of the region as hosts for their activities 
they have maniçulated this advantage skillfully and now easily promote 
he most backward industria] practices in the region. Thus in April 
1985 five major unions in Jamaica wrote the government allegiflg that 
viorkers in these zones were being treated as indentured laourers. 
A recent study of these zones in the region has highlighted 
a long list of abuses. Thus in many factories unions are not 
recognized; safety standards are poor and working conditions 
hazardous; pollution of the work place and the immediate environ- 
met quite marked; poor tmedical facilities exist and in several 
cases there is no medical record keeping; limited formal training is 
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afforded employees with almost all training done on the job; 
mobility and career prospects are very restrictive with the only 
movement being one from unskilled to clerical or supervisory 
grades; and finally, despite appearances to the contrary pay is 
frequently lower than in other industries. Long has observed: 
"with respect to wages, it is sometimes held that overseas MNEs 
offer better pay packages than local enterprises. We have found 
that it is difficult to uphold this proposition entirely". He 
then cites examples where: "tie weekly pay for unskilled, demi- 
skilled and skilled workers tend to be lower than a large number 
of non-enclave enterprises". He then goes on to point out 
"however, managers in MNEs are paid higher than elsewhere in 
15/ the manufacturing sector". - Long's study has shown 
that Iii this sector: 
the net tran: ' of resources abroad is high. 
The outflow nf profits and dividends is as much as 
)40% in excess of equity capital inflow. 
The net foreign exchange contributions. to. the 
local economy out of current operations is 
negative. 
Very limited inter-industry linkages exist. 
Foreign domination of the sector. Ninety percent 
of the firms are owned by TNCs. 
y) The employment level as a percentage of national 
employment is nat significant - in the case of 
Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago less than 1% and 
in the case of Barbados )4% The rate of increase 
over recent years (1981814) is high, and given 
the failure of employment levels to expand in 
other areas its relative importance in the future 
will be enhanced. 
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vi) Technological diffusion to the rest of the 
economy is virtually non-existent, a feature 
which reflects the enclave character of these 
operations. 
As a result of the above mary of the hoped for advantages 
of these firms, (increased export earnings, significant increases 
in employment and development of skills among the population, 
and so on), have not materialized. 
One aspect of the export-processing zones arrangements 
which needs special mention is the development of a certain fype 
of regional specialization through twin-plant and international 
-contracting arrangements. Typically, these regional operations 
use Puerto Rico as the US base, and certain elements of the pro- 
duction process are parcelled out, or further sub-contracte1 to 
other Caribbean territories where wage rates and costs may be 
lower. The sub-contractor then supplies the factor» management, 
emp:yees, and contracts to produce agreed quantities at ajproved 
specifications. The most developed of these arrangements involve 
Puerto Rico and Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Indeed Haiti 
is second only 
in the western 
20;000 persons, 
to Mexico in the US sub-contracting territories 
16/ 
hemisphere. - Overall it is estimated that 
mainly women work in 750 garment factors in the 
English_speaking Caribbean, producing mainly for the US market. 
17 / 
In these arrangements the TNCs clearly seek to relieve themselves 
of the problems of day to day management and control of 
operations. While theoretically, either local or other foreign 
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(usually smaller than the typical TNC) enterprises are acceptable, 
in practice these operations have developed a certain specialism 
which the foreign operators with experience elsewhere have 
acquired, and so they are usually favoured. 
The export processi1g zones constitute a further aspect 
of the foreign capital domination model of exploitation of the 
regional economies. In this regard what is significant about 
it is the way in which it has developed as an off-shoot of 
the process of international re-structuring of capital which 
the TNCs have been engaged in recent years. In this re- 
structuring the effort is to reduce both assembly costs and 
the costs of repetitive operations which the high wage markets 
in the industrialized countries have made unattractive to their 
location there. ThL risks abroad, rising wages, militant 
unionism or political upheavals, are partly reduced by the 
contract method. As the sub-contractor c,arries the risk, 
he in turn seeks out members of the local business elites as 
partners or advisers, and host governments which are prepared 
to "police" the labour movement or "de-activate" it as far as 
their operations are concerned. 
s 
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vii) Regional Industrial Programming. The second 
strategy developed to circumvent the limitations of small, 
uneconomic, import-substituting activities has been the promotion 
of industries at the regional level. The idea here is to take 
advantage of the larger regional market, as well as the pooling 
of skills, technology, resources, finance and enterprise within 
the region. Such pooling it is hoped would reduce the "dog-eat- 
dog" competitive pressures which prevail in the region in the 
fight to attract foreign capital. This proposal goes as far back 
as Brewster and Thomas' proposals for the dynamic integration of 
the West Indian economies. In their proposals the emphasis 
was on fusing resources, production structures, and markets of 
individual countries of the region, so as to reap economies of 
scale in order to create an industrial sector capable of producing 
the goods (wage goods and industrial materials) needed directly 
and indirectly for the production of all other goods. A range of 
critical industries was indentified by them as describing the 
basic material sector of the region: iron and steel, textiles, 
plastics, wood, paper, glass, industrial chemicals (mainly the alkalis 
chlorine and sulphuric), cement, leather, rubber, aluminum, and fuel. 
In the sphere of regional industrial programming no development 
along these lines has occurred, but the ghost of these proposals 
continues to haunt regional discussions and efforts, particularly 
under the Caricom arrangements. As this topic forms the sub- 
stance of a separate chapter, it is enough to mention here 
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that little has been achieved in this direction as 
none of the 
identified regional integration industries have yet come 
into 
existence. What has happened is that in an haphazard 
way the 
TI\TCs operating in the area have sought to rationalize 
production 
and avoid the duplication of establishments as far 
as possible. 
As a recent author has pointed out: 
"a decade and a half after Brewster and Thomas 
published their formidable tome, nearly a decade 
since the Caribbean Community treaty was signed 
not a single 'integration industry' exists in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean". 19/ 
This sentiment was echoed in the Report of a special 
group of 
experts who examined the workings of the Caricom 
arrangements: 
"efforts to programme industrial production on a 
regional basis has been slow and disappointing". 20/ 
viii) Technology. Another weakness of the industrial- 
isation process is that it has generated negative consequences 
in the area of technology. As we noted above, the 
technology 
employed is limited in most cases to the to the assembly 
of pre- 
fabricated inputs. The technology used is also highly 
capital 
intensive and this 'is encouraged by the favourable 
state subsid- 
isation of capital. This capital intensity has been generally 
criticised as inappropriate to the needs of these 
economies with 
their high levels of unemployment. The technology arrangements 
under which the transnationalS operate preclude any real 
transfer 
152. 
to the local econom3l. There are 
strict conditions attached to 
patenting rights and in the licensing arrangements 
for local 
production. Maintenance, replacement of 
equipment, and innovation 
are also strictly regulated in these 
arrangements. The overall 
consequence is that the technology utilised in 
this sector is not 
rooted in the development of an indigenous 
technological capability 
based on the use of local skills and local 
resources. There 
develops, therefore, a relation to technology 
in which people use 
it but do not rodice it. There is no 
creative social interaction 
between the local people and the machinery 
aid techniques with 
which they produce. 
ix) Urbsnisation. The pattern 
of industrialization has 
resulted in an urban concentration of thes 
industries. This has 
encuraged the flow of persons from the rural 
areas to the cities 
as the hope of obtaifliflg a job in these 
industries lures many to 
the cities. With the disintegration of 
traditional agriculture, 
he urban drift pushes the underemploved in 
the countryside into 
the open. The cities become distinguished 
by their barrios, 
ghettos and the large number of young people 
who have never worked. 
The earlier periods of this phase of 
industrialisation coincided 
with high rates of external migration. 
This reduced some of the 
pressures to open urban unemployment. 
But later, as stricter 
quotas were employed by the receiving countries 
to mass migration, 
this effect was diminished. In addition, 
as only the relatively 
skilled were able to obtain residency 
visas, this, combined with 
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the flight of professionals out of the region, has led to a 
serious "braindrain". 
x) Infra-structure. inevitably this industrialisation 
process has put a strain on infra-structural facilities in the 
region. In some cases, major expansions have occurred, e.g. 
airport construction, deep water harbours, roads, etc. Most of 
these were financed on the basis of aid or soft-loans from the 
major capitalist countries and multi-lateral lending institutions 
such as the World Bank, Inter-American Development ank and the 
Caribbean Developmen Bank. Despite these, as the manufacturing 
sector has become more firmly established and along with it the 
urban concentrations of population, most of the btate owned public 
utilities have failed to keep pace. Thub electricity outages, 
telephone and postal systems which do not function adequeiy, 
public transport which is inadequate mce the labour iorce to 
and from the place of work, have become the rule :rat,n then the 
exception. This has compounded the difficulties which the state 
has encountered in promoting industrialisation along these lines. 
xi) Uneven Development and Crisis. Industrial develop- 
ment has occurred in the region in an uneven manner; thereby 
leading to a widening of the gap between countries and among social 
groups within countries. This process of uneven development is 
inherent to capitalistic modes of production where the market 
principally determines output, resource allocation and the 
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appropriation of the surplus and other benefits of production. 
Proportionality in growth and an equitable distribution of 
benefits at the minimum require planned social intervention into 
this system. In the absence of this, the principal beneficiaries 
of the regional market have been the larger territories, principally, 
Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. This has also led at one stage to 
the emergence of a regional-type manufacturing group of business 
persons who have sought to promote the dismantling of national 
market protective barriers within the Caricom frarnewnrk. However, 
the ecunomic crisis which has become manifest and has persisted 
more or less since the mid 1970's, has undermined these efforts. 
The collapse of the regional payments mechanisms in 1983 and 
the failure to date to replace it with a workable alternative has 
led to stagnation of intra-Caribbean trade. In addition he 
macro-economic and balance of payments policies which have been 
1 
introduced in the region with the aim in part of curtailing 
impoi'ts have also affected regional trade. Restricting home 
demand, e.g. wage restraint policies and curtailing imports 
especially of industrial inputs and spare parts have seriously 
disrupted the process of industrialization in the 1980's. The 
critical dependence of the new manufacturing sector on the region's 
capacity to earn foreign exchange through the tradit'na1 export 
sector has also been exposed in the wake of the adverse situation 
facing these industries. The neglect of agriculture, which 
seemed to have accompanied the focus on the new manufacturing 
sector is now being bitterly regretted everywhere in the region. 
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After decades of industrialization and the commitment of 
huge resources to its promotion, the region has not achieved any 
qualitative development in either its elimination of poverty and 
powerlessness of the broad mass of its peoples, or the care and 
protection it offers those who find themselves in this situation. 
Long ago the limitations of the Puerto Rican model had been pointed 
out: 
"In a practical sense the most disillusioriig 
experience has been that of Puerto Rico, which, 
lying in the midst of the region is as much the 
showpiece of industrialization, as of unemploy- 
ment and maldistribution of wealth and income". 21/ 
In retrospect the slavish imitation a1 the Purtn Bi-r model, 
without recognizing its real ce on i.. co]onl relation 
of Puerto Rico to the USA, se:::d Jomed to failure in a part of 
the region which was aspiring towards inJependence and a break with 
its colonial relationship. Indeed, as the model spread and the 
territories began to slavishly imitate each other in the pursuit 
of this model, they inevitably competed wit- -'ach tcr to attract 
overseas investors. In this sense also, the muiei raeci inevitably 
to undermine the drive towards regional integr... iileh as we 
shall see later is itself one aspect of the movie cit towards 
independence. 
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The overall dependence which this new sector has developed 
on foreign technology, finance, enterprise, raw materials ana 
components, as well as the drain of surpluses which this has caused, 
in the form of profits, royalties, dividends, interest, licence 
fees, management fees, sales charges, have fused in a manner which 
has locked the region as a whole more and more firmly rito the 
metropolitan sources of domination which they were ostensibly 
rotelling against in their pursuit of independence. Even in the 
large, mature, industrialized capitalist centre countries 
tmu1ating investment through public subsidies in the form of 
tax breaks, rarely achieve their objective. Thus a study by 
R.S. McIntyre has shown that in the US tax breaks: 
Tido not spur investment - the companies receiving 
the largest benefits from the Reagan tax program 
have actually decreased their Thvestment and re- 
tamed the windfall or used it for dividends. 
The heaviest new investments, by contrast, have 
tended to come from companies that pay more in 
taxesh. 2/ 
Given the small market size constraint in the region, the contin- 
uation of this flow once the industry is already established, 
rarely leads to new investment as the governments, anticipate. 
Instead it is diverted to dividends, the expansion of cash reserves, 
the increa3e of executives pay, more fees and other charges to 
the parent company, increased advertisement budgets, etc. 
While the process of industrialization in the region has 
led to the establishment of many new industries and a certain 
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degree of differentiation of the regionts productive structure, 
it has fallen far short of a structural transformation of 
Caribbean economy and society. The process, however, has created 
several new layers of business persor linked to the new enter- 
prises established under it. These groups have grown in influence 
over the state, and even its world view has tended to play an 
increasingly major role in shaping the views of other strata and 
classes. Because they have Lnefitted from the process they 
have developed a collective Lf-interest in its preservation. 
From the point of view of their calculus (profits and status) 
the process has done well, nr unernploymen xtreme inequalitie 
and social distress continue. Their objections or criticisms if 
any) stem largely from vague nationalist concerns about foreigners 
dominating industry and society. This, however, is:not the 
enlightened c.tion.aiism of a developed bourgeoisîe,but the 
expectation of a colon1 1 1 y i1tre petty bourgeoi ele to inherit 
the colonial legacy and adopt tt . its interests. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CARIBBEAN IN "BOOM": OIL AND BAUXITE 
In this chapter I present a broad outline of nationalist 
policie towards natural resource development in the region up 
to 
the 1970's. DevelopmentS after this period are discussed 
n 
Part 3 of the study where issues of TNC control and government 
responses are taken up. 
) Survey 
The "bcom' cci1t ions whIch Tfr T jj onmies 
generally experienced Iii the period frc ruid. 1950' s to 
the 
1960's, depended quite heavily on the expansion of three sectors: 
manufacturing (discussed in the previous ehapter), tourism 
(dis- 
cussed in the next chapter) and minr Two mineral industries 
in particular expandé onsiderably, potrol rn in Trinidad- 
Tobago, and bauxite-Umina in J and Guyana. The importance 
of the mineral secto in the nat output of these countries 
can be gleaned from the data in Tab'e 6.1. Despite the wide 
annual fluctuations observed in these data, at their peak oil 
accounted for nearly half the GDP in Trinidad-Tobago, and 
bauxite- 
alumina more than one-fifth of the GDP in Guyana, and about one- 
seventh of the GDP in Jamaica. While petroleunand bauxite- 
alumina in the three territories listed in the table are the 
major products of the region's mining sector, other mineral 
production also takes place: gold and diamonds in Guyana, 
and 





































































































































In the post-war period there have been two watershed in 
the development of these industries. The first occurred during the 
early 1950's to the 1960's when bauxite-alumina production expanded, 
particularly in Jamaica and l a lesser extent Guyana. In Jamaica 
production commenced in 1952, and by 1970 its output equalled the 
combined output of the rest of the region. The second is the oil- 
boom years after 1971, which led to a doubling of the contribution 
of this sector to Trinidad-Tobago's G.D.P. Although tne discussion 
in this chapter focusses principally on the West Indian/Caricom 
group of countries, this region along with the wider (. «'ean' 
has been an important mineral producing area. At the 'f vJorld 
War II Guyana and Suriname supplied two-thirds of the world output 
of bauxite. In 1965 there were more producing territories and the 
region as a whole (Guyana, Jamaica, Dominican Bpublic, Haiti and 
Suriname) produced 56% of world bauxite. While this vreight in 
world output has been substantially reduced o account of the 
growth of the Brazil, Australia and Guinea industries, by 1970 
the region still produced 48% of total world output of bauxite 
and 17% of world alumina output. It is during the period after 
the 1970's which we take up in Part 3 of this study that these 
industries plunged into crisis and output fell substantially. 
Thus by 1982 the region was producing only 18% of world output 
of bauxite or 14m tonnes, and 3 million tonnes of alumina or 10% 
of world output. Only Suriname (43,000 tonnes in 1982) and 
Venezuela (274,000 tonnes in 1982) produce primary aluminum 
(out of a total world output of about l4 million tonnes). 
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While traditionally, the Caribbean nationshave been 
the principal suppliers of bauxite and alumina to the US and 
Canada, its stake in the oil trade is also considerable. 
Thus, it is estimated that one-sixth of the oil consumed in the 
USA is refined in the Caribbean. The dependence of the US 
on the region for this strategic mineral is further 
strengthened when we consider that about one-half of hc oil 
shipped to the US passes through Caribbean shipping lies. 
In the English-speaking Caribbean onlyTrinidad-To1. 
there a significant domestic output of crude oil a;1 natural 
gas. Barbados produces small amounts of these products but 
not enough to cover its domestic needs. In 1985 Trinidad 
and Tobago produced over 10 million cubic metres of crude 
oil and 8 billion cubic feet of natural gas. i Barbados 
for the same year output of oil was only 679,0uO barrels or 
about one-half its domestic requirements, and natural gas 
output was just under 111 million cubic feet. 
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Recoverable crude oil reserves in Trinidad-Tobago is put at 
580 million barrels or about 10 years output at the 1983 level. 
Natural gas reserves are huge and output of this is projected 
to rise to 1 billion cubic feet per day. 
It is in the area of refining that the Caribbeab'.s 
importance in the world's oil economy is most significant. Some 
of the most important refining centers in the world ar located 
there. These refineries use imported crude and their development 
in the past has depended on four major consideratipr 
proximity of the region to the L arket as well 
as to the Panama Canal routes; 
the existence of easily accesd.ble dee water 
harbours; 
political stability, whic:i it was, anticipated would 
have derived from the fact that these were "old coloides" with 
little or no inclinations towards revolutionary upheavals, and 
very "amenable" host governments; 
regulations and incentives offered in the US markét 
to regional .suppliers. 
As events have unfolded several of these territories have witnessed 
over the past decade or so major social and/or industrial upheavals. 
In addition, new regulations concerning oil imports into the USA 
and new incentives for domestic producers there have reduced the 
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attractiveness of the region as a refining location. As we 
shall see later in Part 3 of the study, this has created many 
difficulties for the area. 
In the region as a whole the Nethorlands Antillez has 
been the most important refining centre. Refring began there 
in 1917 when Shell built an installation to réfine as much as 
80% of Venezuelan crude. Later Stândard Oil constructed a large 
refining facility in Aruba to refine Middle East and Venezuela 
crude for shipment to the US market. Eventually, oi refining 
accounted for over one-fifth of the GDP of these territories and 
5 percent of their emplo.ment. In 1966 Amerada Hess Oil tarte 
construction of an oil refinery in the US Virgin Islands. The 
incentive here was an old legal provision in the US which excluded 
the islands frqm the requirement that all JS oil companies were 
to use JS flag ships in its dome3tic trade. The wider Caribbean 
area is also an important transhipment facility for oil carriers. 
The territories which provide the bulk of this facility are the 
Netherlands Antilles, Trinidad-Tobago and St. Lucia. Table 6.2 
below, which has teen reproduced from Barry et al'stext give 
a vivid picture of the spread of multi-national petroleum 
interests in the region. 
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TABLE 6.2 
OIL IN ThE CARIBBEAN - Production, Refining, 1'ansshipment 
dirr.iz 
Oat' 'r'r' '--- - 




Freeport Bunnah Oil Apex Oil T-.r - sh7 pment 
Bahamas Govt 
Barbados 
St. Michael Mobil Cil 
Barbados 
100% Mobil Oil ',20 bpd 
rafinery 
Bridgetown Barbados 100% Barbados rr\duction 
National Oil Govt (formerly 
Mobil) 
Cuba Instituto Cubano 100% Cuba Govt 3 refineries 
del Petroleo (formerly Shell totaling 





Republic Falconbridge 100% 16,500 bpd 
Boriao Dominicana Fal conbridge refinery 
Hainai. Refinieria 50% Royal Dutch 30,000 bpd 
Dominicana de Shell refinery 
Petroleo 50% DR Govt 
LOCATION COMPANY OWNERSHIP FUNCTIONS 
Antigua 








Freeport Bahamas Oil 50% Charter Oil 500,000 bpd 
Refining Co 50% Chevron roriery 
(BORCO) (SOCAL) 60,000 bDd 
Bonaire 












CJJ ).)SJ aomerit, 
Curacao Curacao Oil 1.2 'million bpd 
Terminal transshipment 
Curacao Shell Curacao 00% Shell 37'CT,OOO bpd 
refinery 
t1 L1s shipment 
Puerto Rico 
San Juan Caribbean Gulf a-'- uJf Oil n,000 bpd 
Refining Corp % others reinery 
San Juan Petrolane of LP gas producer 
Puerto Rico 
Yubacoa Yubacoa Sun Oil 100% Sun Oil 85,000 hpd 
refinery 
Penueles Clark Oil Apex Oil 161,000 bpd 




PPG Industries Bulk terminal 
planned, by 10,000 bpd 
Canadian refinery 
investors 
Arba Lago Oil and 100% Exxon 480,000 bpd 
Transport rciinery 
tï ri Sli ipinent 
LOCATIONS COMPP3NY OWNERSHIP FUNCTIONS 
Jamaica 
Kingston Petroleum Corp 100% Jamaican 33,000 bpd 
of Jamaica Govt (formerly refinery 
Exxon) 
Martinique 
Fort de France Societe Anonyme 24% Royal Du,tch 13,000 bpd 
de la Raffinerie Shell refinery 












Port of Spain 
Port of Spain 
Port of Spain 
port Fortin 
Port of Spain 
US Virgin Islands 
St. Croix 
* bpd = barrels per day 
Source: The Resource Center, Compilation of Corporations, 19814. 





















77% Texaco Oil 
23% Others 
77% Texaco Oil 
23% Others 
Standard Oil of 
Indiana (Imoco) 






100% T&T Govt 
(formerly Shell) 














oil & gas 
production 











In concluding this section it should be noted that 
many of the region's territories are very dependent on oil 
imports to service domestic needs. Given the post-19714 rise 
in petroleum prices these deficit countries have suffered con- 
siderable pressures on their foreign exchange budgets, as 
frequently oil imports have exceeded one-third of total import 
costs. The impact this had had on these national economies and 
the role it has played in the post 1970's crisis of the region 
will be taken up in Part 3 of the study. 
'ii) Policy 
Up to the 1970's the basic approach of the various 
Caribbean governments to the 
development of the region's natural resources was to invite foreign 
capital to exploit them. The argument advanceI in support of this 
was that the development of these resouces required capital on 
a scale which could not be generated domestically. In addition, 
domestic market size constraints meant that these industries would 
have to be export oriented to be profitable. It was expected 
that foreign ownership and control was the only vay to ensure 
this outcome. As a consequence of this approach TNC investments 
in this sector probaly constituted the bulk of North American 
(if not world wide) capital investments in the area by the 1970's. 
At the end of the 1960's all the West Indian bauxite-alumina 
production was under the control of six American and one European. 
TNC. At that time too, 98% off the region's bauxite and 57 percent 
of the region's alumina production went to North America. 
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US investaents in the Jamaican bauxite industry were valued 
at 
over hali-a-bill10n US dollars in 1972, at a time when Jamaica 
was the world's second largest producer of this ore. As a 
consequence of this there was a marked dependence of the US 
on 
the region for a strategic military mineral resource as 
well as 
fuel. The inevitable outcome of this was that the US 
government 
sought to play a major role in ensuring the flow of these 
products. 
In the case of bauxite, an important mechani"i in this arrangement 
has been the US government's stock pile is ore which has 
givcn tnc US government an undoubted leverage tie market. 
Tie recent purchase of ore, at a cime when s"'s are high, in 
order to ease the foreign exchange pressures on Seaga's Jamaica 
is a good example of the use of this power. The publicity 
attending 
this, ¿ogether with the more-or-less open admission of 
both parties 
of the intention behind the Reagan's administratiofl' purchases, 
can leave no doi'bt about the significance of this leverage 
and 
the willingness of the US authorities to use it to 
protect its 
interests. 
In order to facilitate the entry of foreign capital 
into this sector, a number of the usual incentives already 
indicated in the previous chapter were offered. In addition, 
the governments afiorded these TNCs pepper-corn leases over 
large tracts of state lands f cr the purpçse of mining ore as 
well as prospecting for new sources of supply. Environmental 
and health regulations were also deliberately ke lax 
in order 
to increase the attractions of the area vis-a-vis 
industrialized 
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countries where progressively tighter regulations on pollution 
were raising the costs of these types of operations. 
This was 
particularly the case in oil refining and storage. 
By the 1970's however, a new more militant naUonalist 
phase emerged in the area of natural resources development. 
in 
this phase the governments struggled to increase their 
control 
over these industries, prompted in no small measure by the 
pressure on their revenues and foreign exchange earniiiS 
as the 
spurt of import_substituting industrialization was 
tj 'ing off. 
It was also prompted by the political and industrial 
gitation 
of some trade unions in the area, and the emergence 
at the nationaL 
level of the first post-war left-wing or "socialist" 
movements. 
The rallying point of this opposition was the proportionately 
small 
contribution the bauxite and oil comapnies were iiickirig to; national 
employment, tax revenues, and foreign exchange. 
The criticism 
was based on the consideration that the vertiesi 
integration of 
the local mineral TNC subsidiaries into their parent 
organizations 
allowed them literally to fix the price at which they 
'transferred" 
the local product out of the region. This transfer 
price was 
invariably devised in a manner to minimize the 
overall tax 
liabilitieS of the parent company, as well as the 
costs of its 
entire operations. The view was also advanced that the 
global 
operations of these TNC's were highly oligopolistic in 
structure 
encouraged the individual corporate groups to 
collaborate in market sharing to rationalize 
the rate at which 
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they introduced new technology into their operations in order 
to minimize costs, to hide the true quantity of local 
reserves, 
and to exploit any single government or trade union which 
negotiated with them. The last of these was made easy 
because 
the producing countries stood in competitive relation to 
each 
other and did not act as a group. It is not surprising, 
there- 
fore, that in Jamaica in 1972, at a time, when the companies 
there 
T.yçre producing the world's second largest amount of bauite ore, 
oîly $23 million was paid in taxes. 
By 1970 the Guyana government had moved to ationalize" 
the local bauxite-alumina industry. In 19V4 Manley began 
to call 
forafairer return from these companies to the Jamaica economy and 
to this effect he introduced a levy on all ore mined or 
processed 
in Jamaica. This was a novel approach as the levy was 
set at 
7 percent of the selling price f 
aluminum ingot, that is the 
final product rather than the ore produced localLy. The effect 
was dramatic. In two years government revenues jumped to $170m. 
As we shall see later in Part 3 he also encouraged the format 
ion 
of an International Bauxite Association with a view to reducing 
the cut-throat competition which existed among the ore bearing 
countries; to get better returns on the ore which was 
mined; and 
to create an independent source for the gathering, 
and sharing 
of data on the industry world wide. In 1968 ad 19714, Brait j sh 
Petroleum and Shell also sold their operations to the Trinidad- 
Tobago government. 
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This phase of development and the reactions of the 
companies constitute the substance of our discussion in Part 
3. Here it is perhaps apt to note only that the companies 
reacted to these developments swiftly. They pressured their 
home governments to intercede on their behalf, and much oÍ the 
source of the destabilization of the Manley regime in Jamaica 
stemmed from this episode. The companies also began to diversify 
out of the region, and as we saw th region's output declined 
rapidly as a proportion of the world's total. By the mid 1980's, 
the benefits of these moves were all but gone. World depression 
and the glut and collapse of the oil and aluminum markets 
had placed the boom economies in deep depression. So called 
¡phase of crisis was 
prosperity was at an end and anew once again confronting the 
Caribbean region. By 1985 such issues as local onwership and 
control, relations to TNCs, collaboration regionally and inter- 
nationally to secure a new international economic order, which 
dogged the discussions of economic policy in the region after 
1970 had turned out to be far more complex than was at first 
anticipated. This, however, is to anticipate the later 
discussion of Part 3. 
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CHAPTER 7: FOREIGN PLANTATIONS, PEASANTS & STATE: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND 
I: Introduction: 
Given the genocide which accompanied European penetrat- 
ion of the Caribbean and slavery which was institutionalized after, 
the Caribbean peasantry is a "modern" phenomenon and not the "time- 
less agent" of older European, Asian and African cultures. Not 
only is the Caribbean peasantry a comparatively recent transplant 
from other continents, but the plants and animals which have 
made up and continue to make up the source of its livelihood are 
also recent transplants. Many of the grains, fruits, export eash 
crops, vegetables and domesticated animals on which its livelihood 
is founded originated elsewhere and were diffused through Europe. 
Thus from Asia and Oceania camerice, chickens, manges, coconuts, 
bananas, sago, bamboo, and breadfruit. From Africa the water- 
melon and okra. The sugar-cane plant which was to dominate export 
agriculture as well as many of the ground provisions which account 
for the bulk of domestic agriculture have been originally imported 
into the area. If these factors are taken into account then it 
follows that the development of the capitalist system on a world 
scale has been crucial not only in shaping the economy of the 
Caribbean in general, but even in such specific forms as what 
land is used, by whom, what is produced and who consumed this, 
and in what form. 
observes: 
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Prior to emancipation the limited small scale farming 
which occurred depended upon a few "independent" blacks and run- 
away slaves which formed communities and squatted on Crown Lands 
e.g. the Maroons. It was not until after emancipation that the 
growth of this group was accelerated and a variety of tenancy 
forms emerged: share-cropping, tenant farming, and free-hold 
tenancies on individual and collective basis. This peasantry 
which emerged, coexisted in a larger rural social system which 
the plantation effectively dominated. Their relationship to the 
plantation, howevr, as never embodied in the simple idea of 
a mere "adjunct" nor was it a simple "dualistic' relationship. 
From the outset there was a dynamic inter-connection in which 
the peasantry formed the core of'a "counter-plantation system". 
Because the plantaticn could not survive without assured supplies 
of cheap and available labour (usually required seasonally), the 
development of a peasantry, and hence an alternative set of 
activities for the producers always posed a threat to the pros- 
perity of the plantation. Throughout its history, therefore, it 
always sought to ensure that an adequate availability of labour 
supply was embedded into the system of production and reproduction 
of labour on peasant holdings. To achieve this brute force was 
the ultimate weapon, and this force was monopolised in the state 
which the planters effectively doxiinated. Thus as Thorne 
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"it was at one time a common occurrence for 
military and para-military expeditions to 
be launched to destroy crops that were not 
grown on plantation-controlled lands; to 
to prohibit plantation workers from rearing 
cows, pigs and the like and seize animals 
reared without persmission". 
This was of course in contrast to: 
"policies of accommodation and encouragement 
adopted in non-plantation or 'settler' 
colonies such as America, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. In these colonies families 
were stimulated and assisted to expand in- 
wards and 'settle'". 1/ 
The counter-plantation system which emerged along with the 
Deasantry is one of relatively long usage, based on economic as 
well as social and cultural factors such as kinship structures, 
religious practices and so on. It follows therefore, that a 
proper understanding of it must be derived from an analysis which 
extends to a wider and deeper social level than, that represented 
in the idea of an alternative agricultural system, or set of 
agricultural practices. It is at this level of analysis that 
we can readily grasp the way in which the peasantry has from the 
inception formed a deep inner core among the poor and powerless 
of the region. From this vantage point it is also easier to 
discern the mechanisms by which it has been marginalized or 
excluded from the political process, and denied social mobility 
through state activities. As a group the peasantry has always 
possessed land, (albeit in small, uneconomic quantities), and has 
worked it with a variety of instrumeñts which it has owned and 
controlled. Overall however, these inputs have been less in 
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value than labour of the family or household, or other discrete 
domestic groups in the peasant production process. This labour 
has traditionally produced much of what the peasantry itself 
consumed, and continued to do so later even when it became 
engaged in export cash crop production. This self-sufficiency 
was directed not only at food, but clothing and shelter also, 
as many of these items are produced by labour within the control 
of the given domestic group. Despite the orientation towards 
self-sufficiency of the domestic group, however, the development of 
the peasantry has been strongly associated with the introduction 
and development of new export crops in the region, e.g. bananas 
in Jamaica, cocoa in Grenada, rice in Guyana. 
Woodville Marshall has identified three major stages 
in the development of the West Indian peasantry. The first being 
the two or three decades after abolition when as we saw in Qur 
earlier chapters there was a rapid movenent to acquire land and 
the number of peasant families grew as ex-slaves tried to leave 
the estate system. The second period lasted from the 
middle to the end of the 19th century, and in this 
period peasant numbers grew and many of thmoved in to export 
production. From 1900 onwards he defines asa period of 'tsaturation" 
where the peasantry did not really grow and in some territories 
their numbers were even contracting. It semed clear, 
however, that by World War II a variety of peasant structures 
had emerged in the region. These consisted basically of four 
groups: 
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j) rural wage earners working on estates or in 
public works programmes, who also rented and/or leased small 
plots of land often with very insecure tenure; 
small holders who owned less than 5 acres and 
who also may or may not have rented other small areas away from 
their homes. These produced food for the home, some cash crops, 
and kept livestock, and might also be engaged in other activities 
such as fishing and timber extraction; 
small holders who were cash crop specialists and 
who produced little domestic food crops and had virtually no 
livestock; 
irnsii small farmers, particularly of vegetables 
who lived near urban areas. Sometimes this group combined this 
activity witi' occasional wage labour and/or craft sales in the 
cities. 
These structures therefore indicate not only a "pure" peasant 
type, but also the 'ransitional nature of the group as a whole. 
Towards one end of the spectrum we find those who are rural wage 
earners renting small plots, those who produce on their plots and 
commute to the city to sell vegetables and crafts, those who 
combine fishing and extracting timber with crop cultivation. These 
are often on the way to becoming proletarianized as wage labourers 
outside the domestic group. At the other end we find a minority w 
are acquiring more and more land and becoming comparatively better- 
off farmers. 
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In general, however, poverty and destitution were the 
lot of those who fell into this system. This combined with their 
exclusion from the political process through which otherwise 
they could have used their numbers to seek redress through 
the state, was one of the major elements in the explosive 
confrontations of the 1930s. The Moyne Commission recognized 
this and remarked: 
"Serious discontent was often widespread in 
West Indian Colonies during the nineteenth 
century, as is indicated by the occasional 
uprising that occurred, leading sometimes 
to considerable loss of life. But the dis- 
content that underlies the disturbances of 
recent years is a phenomenon of a different 
Character, representing no longer a mere 
blind protest against worsening of conditions, 
but a positive demand for the creation of 
new conditions that would render possible a 
better and less restricted life. It is the 
co-existence of this new demand for better 
conditions with the unfavourable economic 
trend that is the crux of the West Indian 
problem of the present y". 3/ 
II: Colonial and Nationalist Strategies in Agriculture 
As we saw earlier, one of the two central planks of 
colonial strategy in agriculture was the implementation of land 
settlement schemes as recommended by the West India Royal 
Commission (Moyne). The other was measures aimed at rehabilitating 
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the neglected plantation sector, especially sugar. War time 
conditions had so disrupted shipping and put a :strain on this 
sector to acquire financial and material inputs tokeep its 
capital stock efficient, that by the end of the war only the 
massive infusion of outside funds could have put it back on its 
feet. As we noted earlier, also, land settlement policy was 
wider in its aims than simple land distribution. It was also 
an effort to restructure the peasantry and create a new social 
order'e rural areas. These reforms were ultimately aimed at 
stemming the tide against any revolutionary assualts on the old 
colonial order. It is for this reason that the major objectives 
of the policy were always explicitly expressed in economic as 
well as social terms. Hence the stress on relieving agricultural 
pressure on the land, to find devices to stem the tide of growing 
unemployment, the emphasis on cooperatives and rural restructuring, 
the need to reduce inequities in access to land, and aways the 
desire to support the coming into existence of a vibrant, 
independent class of peasants. Even the economic objectives were 
more than simply providing a means to make a better living, 
stress was also laid on the need to develop in the region a mixed 
farming system and to move away from over-dependence on one 
staple export. 
As events turned out these expectations did not materializ.. 
"Outsidet' leadership stifled the cooperative movement. Land 
distribution was not on a scale to make any noticeable dent in the 
prevailing situation of gross inequities in landholdings and the 
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plantation dominance of rural resources. The plantations 
continued to hold an effective monopoly of land with the best 
soil types, situated in the best locations and served by the most 
developed infra-structures in the country, particularly access 
roads and drainage and irrigation. When new crops wex'e encouraged 
on these schemes by the colonial authorities, e.g. bananas, it 
was often directed at the export market and this favoured the 
diversion of resources away from domestic food supplies, with as 
we shall observe in the next section disastrous foreign exchange 
consequences. The eflect of all this, however, was to drive more 
and more of the trad ional subsistence farmers into the cash 
economy. Thus it is claimed that in Dominica, after the banana 
boom, nearly 70 percent of the farmers who previously produced 
for subsistence no longer did so. 
In the land settlement schemes fragmentation of hold- 
up also developed and the distributed lands were soon reduced 
to "uneconomic't sizes. The main cause of this seems to have been 
the general failure to come to grips with the variety of customs 
and laws governing intergenerational transfers of land in the 
region. Many of the schemes also gave out only marginal lands. 
Thus in Jamaica it has been estimatcd that only )4 percent of the 
settlements were situated on the most fertile soil type in that 
country. This put severe pressure on the peasants to earn 
an adequate living. To this we might add that since much of the 
land distributed was of an uneconomic size, very often less than 
5 acres, this forced the peasants to seek supplementary forms of 
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income. Thus in Jamaica 13 percent of the peasants on these 
b 
schemes supplemented their income by seasonal work, and as many 
as 2 percent had regular part-time work. 
In geneial the land settlement schemes involved 
significant capital outlays. Thus in Guyana as much as *30m US 
was spent on land development schemes between l954 and 1964. 
In these schemes the government cleared the land, provided drainage 
and irrigation facilities, built access roads and housing sites. 
In the case of the rice development schemes in Guyana, the lands 
were allocated in a condition "ready for immediate cultivation" 
The other plank of colonial policy was rehabilitation 
of the traditional plantation export sector. In the case of 
sugar, this took two forms, namely, protected entry of their 
products into the UK and later Canadian and US market; and an 
export levy in the case of ugar exports. From this levy three 
funds were created; one aimed at financing rehabilitative invest- 
ments, a second at financing plantation expenditures on social 
amenities for its work force, and a third to provide funds to 
'tabilize "wage earnings in the industry by putting aside 
resources to finance wage payments at times of low earnings and 
prices. After these funds came into operation the sugar estates 
commenced massive programmes of mechanization and re-structuring 
of operations to increase labour productivity. Thus, existing 
factories for processing the sugar cane were often scrapped and 
new efficient ones put in place. Transportation was mechanized, 
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as were several aspects of land preparation by the use of 
diggers, bulldozers, trucks, etc. Bulk loading stations 
were aise 
established to facilitate storage and export of sugar. 
Cultivation 
practices were improved and reorganized so as to make land use 
more effective. Last but by no means least, work study methods 
were introduced into their labour-intensive planting and reaping 
operations. The effect of all this was a period of very rapid 
displacement of labour which served to exacerbate social 
tensions. 
Thus in Guyana, between 1950 and 1960 employment in the sugar 
industry fell by about one-third, even as output was expanding. 
As the movement to self-government and later independence 
advanced, and the leaders of the nationalist movement were in a 
position to exercise more and more influence over state 
policies 
there was little real change in their approach to either the 
rura1 probleii, the land problem or agriculture in general. 
What 
they sought to do can best be summed up as to seek 
improvements 
through various adjustments here and there. No real alternatives 
policies were either articulated by them, or attempts 
made to put 
themin place. Even the Marxist, Peoples Progressive 
Party 
government in Guyana endorsed the land settlement approach, 
and 
actively sought to implement it. Reduced to its esentia1s 
therefore, the nationalist phase constituted no qualitative 
break 
with the past, and what improvements-it attempted can 
be summed 
under five general headings: 
1) Support for the land settlement schemes, while 
seeking to introduce other measures to encourage 
the beneficial 
l8i. 
occupation of Crown Lands. In many instances this policy was 
self-serving as it was seen as a means of passing out patronage 
to particular constituencies of voters. 
Support for the rehabilitation of the export crops. 
Two major efforts were made here. One was to entrench the level 
of protection in the UK market for sugar, and the other was to 
advocate the extension of this kind of protection to other export 
cash crops; coffee, cocoa, banana, coconuts, etc. The period 
preceding the entry of the UK into the European Eccnomic 
Community (EEC) was one of great upheavel and desparate efforts 
were made then to secure the extension of the protection afforded 
by the UK into the EEC arrangements. Eventually this was to give 
rise to the Lome' Convention. This became possibie as during the 
post-war years an increasingly regional approach was taken to 
the issue of resolving the sugar problem and the UK entry into 
the EEC. 
Support was also given to the diversification of 
the export cash crops, and the government played a major role 
in the development of the alternative crops through its land 
policies as well as marketing and credit arrangements. 
1) Incentives were also extended to agro-processors 
under the rubric of the industrialization drive. As a consequence 
a number of TNC subsidiaries either alone or in joint venture 
arrangements entered into such areas as canning of juices, milk 
processing, sweets and preserves, chocolates and candies, etc. 
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5) The most significant of the improvements in this 
period was in the area of institutional reform and development. 
Here the major changes were the creation of land and/or 
cooperative departments in the government; statutory marekting 
boards to regulate the sales of both domestic and export crop; 
the creation of state supported financial agencie3 to 1ac11itate 
the flow of credit to small farmers; the construction of 
processing facilities out of public funds as well as other 
anullary facilities such as silos, warehouses, bulk loading 
facilities etc for export crops; the consbruction of infra- 
structuie especially water control systems, access and feeder 
roads and rural electrification. To these should be added 
extension services, agricultural advisory agencies, grading 
authorities, etc. 
Taken as a whole, this approach was clearly neither 
revolutionary nor radical, since :t did not address the roots 
of' the historic problems confronting the rural economy. Thus 
nowhere in the region has a land reform programme of any seriousness 
ever been attempted. Throughout the period from the end of World 
War II to the 1970's the major emphases have been on industry, 
tourism and off-shore finance. Agriculture was effectively 
neglected and the consequences are clearly seen in the state of 
West Indian agriculture which is discussed in the next section. 
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III: The Stte of Agriculture 
In chapter 3 the scathing description of the state oÍ' 
West Indian agriculture just prior to World War II made by the 
agricultural specialists in the Moyne Commission was cited at 
length. As they remarked the general level of agriculture was low 
"in technical knowleCge, business organization and managerial 
efficiency" and that "systematic agriculture ... suited to the 
inherent circumstances of the area" was unknown. From this they 
predicted, that if these methods continued 'it will be impossible 
for agricultural production to provide even the essentials of life 
for the growing population of the West Indian Colonies't. The 
comprehensive reform in agricultural methods which they deemed 
necessary has not occurred anc the situation today is not greatly 
improved over that time. After nearly half-a-century has passed 
the region still remains by and large a high cost producer of 
export products organized on a rore-or-less monocrop basis in each 
territory, with the plantation or large estate sector still of 
preponderant importance as a whole in the region's agricultural 
economy. The net result is that despite the fact that a great 
deal f the region's resources (human, financial, technical and 
land) is tied up in agriculture, this has been so neglected that 
by 1970 the food balane sheet of the area lad gone into deficit. 
Today over 50% of the food consumed on average in the area is 
imported. In particular countries, e.g. Barbados, Antigua and 
Trinidad-Tobago the estimate is over 80%. Currently the region 
imports about US$1 billion in food, that is the value of Barbados1 
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national output and twice that of the Leeward and Windward Islands 
combined. 
This occurrence reflects sev'ral developments. One is 
the real neglect of peasant domestic agriculture at all levels: 
scientific, organizational, credit and marketing. This was 
indicated in our interpretation of policy measures in the previous 
section. Another is the development of tastes in the population 
which favour imported foods (reinforced by the social impact of 
tourism and the proximity of the region to the US and Canada and 
the consequent access the population has through the media to their 
consumer advertisements). Thus apples, salted cod, grapes, etc 
are highly prized food products in the area. It is, however, in 
the expansion of fast food outlets, franchised from TNCs that this 
development is most dramatically seen (pizza, "Kentucky" fried 
chicken, hamburger outlets, etc). A third development has been 
the movement of the population away from agriculture. Thus whereas 
in the 1950's approximately one-half of the region's economically 
active population was in agriculture today the ratio is about one- 
quarter. The decline in agriculture has also been general, affect- 
ing both export agriculture and domestic food. Thus while in the 
early 1960's the region was producing more than 1.3 million tonnes 
of sugar, the current output is about two-thirds that total i.e. 
just under 0.8 million tonnes. In all the major territories 
production has fallen. Overall indices of per capita food production 
in the region (1969-197l100) show that-by 1980 the index was down 
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to 88 for Guyana, 90 for Jamaica and 79 for Trinidad-Tobago. - 
The region's export crops can be put into five 
categores, viz: 
sugar which is overall the most important export, 
and is produced mainly in Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, 
St. Chñstopher-Nevis and Trinidad-Tobago; 
bananas whose output is approximately L5U,00O tonnes 
and whith employ directly and indirectly a out one-half of the 
working population of the Windwards. The other important producing 
areas aie Jamaica and Belizé; 
citrus tsuits produced mainly in Jamaica, Trinidad- 
Tobago, Dominica, Belize, Grenada and Guyana. 0utpt is about 
100,0Ot tonnes; 
grain, produced main] y in Guyana, with smaller 
crops ii Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Belize. The Guyana industry 
has a pacity of about 400,0O0 tonnes but regional ut is 
about 350,000 tonnes with Guyana p:'oducing about 200,000 tonnes, 
and Belize 100,000 tonnes each; 
y) tree crops which together constitute the so-called 
"minorxport staples" (coffee, cocoa and coconuts). About 
25,000 tonnes of copra is currently produced, 9,000 tonnes of 
cocoa bans and 6,000 tonnes of coffee are produced; 
vi) a variety of speciality crops. These include sea- 
island:ottofl which has-declined from over 2.5 million lbs of lint 
in theperiod 1957-1958 to less than 300,000 lbs today, and 
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ganga or marijuana. To thoseTirl control of the region's supply, 
the latter crop probably yields more foreign exchange than all 
other agriculture products combined It, remains, however an 
illegal and therefore "unrecognized" activity which does not enter 
into the national and social income accounting publications of 
the region0 Jamaica is currently reputed to be the second largest 
suppliei of ganga to the USA, after Colombia0 Exports are 
estimated at US$1.5 billion, of which about $250 million remains 
in Jamaica and about 3,000 farmers are involved0 
In addition to these export crops there is a variety 
of' local products. These comprise roots and tubers such as sweet 
potatoes, yams, and cassave; vegetables, and fruits. Most of 
these products are consumed almost entirely in the domestic market, 
although small quantities are exported. In addition livestock is 
kept for both beef and dairy purposes, while the poultry industry 
is based on using imported feeds processed locally0 
Two broad features characterize the organization of 
export agriculture. One is the predominant role historically 
played by TNCs in the export sector0 Thus two major TNCs (Geest 
Incustries and United Brànds) dominate the banana industry in the 
region through the control they exercise over purchasing, 
shipping, and the distribution and sale of bananas. Even where 
small growers produce the bulk of the output, sales from their 
local associations go to one or other of these companies. Tbus 
l9O 
Geest controls the crops in S. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada 
and Dominica; in addition it purchases citrus, coconuts, mangoes 
and egg-plant from these territories. Fyffes, a UK subsidiary 
of United Brands purchases from Belize, Jamaica and Suriname0 
(A French subsidiary of United Brands controls banana production 
in the French departments - Martinique and Guadeloupe). 
TNC domination of sugar output was sharply curtailed 
in the 1970ts after the nationalizations in Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago 
aji Jamaica0 Despite this, however, they continued for some time 
to exercise considerable leverage over local activity through 
their control over marketing, and the production and sale of 
machinery, equipment and spares utilized in the industry0 As 
we shall see in Part LI, in recent times in Jamaica there has been 
a move to divest the sugar installations taken over by the state. 
TNC control over regional agriculture is also expressed in their 
conLrol of agro-processing industries and ttfastfoodst and other 
convenience foods outlets in the region. These industries using 
imported machinery basically"assemble" imported inputs with the 
domestic value added almost entirely derived from the contribution 
of the local work force in these machine intensive operations. 
The domestic value added is further reduced because linkages to 
domestic agriculture are low0 Thus it is estimated that in 
Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, 81% of the varie of agricultural 
inputs to this sector comes from outside the Caricom market. Indeed 
some products like corn, sphagetti, and bread rely on 100% imported 
7/ 
agricultural inputs0 - 
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It should be noted that agro-processing here includes the 
beverage industries all of which operate either as TNC branch 
plants, or as locally franchised or joint venture arrangements 
of one sort or another0 TNC domination also extends into the 
feed industry, important for poultry production0 Here the local 
inputs used vary from one territory to another and usually comprise 
of some mixture of coconut meal, ctrus meal or molasses0 These 
however never exceed one-half of the feed mixes used in the region. 
The secord fe'ture is that all the major export crops 
are high cost and uncompetitive in world markets ad as a result 
depend on protective marekting arrangements which offer premium 
prices and/or domesiic subsidies. Thus banana exporLè to he UK 
and the EEC, sugar exports under the ACP-EEC Sugar Protocol and 
quotas to the USA, as well as Guyana rice exports to the other 
Caricom trritories enjoy some measure of protection. These 
prótected prices, however, have not risen as fast as increases 
in costs which have occurred as Caribbean agriculture has become 
more and more inefficient. The result is that the regon is now 
caught in a serious price-cost squeeze. The general inflation of 
prices since the mid-1970s has turned the terms of trade against 
the region, partly on account of rising input prices into agri- 
culture; fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, machinery, equipmert, 
services (freight, insurance, etc). This undersireable situation 
is further worsened on account of the marked fluctuations in 
export earnings which is a well known consequence of reliance on 
agricultural export stables. Finally note must be taken of the 
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fact that exposure of the region to hurricanes has led to periodic 
devastation of crops and agricultural infra-structure, thereby 
considerably worsening the plight of the region's farming population. 
Tables 7.1 - 7.7 highlight some of the basic features 
of the region's agricultural economy. Table 701indicates the 
variat ons in population density for the West Indian territoDies, 
with supplementary data on other selected countries in the region. 
There it can be seen that the overall density ranges from 57 
persons per sq.km. in Barbados to )4, 6, and 7 in Guyana, Bahamas 
and Belize, respectively0 Excepting these three cuntries, all 
the other West Indian territories have a density in excess of 
100 persons per sq.km. The density ratio for agricultural land 
is also revealing. For most of the territories there were three 
or more persons per hectare of ag'icultural land, and for nthe of 
them the ratio was 5 or more persons. Not unexpectedly the ratios 
for Belize and Guyana, the two territories with the largest land 
mass, were the lowest. For the Bahamas, however, the agricultural 
area to total population was the highest, indicating that 
although it ranks third in size, much of the country is barren 
and unsuitable for agriculture in its present state. For the non- 
West Indian territories the situation is not as harsh with the 
exception of the Netherlands Antilles where the overall ratio was 
277 and the agricultural area to total persons ratio was 33 - 
the highest in the entire Caribbean region. 
Source: 
TABLE 7.1 
Country Year Population Area Agricultural Density 
'000 Sq.Krn Area 
A/B Hectares 
(A) (B) (C) 
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United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Agricultural Statistics, 
Vol Vi, 1984. 
Antigua-Barbuda 1982 77 4140 11 175 7 
Bahamas 1983 227 13,935 17 6 
12 
Barbados 1980 247 1430 37 
57)4 7 
Belize 1983 158 22,963 125 125 1 
Dominica 1981 75 750 19 100 
14 
Grenada 1982 107 311 16 
3144 6 
Guyana 1982 797 2114970 1,378 4 0.6 
Jaica 1982 2,091 10,992 1475 190 
Montserrat 1982 12 10)4 2 115 6 
St.Cbristopher-NeV1S 1980 144 269 15 164 3 
St.Lucia 1983 126 616 20 204 6 
St .Vincent 1982 i28 389 19 329 5 
Trinidad-Tobago 1982 1,129 5,128 169 220 6 
Sux'iname 1982 368 163,265 59 
2 7 
Netherlands Antilles 1982 266 960 8 277 33 
iaiti 1982 6,103 27,750 1,395 220 14 
Domiriian Republic 1982 6,2117 148,734 2,730 128 
2 
Cuba 1982 9,8146 110,860 14,992 89 
2 
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Table 7.2 shows data on the proportion of the economically 
active population in agriculture for two periods 1970/1971 and 
the most recent year (1980-1982). The data indicate a variation 
from 4.5 percent in the Bahamas to 43l percent in Guyana in the 
most recent period. The figure in Guyana in 1982 has been affected 
by the special circumstances of economic collapse, and the ratio 
therefore indicates more of the effects of declining activity i.n 
other areas of the economy than the vigorous expansion of output 
and employment opportunities in agriculture. The sharp decline in 
Trinidad-Tobago's ratio between the two periods, reflects the rapid 
growth of the petroleum sector as well as the particularly marked 
neglect of agriculture in that country, following on the oil boom0 
Over the period the ratios in Barbados, Belize and Jamaica have been 
stable. The only other significant movement has been the decline 
in St. Lucia, Grenada and Montserrat following on the development 
of the tourist industry in these countries. Table 7.3 shcws the 
contribution of agriculture to gross domestic output (GDP) at 
factor cost measured in current prices for the period 1974-1975 
to 1982-1983. In five of the countries shown, agriculture contri- 
buted less than lO%t%DP. These together with three other territories 
(St. Lucia, St. Christopher-MeVis and St. Vincent) had ratios of 
20% or less. In two of the territories the ratio exceeded 30%, 
namely Belize and Dominica, with the latter having the highest 
Source: 
1950 
United Nations, Economic Commission for Ltin 
America and the Caribbean, Agiicu1tura1 
StatistïcS, Vol Vi, 1984. 
TABLE 7.2 
IN AGRICULTURE ACTIVE POPULATION RCENT OF 
Country 1970 Recent Yr (1980-1982) 
9.0 (1982) Ant i ua-Barbuda 807 
Bahamas 907 4.5 (1983) 
Barbados 16.7 16.4 (1980) 
Belize 3401 35.9 (1982) 
Dominica 38.1 30.8 (1981) 
Grenada 
c:rz -J-i. 27.6 (1982) 
Guyana 28.1 43.1 (1982) 
Jamaica 24.5 24.9 (1982) 
Montserrat 25,0 1000 (1982) 
St. Christopher-NeViS 3008 35.7 (1980) 
St,. Lucia 37.0 29.5 (i23) 
St. Vincent N.A. N.A. 
Trinidad-Tobago 22.8 8.6 (1982) 
Suriname 22.4 11.6 (1982) 
Netherlands Pnti1es 1.6 N.A. 
Haiti 7)4,2 6409 (1982) 
Dominican Republic 61.2 55.0 (1982) 
Cuba 30.6 21.9 (1982) 
America and the Caribbean, Agricultu.zal 






OF AGRICULTURE TO GDP 
COST (current prices) 
Average of 
1974 - 1975 
Average of 
1982 - 1983 
ntigua-Barbuda 705 707 
ahamas N.A. N.A. 
arbados 120 
3elize 27.0 3li4 (1980) 
)ominica 35.0 3.0 
renada 26.8 26.2 (1980) 
uyana 30.5 23.8 
Jamaica 7.2 6.7 
ontserrat 7.8 
St.Christopher-NeViS 24.7 (197k) 20,2 (1982) 
St.Lucia 17.6 15.1 
St.Vincent 13.6 l7. 
Trinidad-Tobago 3.3 2.5 
Source: United Nations, Economic Commisioi for Latin 
e 
Tables 7L and 7.5 show the area of agricultural holdings 
by size groups and numbers0 Two points are obvious from these 
data0 The first is there paucity. It is amazing in light of the 
socio-economic importance of the rural economy of the region that 
in no territory is there a series of data which can be used for 
meaningful analysis of changes in the rural areas. These tables 
are therefore, as revealing for what they do not contain as what 
they do contain. The second point is the manifestly uneven dis- 
tribution of land. Although the data are not strictly comparable, 
they do suggest that a total of just under 150,000 hectares of 
land out of a total of about 101 milliun hectares, or about 11% 
of the total iand in farms, is held by small farmers who own land 
up to 2 hectares in size. These farmers represent about two-third 
the total number of holdings registered in these tables. It is 
also widely acknowledged that a high proportion of the land in 
large farmers e.g., 0 hectares is idle. As this is usually1the 
better quality land, the land pressures are more than these data 
at first eveal. Additionally, note should be taken that a high 
proportion of the small farms is held in widely scattered holdings 
with sometimes marked variations in quality. This also intensifie 
the land problems for the, small farmers. 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show the contribution of food imports 
and exports to total merchandise trade, In 1972, in seven of the 
13 countries over 20% of their imports was food imports and in 
the 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In interpreting these data it should be borne in mind that rising 
fuel costs of imports noted in the previous chapter, maskc the real 
importance of food imports over the years. Except for Guyana (and 
here the special economic circumstances already hinted at should 
be recalled) in no territory has there been a really significant 
decline in the importance of food imports. The export data show 
that in 1972, in seven of the countries food exports accounted 
for over two-thirds of export earnings, and in two others it was 
just under one-half. In the 1980' s in only .two countries were 
export earnings from food in excess of two-thirds of total export 
earnings. As we pointed out earlier, although the region developed 
as an exporter of food, there is currently a sizeable deficit on 
the trade account. Despite the high level of food imports, the 
claim has been made and repeated by the Group of Experts who 
examined the prospects for Caricom in the 1980's that 1'% of the 
region's population does not obtain minimum requirements of protein 
2 
intake, and 56% do not obtain minimum requirements of calorie 
intake. This same report projected food imports at $1.6 
billion by the end of the decade. 
To conclude this section it may be useful to take the 
example of Barbados to see some of these difficulties more clearly. 
In that country sugar occupies 85% of the arable land and employs 
about one-sixth of the labour force. Sugar exports and the pro- 
cessing of sugar related products yield about 36% of the foreign 
exchange earned on the merchandise trade account. In this situation 
the following self-sufficiency ratios obtain beef (6%); mutton (9%); 
dairy products (1414%); fruits (56%); vegetables (61%);. In the 
2O3 
farming system over 98% of the land holders possess 
less than 
5 acres and 75% of the agricultural population 
is part-time 
farmers. 
Section IV: Conclusion 
The neglect of agriculture is probably one of the most 
distinguishing, and disastrous consequences of the nationalist 
approach to ecbnomic and social policy in the region. 
The bias 
in favour of industry has created a legacy of 
unattended problems; 
such as inadequate water control system, lack of feeder 
roads, 
underdeveloped research and development (R&D in local 
agriculture), 
absence of land reform, the continued drift of the population 
from 
countryside to cities or to other countries, 
land wastage and so 
onZ. Afte reviewing the region's efforts to develop 
a regional 
food policy and to cooperate in the framework 
of a regional food 
plan, Long ¿ornes to the concluiOfl that the results to 
date are 
inadequate. He states it as follows: 
"Amid pressures for foreign exchange and the 
need to promote employment and generate incomes, 
the countries of the Caribbean Community 
announced a Regional Food Plan to activitate 
agriculture. After nine years, however, the 
impact of regional efforts to boost agri- 
culture remains negligible". 9/ 
He goes on to state that his: 
"study would be incomplete without reference to 
the continued bias facing agriculture in the 
2OLL 
Caribbean ... the bias is probably the 
gr atest single factor affecting regional 
efforts to stimulate food output"0 10/ 
This neglect has led to the emergence of under reported 
and little discussed resource problems in the region's 
agricultural 
sector0 One is soil erosiOfl As recently as March 1985 
it was 
claimed that "social erosion is probably the most serious 
single 
cause of a loss of agricultural land in the Caribbean"0 
11/ 
The second is increasing alienation of agricultural 
land. This 
is particularly marked in the smaller territories 
where property 
developers and land speculators have bought up 
agricultural 
land for housing development. It is estimated 
that in Barbados 
about one-quarter of the land in sugar (i.e., 16,000 
acreshas 
been caught up in property speculation.. So called 
"developers" 
rushed in with plans for residential sub-division, 
but only one- 
quarter of the alienated land, or ,O00 acres, has been 
actually 
subdivided, and to date only 1,000 acres have 
actually been 
used. The developers have announced plans to use 
1,000 acres 
in "other agriculture, but the remainder of 
the land is essentially 
idle". If to this we add land alienated 
for tourist develop- 
ment, the spoliation of land through urban 
de,velopment, poit 
development and quarrying and mineral extraction, 
than the impact 
of these factors in a region of small size should 
not be under- 
estimated. 
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The low rewards for 'trisk...taking" in the rural 
economy of the region when combined with the disproportionate 
share of the value of output going to intermediaries and sellers 
of the final product have considerablj reduced the attractiveness 
of agriculture as a choice of occupation0 This has led to 
small farmers abandonning agriculture and developing an attitude 
which ranks farming as the last chocle of employment, with in 
several instances unemployment and thustling in the streets 
being preferred to farming0 The predicament of the disadvantaged 
group of small farmers therefore, can hardly be worse. 
In sum therefore, the increasingly uncompetitive 
position of the traditional export staples in world markets, the 
failure to develop new export crops on a significant scale, combined 
w weak producing and markéting structures of food and raw 
materials consumed by the local population, tourists, and domestic 
industry mean that palliative measures which do not go to the root 
of the problem will continue to be of little or no avail. Until2 
radical land reform is introduced; fundamental changes in the 
legal and institutional structures of the agrarian system are 
put in place, a science based mixed farming agricultural system 
is developed, a technically trained farming population comes 
into existence, marketing and distribution structures geared 
towards satisfying the needs of the broad mass of the population 
are given priority, and supporting structures, such as credit, 
drainage and irrigation, feeder roads, processing, grading and 
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storage to minimize post-harvest losses are introduced, the 
reversal of the historic dispossession of the poor and powerless 
peasants will never be attained0 Such a perspective, ;iiOwever, 
is that of another development, an alternative to the developing 
underdevelopment.that has charaeterizedpOStWOrld War II of: 
Caribbean history. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE SEARCH FOR NEW POLES OF GROWTH : 
TOURISM 
AND OFF-SHORE BANKING 
I Introduction 
Following World War II, nationalist economic 
policy was 
above all distinguished by the thrust 
to build up a manufacturing 
sector of sorts. The pursuit of this 
was not, ho*ever, entirely 
single_minded. It might be argued, 
with some plausibility, that 
even the neglect of agriculture which 
was highlighted in the previous 
chapter was relative, for as we did 
observe state support for 
certain kinds of activities was forthcoming. 
One area, however, 
where state support was decidedly of 
great importance was the 
concerted policy to promote a seIViceS 
sector in these economies, 
mainly comprised of tourism and off-shore 
banking. In scne 
territories, particularly the smaller 
ones, the emphasis on this 
might even have exceeded the thrust 
towards industrialization, at 
least during certain periods of 
time. 
The stated objectives of this policy were 
to exploit 
natural advantages which the region 
had, in order to expand 
employment opportunities, increase 
incomes, and sustain foreign 
exchange inflows into the local 
economy. As we have already seen, 
the industrialization policy was 
import-intensive despite the 
original motivation of import_sUbstitUtiofl 
which lay behind it. - 
As a consequence, the regime of 
accumulation in this sector was 
heavily dependent Ofl a continuous 
availability of foreign exchange. 
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Whenever this flow has been interrupted a crisis of accumulation, 
with its negative income, employment and growth consequences, has 
manifested itself. Tourism offered a partial release from this 
constraint, and it was particularly welcome in the face of the 
declining performance of the traditional export staples sector0 
As we shall see, however, the extent of the release which tourism 
could offer depends on the import-intensity of accumulation and 
current expenditure flows in this sector The employment problem 
stemmed from the slow growth of export agriculture in the region, 
combined with its increasing mechanization and the low labour 
absorptive capacity of the new manufacturing ecto.L !iich was 
created. The rete of increase in the labour force was high and this 
together with the migration from rural to urban areas, particularly 
among youths, resulted in open unemployment, destitution, slums, 
ghettoes and all the other distinguishing characteristics of Third 
World cities, becoming very evident in the region. These features 
stood in sharp contrast to the affluent suturbs ich sprang up 
in the wake of the new manufacturing sector. It was obvious that 
these considerations would have impelled the search for new ways 
to keep the peoples of the region "gainfully employedT'. To the 
nationalists, off-shore finance and tourism seemed to offer this 
opportunity, since the region was rclatively abundantly endowed 
with resources to develop these services. 
The natural advantages which tourism sought to exploit 
were, a tropical climate, soothing winds, sandy beaches, blue sea, 
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and the attractive and relatively varied scenery of what are 
mountainous islands. In the case of off-shore banking these 
advantages were seen as: 
- location in the time zone of the north-eastern 
seaboard of the USA; 
- proximity in terms of travel time to the US; 
- accessible communication; 
- the widespread use of English and a high degree 
of literacy among the population; 
- and, excepting occasional hurricanes, good weather 
all year round. 
In addition to the above, it was hoped that both of these services 
would find the "political stability?! of the region an added asset. 
This stability was seen as being derived from the region's lung 
standing colonial links with Europe and the sense of reliability 
which tb-is engendered in prevailing laws and financial regulations. 
In the analysis which follows in this chapter we shall 
examine tourism first, then turn to look at off-shore financial 
activities. 
II: Turism Policy 
The development of the tourist industry was stimulated 
by government action starting in the mid-1950's. By then, although 
political independence had not been attained in any of the territorios 
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of the region, the different levels of "internal 
self-government" 
which prevailed had created a situation in which 
the leadership 
of the nationalist movement was able to exercise a 
very strong 
influence over the direction of economic policy0 
To this group, 
tourism seemed to offer a solution to the pressing 
problems of the 
day, and the fact that the colonial authorities 
endorsed these 
views was further encouragement to its efforts0 
Throughout the 
region, the policies adopted to promote tourism 
had many of the 
same elements of subsidisatiOn which we have already 
noted in our 
industrialisation. First, a series of legislative 
acts were passed 
which provided the framework for the operation 
of the system of 
incentives: income tax exemptions, accelerated 
depreciation 
allowances, duty free importation, etc. A good 
example of this 
legislation IS the Hotel Aids Act of Barbados passed in 1956. 
Second, tourist boards were established and charged 
with the 
responsibility for the overall regulation of 
the industry. Thus 
the functions of the Barbados Tourist Board 
which was formed in 
1958 include: 
- advertising and publicizing the country and its 
tourist industry; 
- ensuring adequate shipping and airline facilities 
to 
cater for the flow of tourists; 
- providing training facilities for hotel employees; 
- classifying and grading the services offered by 
botels and allied facilities, e.g. restaurants, 
tour operators, 
rental car agencies, taxi cabs etc; 
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- undertaking research and experimentation with a view 
towards securing improvements in the industry's operation; 
- improving the image and acceptability of the industry 
among the local population; 
- and, generally to help develop all aspects of the 
industry considered important and so continuously upgrade its 
efficiency. 
TITe Jaiiaican Tourist Board which was established was 
similar except that it acquired a number c specialized subsidiaries. 
Among these are the Tourist Product Development Coy, which was 
made responsible for hotel standards and worker attitudes, and 
the Jamaica Att'actions Development Coy which was given the 
responsibility of devising schemes, programmes, advertisements, etc, 
Tith which to attract tourists. In addition the Tourist Board 
owns/leases/operates some tourist facilities: marketing and 
advertising, car rental, and travel agencies. It also supports a 
programme of training through its operation 01 hotel training 
facilities. Finally, it is also responsible for ensuring that 
investment in the necessary infra-structure of the industry takes 
place e.g., airports, telecommunications, roads, harbours, fore- 
$ 
shore development etc. 
In the development of the tourist sector, the policy of 
regional governments was without exception foreign oriented. Not 
only were the tourists encouraged to come from outside the region 
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and the finance for infra-structural aevelopment sought from 
multilateral and bilateral aid donors, but the hotel industry, the 
tour operators, the airline companies and so on were principally 
attracting the major TNCs to invest. In all instances also the 
colonial reletion was "exploited". Thus, initially, the English-. 
speaking Caribbean sought to exploit the market for visitors from 
Britain who were seeking holidays in warmer climes0 It was not 
until later that the US and the Canadian markets were approached. 
Similarly the French overseas "depariments" sought to exploit their 
link with France, and the Dutch colonies theirs with Holland. 
One problem which soon became evident was the increasing 
aggravation of the competitive reiat]ion the territories had with 
each other, since basically the product they each marketed was 
similar. Later efforts at regional collaboration were set in train 
in order to minimize this development0 It was out of this concern 
that the Caribbean Tourist Association (CTA) and its research arm, 
the Caribbean Tourism and Development Research Centre were found 
in 1972. The research arm developed from an initiative of CADEC 
(the development agency of the Caribbean Conference of Churches), 
UNICA (the association of Caribbean Universities) and the CTA 
itself. Presently, 29 governments participate in these groupings 
and manage to maintain an acceptable level of amicability i'i their 
relations, despite the competitive pressures they all feel. 
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The present end product of this type of approach could 
easily have been anticipated, as early critics of this approach 
did, namely, that the industry would soon come to be dominated by 
the TNCs. Thus as it has been observed, thirteen Holiday Inns, 
nine Hiltons and Sheratons each, eight Trust Houses Forte, seven 
Club Mediteranee de Paris, and five Grand Metropolitan (Inter- 
Continentals) operate in the region. In addition many of the 
airlines, tour operators, and other associated services are con- 
trolled by TNCs. Often these TNCs function as integrated units, 
running hotels, owning shares in airlines providing tourist services, 
and also serving as tour operators. A frequently cited example 
is Sun Tours of Canada; this company moved 1400,000 visitors on 
3,000 flights into the West Indies in 1979 - i.e., a number 
larger than any individual country in the Eastern Caribbean. The 
British firm, Intra Sun is another good example. This firm moves 
in excess of 100,000 visitors annually to the region, and also 
operates its own airline (Air Europe) with a fleet of 6 B7147s and 
2 B737s making it larger than any West Indian owned airline. On 
the whole the movement of the TNCs into hotel operations has been 
a comparatively recent development. It is estimated that nearly 
two-thirds of those presently in the region arrived after 1970. 
A significant sector of small business family and individual 
$ 
operations in the accommodation sub-sector, therefore, coexist with 
the TNCs, crea;ing a certain kind of dualism in the tourist industry. 
The dominance of TNCs in the Caribbean region is not 
entirely a product of local policies. It is also in part a reflection 
215. 
of the overall domination which these enterprises nave 
attained 
over the world's tourist industry0 Tourism, is presently 
the 
world's second largest international business. Its world 
wide 
structure and dspersion of location makes it an attractive pro- 
position to enterprises which have the resources and flexibility 
to operate globally. Thus the links between Trans 
World Airways 
(TWA) and Hilton Hotels, or ITT and Sheraton subsidiaries 
speak 
for themselves. 
iii Statistical Profile 
The tables included in this section highlight the main 
features of the gion5 tourist industry. Table 8.1 shows the 
number of tourist arrivals in the Caribbean, and 
worldwide, for 
the period 1970-1985. Asthese data show, between i970-981 
the region's tourist arrivals increased at a 
slightly higher rate 
than those for the world as a whole. At nearly 
eight million arrivals in 1985, the Caribbean 
region 
accounted for about 2.6 percent of the world total. 
This figure 
was almost identidal to that which obtained in 1970. 
While the 
data do show year to year fluctuations, these 
have not been 
particularly marked as only in two years was a negative 
growth 
recorded in the region as a whole and these were 
minus three and 
minus four percent for the years 1975 and 1981 
respectively. The 
highest growthrate was achieved in 1978 (11.6 percent. 
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TABLE 81 
INTERNATIONAL TOURIST ARRIVALS IN THE WORLD AND CARIBBEAN 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Cenlre (CTRC). 
All Countries 
Million % Change 
Caribbean 
Million Change 
1910 168 4.24 
1971 182 +8.3 )4.62 +9.0 
1972 198 +8.3 5.05 +9.3 
1973 215 +8.6 5.41 +7.1 
1974 209 -.8 5.65 +4,4 
1975 213 +1.9 5.48 
1976 218 +2. 14,77 +5,3 
1977 212 +11.0 6.22 +7.8 
1978 260 +7.4 6.94 +11.6 
1979 273 +5.0 7.16 +3.2 
1980 28 +14.0 7.19 +0.5 
1981 288 +1.4 6.90 -14,0 
1982 287 -0.1 7.10 +3.0 
1983 294 +2.2 737 +3.6 
1984 300 +2.1 7.62 +3.3 
1985 N.A. N.A. 7.90 +3.7 
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Tables 8.2 and 83 give a breakdown of the regional data 
for 1980 and 1985. There it can be seen that the Caricom countries 
(including the Bahamas) accounted for 38% of the arrivals in 
1985. Of those however, the Bahamas alone accounted for nearly 
one-half the total, i.e. more than 17 percent, and the OECS states 
just over 5 percent. Within the latter sub-group, Antigua and 
St. Lucia together accounted for well over one-half of the total. 
The Jamaica data show a substantial increase of nearly 145 percent 
between the low period of Manley's rule (1980) and. 19814. Currently 
the number of touris arrivals in Jamaica is less than one-half 
that going to the Bahamas. It is, however, the second largest 
tota] in the Caricom grouping. Barbados with 359,000 visitors 
has received about one-fifth the total going to the Bahamas. 
When we consider the non-Caricom territories as well, 
we find that Puerto Rico is the largest receiving territory in 
the region, accounting for nearly one-fifth the total number of 
tourist arrivals. Tourist arrivals in the Dutch territories 
represent about nine percent of the regional total, while that 
in the French territories is even lower, at four percent of the 
total. 
Table 8.14 shows the arrivals by country of origin. In 
1985, the US accounted for just over two-thirds of the total, 
followed by Europe (one-tenth), the Caribbean (9.2%), and Canada 
(6.5%). The annual data (not included in the text) show that 
every year since 1980, the USA's share in the total has been 
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TABLE 8.2 
TOURIST ARRIVALS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
1980 1985 
OECS COUNTRIES 3114.5 
1428.8 
Anguila 507 15014 
Antigua & Barbuda 86.6 139.7 
Dominica 114.14 21.5 
Grenada 29.14 
52.0 
Montserrat 15.5 16.5 
St. Kitts/NeviS 32.8 147.1 
St. Lucia 79.7 914.5 
St. Vincent & Gren. 50.14 
142.1 
U.S. TERRITORIES 2007.14 19143.8 
Puerto Rico 1627.14 1532.3 
U.S. Virgin Islands 380.14 1411.5 
OTHER COUNTRIES 1277.1 114146.7 
British Virgin Is. 97.0 129.9 
Cayman Islands 120.2 1145.1 
Costa Rica 3145.5 
261.6 
Dominican Republic 301.1 1425.0 
Haiti 138.0 1141.0 
Suriname 148Q 
36.0 
Turks & Caicos Is. 11.9 69.1 
















NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 577,8 755.8 
Aruba 188.9 206.7 
Bonaire 25.2 214.0 
Curacao 1814.7 127.6 
St. Maarten 179.0 397.5 
BAHAMAS 1181.3 ±368.3 
BERMUDA 1491.6 1405.9 
FRANCE (D.O.M.) 3114.9 3141.2 
GuadelouPe 156.5 150.9 
Martinique 158.5 190.3 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
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TABLE 8.3 







OECS 4»4 5»4 +36 
Other Caricom 14.3 15.3 +18 
Netherlands Antilles 8.0 9.6 +30 
Bahamas i6.1 17.3 +16 
Bermuda 6.8 5.1 -17 
French Territories 414 14.3 + 8 
U.S. Terr'itories 27.9 24.6 - 5 
Other Caribbean 17.8 18.3 +13 
Total 100 100 
TABLE 8.k 













Canada 7.7 6.5 
Europe 13.3 10.2 
Caribbean 
(1) 8.3 9.2 
Other 13.2 8.1 
Total 100 100 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
Notes: (1) ExcludeVeneZUe1a. The definition of 'tCaribbean" 
varies from country to country. 









increasing while that of Canada and Europe has been declining, 
lso interesting to note that of the approximately 
5 million US tourists in the region, about 29 percent went to the 
US territories (Puerto Rico 23%) and the US Virgin Islands (6%) and 
40 percent to the Bahamas (23%), Jamaica (9%), and Bermuda (7%). 
The dependence of the region on the US market is further revealed 
in Table 8.5, There it can be observed that only in Dominica and 
Suriname is the dependence on the US market less than 20 percent, 
In all the leading tourist areas (Bahamas, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, 
Jamaica and the U.S. Virgin Islands), the US? share of the market 
is in excess of 70 perceft. It is apposite to note here that 
European tourism was most important in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
the two French overseas departments in the region, which together 
accounted for over one-quarter of the total number of European 
tourists. Most of the Canadian tourists went to the Bahamas, 
Barbadns, and Jamaica which together accounted for about one-half 
of the total number in the Caribbean region. As the data in 
Table 8.4 show. intra-Caribbean tourism is significant Most of 
the intra-Caribbean tourism goes to Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. 
In some of the smaller territories, however, regional tourists 
account for a significant share of the total market, e0g. St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (52 percent), ana iJominica (112 percent). 
It should be noted that the structure of regional communication 
nkes Barbados and Trnidad-Tobao the two main gateways to the 
Eastern Caribbean, and this factor has played a role in this sector 
of the regionts tourism. 
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TABLE 8.5 
DEPENDENCE ON U.S. MARKET IN 1985 (1) 
U.S. tourist arrivals as a percentage of total tourist arrivals 
in the Caribbean 
PERCENTAGE RANGE 
less than 20 Dominica, Suriname. 
20 - 30 Costa Rica, Curacao, Grenada, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela. 
30 - I0 Barbados, Belize, Bonaire, St. Kitts and Nevis. 
- 50 Montserrat. 
50 - 60 Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti. 
60 - 70 Anguilla, British Virgin Islands. 
70 - 80 Aruba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto 
Rico, St. Maarten, U.S. Virgin Islands. 
Over 80 Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands. 
(1) Or most recent year for which information is available. 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
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If we exclude travel by US citizens to the bordering 
states of Canada and Mexico and to US territories abroad, then 
about one-third of US travellers went to the Caribbean in 1985. 
Their expenditure in the region, however, was comparatively low 
as this accounted for less than one-fifth of the total. For 
Canadians, virits to the Caribbean represented 18 percent of all 
visits abroad, if ortie exclude the USA. Expenditure in the region 
at 19 percent of the total was slightly above the average 
for 
all regions visited. 
In Table 8.6 we present data on the region's capacitj 
to handle tourists as of l98 masureJ in terms of available 
accommodation. In the 30 territories the estimated capacity was 
133,900 rooms. A high prop3rtion of these is 
in Venezuela, just 
over one-third of the total. Next in ranking were the Bahamas 
(jO percent) and Jamaica (8 percent). The distribution of hotel 
P by size ivea± that in the Bahamas just over two-thirds of the 
accommodation available was proviled by 29 hotels which had 
100 rooms and more each. Excluding Venezuela, Costa Rica and 
Suriname for which data were not available, hotels with 100+ rooms 
on average accounted for O percent of the total.number of 
rooms 
available. A country breakdown is pf'ovided in Table 8.7. Room 
occupancy ratios which indicate the level of utilisation of these 
facilities show that in the region these range from 146 
- 80 
percent. Not unexpectedly, the ratio fluctuates from year to year 
and is usually used like seat-occupancy ratios in airline travel 
as a measure of performance. As it is widely known many 
tourists 
TABLE 8.6 
TOURIST ACCOMMODATION BY COUNTRY IN 1984 
Number of rooms 






In hotels with 
100+ rooms 
- 
Antigua and Barbuda 2560 853 
Aruba 2460 1983 
Bahamas 13790 8766 
Barbados 71400 2556 
Belize 11490 - 
Bermuda 14850 15140 
Bonaire 1460 225 
British Virgin Isi. 1150 121 
Cajman Islands 2010 339 
Costa Rica 3580 n.a 
Curacao 1760 964 
Dominica 3110 - 
Dominican Republic 14300 3203 
Grenada 580 184 
Guadeloupe 33140 1760 
Haiti 3600 1455 
Jamaica 11280 5497 
Martinique 2750 1131 
Montserrat 280 - 
Puerto Rico 7420 57211 
St.Kitts and Nevis 710 138 
St. Lucia 1700 820 
St. Maarten 1910 1516 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 700 - 
Suriname 6140 n.a 
Trinidad and Tobago 1750 918 
Turks and Calcos 330 
U.S. Virgin Islands 11370 2191 
Venezuela 146000 n.a 
Total 133900 
Percentage range 
70 percent or more 
60 - 69 percent 
10 - 59 percent 
TABLE 8.7 
NUMBER OF ROOMS IN HOTELS WITH 100 OR MORE ROOMS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL NUMBER OF ROOMS IN COUNTRY 
Country 
Aruba, Dominican Republic,Puerto 
Rico, St. aarten. 
Bahamas. 
Bonaire, Cuteao, Guadeloupe, 
Jamaica, Martinique, St0 Lucia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
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20 - 39 percent Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Bermuda, Grenada. 
10 - 19 percent British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Haiti, St. Kitts and 
Nevis. 
Nil Anguilla, Belize, Montserrat, 
Dominica, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Turks and Caicos. 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
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do not stay at hotels, but visit with friends and family, and 
the available data show that visitors in this category range from 
7 percent of the total in Aruba to 53 percent in St. Kitts-Nevis. 
In territories like Barbados, Montserrat, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, this percentage has exceeded one-third0 
The level of prosperitT of the tourist industry depends 
not only on the nuÑber of tourist arrivals but the period of time 
each one spends and his/her expenditure. Data for the region 
show that this ranged between 3-5 nights on average in Puerto Rico for 
1984 to 8-9 nights in places like Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Tourists frDm Europe on average 
stay the longest, followed by Canada and then the U.S.A. This 
no doubt reflects the consideration that the further away the 
tpurist comes from, and the more costly the travel expenses, then 
the longer he or she is likely to spend in the region. About one- 
half of the tourists to the region arrive on cruise-ships, the 
largest number going to the Bahamas (about one-quarter the total). 
This is followed by the US Virgin Islands (18 percent), and Puerto 
Rico (12 percent)0 
Total expenditure by tourists in the region is shown in 
Table 8.8. The information shows that in 1984 the total was about 
$4.6 billion, up from $3.3 billion in 1979. Out of this figure the 
Bahamas received $810 million or 18 percent, and Puerto Rico 
$681m or 11 percent. Next in line were Jamaica (9 percent), the 
U.S. Virgin Islands (8 percent), and Barbados and the Dominican 
ESTIMATES 0F VISITOR EXPENDITURE 
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TABLE 8.8 
3285 )46145 Total 
* 
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Repub'ic (6 percent). Data on employment generated by tourism 
for selected countries are shown in Table 8.9e While on average 
only 3 percent of the total regional labQur force finds employment 
generated from tourism, in individual territories the percentage 
ranges from 9percent in the Bahamas to one percent in Venezuela. 
In six of the countries for which data are available employment 
generated by this sector exceeded one-eight of the total labour 
force. 
The contribution of tourism to the GDP of selected 
countries is shown in Table 8.10. These show a wide variation 
ranging between 5-36 percent; indicating that the dependence of the 
various territories on tourism is quite uneven. Although data are 
not available for all the countries, there are in effect, three 
broad grouping of countries0 Those like Jamaica, Dominican Republic, 
Trinidad-TobtgO, Venezuela and Puerto Rico where tourism is 
important, either as foreign exchange earner (in Jamaica it is 
the largest foreign exchange earner) or source of income generation 
and employment, but where a prized mineral resource exists, a 
significant level of industrial diversification has been attained, 
and agriculture remains significant0 Second, there is a group of 
countries like the Bahamas, Bermuda, and the Cayrran Islands where 
the dependence on tourism is very high and other economic activities, 
except other services like off-shore banking, are not significant. 
In between these there is a middle range of countries in which 
although tourism contributes significantly to employment, and 
foreign exchange earnings, its overall weight in the GDP is not 
TABLE 8.9 
EMPLOYMENT IN TOURISM 
ource: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC). 
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Country Employment Generated 
ntigua & Barbuda 
by Tourism as a % of 
employed labour force 
23.6 
Dominica 5.3 
St, Kitts/Nevis 13.1 
St, Lucia 18.2 
'3arbados lLt.O 
Jamaica 2.3 
.rrinidad & Tobago 1.5 
Puerto Rico 5.2 
J.S.V.I. 32.6 
3ahamas 148,7 
osta Rica 1.7 
lenezuela 1.0 
PERCENT CONTRIBUTION OF TOURISM TO GDP 
COUNTRY PERCENT 






St Kitts/Nevis 5 
St Lucia 19 
U.S.v.I. 32 
Source: Caribbean Tourism Research Centre (CTRC)O 
Note (1) The above estimates are however not strictly com- 
parable dué to different methods of compilation. The 






as great due to a modest development of light industry and the 
existence of at least one important agricultural staple, e.g. 
Barbados. 
Iv: Thee Results 
How do we evaluate the achievement of the region in the 
area of tourist development? To begin with as the statistical data 
revealed the level of development of tourism in the region is quite 
uneven, and the dependence of the territories of the region on 
tourism is also uneven, Since all the territories, however, have 
tried to market the same "product" in roughly similar ways, the 
absence of a truly coordinated development of the industry in 
the region has resulted in increased social costs for the region 
as a whole despite cooperation through the CTRCO These increased 
social costs have stemmed from the under-utilization of infra- 
structure and other capacity at the regional level, and the 
relative disadvantage in which the smaller territories have found 
themselves, as on the whole they have had less accessible airline 
links to the major markets, ,and less resources to promote and 
market tourism in the expensive cities of Europe and North America. 
Thus in the early' years of the industry, Antigua, Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago reaped advantages from being "gateway "territories 
because they had airport facilities which accommodated big jets,- 
while smaller propeller aircraft were required to link the other 
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territories in- the various a1'line networks. These "gateway 
territories were seen as benefitting so much from this situation 
that the smaller territories were eventually forced to respond 
through upgrading their airports, e0g. St. Lucia, St. Christopher- 
Nevis, and Grenada, in order to keep their competitive standing. 
In the development of the industry, although as we have 
observed the regional share of the market is quite significant, 
for much of the period rnder review there was a single-minded 
focus on marketing the industry in Europe and North Anrica. In 
this marketing, sun, scenery, beaches, water-sports, and other 
outdoor activities were the chief points of promotion and the major 
targets sought were cruise ships, conventions, business travellers, 
and the leisure classes of these countries who coulu afford 
"holidays in the sun". In the early years the focus was so much 
on high income leisure groups, that the industry was promoted as 
an alternative way "to spending winter in the North" It was only 
with the growth of incomes in Europe and North America, ar±d 
cheaper cruises and airline flight arrangements put in place by 
tour operators chere who exploited all available avenues for 
discount travel, that brought the focus down to persons in the 
middle income ranges. Despite this occurrence, regional tourLst 
arrivals have continued to grow in numbers, with minimal promotion, 
indicating a significant untapped potential0 The exploitation of 
this potential, however, would almost certainly require significant 
changes in the social and cultural orientation of the industry, 
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as it would be impossible to tap this market while continuing to 
manifest the colonial and cultural bias of the original enterprise0 
Throughout the period, TNC domination of the industry 
has continued to be an important feature of it. In recent years, 
however, efforts have been made to modify the character of this, 
particularly in the hotel sector0 As we shall see in Part 3 this 
has taken the form of governments entering into joint-ventures 
with TNCs and in some instances even "nationalizing" these concerns, 
as Jamaica did during the Manley years0 In general the TNCs have 
not resisted these developments, since &ll the joint venture! 
managemei.t contract type of arrangements in force so far, for a 
number of reasons makes economic sense to them. In the first 
instrnce where nationalization has occurred this has not been 
confiscatory, but represents in fact a commercial purchase of their 
assets by the governments. Second, wriere direct ownership is not 
exercised by the TNC, the possibility of any complications arising 
out of ever this type of nationalization is removed while the 
TNC continues to receive income. Third, the government as a 
partner 'protects" the TNCs from some of the negative social images 
of big hotel operations in.these countries. Finally, the manage- 
ment and otherfees generated by these arrangements are guaranteed 
income and fixed changes on the operations of these facilities. 
As a result it is not surprising therefore, that such arrangements 
have led to negative effects on efficiency. As Barry et al have 
pointed out: 
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"in almost every case in which a TNC 
operation has been unsatisfacto'y in 
the Caribbean, the TNC had no direct 
financial involvement in the hotel0 
In contrast, in all cases where the 
hotel keeping experience was satis 
factory, the TNC had direct financial 
input". 2/ 
One of the principal reasons why governments have 
consistently supported and promoted tourism in the region has 
been the expectation that it would generate scarce foreign exchange. 
Experience has shown, however, that a numoer of major leakages of 
out of this sector exists0 Among the more important have been: 
The high foreign exchaige content of the original 
investments in hotel and infra-structure. This is brought about 
largely by the absence of local industries capable of supplying 
such items as construction materials, furnishings etc used in 
hotels, heavy duty cquipment and oih'.msc.hinery needed for 
constructing airports, harbours, telephone systems, etc. Sometimes 
this leakage has been partly eased, since investment in infra- 
structure for tourism has been a favoured source of grants and 
aid by both bilateral and multi-lateral donors to these countries0 
The high import content of transporting tourists 
to the area, and in local travel as well. Most of the airlines and 
all the aircraft and cruise ships are either foreign owned or 
have been purchased from abroad. In terms of local travel, with 
few exceptions, e.g. Trinidad-Tobago, both the vehicles, and the 
fuel they use are imported. 
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3) The high levels of foreign exchaige used to finance 
consultants to the industry, architects, building firms which 
routinely win the contracts to service and build these facilities, 
as well as the management recruited from abroad to run these 
industries, or to train those who will run them. 
LI) Because of the high foreign participation in the 
local industry and the need to keep this intact, governments have 
been facilitating the repatriation abroad of profits, fees, and 
other incomes earned locally. 
The high import-content of food and beverages served 
to tourists is high. Thus the CTRC has conducteda study of 
Grenada, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia which siows that 5LI percent 
of tourist expenditure on food was on imported foods; 62.5 per- 
cent of their expenditure on beverages were on imported items; 
70 percent of their expenditure on meat was on imported meats; 
20-25 percent of their expenditures on fruit and vegetables was 
on imports; and almost all the dairy products consumed were 
imported. 
The high foreign exchange cost involved in promoting 
the industry abroad, particularly in the television medium. 
In addition to the above there are other illegal/underground 
leakages whçh are important. The more significant ones are the 
movement of foreign exchange through the black market or at least 
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outside the banking system; hotels receiving payment for services 
in the country of origin of the tourist and not remitting all of 
it which is required by law; and tour operators in Europe and 
North America who do the same0 The significance of this leakage 
can be gleaned from the fact that in one territory, e.g. Antigua, 
as much as 95 percent of its hotel reservations are made from 
abroad. Further, Barry et al cite a study in the Bahamas which 
shows that 81 cents out of every tourist dollar spent there is 
leaked out of the economy0 
The identification of leakages does not deny the existence 
of local earnings' retained in the eonomr. The bulk of these 
deriv from labour used in the construction phase and in the 
provision of services on an or-going basis, both currently and 
in the form of maintenance. In addition employment as well as 
incor1e are generated in related services, such as nite spots, 
taxis, banks, shops, restaurants, etc; and in the maintenance 
of the tourist infrastructure, e.g. iircraft, motor vehicles, 
pleasurecraft etc; is important. Thus in Jamaica it is estimated 
that the ratio of direct to indirect employment in this sector is 
1:1.25. Finally, taxes are paid by the companies directly 
involved, 
ialthough the amount varies with the leTe1 of relief in operation 
under the incentive programmes); persons who derive direct and 
indirect income from the industry; importers who pay duty on 
imported items; travellers who pay travel and exit taxes; plus 
guests who pay hotel room and service taxes, Before leaving this 
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point it should be noted that while the claim is made, justi- 
fiably, that the tourist industry as a whole has put budgetary 
pressure on West Indiagovernmentsin having to build adequate mf ra- 
structure, this is a benefit to the local population as well, and 
frequently it is these territories which have comparatively high 
levels of public services. 
In addition to the issues of ownership and control the 
pattern of marketing of the product, and foreign exchange earnings 
in the industry raised earlier, a number of miscellaneous economic 
considerations have to be also taken into account in evaluating 
tourism in the region. One of these is the inflationary impact 
of tourism on local economies. Although no precise measurements 
have been made it appears that the prices of services and food 
in the tourist sector on average rise faster than other prices, 
largely beause it is assumed that the income of tourists at 
home rise faster than those of the local population and therefore 
the tourist traffic can "bear" more, When this occurs it puts 
pressure on the prices of these items and substitutes consumed 
by the local population e.g0 food, transportation, clothing, etc. 
Related to this consideration is the practice of pricing products 
in the tourist sector in Us dollars. One effct of this is that 
when the US rate rises against local currencies exchange rate 
inflation is induced. Where, as in the West Thdies, local currencies 
are denominated in US dollars, the effect of a rising US dollar 
relative to other currencies, is to act as a disincentive to 
tourists coming from Europe, Canada and elsewhere. The potential 
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effect of this can be gauged from the fact that between 1979 and 
the 
l98, against the US dollar, British pound depreciated by about 
58 percent, the Canadian dollar by 11 percent, the French franc 
by 105 percent, and tne German mark by 56 percent. 
Another consideration is that the TNC controlled hotels, 
having been built early, presently control some of the best beach 
lands and scenic locations in these territories. In additIon it 
is they who have given an impetus to new activities from other 
TNCs which seem to support the industry as a whole, e.g. fast 
food chaiis, car rental agencies, restaurants etc. In all of this, 
however, the hotel industry remains the most cen;ral element in 
the performance of the region's tourist industry. In this regard 
a recent article by Bell is particularly instructive. A table 
with the data he has provided is presented in Table 8.11. These 
data indicate the following: 
0f the 13 geographical areas listed in the world 
survey, the Caribbean had the lowest net income per room ($150). 
This compared with a world average of ($3,027), while the second 
lowest of the 13 regions had a net income six times larger. 
The Caribbean's productivity index (2.5t) was also 
the lowest, with the world average being one-third larger (3.38) 
Of the thirteen regions, the Caribbe.an had the highest' 
cost of electricity, the second highest cost of water, and a well 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































LI) Maintenance charges per room at uS$2,076 were the 
highest in the world, compared with a world average 
of $1,526. 
Th poor performance indicators revealed here have to 
be 
seen in the context of two further features of 
the industry0 First, 
the industry is a major buyer on the local market 
as well as im- 
porter0 In both instances Bell refers to numerous 
complaint 
about over-charging by local distributors and manufacturers. 
In the former case middlemen combined with import 
regulations are 
identified as the major source of overpricing, while 
in the latter, 
the inefficient scale of operations in the manufacturing 
sector, 
and the monopoly status of many of these producers 
combine to 
produce overcharging0 The second feature to note is 
complaints 
about excessive commissions which prevail in the 
local industry. 
Thus Bell cites the time "not too long ago "when 
the hotels paid 
10 percent to the retail travel agent, an 
qverride of a further 
5 percent to the wholesaler, and a 
negotiated flat fee to the 
representative. Currentli he states that the chartes 
are 13, 20, 
and 5 percent, respectively..: In addition, 
the cost of credit 
card handling and commisSion is between 3-5 percent. 
As a result 
he claims that on average the Caribbean hotel 
industry pays out 
25-30 cents out of every dollar in the marketing 
of its product. 
The high cost inefficient tourist industry which 
seems 
to have emerged reflects similar developments 
in other major areas 
of Caribbean economic activity, e.g. export 
cash crops, and the 
anufacturiflg sectors. These negative economic 
features of the 
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industry are further complicated by several socio-political 
factors0 One of these derives from an observation which was 
made earlier, that is, the industry initially developed with a 
thrust towards providing a change of scenery and climate for 
the upper class inhabitants of the colonial and/or former colonial 
power. It was in effect, promoted as a winter retreE't, a "winter 
home away from home". Later, the region's proximity to Noith 
America and the comparative affluénce of its middle classes, led 
to a greater and greater orientation to the US market. In this 
pattern of development the emphasis was not on mass marketing as 
such. It was not until later with the arrival of package tours, 
cheap cruises that a serious cost-consciousnesS developed, but 
by then the industry was already locked ir to high cost structures 
it could not easily break out of without drastic consequences for .' 
the returns to resources cu'rently invested in the industry. 
A second soda-political consideration which affects 
the industry is that over the period of its existence it has 
developed an excessive concentration on the US market. This has 
made it vulnerable to changes there e.g. depression/recession, or 
changes in fashion. It has also given scope to the US government 
and/or media to destablilize regimes in the Caribbean through 
adverse publicity and hostile foreign policy statements. The best 
known examples of these occurred during Manley's rule in Jamaica 
and Bishop's Grenada. We shall return to this issue later in the 
study. 
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A third consideration of some importance is environmental. 
The industry inevitably generates a certain level of pollution such 
as garbage on the streets and beaches, and even in the sea itself. 
While attempts have been made to keep these areas tidy , a 
larger issue exists, which is that the Caribbean sea itself, which 
is the major source of attraction for tourists, is now being 
affected by pollution in ways which could diminish its appeal. Thus 
as oñe commentator has observed: 
"The tourist image is still valid: white. sand 
beaches, fringed with palms, cooled by lucid 
blue water. But another realLty is creeping 
up on the vision of paradise. On any given 
day, 100 loaded tankers carrying 5 million 
barrels of crude are likely to be churning 
their way through the narrow shipping lanes 
of the Caribbean. An estimated 6.7 percent 
of the regional oil production ends up in 
the sea". 5/ 
In the same article the author points out that in 1977, 77 million 
barrels of oil were spilled from Oil platforms. To this we can 
safely add 7 million barrels from tank washings and emptying 
tankers, and we get an idea of the size of the pollution. If to 
this we further add the waste 30 million people dump into the sea, 
spillage from hotels and other sùich facilities on the sea front, 
untreated discharges from chemical and fertilizer plants, cement 
works, etc, then the scale of the problem is appreciated. 
As a social issue these environmental dangers do not 
exist only in relation to the sea. Already over 50 percent of the 
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forest cover of the region has been lost since colonisation. 
The current rate of forest depletion is said to be in 
excess 
of 10 times the rate of replacement0 The consequences 
are increas- 
ingly being brought to the public's attention by concerned 
persons 
and organisations; soil erosion, flooding, land slips, 
marine 
pollution, etc0 The future danger was considered sufficiently 
threatening that in 1981, 27 countries of the region agreed 
to a 
Caribbean Action Plan under the auspices of the United Nations 
Environmental Programme. Under this arrangement two treaties 
have 
been subsequently agreed to, one dealing with oil spills was 
signed in Colombia in 1983. 
The final consideration refers to a number of inter- 
related socio-psychologiCal aspects of the region's industry. 
One 
of these is the image of tourism which has been projected 
by the 
industry. In the past tnis has portrayed the local population 
as 
menial and servile, living for the tourist and willing to do any- 
thing to make him happy. Because the tourists were overwhelmingly 
white, this tended to reinforce negative racial perceptions 
of the 
area by both parties. As a consequence tourism although 
important 
to the region, is only uneasily accepted by the populationat 
large. While on the one hand glad for the opporlunities to 
ea'n 
an income, there is also resentment at the second 
class status 
which seems inherent in doing so. In recent years 
governments 
have tried to develop "courtesy »'nd to publicise and poject 
the importance of the industry to the local population 
through 
the local media, and so on. On the whole, however, 
the results 
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have been mixed. Thus in its Annual Economic and Social Survey, 
1984, the Government of Jamaica acknowledges that: 
"Towards the end of the year, also, the Board 
launched an aggressive compain on local radio 
and television against tourist harassment as a 
number of surveys had shown that this was the 
major complaint of visitors to the island". 6/ 
A second issue stems for the fact that throughout the region the 
growth of the entertainment industry along side tourism has 
spawned a significant growth in male and female prostitution0 
Generally, governments and other social agencies have turned a 
blind eye to this development, with only occasional public out- 
cries. Finally, much concern has been expressed over the continued 
seasonality of the tourist trade, since reflecting its earlier 
orientation as a winter home for northerners there is a marked 
division of the trade into a high season (December 15 - April 15) 
and a low season. Efforts to even out these swings have not been 
particularly successful. 
In recent years it has been popular to promote the 
industry in terms of local culture and its artifacts. This has 
led to publicify campaigns on local foods, art, sculpture and 
literature. The overall approach is essentially, however, one 
of promoting Caribbean exotica, with heavy emphasis on winning 
favourable journalistic comments in the foreign press. Thus: 
"During 1984, the Jamaica Tourist Board 
diversified its promotional strategies to 
include not only the promotion of tourism 
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features but also cultural, historical 
and economic aspects of Jamaica, through 
joint promotions..with such organisations 
as the Jamaica National Export Corporation, 
the National Trust Commission and Things 
Jamaican. In this regard, in addition to 
the regular familiarization tours for travel 
writers, special familiarization trips dealing 
with Jamaican art and culture were arranged 
for foreign journalists". 7/ 
The Report then goes on to cite as an exmple of this type of 
promotion an exposition at Macy's department store in California 
where "over a one week period [was] highlighted not only Jamaica's 
tourism product but also our art, crafts, foods, fashion and 
manufacturing industries". 
The harsh reality, however, rernair-s. Plush tourit 
facilities coexist with depressed rural arcas, unemployment, 
poverty, and irban slums. The contrast is constant rernr.r 
that the development of the industry at huge financial and social 
cost has done little over the long run to eliminate permanently 
the widespread poverty and powerlessness of the West Indian peoples. 
V: Off-Shore Banking 
Just as tourism was developed on the principle of 
selling the natural advantages of a Caribbean location to Europe 
and then later North America, natural advantages were also offered 
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as reasons for the development of off-shore financial centres 
in several of the territories. This time the natural advantages 
were: location in the eastern-seaboard of the US time zone; 
proximity to North America, convenient locations for building 
communications directly linked to the US network; and, good all 
year round weather. To these, however, we must add the "man-made" 
advantages: financial regulations and laws, or rather their absence, 
which could serve as inducements for certain types of transactions, 
and the security inherent in a region politically and culturally 
oriented towards North America and Europe. 
Contrary to popular views, overseas banking is not a 
new phenomenon in the area, it has always been a part of its 
history. The Currency Board systems which operated in the region 
until the 1960s, linked the currencies of these countries to the 
pound sterling at fixed and unchangeable exchange rates, and 
also required the currency issuing authorities to back each unit 
of currency it issued with its equivalent in sterling. Such an 
arrangement allowed the banks in Britain to view their operations 
in the British territories of the area as being no less risky 
in terms of exchange rate movements andfriconvertibility of their 
profits, than that geneçated at home. The decline of Britain 
form its pre-eminence in the area and the increased influence 
of 
North America, other parts of Europe, and Japan, 
combined with the new activities being promoted by the nationalist 
governments of the area to attract a new range of banks into-the 
region : Chase Manhattan, Bank of Nova Soctia, Southern and Citizens, 
Bank of Commerce, and so on. These however, came in principally 
to exploit local credit oppo'tunities and to make profits from 
the financing of the region's external trade. 
The financial havens which have developed are neither 
formally nor directly integrated into the internal credit structure 
of the territories ortheirinternational trade. Usua±ly local law 
distinguishes between resident and non-resident banking activities, 
with the latter not having controls on reserve requirements, or 
foreign exchange remittances, and also being taxed, if at all, at 
very low rates. Controls only exist where rûn-residents deal in 
local currency. These territories have all passed legislation which 
either impose no tax on either all or certain categories of wealth 
and income, or where taxes on income and wealth exist these are 
at a level that their effective rates are l"-' than :ch those 
residents from such otentil countries as the 1J.S8L.. Canida 
Japan, and the WeEt ropean countries of the E.E.C., would have 
to pay in the country of origin. These arrangements are normally 
backed up by institutional and/or legal arrangements which enforce 
rules of secrecy and confidentiality on commercial transactions 
conducted either through or in foreign countries. Sometimes, as 
in the case of the Cayman Islands, criminal penalties are imposed 
for those who breach local laws which enforce secrecy and confident- 
iality. Such laws are intended to act as a deterrent against ot1-er 
countries courts seeking to compel officials who work in the 
Caribbeant0 make disclosures, without the prior approval of the 
local courts. Finally, in some instances tax treaties usually 
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exist between the country which wants to operate as a haven and 
other countries0 The best known exmaple in the region is that 
between the Netherlands Antilles and the US which at one time allowed 
exemption on certain interest paid by US persons to residents 
of those territories0 
The most active of the off-shore financial centres in 
the region are the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The former 
handles over US$150 billion in funds and hosts about 370 banks. 
Experts claim that on some days more funds pass through Nassau 
on a daily basis than London. It is further claimed that the 
Bahamas is the worldTs second largest loan syndication centre after 
London. In 196k the Cayman Islands had virtually no off-shore 
business and only two banks, but beginning in 1977, there were 
218 licensed banks and trust companies. By 1979 there were 
8,158 registered companies. Today these islands host 13,600 
companies and 360 banks, and inside circles claim it is the 
favourite for Canadian comapnies. Bermuda is also a major centre 
and is thought to hold the leadership in the field of insurance. 
The Dutch territories have played a leading role for US corporations 
seeking a tax - haven for in-house financing. This has been based 
on the tax treaty referred to ear]ier, but this treaty is now in 
jeopardy after the passage of legislation in the US in 198'1. 
Overall, it is said thac the regicin hosts over one-quarter of the 
banks located in financial centres around the world. 
The tremendous expansion of off-shore financial centers 
in the region did not grow out of its internal needs. This 
development was founded on the restructuring of world finance which 
was taking place in the capitalist system as a whole in the 1950's. 
The specific manifestation of note is the development of what 
has been termed Euro-currency markets. Although so named, the 
market in effect depended on the growth of banking transactions in 
any currency other than that of the country where the bank involved 
is located. It first evolved in Europe where the banks dealt in 





In each of 
to promote 
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embrace several major currencies on a world-wide basis. 
is currently estimated at over Us$3,000 billion, of which 
is held in US dollars. It was therefore in an effort 
this development that the Caribbean became involved. 
the territories a great deal of public funds was used 
the country as an attractive haven, and as with thc 
case of tourism, consUderable intra-regional competition exists, 
as the territories seek to outbid each other in their appeal. 
Because of the emphasis on secrecy and avoidance of taxes, not 
surprisingly the industry has developed strong connections not 
n1y with the questionable activities and possibly large scale 
'white collar crime' committed by TNCs and wealthy families and 
individuals, but with well organized crime and drug trafficking. 
Several scandals have errupted recently which appear to involve 
the higher echelons of the political and police administrations of 
several countries: the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Turks and Cacios, 
Jamaica, Trinidad-TobaigO, Barbados. 
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Although the off-shore financial centres operate as 
entrepots in the huge movement of finance, nonetheless it is 
claimed that four major economic benefits flow to the local 
territories. The first is the revenue the governments receive 
in the form of fees and licences which these companies pay 
prior to engaging in business0 Since tax haven status provides 
exemption from taxes on income, profits, earnings, capital gains 
or distribution, inheritance, succession, witholding and death 
duties, and all that is required to "engage in business" is a 
name plaquea postal box-number, and maybe a file cabinet, the 
fees and licences paid are small in relation to the magnitude 
of the funds the banks handle, an even revenue raised by the 
governments. Thus in the Bahamas these fees average US$3-5 
million annually. The second benefit claimed is employment. 
Here again the amount involved is quite small since very little 
of the actual bookkeping in these transactions takes place 
locally. In the Bahamas in 1979, 270 of the 300 banks located 
there did not even have a physical presence on the islands. 
Often what was there was Ita plaque, a walk-in closet, a desk, 
10/ 
a file cabinet and a telephone . - In that country it is 
estimated that at the end of 1983 the activities of all off-shore 
centres provided employment about 3,000 persons, i.e., two to 
three percent of the labour force. The third benefit claimed 
is the spill-over effect into other service areas. Here it is 
true that in particular a number of local lawyers and accountants 
have benefitted from these activities and some have developed 
specialist reputations in these areas. These personnel usually 
251. 
the legal and book-keeping red-tape involved in starting 
up operations and then oversee changes, from time totime, 
in local laws and procedures0 Since the banks have no 
Bahamian dollar incomes, all local expenses are financed from 
foreign exchange inflows. The final benefit claimed is that 
this activity serves as a. form of promotion for the territory) 
attracting tourists and hopefully also investors with an interest 
in the local market. There is no doubtthat frequent references 
to these countries in the financial press, the electronic media, 
film, etc, helps to raise their profile, and that ocasionall 
a business person doing business in the territory ma:-- "fa1l 
in-love" with the place and possibly invest some funds there. 
It is difficult, however, to find many concrete examples of this) 
except for the occasional purchase of land and housing as places 
of retreat and/or retirement. 
On the other side there are costs to?be considered. Thea 
first is the need for these governments to invest in adequate 
infrastructure : airports, local transportation, hotls, telex and 
telephone links, etc in order to make the territory a feasible 
choice. Since these infra-structure also service the tourist 
trade, the development of off-shore financial services has served 
to reinforce the latter. The second is that since the entire 
business is founded on avoidance of taxes and there is a gray area 
between avoidance and evasion of taxes, the latter being illegal, 
it has tended to attract many dubious persons and operations as 
well as organized crime and drug trafficking. This has led 
inevitably to the corruption of many of the rich and powerful in 
the region leading to even further selling-out of the birth 
rights 
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of the poor and powerless. At the present time, however, 
in 
Europe and North America public concern is growing over the 
fact 
that these "tax-havens" have unfairly increased the tax burden 
of citizens who do not have the knowledge and/or resources 
to 
exploit such arrangements. The linking of these activities 
with crime and drugs reinforces these concerns and has 
helped 
to generate pressures in favour of governmental action to 
eliminate these loopholes. While the future of this new 
West 
Indian enterDrise does not seem to be immediately at threat, 
it 
must be acknowledged that a note of uncertainty ha already 
crept 
into the enterprise of off-shore financial havens, particularly 
where US sources are concerned. While initially contributing 
tc the growth in these centres in such past actions as its 
Interest Equalization Tax of 1963 (which made it unattractive 
for US citizens to invest in non-American securities 
and 
Regulation Q(which made it unattractive for non-Americans to 
tuy American domestic dollar bonds by limiting the interest 
rates on these bonds below international rates) recent moves 
by the Reagan administration, particularly in exempting 
from 
taxation interest earned by non-residents holding acrounts in 
the US)has encouraged the movement of considerable funds into 
the U.S.A. Similarly, its high profile attacks on the supplies 
and suppliers jn drug_trafficking has opened many of these 
havens to systematic investigation. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE STATE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
In various stages of the presentation in Part 1 we 
considered the main contours in the development 
of the colonial 
state in the Caribbean over the three major historical 
periods 
identified there, i0e., the period of the colonial slave 
mode 
of production, its later disimtegrati-Ofl during 
the period of 
transition to freett labour in the 19th century, 
and finally 
the emergence of a more or less definitive 
peripheral capitalist 
formation in the 20th century up to \Ñoild War 110 
Bight up until 
the 20th century the ruling planter class was 2hle to wield 
through he state its economic and political power. This it 
used to support slavery, and later when its abolition 
was inevitable, 
to retard the growth of "free" labour and its 
associated labour 
market, as well as the developinent.Of a locai agriculture 
oriented 
towards domestic needs nd -i ?4d pcasantry. Despite this, 
however, by the end of World War 11, the continuous resistance 
of 
the dominated classes to planter rule, along with 
the momentous 
transformations which had taken place, and which 
were still under- 
way in the capitalist world system in general 
and Europe in 
particular had forced important changes on the colonial 
state. 
This could be seen in a number of areas. Firs, those who 
controlled the local state had by then to take 
into account the 
strength of nationalist sentiment and 
popular resistance to 
colonial rule. This encouraged an abandonment 
of the old laisser- 
faire ideology and supported an increasingly 
active role for 
the state in laying the foundations of what 
was described then 
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as a modern economy . In this new role the state became more 
and more an institution of economic reproduction, eclipsing in 
the process the earlier and cruder emphasis which it had laid 
on the development of repressive functions. In undertaking 
this new role, those who controlled the state machinery did so 
under the guidance and patronage of the Colonial Office.. 
Ultimately, the hope was that in acting this way they would 
facilitate a new imperial division of labour at the global 
level, and entrench market relations in the process of internal 
accumulation, thereby irretreivably puttThg the capitalist stamp 
on the local economy. The existence of a rericted franchise 
at the end of 'World War li meant that a suificient group of 
colonial officials and planter representatives still had access 
to state power and they could therefore readily promote this 
design However, as te franchise was idened to include uni- 
versal adult suffrage, and as the emerging local class of eda- 
cated professionals, Jocal cornmercs iî'.erest. and iocal land- 
lords came more and more to exercise control over the machinery 
of state, the pursuit of this grand design became a far more 
complicated affair. 
One factor which began to play an increasingly important 
role in this late period was the ideological and cultural role 
of the state. Thus, we find that as access to education grew, 
the merits of bourgeois political democracy - particularly as 
idealized in the so-called Westminister model of parliamentary 
rule' - were increasingly propagandized. This model required a 
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sequence of "orderly constitutical advance". This in turn 
was 
based on the premise that the masses were at that time 
incapable 
of self-rule, but they could, nevertheless be tutored to 
reach 
this stage of development, and during their progress 
to this 
stage the Colonial Office would be the "trustee" of their 
interests0 
By orderly constitutional advanc.e was meant several things, 
namely, the progressive wideTiing of the ñanchise; a progressive 
devolution of functions from the Colonial Dffice to the local 
government; a multi-paiUY olitical system; orderly changes 
in 
government :se eLectoral practices; ne rule of law 
and the indepencie of the judciary. The hold o this ideology 
over the population was such that virtually every 
prominent local 
personality subscribed to the approach, with only perhaps 
minor 
differences in emphasis. The practice, however, was in 
marked 
contrast o the ideal. in rospect t an be se 
that limited 
self-government reflected a deep seated fear of the 
masses on 
the part of both tbd Colonial Office and the eccne..: 
illy important 
plantocracy which together constituted a very small 
mLnority of 
the population. It was no surprise therefore that as in 
the 
case of Guyana, when a Marxist government was "freely 
elected" 
to office in 1953 after the first elections based on universal 
adult suffrage, the British government after only 133 days found 
a pretext of "communist subversion" to invade the 
territory again, 
and suspend the constitution. 
A careful analysis of the region would show that up 
until World War ii constitutional advance depended 
basically on 
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the state of social struggle and the capacity of the nationalist 
forces to press for concessions from the Colonial Office and 
the local plantocracy, and when these were obtained to defend 
their gains. However, after World War 11 those eading the 
struggle became more easily coopted to the outlook of the 
Colonial Office, and as a consequence social struggle as the 
basis of constitutional advance receded, and the concept of a 
"partnership of interests" emerged in order s it was put, "to 
advance the masses to full ir,ipdenceU. The result of this 
was that on the eve of independence in the 1960's a number 
of negative features became obvious. One of was that 
nowhere in the West Indies was the colonial state going to be 
"smashed". The petty bourgeoisie which viewed itself as the 
group best constituted to lead in the development of these 
societies was not in favour of any revolutionary transformation 
of internal class relations. A second feature was tht on this 
trajectory, the independence settiementz, which would c:erge 
would inevitably result in the exclusion of the masses from real 
political power. This exclusion was neither accidental nor 
shortsighted, as some have argued, as it accorded fully with 
the long term interests of the colonial power. Third, the rise 
of mass poli4ics which prectded L1dependence and the fuller 
development of an array of nass organizations, and in particular 
political par'ties and trade unions, were important manifestations 
for two reasons, namely, the greater legitimacy these gave to 
state activities and the defacto separation the process of 
imperialism and colonization which these developments seemed to 
underscore. 1/ 
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The constitutional struggles against the colonial 
state form while linked to wider social struggles did not finally 
result in many significant economic or social victories for 
the poor and the powerless. Many crucial struggles, had there- 
fore, to be carried over into the independence period. Among 
the most important of these were: the struggles against the 
colonial division of labour with its emphasis on prïmary commodity 
production, export specialization, and mInimal industrialization; 
the stigg against forced trade d fircial 11n qith 
Britain which were designed to reproduce tfle world met 
internally (e.g. through currency boards, tariff policies, 
imperial preferences, etc); th struggles agaiflst foreign 
personnel filling the strategic executive/management positions 
in the upper echelons of the state and the private sector; and 
above all, the struggles against the limited- auonomy of local 






It is from this perspective that we should seek t 
the economic fuñctions of the state in the region after 
11 and up to the 1970's. To the major roles which it 
industry, agriculture, mineral production, tourism and 
banking, which we have already studied in previous 
we must add a long list of other institutional and 
administrative arrangements which the post-colonial state 
established in the region0 These can be organized into six major 
categOrieS 
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The establishment of institutions and agencies 
to regulate and give direction to national economic processes. 
Among the most important of these was the creation of rudimentary 
national planning authorities0 These authorities were frequently 
supported by the creation of statistical agencies whose functions 
are to collect and assemble data on the national economy in a 
this 
systematic ,way. It was effort, combined with the services of the 
University of the West Indies, which led to the preparation of 
the first set of national economic and social accounts of the 
area, the local iation of the population iisuses in 1960 
and l97, a number of social and economic surv'- on employment 
and unemployment, household expenditure surve .s well s 
studies of balance of payments and financial performance of the 
region. 
It was from these developments tori, that in some of 
the territories the currency boards were re;»ac' by Cent:al Banks, 
and foreign exchange authorities were brougPt :Ht legal existence. 
These agencies in turn regulated the development- of cpmmercial 
banking, non-banking financial intermediaries like insurance 
companies, mortgage companies, hire-purchase arrangements etc, 
and the exchange control regulations which later ;:rc to become 
increasingly activated. 
In the area of trade and foreign relations a 
number of new developments occurred. Initially these were 
impelled in large measure by the issues raised in Britain's 
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long drawn out decision to join the European Economic Community. 
Later those countries that became independent in the 1960's 
sought membership of the UN and its related organizations (IMP! 
World Bank, UNCTAD), participated in the non-aligned movement 
and echoed the call for a new international economic order. 
These in turn led to a certain diversification of foreign relations 
and foreign trade as can be seen in the establishment of new 
embassies in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The customs 
departments which had long existed in these countries but which 
functioned passively for most of their history, during this 
period became active as new regimes of import and quota arrange- 
ments were put in place. The later creation of the Caribbean 
Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1968 and then the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) in 1975 give further impetus tu these changes. 
Finally, the system of import licensing which became universal 
as the system of incentives was elaborated, rna tJe Nirnstries 
of Trade quite active institutions d.iring this peiiod. 
3) Labour also became increasingly regulated. This 
took many forms. First labour or as it was sometimes called 
"employment exchanges" were created with a view towards 
facilitating the matching of supply and demand for labour. As 
unemployment remained staggeringly high during this period, the 
effect of these exchanges was largely cosmetic. Second, the 
various departments of labour in the state bureaucracy were 
given the functions of preserving 'harmony" in worker-employee 
relations. In this regard the Ministers who headed these 
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departments were given conciliatory and arbitration powers 
over employer-employee disputes0 The labour ministries were 
also expected to oversee existing legislation as it affected 
trade unions and workers especially in such areas as trade 
union recognition, the operation of minimum wages, hourB of 
work, apprenticeship provisions where these existed, and so on. 
In some instances e.g. Trinidad-Tobago, income-policies 
were institutionalized in the form of legislati, supporting 
industrial cOurtF' and sr u coiit1tuLiu further inificant 
new areas of state activity. 
Lt) In the area of utilities the period also saw 
some of these fall under the direct ownership and control of 
the state, e.g., electricity in Guyana. iv addition both those 
owned and managed by the state and those still in private hands 
were in sorne territories suhjecd to reguLatory agencies which 
were given authority over sch tters as their rate structures, 
the levels of quality of service they dealvered, and so on. 
Allied with these developments was the establiahment of a large 
number of government agencies and/or parastatal institutions 
which followed in the wake of governments decisions to provide 
the requisite infra-structure for their induslization and 
tourism development. Thus we find during th' period that in 
many territories new haroours, airports, shippng terminals, 
and so on were constructued and placed under the control of 
special parastatal authorities. 
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5) A range of new or improvedwelfare servics were 
provided. These included health, education, community development, 
old age-pensions, national insurance, and so on, Although 
the 
level of benefits from these services as a whole remained 
piti- 
fully low, and a major area of social need like unemployment 
was 
not provided for, these departures were new for. a region 
where 
such functions were historically provided for by plantations, 
churches, and other private groups0 
6) F:inally, legísliition dealing with the operations 
of local companies were introduced. These were patterned 
after 
British legislation with the aim of providing a clear legal 
framework for the operation of private capital in itE 
corporate 
guise. Generally it can be posited that the overall aims 
of 
these institutional and administrative developments, when 
combined with state support of economic diversification as 
discussed earlier, were to: 
- minimize the social costs and social dis- 
organization inherent in foreign investment 
in national economies of the region being 
constituted as the "engine of growt"; 
- correct the. distorted and biased lonial 
production structures in so far a i,hey were 
seen as an inadequate basis for tite develop- 
ment of indigenous capital; 
- enhance the position of local capital vis a 
vis foreign capital, particularly in the 
fields 6f resource control, technology, 
marketing and skills; and 
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general'y also to enhance state control over 
the society by seeking to control the use and 
disposition of the means of production and the 
work process. 
When considered in this light, it can be seen that the state had 
started its interventionist role in the region's economic lMe 
even before political independence riad been attained. This 
intervention was never intended to be hostile to the interests 
of capital, local or foreign. To contrary, lU was advanced 
as essential to its urvival and uccess. If t w-_otherwise, 
how cou]d it have been promoted h the colonial authoities? 
One manifestation of the new role of the state which 
was only of token importance by 1970, but which after then became 
one of its major distinguishing characteristics in the region 
was the rapid gro1Tth of state property. Ilthough this phenomenon 
is discussed at some length I.r t next :hapter, it is important 
to draw attention to it here; organically that development 
has proceeded out ol' tue Lhrists dentified in this chapter. 
At the time under consideration here, the traditional view was 
that state property was justified only in certain limited circum- 
stances. One was where the product or service offered was a 
"natural monopoly" e.g., pur water supply, electricity, 
telephone, 
etc. Here state ownership was seen as a ieans of preventing 
consumer exploitation. A second circumstance was when society 
wanted to promote equity and to favour re-distributive 
policies, 
it was accepted that it should own certain essential 
services 
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so as to ensure that profit criteria did not override others 
in the provision of these services0. A third reason was when 
an industry or enterprise was threatened with immediate closure, 
it was felt that the state should take it oer in order to 
prevent the loss of incomes and jobs and the accompanying social 
dislocation. Together these views favoured at best the develop- 
ment of a strong public utilities sector0 Later, however, 
ideological and other socio-poiltical considetions become 
powerful, and it was in the name of such objectives as "develop- 
mental irnperatives!, "improved regulation of euuromie activity", 
"control of th mmandirig ieigh ecorlu!!!y", ltanti 
c1oniaUsm", "anti-imperialism', and "socialism't that an 
expanded state property sector was to be establIshed in the 
region; the best example being the cooperati'e socialism of 
Guyana. At the same time, howeer, unheralded without any 
umpeting and fanfare and tified on "pragmatic" ard "non- 
1ltical grounds" a similar rapid expansion of the staie 
pronerty sector in the region was also occurring, the 
best example being Trinidad-Tobago. 
The expansionist/interventionist role of the state 
in these economies was not a "voluntary" development on the part 
of these who controlled it. While they may have believed this 
at the time, its real foundations lay in the organic and 
structural relations these states had with the colonial division 
of labour and the requirements of internal áccumulation which 
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these historically imposed on the countries of the regior.. 
Because the expansion of the state property sector followed 
immediately after the period of mass politics and popular 
agitation for independence»S one more reason why the post- 
colonial state has been able to acquire a level of legitimacy 
unparalleled by the colonial state. As we shall see the potential 
inherent in this, however, did riot play itself out for as we 
have argued before those who controlled the rchinery of state 
at that time had no fundamental interect in a radi or 
revolutionr '.ation of internal social relats. To 
the ruling groups the state was there to protect thurnd the 
interests of their class project. Three important consequences 
flowed from this. One was that the independence settlements 
which were reached between Britain and the individual territories 
were all based on the exclusion cf the masc from effective 
lowor, and the clearest example of this was manoeuvre by 
toe UK and US governments, the CIA, and the oppo:ition forces 
in Guyana (mainly Burnham's People's National Congress) to 
remove the PPP from office as a pre-condition for that country's 
independence. The second consequénce was that after independence 
had been attained politics increasingly took the form of the 
demobilization and depoliticizatiofl of the mass ol' the popuLation. 
We might ask, without this, how otherwise could they be kept in 
their continued poverty and powerlessness? That the state Was 
used to achieve this particular objective reflects a fundamental 
observation I have made earlier elsewhere, i.e.; 
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"despite the different degrees of importance 
which .... these various policies attach to 
the freedom of private ownership of property 
and the freedom of markets, they are all 
fundamentally characterized by the deliberate 
intention of using the state apparatus as a 
principal instrument of ueveloping a strong 
class formation, capable of assuming the 
responsibility of raising the level of develop- 
ment of the productive forces. Traditionally, 
in the context of highly developed class 
societies .... the state [is] the object of class 
conquest and the instrument of class rule. In 
the historical situation that prevails in these 
countries, it is more correct to argue that the 
state has become, as it were, an instrument of 
class creation"0 2/ 
It is out of this consideration that the analysis of 
this work is so closely premised on the thesis, that it is 
impossible to isolate successfully, economic policy and socio- 
political considerations in the region's development. The 
economic functions of the.state while far from pursuing the 
class project of the dominant classes and groups along a single 
minded, unswerving line, nevertheless, on the whole have reflected 
the interests of these dominant groups, mediated perhaps through 
the conflicts which have developed from time to time with those 
who oppose them. It is through this perception that we can best 
answer such questions as why right up to the period of internal 
self-government in the 1950's was the major source of tax 
receipts in the region import duties? That no significant export 
duties or income taxation existed was only because this was 
convenient to planter interests. Historically these interests 
were served by a regressive tax stiucture which ignored ability 
to pay, but which nevertheless was a useful device in the 
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19th century for forcing the ex-slaves into the market economy 
either as wage labourers on the estates or as producers of 
export cash crops. 
In conclusion we can say that despite the increasing 
range and proliferation of state functions and institutions, the 
period of nationalist strategy reviewed in this chapter did 
not yield any real and lasting relief to the poor and powerless. 
The state although falling increasingly into local 
hands did not turn out to be any less an agent of their 
domination. It is this' consideration which under1in the social 
consequences of its major actions during the period under 
review: the neglect of domestic agriculture and limited support 
to the counter plantation system together with the development 
of a class of local businessmen and a wave of import substitution 
industrialization built at a huge social cost on the backs of 
the unemployed and the landless. For iiiost of the period under 
review income and wealth distribution not only became more 
skewed, but a great deal of what was generated locally was also 
drained away through the various mechanisms of surplus extraction 
perfected by the TNCs, and through the growth of a class of 
entrepreneurs the vast majority of whom also held residency or 
citizenshiP in one or other North Americaaor European country. 
As the social wealth coming to the local population became more 
and more concentrated in the hands of this group, TNC control 
was consolidated in the traditional areas (agriculture, commerce, 
banking), as well as in the newer areas of mineral development 
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(bauxite-alumina in Jamaica), agro-prOceSriflg, tourism, 
and 
manufacturiflg All this served to deepen the alienation of 
the 
masses from the system of decision-making, income creation 
and 
reproduction in the region. Associated with these developments 
was the growing importance of multilateral institutions 
(World 
Bank, IMF, Caribbean Development Bank, Inter-Amerirafl Develop- 
ment Bank, and the European Development Fund) and bilatei'al 
ones 
(US A.10D., the UK's Overseas Development Association, and 
the 
Canadian International Development Agen'y) 
in the region's 
economic life, particularly as expressed through state activities. 
The movement into tourism and off-shore tax havens also 
served 
to expose the political directorate and several key' 
professionals to 
international criminal elements0 In the process 
the economically 
active state spawned a group of criminal marauders, like 
the 
buccaneers of yore, just as the new manufacturing 
elite it 
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Part 3: Crisis of the Nationalist Models and 
Social Experimentation 
By the early 1970's the possibilities inherent in 
nationalist strategies of economic development 
seemed to have 
exhausted themselves. The global crisis M.ingthe capitalist 
system at the time was magnified by the oil 
crisis and calls for a new international economic !JrcIr. 
This 
interacted with locai developments in the varioLs te'ritories 
of the region to produce a situation of more or less 
generalized 
crisis. Everywhere in the region there was evidence of deep 
ferment and the desire for fundamental social change0. 
At the 
mass level this erupted into strong direct action w-iich peaked 
with the Rodney riots in Jamaica and the "black power" 
proteits 
of Trinidad-Tobag0. Alongside these occurrenceS,neW 
political, 
'ivic, and social organisations were corniLng into existe. 
We have as examples new political movements like 
the New Jewel 
Movement of Grenada, the Working Peoples Alliance of Guyana, the 
Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement of Antigua, Monali in 
Barbados, and the Workers Party of Jamaica, all 
of which established 
themselves during this period, and put forward 
programmes which 
promised to open up new directions of social 
change and politicEJ 
development in the region. At the cultural 
level, signs of 
resistance could be seen in many areas of life, 
from the renaissance 
of the Calypso, the new thrust and direction of 
reggae music, the 
growth of West Indian literature, and even the 
rise of 
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Rastafarianism among the youth. Civic organisàtions like the 
Caribbean Conference of Churches and its local councils, human 
rights organisations, friendly societies and solidarity 
organisations, sprang up in the region, giving voice to the 
concerns of the poor and the powerless0 New bold efforts at 
grass roots formsof self-organisation and cooperation in such 
diverse areas as the arts, agriculture, education and recreation 
sprang up in the region, and many of these received support from 
the other organisations expressing the content of the new social 
moverne'.ts Intellectually nationalism also developed as ideas 
of dependency, as well as Marxst theories of socia] change, 
inf1u'nced intellectul activity in the,, region, while in turn 
the region's intellectual activity sought deliberately to enrich 
these theories as well through drawing on the experiences of the 
region. Behind all this the image of Cuba as representing a new 
Caribbean society piayed an extraordinarily potent social role. 
These developments provoked responses and we find in the period 
that followed the stage was set for such major national experi- 
ments as Jamaica's democratic socialism, Guyana's cooperative 
socialism, and the endeavours of the Bishop regime in Grenada. 
In this part of the study we begin by outlining some of the basic 
issus as they affected the economic strategies which unfolded 
(Chapter 10) and we follow this by briefly examining the national 
experiments which followed in fiv countrie (Chapter 11: Jamaica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados). The period ends 
in crisis in 1986 0 
CHAPTER 10: SOCIAL STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: 
THE BASIC ISSUES 
I: Social Structure and Class 
If by the social structure of the Caribbean we mean 
the sum total of classes, social strata, and groups, and their 
system of interconnections, then by the 
alad 
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(proletariat and industrial-fiflaflcial bourgeoisie) underdeveloped, 
and along with it their characteristic organisations (trade unions, 
political parties, business lobbies etc) but since these are in 
an early phase of formation a thcir further development is 
impeded by economic nd structural features of these societies, 
the class structure of the region exhibits more omp1 xity and 
weakness than in the already developed capitalist economies of 
Europe and North America. The following observations illustrate 
this feature: 
- The working class. The region"s employed working 
class is concentrated in four major areas - the mineral extractive 
sector, large-scale plantation - type agricultural enterprises, 
the emerging import substitution sector, and the services sector. 
The first two are the traditional colonial sources of wage labour 
developed, as we saw, in the later 19th and 20th centuries. 
distinguished the social structure of the region0 Briefly these 
are: 
1) Not only are the itorical classes of our age 
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The third is oriented to the manufacture and/or assembly of 
consumer goods for the local high income and urban markets0 As 
we have seen, frequently enterprises in this sector are either 
branch-plants of TNCs or operate under joint agreements with 
these. The services sector occupies a large proportion of the 
labour force, however, it is mainly the government and tourism, 
sub-sectors in this grouping that are effectively organized. 
Some sub-sectors, e.g. higgling and household services really 
consti1llte an hhinformal" sub-sector.within this category. Majiy 
of the enterprises which offer employment in the services sector, 
apart from government and tourism are small and frequently 
concentrated in the urban areas. 
Several features of the employment situation reveal 
the complexity of the class structure. One is that the working 
class is typically distributed among enterpi?ises that are both 
large and small, foreign and local, highly concentrated in urban 
settlements and in isolated communities. A significant proportion 
of the female labour force is concentrated in two areas - lowly 
paid domestics in individual households, and in the recently 
established sweat-shops located in the export processing zones, 
as the firms located there shown an overwhelming preference for 
female employees. In only a few of the territories, e.g. Jamaica, 
is the employment of domestics in households covered by any 
social or industrial legislation. The complexity generated by 
the employment situation is compounded by the lack of unionization 
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of muc1 of the labour force. Typically, only about one-third 
of the labour force is unionized, and even then, the unionized 
sector is frequently concentrated in the large establishments0 
The fact that employment is spread among a large number 
of small establishments has not only hindered the unionization 
of the work force, but also the development of a sense of class 
identity and class solidity, both necessary elements for united 
class action. The fact also that small scale employment frequently 
preutirrinates even in the urban areas means that worin class 
organisations are weak in polticially sensitive areas - 
areas that hous the seat of government, the administritive head- 
quarters of political parties, trade unions, civic and social 
organisations, and the largest concentration3 of students0 There 
is alo a considerable geographical mobility in the work force, 
so that workers may lI'it dud work in one area (a city, iíni1ng 
town, tourist resort, or a plantation) and maintain a nousehold 
in a distant area, frequéntly a rural conimnity. Someiines the 
migration is international, and households are split over huge 
distances. In other instances seasonal migratory movements of 
the work force occur internationally as when sugar cane-cutters 
from the Leeward and Windward Islands go to Barbados, or 
agricultural workers go from the region to North America as 
short-term contract labour. 
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In addition, to the above, considerations, it should 
be noted that substantial sections of the working class in the 
region have sorne access to private property from which they 
supplement their income, e0g., self-operated taxis, small land- 
holdings, small stores, etc. Significant sections also have 
skills that they sell on a part-time, spar-time basis, e.g. 
female higglers, carpenters, female seamstresses, electricians, 
plumbers, etc0 These links to small property inevitably complicate 
the structure of the working class, its perceptions and behaviour. 
One factor affecting the work force which shou.Ld not be under- 
estimated is the seasonalit of employment. wo or the region's 
major soirces cf employment, agriculture and tourism, are 
seasonal activities. This feature has bred a seuse of insecurity 
in te work force, since seascniai employment uds grirally been 
treated as temporary empinyrnrit, so tnat it is possible for a 
sugar cane worker to wor ia_7 ¿i his 'oririg life and; 
end up being a temporary emplo'ee. 
A significant new dimension has been added to the 
class structure of the region by the rapid expansion in recent 
years of the lower level s.lariat that is paid by the state - 
clerical workers, teachers, nurses, messengers, drivers, and 
other such service workers. As state functions and state property 
have grown and with it the development of state productive 
enterprises in manufacturing, export agriculture, mining, etc., 
this section of the work force has developed close - links with 
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workers in the more directly productive sectors of these 
economies. 
A final feature of the working class which should 
be noted here is that a large proportion of the labour force - 
particularly persons between the ages of 18 and 26, are long- 
term structurally unemployed. Unemployment rates in the region 
typically range between 12 and 30-percent, and can often represent 
as high as two-thirds of the labcur force between the ages of 
iQ ' 
The propertied classes. A similar complexity is 
found among the propertied classes. Thus, as we have seen, the 
manufacturing bourgeoisie which was so much cultivated in the 
post-war period have close family ties, while at the same time 
c2en possessing residency or citizenship of one or more country 
in North America or Europe. Thus in Jamaica the famous "21 
families" dominate the locally controlled sections of the manu- 
facturing, construction and distribution activities developed 
since World Worl II. In the region also, it is customary to 
find that the traditional land&d oligarchy representing "feudalism 
in the countryside" ànd the emergent manufacturing bourgeoisie 
representing "capitalist relations in the cities" as they are 
classically defined, are not clearly demarcated. Indeed, they 
may overlap in one person or in one family creating a complex 
intertwining of pre-capitalist and capitalist property relations. 
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As we have seen the landed oligarchy has developed out of 
foreign penetration and settlement and has no indigeneous roots 
in the pre-conquest class structure. The structure of the peasantry 
as a land-holding class as we have already observed, is equally 
complex0 The category includes a wide variety of landless peasants, 
small and medium peasants, "kulaks", any or all of whom may earn 
a substantiaL proportion of their income from wage labour on state 
projects, private haciendas, plantations and so on, as well as in 
a number of artisanal and craft-type activities. In addition 
the concept of the middle class is especially vague, s 
class usually comprises a complex category that includer he lower 
ranks of landholders, professipnals, including teachers, middle 
level management in state and private enterprises, small 
scale commercial operations, shopkeepers, artisans, and traders 
who work on their own account or with faiiily labour. 
The vagueness of "middle class" as a categoy 
revealed by the fact that elements usually included in it can 
also be classified into other groupings; for example the lower 
ranks of the landowners can also be classified with richer 
peasants, while professionals can be included as part of the 
bourgeoisie. The middle clas is soineti:s euated with 'what 
is called the "intermediate strata" which is a term used to fill 
the middle ground or gap between the relatively clearly defined 
peasantry and working class and the major propertied classes 
(landlords and manufacturing bourgeoisie). 
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The state and petty bourgeoisie0 The most significant 
development in the class structure of the region by the 1970's, 
and one whose importance has grown rapidly since, is the 
emergence of cer*ain groups and strata associated with the 
expansion of state property. In the post-war period petty 
bourgeois control of state power has been the basis through 
which these groups and strata have sought to confirm their social 
position as a ruling class, albeit in the larger context of this 
class' relationship to the metropolitan power/imperialism and 
its superordinate ruling class. In the process of consolidating 
itself as a ruling class, a group of persons haT ''e1oped and 
formed themselves around political roles and managerial positions 
in state enterprises. This group is one of the specifically 
post-war and perhaps post-colonial manifestations of this period. 
It has been variously described as the 
" state petty bourgeoisie", 
the "state bourgeoisie" or the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" 
Whichever term is used, its essential feat res are control of 
state property, its "non-antagonistic" re1aton to the capitalist 
class in the center countries, and its re-enforcement of the 
continued reproduction of capitalist relations both locally arid 
on a world scale. Some writers have tried to handle the complexity 
of the petty-bourgeoisie by distinguishing a "politico-administrative" 
element, comprised of heads of government ministries, top C1Vi 
servants, the top leadership of the party, etc, and an "economic" 
element, comprised of heads and higher functionaries of public 
corporations and-other state supervised economic enterprises. 
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the state machinery 
'tate for itself", 
occupying the state 
This development suggests the idea of a 
that is, a situation in which the people 
use it to promote the economic interests 
of their group (comprised of family, friends, and polticial 
buddies). State power in other word, is being ustd to form 
the nucleus of an indigenous bourgeoisie. It should be noted 
here that the expansion of'state property in the region has 
seldom been opposed by local private capital since it has been 
directed against the dominance of foreign capital via national- 
ization, and not against capital as such. This is not to suggest 
This is not a particularly useful formulation, however, because 
although these elements are identifiable members of the petty bour- 
eojsie,they have 
strong kinship and other social ties to each other as well as 
to elements of the more traditional petty bourgeoisie, including 
the military, which has also expanded rapidly. 
A fundamental consideration which emerges from this 
development of state property and the petty bourgeoisie 
associated with it, is the reversal of the classical relations 
of economic power to political power manifested in the development 
of capitalism. Historically, in the developed capitalist 
countries, the political power of the bourgeoisie came after its 
consolidation of its economic power. Thus in the United Kingdom, 
the landed gentry prevailed in political influence long after 
the economic ascendancy of the manufacturing bourgeoisie. But 
we have outlined here, in the region the consolidation of 
economic power follows after the seizing of political power and 
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that conflicts have not occurred between local private capital 
and the state over such issues as internal regulation of the 
economy, foreign exchange and foreign debt policies, the 
desirability of IMF-type stabilization programmes, etc. Such 
disputes. have occurred, particularly when there are interruptions 
and crises in the process of capital accumulation nationally 
and internationally. On the whole, however, private capital 
has benefitted from the expansion of the state and more often 
than not maintains close links with the statpety bourgeoisie0 
Indeed members of the business class frequéntly move into the 
state sector, when the state needs employees with entrepre- 
neurial and managerial skills to run the nationalized enter- 
prises. 
A second feature of thu social structure in the region 
is that its classes are mo'e fluid - not only in the movement 
of individuals between one class and another, but in the changing 
nature of the classes themselves and their relative size. A 
good example of this is the rapid development of new urban based 
groupings - i.e., higglers, unemployed youth, etc, - as migration 
from the countryside to the cities continues. The development 
of a bourgeoisie and proletariat in the cities also co-exist 
with older forms of social relations, i.e. ethnic groupings - 
which act as mediating elements in the relations among the new 
urban classes. The mediation process in turn adds to the fluidity 
of class relations, and at the same time makes these even more 
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complex than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the 
rapid growth of urban centres is linked to the growth of two 
areas of economic activity, namely, the expansion of the import- 
substituting industry and a proliferation of small business and 
trading establishments. The growth of the former constrains 
the growth of the latter, which 'Tihas been ruined by the intro- 
duction of machine production into import-substitution industries 
e.g. footwear, clothingagro-prOCeSSing, and so on. 
The third feature is that the economies of the region 
can be described as "multi-structured't in that they combine 
numerous different forms of production and types of economic 
relations: branch plants of transnational enterprises, state 
property, peasant subsistence holdings, share-cropping, wage- 
labour, individual/family traders, artisans, commercial houses, 
local manufacturing enterprises, and so on. Each in its ¿wn 
way affects national production, accumulation, employment, and 
foreign exchange earnings so that monopolistic industrial and 
commercial corporations are not clearly dominant. Nevertheless, 
there remains as we have seen a pattern of specialized production 
of one or two commodities for sale in the world market, and a 
heavy reliance on foreign skills, technology and financing, 
despite the fact that even this specialized production embraces 
many different forms of enterprise. 
282. 
As we have noted, the predominant role of production 
for the world market has led to a very special type of capitalist 
relations0 In the case of classical European, American, and 
Japanese capitalism production was initially impelled by the 
requirements of the internal market and internal resources were 
developed in order to satisfy that market. The world market 
then developed as an extension of the domestic market, thereby 
ensuring that the predOminant economic relations were nteriorized. 
In the region, however, this interiorization has not 
occurred. 
The fourth significant element of the social structure 
of the region is the dominant role played by foreign capital, 
whether resident or not. This development underlines a larger 
historical phenomenon, which is the bourgeoisie alone of all 
the classes, has been able historically to organize itself as 
a class at the global level. However, although there is a 
for'ign section in the ruling class structure of the region, 
it is not a "legitimate ' part of the nation state insofar 
as neither its members (nor their resident representatives) 
are citizens. As a.. result, this section of the ruling class 
must f Thd mechanisms to ensure its continued influence. The 
existence of this section of the ruling class therefore, 
inevitably complicates social relations and has an important 
effect on the structure of the Caribbean states. 
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Finally, in the region the interaction of class- 
based and non-property based structures is much more important 
than in the capitalist centre countries where class structures 
are more clearly defined0 Thus in the region, ethnic, sex, 
religion, rural/urban and even language divisions interact with class 
and make the social structure even more difficult to analyze. 
The co-existence, and interaction, of non-property and class 
relations is the product of the particular stage of development 
'Qf these societies, and until class structures, class consciousness, 
and class outlook become :ore defined, any attempt to understand 
the social structure of the region must take the nature and 
character of this interplay Into ccount. 
By way of concluding this discussion of the social 
structure, let me make a number of observations of direct 
relevance to the study. The first of these is that colonialism 
and external capitalist domination of the region (particularly 
the class structure and econonic structure) are crucial factors 
to be taken into account in developing any theories of the 
laws of motion of these societies. This point is implicit 
in my earlier observations particularly those related to the 
specific nature of colonial domiiation which facilitated the 
development of petty bourgeois control of state power, and 
the fact that the independence settlements which were 
reached in the 1960s and after, were predicated on the exclusion 
of the masses from political power. This point constitutes 
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a continuing thread of the analysis and so it must be kept 
constantly in mind otherwise there can be no real comprehension 
of the dynamics of the crisis after the 1970'S0 
A second observation is that in the region where 
both the traditional classes of the capitalist social formation, 
(workersand capitalists) are under-developed, and where both 
of these classes are small in numbers and qualitatively weak, 
there is no clear hegemonic ruling class. Further, the pro- 
letariat, while the weaker of the two, has been in existence 
longer and so demonstrates the existence of an original con- 
tradiction between the local working class and foreign, even 
the 
though both local bourgeoisie and the proletariat developed 
under the domination of expatriate capital. The phenomenon 
observed here is a particular feature of peripheral capitalist 
societies 
A third observation is that the social and cultural 
conditions under which the working class developed in the 
region have produced deep divisions within it. This fracturing 
of the working class - whether along sexual, ethhc, cultural, 
or religious lines has led to racial, religious and other 
aspects of a''caste"outicok playing important roles in 
forming class consciousness in the region. This has frequently 
made it difficult to delineate class lines. Thus while it may 
be possible to predict, on the basis of past experience that 
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'lass consciousness will develop as capitalist relations 
deepen, at the moment the situation in these societies is 
too complicated for easy prediction. 
A fourth observation is that the petty bourgeoisie 
that prently controls state power is not a homogeneous group, 
but includes several fractions - professionals, political 
administrative, state-conOmic, and private - and although 
fractional conflict exists generally, in the absence of an 
entrenched ruling class, its self-interest leads it to develop 
closer relations with national private capital0 Because f 
these considerations the síte takes on the characteristic 
of being a "state for itself", and in the absence of bourgeois 
democratic constitutioial restraints, it can proceed rapidly 
to the institutionalization of all forms of corruption. This, 
we believe, is the central explanatory factor behind the rise 
of corruption, and the pattern which it has taken in the 
region, i.e., it constitutes a means of facilitating the 
consolidation of an economic base and the enlargement of 
property held by this class0 
It is out of this comrlex situation that a final 
observation arises, which is, that despite the complexity and 
fluidity of the class structure, tie pre-capitalist influences 
on class outlook, etc., class struggle nevertheless continues 
no less sharply than elsewhere. Indeed, as we shall discuss 
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more fuly in succeeding chapters the development of state 
property and the consequent role the state has come to play 
as a major employer of wage labour, has enhanced class struggle0 
The reason for this is that in developed capitalist societies 
where private capital is dominant, the link between worker- 
capital conflicts and state power is not easily perceived 
by the general population; but in the circumstances of a 
significant state sector, and a major structural crisis of 
world ctpitalism the consequent impact on employment, incomes, 
etc, allows employees to see the ink between the state and 
the dominant economic interests in the region more clearly. 
II: Ownership and control 
With the description of certain features of the social 
structure presented in the previous certain we can understand 
the crisis confronting nationalist policies in the early 
1970's. Those policies, we observed, were based on adapting 
the then existing colonial model to the requirements-of countries 
moving towards fornal political indepenence, and as such 
they depended on four key measures, viz; 
1) Capital importation as the major source of expansion 
of economy. While this led to a further deepening of the colonial 
dependence on foreign capital, the effort here was to adapt this 
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circumstance to the possibilities of a local diversification 
of economic activity through Import substitution, the develop- 
ment of mining in new areas, and the promotion of tourism and 
off-shore financial services. 
Diversification in the source of capital and trade 
dependence through exploitation of the geographic and strategic 
links with Canada and the USA. This process was facilitated 
by the decline of Europe and Britain in particular in the 
world economy, and the rise of the USAO 
Implicit in the above was a policy of deepening the 
regions ties to the world market, and as it turned out 
this 
it came to be believea was best expressed by giving a dominant 
rûle to the TNCs. which effectively controlled technology, 
sldlls, finance, markets and management, in the diversificatioi 
of regional production structures. 
L) No explicit policies for tackling poverty as a 
social problem In itself were actively promoted, although it 
can be said that some limited amelioration was clearly intended 
as can be seen in the introduction of a minimal range of social 
services. In general the distressed sections of the population 
depended on traditional sources for relief: friends, family, 
social agencies like the Salvation Army, Child Boards, and 
the churches. Implicit in this-approach, also, was the expect- 
ation that in the natural order of things the growth 
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objectives which their policies were aimed at would trickle- 
down and/or spill-over into the under classes and so ensure 
the development of the whole society. 
As we saw several economies experienced high rates 
of growth of per capita poduct during the post-war period, 
e.g. Jamaica, Barbados, and the Bahamas. While the point was 
made earlier that this often depended on the development of 
special sectors in largely fortuitions and unexpected ways, 
e.g. bauxite-alumina and tourist developrnmt, the point at 
issue, however, is, that even in these economies by the 1970s 
a range of problems (economic, political, soial and cultural) 
had emerged. Thus as we saw unemployment in the region ranged 
from l2i1O percent. In Guyana in the larming community only 
fifteen percent of the peasant households depended on farming 
as a sole source of income. In a survey conducted by PAHO/WHO 
it was discovered that as many as 57 percent of the surveyed 
households depended on sources other than farming for more 
than one-half of their income. The survey also showed 
a complex situation of land titles, where more than one-third 
of the farmers surveyed did not have bona fide titles to their 
land. Only 8 percent of the farm lands surveye. had irrigation, 
and 62 percent had drainage facilities. Farmers were so poor 
that as many as 57 percent of the farms surveyed applied no 
regular fertilizers and 56 percent did not use insecticides. 
This picture of rural poverty is compounded when we consider 
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the social amenities available to rurai households at the 
time. Thus the survey showed that as many as three to four 
persons slept in the same room at night. Only 53 percent of 
rural. families had piped water running into their homes or 
yards, while bne-eight of the rural housewives had to travel 
one hundred yards or more for water0 Ninety percent of rural 
families used pit-latrines, while only 23 percent ofrural 
dwellings had refrigeration. A study of eating habits showed 
that rural diets were low in energy, protein, riboflavin and 
niacin. Seventy-seven percent of rural households had less 
than the recommended daily intake of energy and 65 percent had 
less than the recommended daily intake of protein. Indeed, 
as many as 511 percent of the sample received less than 80 
percent of the recommended intakés of energy and protein 
respectively. It is not surprising that whilst the survey 
hr'wed that one-third of the bour power available on these 
farms s underemployed and tat the average farm workér 
worked only seven hours per day, one-fifth of these did so 
because they claimed that they were "too tired to work. 
The evidence on malnutrition was confirmed by anthropometric 
data. Approximately 18 percnt of the children in all house- 
holds in Guyana suffered from malnutrition. However: 
"malnutrition is more severe in the rural 
areas where 22% more infants and children 
under 5 years old are in .Gomez Grades II 
and III than in the urban areas". 5/ 
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In Jamaica eviden-ce of poverty id inequality was no less 
striking. Thus Stone provides a portrait of the Jamaican 
class structure in terms of three major categories and seven 
sub-categories. 
A. Upper and Upper Middle Class 
Capitalists (owners and managers of large and 
medium business) 0.5% 
Administrative class 0.5% 
B. Lower Middle Class 
30 Independent property owners and middle level 
capitalist s 5. 
Labour aristocracy (technicians, white collar, 
skilled workers ...) 18.0% 
C. Lower Class 
50 Own-account workers or petty capitalists 
(small farmers, higglers ...) 28.0% 
Working class (low wage manual workers) 23.0' 
Long-term or indefinitely unemployed 25.0% 
The stratification is reflected in unequal consumption levels 
and access to social amenities. Thus as Kaufman points out 
his data show that in the Kingston area only 10 percent of the 
lower working class and 21 percent of the working class homes 
had a refrigerator or a stereo set. Only !I0.6 percent of 
urban dwellings and 6i1 percent of rural dwellings had piped 
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water0 As many of 45 percent of urban dwellings had only one 
room. Using an estimate of J$30 per week and J$50 per week 
for the poverty-line of peasant and working class categories 
respectivély in 1977, he points ou that Stone's data show 
that 84 percent of small farmers, 94 percent of the lower 
working class, and 50 percent of the working class earned 
below their respective poverty lines. The poorest 70 percent 
of the population consumed only 37 grams of protein per day 
(a figure less than the recommended daily allowance) even 
though on average 68 grams of protein per day was available 
to the population at large (that is, a figure one and a half 
times the recommended daily allowance). It was estimated ther 
that one in three pre-school children did not receive sufficient 
food energy and. protein and that almost half of pregnant and 
lactating women were anaemic. The crisis of this period 
becme more Lue as the capitalist world sytem itself 
entered a d crisis brought about by the ending of yet 
another long tve of capitalist expansion, this one having 
lasted from 1945 to 1970. The long wave ended for a number 
of reasons, but the most important for our purposes are: 
-- The end of the US hegemony in the capitalist 
world economy established after World War II and the emergence 
of a number of different growth centers, in particular the 
European Economic Comniunitt (West Germany) and Japan. 
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- The rapid growth of Eastern Europe, particularly 
when measured in terms of its contribution to gross world out- 
put, to manufacturing, to technology and to armanents production. 
- The emergence of the oil-producing states as a 
major economic force brought about by the oil crisis and the 
ithpact this has had on the global division of income. 
- The growth of nationalist measures in the periphery, 
whose objective is to alter the terms of their engagement in 
the world division of labour. 
The structural crisis of world capitalism has mani- 
fested itelf in many ways: a sluggish demand for imports, 
i.rternaiional inflatiun, persistent balance of payments crises 
Th several npct:.r pitalist courtries, development of 
ationalist and thy-neigiudr" that have 
ut severe presure on internati l reguIatorr mechanisms. 
The generalized foreign exchange crisis and the slow growth 
in the demand for exports of the nonoil-producing countries 
of the periphery have also forced a growing indebtedness 
(with the attendant' risks of default), and restrictions on 
demand for imports. These in turn have led to lower domestic 
consumption, a shortage of consumer goods, raw materials, 
spare parts, and so on and to reduced domestic production 
because of the high import content of domestic output añd 
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consumption. Not surprisingly the period was marked by 
considerable ferment and agitation0 Popular resistance to 
all forms of foreign domination was widely expressed and these 
peaked in a number of social explosions: the Rodney Riots 
in Jamaica, the Black Power revolt in Trinidad-Tobago in 1970, 
and the crisis in the Dominican Republic in the late 1960's0 
As wenoted a number of left wing political parties also 
developed out of this increasing consciousness of foreign 
domination and the need for change0 In the ideological struggle 
which ensued a key issue which emerged was the extent of 
foreign ownership and dominatipn of the economy of the region. 
Since raising suc'i.an issue was in effect to question a key 
premise of both the colonial and later the nationalist strategy 
for regional development, this turned out to be an issue of 
immense significance in the pursuit of means to overcome the 
crisis. 
Crudely p'it opponents of existing strategy argued 
two things. First, regional ownership was a necessary, and 
misguidedly to many,a sufficient condition for indigenous 
regional control of its resources, and secondly, it was argued 
that only with such ownership and control was it possible for 
models of economic development on which policies were developed 
to be oriented to the needs of the historical majority - the 
poor and the powerless. hen put in such a crude form, as 
it was frequently done, a number of complex considerations - 
were definitely by-passed. To take a few examples; did regional 
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ownership and control necessarily further mean either state 
control or control by indigeneous private capital? Was owner- 
ship and control indifferent to everything but the nationality 
of those in control? In other words, were these class related 
categories? Was local ownership and control in whatever form 
capable of producing rates of material progress comparable to 
that of the earlier periods and therefore in keeping with the 
expectations of the masses in whose name such control was 
sought after? Wnat were the domestic political implications 
of these choices? What inernational ramifications did they 
entail and how far could small, vulnerable economies in the 
"backyard" of the world's most powerful imperialist state pursue 
policies in contradiction to the historical evolution of 
imperialism itself? 
With the vision of hindsight (which is of course more 
easily 20:20 than foresight), the vital signIficance of all 
these considerations appear self-evident. At the time, however, 
they were not and to be frank a number of serious errors were 
made, as shall be observed in some detail in the succeeding 
chapters. Here we would like to confine the discussion in 
* 
remainder of this chapter to an examination of the broad 
characteristics of the four major approaches to the issue of 
ownership and control which as events proved, were to be pur- 
sued in the region. Before turning to this, it is important 
to recall very briefly at this stage some of the changing 
295e 
character of TNC domination in the region referred to earlier, 
as it is important to the discussion. First the exclusive 
dominance of UK firms was being replaced by North American 
companies0 Second, the major sectors under NC control were 
no long the old plantation and raw materials producing sectors0 
These remained important, but even here new crops, e.g., bananas, 
and new raw materials, e.g. bauxite-alumina in Jamaica, and 
manganese in Guyana, were being developed under their control 
after World War II. The newer areas were tourism, banking, 
finance, and other related services; import substitution 
manufacturing and agro-processing activities; with a limited 
spill over into exports and here it was confined mainly to the 
regional market; and export-processing zones. Large scale 
capital projects in joint venture arrangements with governments 
in the area, e.g. steel and fertilizers in Trinidad-Tobago, as 
well as in the more traditional manufacturing areas wer also 
of importance. Examples of the latter are in Barbados, 
Government/TNC joint ventures in dairying and sea-foods; and 
in Trinidad-Tobago in flour-milling. 
The policy responses to regional ownership and 
control ;were to take four major forms: 
- localization of tTdecisionmakers in foreign 
enterprises; 
- requiring foreign firms to localize their owner- 
ship by raising a substantial part of their capital 
through local equities; 
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- state participation through joint-ventures; 
- nationalization or compulsory acquisition. 
In broad terms these four policies either reflected stages of 
evolution of policy or the degree of radicalisrii in the 
approach of goverpments to the problem0 
Localization of Management 
Throughout the region a great deal of state activity 
was directed toward publicizing and pressuring foreign-owned 
companies tô allow participation by nationals in the higher 
levels of management and decision-making. This strategy sought 
to find attractive etployment outlets for local skilled personnel 
while at the same time claiming that such an infusion of 
indigenous people into key management positions will. serve 
to localize these companies in their operations and decision- 
making. Inasmuch as such localization is seen as operating 
to dramatically offset one of the major means of perpetuating 
dependency, it is not infrequént to find that progress is 
simply measured in term of the number of foreigners whose 
jobs have been taken over by local personnel-and, judging from 
the propaganda claims all around, this progress has been 
claimed to be quite considerable. 
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There are of course very serious limitations to 
the effectiveness of this approach, two of which we can single 
out as being the most fundamental. In the first instance, 
while this policy is undoubtedly a logical extension of the 
dismantling of the administxative apparatus which began during 
the struggle for constitutional independence, it nevertheless 
seriously underestimates the social power of these institutions 
and their almost total control over individual lives. Pursuing 
su'h a policy in the context of a drive to establish an indigenous 
capitalist class can contribte very little to the struggle to 
transform the mode of production because thé local persons, 
when appointed to positions in these companies, inevitably 
move into particular institutional structures which in turn have 
developed their own particilar ethos, values, life-styles, and 
ways of doing things, all in direct relation to the imperatives 
¿f exploiting local resources for the benefit of metropolitan 
capital. These nationals, therefore, function in an institutional 
situation where there are strong historically built-in pressures 
to conform to the patterns of behaviour of the enterprises. 
The pressures inevitably continue as long as the individual 
is a functioning part of the corporate entity. 
s 
But as this socialization process continues, it 
becomes evident that instead of the company becoming more and 
more national in its outlook, character, and purpose, it is in 
fact the nationals who are becoming more and more integrated 
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into this foreign system and 1Tho usually end up as extensions 
of the exploiting corporation. In this conflict between 
effective localization and integration into the existing company 
system the enterprises are indirectly aided by the very public 
policies which seek to encourage capitalism. Thus these 
policies create a con'tradictory situatThn in which it is easy 
for the national bourgeoisie, which they themselves seek to 
create, to become more effectively denationalized in practice,. 
since it is required to opern.te as a peripheral force to 
international capitalism. The large nuners of these rersonnel 
in the region who possess residency status in North America 
or Europe facilitates tuis socialization outlook. 
It is their confidence in this 
acculturation3prOcess that encouraged many of the TNC5 
not toresist pressures fora locai.ization, but instead to 
appear to eagerly welcome nationals into their operations. 
it is by now a well-accepted part of the corporate strategy 
to acquire a national image this way, knowing full well that 
this will hardly endanger the true nationality of the corporation. 
For those of us living in the region, proof of this can be 
readily seen from the striking frequency with which the news 
media refer to these various promotions and appointments, often 
made to very public positions, so as to maximize their publicity 
value. Thus we have a pattern of appointments to directorships, 
either on boards with little authority or on boards which have 
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authority but where the local appointments are in a minority; 
of appointments to public relations offices; and, of increasing 
strategic importance, of local appointments as personnel officers. 
The latter has the additional advantage of being able to divert 
workerst hostility by "hiding" the true identity of the enter- 
prise. Whatever the particular stratagem employed, these 
companies seek, as indeed they must, to undermine the significance 
of this strategy to nationalize their operations. They naturall 
hope to be able to exploit the dynamics of cultural rnd psycho- 
logical dependence. In the region, the sheer weight and power 
of international capitalism are in their favor, and it is cor- 
respondingly difficult for their entrenchment tu be overcome 
in this way0 
The second weakness of this strategy arises from the 
technique of organizational su'L3stitution which has been facili- 
tated by the technological possibilities of computerisation and 
virtually instant communication. This process permits the 
companies to let nationals nominally fill managerial positions 
while at the same time depriving these positions of any 
decision-making significance by referring to the head office 
decisions that would normally and routinely be made locally 
if the head office had the uncontrolled and uncontested right 
to appoint management. Of course, insofar as the previous 
argument holds (i.e., that local management is acculturated 
to the values of the enterprise and is also assumed by the head 
3OO 
office to be efficient), the need for this form of organisational 
substitution is diminished0 The degree of substitution can be 
seen as a useful gauge of the importance of cultural and 
psychological dependence in the development of the local 
managerial class. 
The beneficiaries of the nationalist pressures on the 
corporations are suppsed to constitute the embryo of an 
indigenous capitalist class0 They are supposed to acquire from 
their jobs and their positions in the multinational firms the 
technical and managerial skills whicii will enable them to 
play apioneering and innovative role in the transformation of 
their economies. But, being dependent on the multinational 
corporations and on local nationalist sentiment to ensure their 
mobility, it is not clear where they were to getthe capital 
for indigenously owned enterprises, evéh should they acquire 
the necessary entrepreneurial capabilities. Some therefore 
engage in petty businesses, mainly housing and land speculation, 
as sidelines, but it is clear that the returns are marginal 
to the capital needs of the society. The class remains at 
present objectively veiy much a dependent offshoot of the multi- 
national f irm and probably will become little more than a 
further agency for internalizing the dependency characteristics 
of the society. 
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Local Share Issues 
The second strategy (i.e., issuing local equities 
in order to ensure local private participation in the owner- 
ship of the enterprises), also contains a number of fundamental 
limitations. First,, practice has shown that when compelled 
to incorporate locally these companies have managed to issue 
shares in such quantities, and in such a way, as to avoid 
puttiñg any real control of their companies into jeopardy. 
They are often encouraged in this by generous timetables set 
by the local governments for achieving stated levels of local 
private participation in their activities. The governments 
argue that these generous timetables are necessary to minimize 
disruptions of the local capital market. Second, this device 
is,strongly ieinforced by the tendency for these shares to be 
taken up by other similarly t1ocait? enterprises (e.g., a 
financial company that has been previously localized in a 
similar fashion, or by a particular group of local businessmen 
who specialize in the partnering of local and foreign 
capt ial). 
I 
A third difficulty with this strategy derives from 
the familiar strategem employed by the companies of making the 
local share issues raise sufficient funds from the local capital 
market to finance the physical construction costs of the 
enterprise, while exchanging' the remainder of the shares for 
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patent rights, technical services, etc., from the parent firm. 
Furthermore, where the enterprise is already a long-established 
and going concern, the issuance of local shares to enable 
participation in this way simply provides the firm with funds 
that it may then choose to invest elsewhere, particularly if 
the fear of local incursion into its control is taken seriously. 
In the context of this strategy of issuing local shares, where 
foreign capital comes, woos local capital, uses it, and controls 
it for foreign ends, it beomes inipnssible to sustain the 
claims by its supporters regardirg itas ability to aument 
national resources. 
While this clamer to issue shares on the local market 
is often directed toward foreign-owned enterprises, at the same 
time, there remain many locally owned firms that are not very 
pubtic in their ownership structlres and that remain in the 
firm and uncontested grip of partular families and business 
cliques. While, in terms of capital employed, these are of 
lesser importance compared to their foreign counterparts, 
this failure to implement positive policies aimed at diluting 
their ownership structures serves to emphasize that the strategy 
is based on the creation of a new loca1 capitalist class to 
replace the foreign capitalist within their enterprises and 
does not in any way seek to contest the legitimacy of the 
capitalist structure itself. 
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Majority Joint-Ventures 
The third strategy, that of the state being the 
majority shareholder (i.e., the 51 percent formula), is the 
most common among the progressively inclined states in the 
region. While the regional struggle to contain the multi- 
national firm is implicitly anti-imperialist, when pursued in 
the context of generating an indigenous capitalism there are 
at least three basic reasons why this policy is incapable of 
leading to effective control of local resources. 
First, given an absence of local confidence regarding 
knowledge of the technical, marketing, and managerial 
processes of the firm, such participation in ownership has been 
frequently counteracted b the practice of simultaneously 
entering into management contracts with foreign capitlists. 
To the extent that this practice prevails, it is possible for 
these arrangements not to diminish the power of foreign decision- 
making in these enterprises. Moreover, when pursued in the 
context of generating a local capitalist class, this policy 
does not provide a dynamic basis for phasing out these foreign 
decision-makers. 
Second, experience has shown that contracts made 
for these services often constitute a significant income drain. 
Thus as we shall see in both Guyana and Manley's Jamaica when 
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a "socialist"prograin for phasing out this foreign dependence 
existed, management contracts have been concluded on such bases 
as the total rate of sales (turnover) of the firm. Since such 
expenses are prior to profits, we find firms having persistent 
commercial losses forced to carry the income drain of foreign 
management contract payments0 In other instances, either full 
profit repatriation is guaranteed or the state implicitly, or 
occasionally explicitly, accepts the obligation to "manage" and 
"stabilize" the labor situation0 All these in effect provide 
these firms with guarantees they never would have had in the 
absence of state regulation. 
The third fundamental weakness of this strategy lies 
in a basic misunderstanding of what a multinational corporation, 
and particularly an exporting corporation, represents locally: 
.2 
is essentially a plant. It is not a firm. 
It is true that there are titles such as 
Pirectors, Managers, Managing Directors, etc. 
But the local expression ,., makes no decision 
as regards prices ... output ... levels of 
investment, or the markets. All these are done 
at the head office, where decisions which normally 
define a firm are made. The apparatus which 
exists locally is just a participation in a multi- 
plant firm. Therefore, when we seek meaningful 
participation, it is not simply to acquire a 
share in the local apparatus, but to ensure that 
inroads are made into the decision-making centers 
which exist in the North Atlantic. 9/ 
If this point is not fully grasped and if the thrust of state 
policy is confined simply to legal ownership of par1 of the 
expatriate enterprise, there will inevitably be little change 
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in the content and methods of production. 
Nationalization 
Nationalization has been heralded as the most radical 
of all the approaches. In practice, however, the nationalization 
experiences of the region 'should not be confused with expropriation, 
as say occurred in Cuba after the revolution. In every known 
instance the firms which have been nationalized in the region 
have really been purchased from their owners by the government 
concerned as part and parcel of a negotiated purchase end sale 
agreement. There are also no known instances of firms disapproving 
of any of these final settlements to the extent of either 
stating this publicly or pursuing lines of redress either through 
referring the matter to the government's of the countries where 
their parent companies are located or through international 
legal arbitration. One immediate consequence of such a purchase 
has been to increase the foreign indebtedness of these countries 
and so add to foreign exchange and balance of payments pressures 
which later emerged as the crisis both nationally and inter- 
nationally deepened. A good example of this, is as we shall 
see,Guyana. Apart from this consideration, a number of other 
defects of this strategy are also evident. One of these is 
the existence of management contracts after nationalization, and 
the income drain which this has historically constituted. 
Second, in the absence of qualitative changes in the character 
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of the state, a certain sequence 
of degeneration has unfolded 
itself. There has been a growing bureaucratisation 
of economic 
enterprises which has turned out to be 
costly in terms of 
efficieflcyo Further, in cases where 
the state is corrupt and/or 
its functionaries this has opened 
the way for clientilism, 
nepotism, graft, and so on, to become 
institutionalized. Later 
confusion develops overthe objectives and 
criteria for 
efficiency evaluatiOn in these enterprises. 
This is particularly 
noticeable in situations where as 
with bauxite-alumina in 
Guyana, nationalized concerns previously 
undertook responsibility 
for certain social functions traditionallY 
within the purview 
of the state, or alternatively where 
downturns in economic 
activity world-wide impinge themselves 
on the markets for 
these firms output. As these developments 
have made themselves 
manifest in the management of 
these enterprises economic 
rationality has rapidly gone into 
retreat. 
10 / 
Because the purchase of TNC assets under nationalization 
programmes result in a fixed charge 
on these enterprises, these 
companies have not resisted these 
developments in the region, 
and indeed cases can even b cited where they have precipitated 
their own "buyout1' by the government 
as a means of shifting 
to he no-less- profitable but far 
less risky reliance on 
management, technology, marketing 
and licensing agreements with 
the government as the new owners. 
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As the crisis has deepened in the region 
we find that regional governments have tended 
to reverse many of their earlier positions as they now believe 
they. need the TNCs more than the TNCs need our resources. This 
has opened the way for divestment polcies, particularly in 
Guyana and Jamaica. This story, however, i taken up in the 
final section of our stùdy. 
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It is difficult to determine which of the countries 
under consideration, (Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana) has 
attracted the most attention at the regional and international 
level as social exper'ments. Whet, however, is quite certain, 
is that at the level of international propaganda about the 
merits/demerits of "socialism" and "free enterpris&' as models of 
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CHAPTER 11: NATIONAL EXPERIMENTS: THE "RADICAL" OPTIONS 
In this chapter we shall examine three countries of 
the West Indies which opted for what the political leadership 
described at the time as "radical" or "socialist" solutions 
to the crisis confronting their territories in the 1970s. In 
light of the many issues surveyed in this text it would be 
impossible to attempt here either a detailed analysis or 
case studies of the various countries of the area. What I 
shall try to do is to focus on the major policy thrusts with 
a view to evaluating their general success, or lack of it, 
and the potentiality for success, if any, inherent to the 
approaches. The references given from time to time would 
enable the interested reader to pursue the rapidly growing 
literature focussing on these countries as important case 
studies of Third World attempts at social transformation. 
I: Democratic Socialism and Conservative Reaction: Jamaica 
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Third World development, Jamaica has at'tracted an extra- 
ordinary amount of attention. This is parlydue to the active 
role played by successive US administrations in the internal 
affairs of Jamaica, particularly in destabilizing "Manley's 
socialism" in the period 1972-1980 and supporting "Seaga's 
free enterprise" approach since then. It is also in part 
due to the leading role Manley has played in the recent history 
of the Socialist International. The position has been surnmar- 
ized as follows: 
"The 2all o Mi-The1 Manley, the Socialist 
International s most Important representative 
in the Third World, dealt a serious, if not 
fatal, blow to the gradualist strategy of 
social change advocated by broad sectors of 
the Caribbean left and endorsed in recent 
years by the Cuban leadership. At the same 
time the restoration of the talwart1y anLi- 
communist JLP provided the Reaganadminiration 
with an invaluable collaborator in its crusade 
to contain and roll back te wave of revo1ution- 
ary mobilization that has swept the Caribbean 
and Central America since 1979." 1/ 
It has also been alternatively put as follows: 
"In the last. few years Jamaica has aroused 
more interest in the eyes of the world than 
any other country in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean ... the whole Manley experiment 
constitutes dramatic evidence of the problems 
and possibilities that attach to 'democratic 
socialist' strategies of reform in trying to 
overcome dependency in the Third World." 2/ 
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Policies 
To appreciate the nature of the solutions offered 
by Manleyts democratic socialism, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that between World War II and 1972 Jamaica more than 
perhaps any other West Indian territory epitomized the 
classic forms of the colonial -nationalist strategies dis- 
cussed in Part 2 of this study. This period witnessed a 
rapid growth in its domestic output as the bauxite-alumina 
and tourism sectors expanded on the basis f large foreign 
capital inflows. Between 1950 8nd indepencence in 1962, 
nominal GDP grew seven-fold, and per capita national income 
and foreign trade grew eight-fold. In real terms, the GDP 
had grown at a cdmpound annual rate of 5-6 percent while 
real per capita GDP had grown at 3_4 fiTrent per ann'u. 
Foreign savings financed about one-thiidof Lobai investment 
in this period. One reflection of the oih of 2these new 
sectors is that whereas at the end or World War II the tradition- 
al exports were sugar, bananas, and other agricultural products 
together accounted for 96 percent of merchandise trade, 
by the mid-1960s their share had been reduced to 37 percent. 
Despite the rapid growth in national income, a 
severe crisis of development existed in 1970. Between 
1962 and 1972, unemployment had grown from 13 to 2L percent 
of the labour force. The unemployment, situation was magnified 
by the closure of migration outlets as UK governments in 
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particular sought to bring the flood of West Indian immi- 
gration into that country, to a halt. Income 
distribution 
had also worsened, with the personal income earned 
by the 
poorest 40 percent of the population declining from 
7.2 
percent of the total in 1958, to 5. percent in 1968. In 
absolute terms, the income of the poorest 30 percent 
of the 
population had fallen from J$32 per capita in 1958 to J$25 
in 1968, measured in constant 1958 dollars. At the same time 
the evidence shows a continued consolidation of the 
traditional 
hegemonic groups in the society. Reid shows that at this 
time 21 families accounted for 125 of the 219 directorships 
in corporations registered in Jamaica. These same 
families 
also accounted for approximately 70 percent of the 
chairpersons 
of the various corporate boards. Not one firm was 
in the 
ha'ds of blacks who nevertheless made up 80 percent of the 
population. Of the 219 directorships only 6 were held by 
blacks, and of these two were government appointments 
in 
joint-venture arrangements. F Allied with this there was 
extensive foreign ownership in the major sectors 
of the 
economy, e.g. mining 100 percent; manufacturing 75 percent; 
financial services 66 percent; transport 66 percent; 
cornmuncatiOfls, storage and tourism all exceeded 50 percent; 
and sugar was 0 percent. The Jamaica bourgeoisie was 
there- 
fore limited, linked together by family ties, and 
in economic 
terms, subordinate to North American and British capital. 
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The Manley government's strategies to deal with 
this situation consisted of five major elements; namely 
policies geared to: 
- reduce the dependence of the economy; 
- create a mixed economy with the commanding 
heights under state control; 
- reduce social inequalities; 
- deepen political democracy; 
- forge an independent foreign policy. 
As Manley himself has defined his domestic policy: 
"We began and ended with four basic commitments, 
each of which bears a relationship to and 
reinforces the other three. Firstly we wanted 
to create an economy that would be more indep- 
endent of foreign control and more responsive 
to the needs of the majority of the people 
at home. Secondly we wanted towork for an 
egalitarian society both;in terms of opport- 
unity and also in the deeper sense of a 
society in which people felt that they were of 
equal worth and value. Thirdly we wanted to 
develop a truly democratic society in which 
democracy was more than the attempt to mani- 
pulate votes every five years. Finally, we. 
wanted to help, indeed accelerate the process 
by which Jamaicians were retracing the steps of 
their history." 14/ 
Manley's effort was overall guided by the desire to find 
what he termed as a "third path tt: 
"The PNP won a landslide victory in the general 
elections of F-ebruary 1972. Before our eyes 
were these two models - Puerto Rico and Cuba. 
Surely there was another path, a third path 
we were to spend the next eight and a half pars 
in our periphery exploring that third path. ' 5/ 
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It is in the context therefore, of this central 
thrust to discover and pursue a third path that Manley's 
economic policies in Jamaica must be analysed. It is important 
to note from the outset that Manley was not aware of what that 
path was, but he has expressed a faith in the certainty of 
its existence. In relation to the first element of strategy 
listed above, the goal was to bring the foreign control over 
the economy to an end through the combination of two sets of 
policies, namely, selective nationalization, and the imposition of 
a tax system on the bauxite-alumina industry, which formed 
the core of th economy. The policy of selective nationalization 
was directed to the public utilities, those parts of ;he sugar 
economy under foreign control, some textile operations, the 
flourrefining industry, some financial institutions and hotels 
in the tourist industry. These nationalizations reflected 
the traditional concerns expressed eirlier e.g. need to keep 
natural monopolies in the hands of the state (public utilities), 
and to rescue ailing indtries in order to minimize economic 
and social dislocation (hotels). However it was argued then 
that the end result would also be an enlarged influence of 
the state sector on the pace and direction of internal capital 
accumulation, with the possibility of using this to develop 
other industries so as to forge forward and backward linkages 
within the national economy. It was on the basis of this 
rationale that the state sought to promote the formation of 
agro-industrial enterprises and to bring distribution under 
316. 
closer public control through the establishment of a state 
trading entity and the state importation of certain basic 
goods. 
It is important to note that all the nationalizations 
of the Manley period were undertaken with prompt and adequate 
compensation. Manley himself described his government's attitude 
to capital as follows: 
"We were determined to try to put the whole 
question Df foreign investment on some kind 
of national basis. Make no mistake about 
it: we wanted fore'ign inVestment ... but we 
were not willing to continue the approach 
to foreign fnvestment of the Puerto Rican 
model type, where foreign investment is seen 
as the main engine of development with all 
policy being made to revolve around the 
entrenching of that element. We saw foreign 
capital as part of but not the whole of the 
development process." 6/ 
As regards local capital Manley's regime often expressed 
support for local small ousiness which it no doubt saw as a 
counterweight to the entrenched influence of the famous 21 
families. At the same time, however, its allies within this 
family were invited to play active roles both in negotiating 
the nEtionalization of foreign capital and administering the 
state enterprises which were subsequently created. 
The bauxite policy adopted by Manley is in many ways 
the most interesting of those initiated during his administration. 
Although it falls short of nationalization, ironically it provoked 
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more protest from the companies than any of the nationalizations. 
The declared aim of his bauxite policy was to secure a limited 
disengagement" of the countryTs most vital natural resource 
from control and own.rship by Europe and North America and 
simultaneously to promote the closer integration of this 
resource into the production system of Jamaica. The former 
goal was pursued in policies aimed at securing state parti- 
cipation in the ownership of the bauxite companies operating 
in Jamaica, the formation of a world-wide cartel of bauxite- 
producing countries, the introduction of a tax levy, 
and the formation uf a Jamaica Bauxite 
Institute. The second goal was to be achieved through repat- 
nation, to the local peasantry of lands owned by the bauxite 
companies and held idle , and the development of an aluminum 
smeltcr complex in association with other regional 
countriS; .fluyana, .'Yiidad-Tn:, 'xico and Venczuela. 
Over the period of Man government it secured 51 percent 
of the local operation of tbehxite.minin.g companies, and 
6-7 percent of the companies which produced bauxite-alumina. 
While the purchase price was based on relatively low book 
values, certainly incomparison with market prices or replace- 
ment costs and the rates of interest were attractive,the 
agreements nevertheless included the very profitable manage- 
ment contracts clauses already discussed in the previous Chapter. 
It should be noted that it took several years to negotiate 
the partial ownership and return of idle bauxite lands. 
318. 
What the government eventually did was to purchase all, lands 
and then re-assign portions to the companies to mine bauxite 
at the level the companies desired with a guaranteed of access 
to ore reserves over the next 40 years. 
As we notedearlier the companies resisted the 
levy and took the issue for legal settlement. After strenuous 
effort the International Bauxite Association was formed, but 
this did not turn out to have the teeth of OPEC. For one thing 
Australia a developed capitalist economy was a member and had 
little interest in disrupting the international economy the 
way the oil producers had; for another, as Manley pointed out 
the other Third World countries of the association showed a low 
level of interest in asserting the monopoly power of the association, 
and in fact they all imposed levies on their bauxite sales lower 
than Jamaicats, in order to preY tb.r competitive advantage. 
During the period of Manley's gcvornment bauxite-alumina sales 
were diversified to Eastern Europe, but by all accounts the terms 
were not particularly concessionary price-wise. This diversifi- 
cation nevertheless, opened up the possibility of stable long 
term sales contracts, and this must have constituted a major 
advantage in marketing the product in these countries. Finally, 
by 1980 a deal was signed with Norway for that country to 
establish an alumina plant in Jamaica, but this never came to 
fruition as Manley lost the elections in that year. In like 
manner, Manley's efforts to get regional countries to pool 
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resources in order to establish a major alumina complex never 
managed to get off the ground by 1980. The effect of the levy 
was to lead to a substantial growth in bauxite earnings. 
These 
increased from an average of US$30 million between 1970-1973, 
to an average of US$l6 million between l974-1977, and US$196 
million for 1978-1979. During this period, however, as 
we 
have previously noted Jamaica's share of world output 
fell rapidly. 
This was due to three major factors, the rapid growth 
of the 
industries in Guinea and Australia, and later Brazil; 
the 
policies of the companies in Jamaica cutting back production 
to reduce' the impact of the levy on their global 
operations; 
and the general uncertainty created by the government's 
confrontation with the companies. In relation to the 
third 
of these factors, it should be noted that recorded 
foreign 
capital inflows through the bauxite-alumina sector in Jimaica 
dried in the later years of Manley's rule. Fdrther, 
mainly 
becaUO of concerns raised by the companies to the levy, 
insurance to Jamaica was suspended by the Overseas 
Private 
Investment Corporation. 
In relation to the land a moderate land reform pro- 
gramme was instituted by the government, based largely 
on a 
land lease programme and the establishment of 
productive coop- 
eratives in sugar. The focus of the land lease 
programme was 
flJO 
put idle lands into idle hands" and the scheme was modelled 
one created by the bauxite companies to put idle bauxite 
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lands into productive use through leasing them to small 
farmers. Basically the programme required government to lease 
to small farmers its own lands as well as privately owned 
lands which it acquired where holdings were in excess of 100 
acres and were kept idle. In the first stage the leases were 
for a period of 5-10 years and the second stage, (never 
effectively revealed during the period of Manley's rule), 
required a longer lease, àn'd a more definitive cooperative 
structure was to be established in order to fulfill the obligations 
of the programme. 
In a rimber of important soci-cultural areas several 
innovations were attempted by the Manley government. Leglisation 
was introduced to deal with a number of tradE union-worker 
situations which needed remedying, e.g. minimum wages for 
certain categories 6f woikers, maximum working hours in some 
industries, severance pay, maternity leave, sickñess benefits, 
and the initiation of worker participation programires in the 
public sector. In the area of education considerable attention 
was paid to the pre-primary or basic period, and the post-primary, 
or secondary period, particularly by way of curricula reform, 
the training of teachers, and the provision of improveel physical 
facilties. In the area of health broad reforms were also 
attempted. In general the aim of the government was to make 
the social welfare services which it provided meaningful and 
effective in order to relieve the situation of the mass of the 
impoverished population. It was with this rationale in mind 
that the government provided unemployment relief through a 
number ofsites and services works programmes, sought to up- 
grade the public media as fora for public education, and even 
to improve the system of taxation by taking measures to counter 
the extensive tax evasion practised by the well-to-do. 
In its external relátions, efforts iïere made to 
diversify trade contacts away from North America and the U.K., 
which in the early 1970's accounted for as much as 90 percent 
of the country's trade. By 1980 this as reduced to 60 percent, 
with the CARICOM area, Latin Americ, Japan, and Europe (East 
and West) becoming important as markcta for Jamaican produce 
and as sources of imports. In this drive Manley was very vocal 
in this support for a New Internationai Economic Order. Perhaps 
his 'ost major radiîcal departures 
were ne development of technical 
econcm.c relations with Cuba, and 
national 
on Jte external economic front 
assistance/trade/and other 
the formation of the Inter- 
Bauxite Association, headquartered in. Jamaica. 
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To cope with the historic powerlessness of the masses 
Manley's government advocated more popular forms of democracy 
than periodic national and local elections, e.g. workers parti- 
cipation, and community councils. The latter were promoted as 
a "a new arena for group co-operation and, consequently, a new 
focus for a sense of communal reality". These communities 
were constituted over: 
"a defined geographical area in whih 
residents share basic services and 
institutions, and where residents 
regard themselves as having common 
interests and needs. Examples of 
communities are village, districts, 
housing schemes, neighbourhoods". 8/ 
The functions of these organizations were to initiate, develop, 
and implement plans and programmes for the community in 
liaison 
with government and other non-governmental agencies; to 
mobilize people to participate in community affairs; to 
disseminate 
public information and provide fora for community discussion 
and 
education on issues of importance to it; to represent communities 
in relation to other agencies; and to coordinate their relation- 
ship to government agencies and non-governmental organisations. 
Weaknesses 
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In the course of time several generally recognized 
weaknesses emerged in the program of the Manley government; 
some of these were intrinsic to the proposed policies, 
given 
the context of their implementation, while others developed 
bêcause0feither poor conceptualization, articulation, implementation, 
or monitoring and evaluation. In the interests of brevity 
I 
will list some of these serially before proceeding to evaluate 
M n 
the overall success of the third path 
i) In any society undergoing a fundamental 
transformation 
there would be difficulties in arriving at a correct 
blend of 
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social reforms and maGerial progress. In societies such as 
Jamaica, where resources are limited and the size of the economy 
markedly small, these difficulties are compounded. In both the 
articulation of its policies, and their implementation, Manley's 
regime seens to have, at best underestimated the role of sustained 
income flows (and in particular. in their foreign exchange form) 
in creating the social space required for social reforms. 
This is a complex issue,. linked in part to the expectations of 
the masses, the alternative experiences they are exposed to 
through the media, and the degree of political and social 
mobilization which is achieved. It is the last, which I believe 
that ultimately determines the trade-off between present and 
future, or the extent of self-sacrifice which the masses 
would accept. As a general rule they are more likely to accept 
poverty if they believed that their social power has increased 
to the point where it is irreversible, and where they and their 
representatives can play the leading role in undertaking 
serious programmes to secure its permanent eradication. 
ii) The articulation given to the plans of Manley and the 
PNP look much clearer after the event, than during it. For 
most of the period there was no comprehensive plan or' framework 
to guide economic policy. Thus the period l972-l971 differs 
significantly from the period when the INF became intimately 
involved, and in this latter period there were many different 
starts and false starts. This criticism is not intended to 
suggest that the PNP should have had some hard and fast 
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comprehensive plan which it stuck to, through thick andthin. 
It merely seeks to advance the view that the strategy emerged 
confusedly, as events, more often than not unanticipated, bore 
down heavily on the government forcing reactions. In other 
words the strategy employed by Manley was largely ad hoc and 
pragmatic, and rationalized after the event in terms of the 
orientation of the ideology of the government. Because this 
ideology was phrased in radical terms the consequence of this 
was largely predictable. As Barry et al pt.. it: 
"For all the criticism leveled at it by the 
United States, the Manley overnment was never 
a radical government with a plan for a sub- 
stantial restructuring of the economy. The 
PNP had not formulated an over&ll plan to 
mobilize domestic agricultural .and industrial 
workers. Consequently, it fell helplessly 
victim to international and local pressures". 
iii) The record suggests that many of the programmes put 
in place by the FN? failed because of mal-administration, a 
good example being the Community Enterprise Organization, which 
although termed the key element in popular mobilization, never 
really got started. By December 1980 only 86 of these were 
financial with a total expenditure of only $6.6rn. Yet the 
1978-1982 development plan described them in such exalted 
terms as "a higher stage of development in socialist relations 
of production than the cooperative" and goes on to argue 
that they were "ideally suited to undertake an integrated 
complex of soclo-ecoflomic activities primarily oriented toward 
9/ 
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satisfying the basic needs of the community". In 
structure these organizations took two transitional forms, 
namely the Pioneer Farms where "idle hands were put on 414 
lands" to work cooperatively, and an urban unit which would use 
idle buildings, land, and other facilities, unemployed labour, 
and local materials. Although in the 1978-1982 plan it was 
envisaged that 300 farms employing 15,000 people would be created, 
by the e'nd of Manley's rule only a few existed. As regards 
the urban units, it was not until 1979, that is two years after 
its first announcement, that the first of these were established 
and then in a form where their "socialist content" was watered 
down to the pQint of unrecogniaility. 
Apart from the neg ib1e quantitative impact, many 
of the community organiZatiO were criticised for being 
coperEYAYe in name only. TJir- 'ec'd suggests that my remained 
inactive paper institutions and only a yew few lived p to the 
high promises and expecaiOnS of the original concep. Many 
did not have a building 01' their own and in some instances even 
a permanent address. All seemed to have suffered from the 
bureaucracy of the central government as disputes frequently 
arose out of their relation to the numerous government depart- 
ments they had to deal with (e.g. agriculture, housing, regional 
affairs, youth, sports and community development, loeal govern- 
ment, etc). By the end of the Manley period truly mass or 
community structured organisations were not in existence. Many 
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of the community enterprise organisations had in fact degen- 
erated into partisan bodies where by and large only PNP 
supporters actively particpated. 
A similar set of problems of execution could be found 
in the sugar farm cooperatives. These were not only created 
at a period of depressed sugar prices, but by the time they were 
established the sugar companies had run down their capital 
stock considerably. The sugar factories were not integrated 
into the farms so that the cooperatives were located in the 
most unprofitable segment of the industry. It was also widely 
reported that many members of the government opposed the sugar 
cooperativesand this helped to complicate the difficulties they 
had in their dealings with the central government and in 
acquiring resources to put the industry on a profitable footing. 
As Kaufman has observed: 
"When all was said and done, there was one 
last set of problems key in limiting the 
economic health of the coops and in 
limiting the attractiveness of the coops 
as a model for other workers in Jamaica 
the farms were now worker-owned 
but actual control was not exercised by 
the average worker". 13/ 
He goes on to point out that: 
"because the cane workers were not peasants 
they had no etrepreneur11 experience or 
orientation"; 114/ there was: 
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"a lack of educational programmes, 
low levels of literacy, income inequalities, 
the maintenance of the pre-existing division 
of labour and actual social relations of pro- 
duction and the large size of the coop farms 
and the estates which prevented identification 
between individual workers and problems of the 
coop ... these problems were exacerbated by low 
self-esteem among a group that had been severely 
oppressed - socially, culturally and economically - 
for, generations." 15/ 
Arising out of the above, perhaps the more general point can 
be made that the expansion of the state sector during the 
Manley period was at too high'a cost. Not only were the 
nationalizations as we have already indicated paid for promptly 
and adequately, but very often the government purchased enter- 
prises in danger of economic collapse in order to minimize 
social and economic dislocation. This was the case with the 
sugar uooperatives. The general weaknesses of this sort of 
state expansion was worsened by the severe shortage of managerial 
resources to permit the enterprises which were acquired to 
function efficiently. The inefficiencies of the sugar coops 
and or the community enterprise organizations identified here, 
therefore, mirrored the larger inefficiency of an unplanned, 
unco-ordinated ad hoc expansion of state property. When this 
was combined with propaganda about the socialist thrust of the 
government and so on,' it was to lead to further weaknesses 
identified below. 
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iv) Another critical weaknesses of government's policy 
was 
the failure to appreciate the crucial nature of foreign exchange, 
and in particular the need to maintain inflows adequate to 
service 
the structure of the economy it had inherited. Eventually it 
was the drying up of these flows which forced the Manley government 
into the hands of the IMF and lay the basis forits eventual 
removal from office. Jamaica's balance of payments difficulties 
reached crisis proportion in 1976 with foreign exchange reserves 
falling from J$137m in June 1975 to minus J$181m in Jeceiber 
1976. In June 1977 the government signed a Stand-by 
Agreement 
with the IMF. This was terminated in December 1977 when the 
government failed to meet the net domestic assets test et by the 
IMF. After extensive discussions an Extended Fund Faclity 
was obLained in May 1978 and this lasteduntil December 1979, 
when he Bank of Jamaica failed to meet tie net international 
reselies test set by the IMF. Between December 1979 and 
March 1980 prolonged negotiations were held vuith the IMF and 
finally the National Executive Council of the PNP decided to 
reject the 114F path. Two ministers of government resigned in 
protest. As we shall see later, by then, however, it was too 
little too late. 
Underlying the foreign exchange crisis was a rapid 
expansion of imports (126 percent between 1972 and 1976), and 
more particularly oil imports as the import bill for oil 
increased from J$63m in 1973 to J$178m in 1976. External debt 
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repayments also worsened, rising from J$149m in 19714 to J$lOOm 
in 1976 as the gross external debt increased from US$195 in 
December 1973 to US$1489m in December 1976. The government's 
budget deficit had also grown from J$67m in the fiscal year 
1972-1873 to J$278m in fiscal year 1975-1976. Tourism recepts 
also fell by 13 percent during 19714-1975 and again by 10 percent 
ib 1976. Much of this was due to destabilization measures 
pursued by the US administration, as it became increasingly 
hostile to Manley's foreign policy positions and increasingly 
supportive of Seaga, who seemed to offer the prospect of a good 
collaborator. The foreign policy positions of concern to the 
US were Manley's position in the Socialist International, his 
friendship with Castro, growing Cuba-Jamaica relations, Manley's 
support Angola and Cuba's effort to defend it, and the form- 
ation of the International Bauxite Association. The result as 
that '75 USAID turned down Manley's request for aid and 
food grants unless government's stance was changed. The Export- 
Import alE reduced Jamaica's credit rating. The fact 
that Manley won the elections in 1976 only served to harden 
positions on both sides. Thus the press campaign in the US on 
violence in Jamaica continued unabated, fuelled by the fact 
that over 750 people were killed during the partisan struggles 
at this time. 
During this period Jamaica's share of total world 
bauxite exports fell from 27 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 
1975. Capital inflows into Jamaica which had averaged US$2511 
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nr1lion in 1973 fell to US$115m in 1975 and became negative 
(i.e. a net outflow) by 1976. 
By the end of Manley's rule in 1980, the economy had 
shownno real improvement. Product concentration in exports 
had increa3ed not reduced, and along with it the vulnerability 
of the economy. Thus we find that although non-traditional 
sources of trade had grown from 10 to 0 percent, dependence 
on bauxite-alumina, sugar, and bananas had grown from 79 to 
83 percent between 1972 arl 1980. Trade as a ratio of GDP had 
increased from 72 percent in 1970 to 107 'percent in 1980. The 
external indebtedness of the 'country had grown from $US370 
million in 1972 to US$1.7 billion in 1980. The debt service 
ratio in 1979 was 17 pe'cent of exports of goods and services. 
Capital flight out of Jamaica was extraordinarily high, prompting 
the fornation of a special detection unit in the security 
servicc. All the public utilities were in a state of disrepair 
with massive investments required to upgrade their capacity and 
the quality of the services they delivered. The bauxite-alumina, 
sugar, and tourist industries were all in structural crisis, 
with the result that between 1972 and 1980 real income had 
decreased by 25 percent. 
Recorde*d inflation in this period was 
320 percent. Efforts at diversification and import substitution 
of food were not significantly successful, for although food 
imports as a percentage of non-fuel imports had fallen from 
14 to 10 percent between 1973 and 1980, food shortages was a 
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prominent feature of that year. The flight of skilled persons 
out of the country had peaked, as it was estimated that between 
1976 and 1980, 18,000 persons on average went to the US alone. 
In one year, 1978, 2,705 persons migrating were in the categories 
managerial, administrative, or. technical. 
Assessment 
In assessing the effort at a third path solution to 
Jamaica'b problem it is important to gather from this insights 
and observations which could be useful in any ft.ture social 
experimentation along these lines in the region. The need for 
a constructively critical approach stems from two basic judge- 
ments which I have formed, and I shou],d indicate here at the 
outset. One is, that despite the contradictory natùre o the 
evidence, it is my belief, that on balance, the central figures 
who wei'e urging the third path approach were guided more by 
concern for the poor and the powerless, than exclusively 
expressing the social opportunism of their class, as some have 
argued. Second, I do not believe that the collapse of the 
experiment into the conservative reaction of Seaga's rule, rules. 
out future effort along these lines by other political and 
social movementsifl the region. There have been other previous 
so-called "confirmation" that reformist socialist change is 
not a viable option in the Third World, but yet other experi- 
17/ 
ments have followed these. - Not only does time fade 
memories but the attractions of the third path stems from the 
belief held by many political actors and theorists that it is 
the'only path which combines socialist and democratic practice. 
This belief is grounded in the growth of the false notion among 
socialists,Marxists, and Marxist-Leninists that socialism and 
political democracy are irrecQncilable as either objectives or 
practice for capitalist societies. I have explored the weak- 
nesses of this view elsewhere and it is not necessary to delve 
into these issues here at any length. The main point 
to grasp here is that the third path offers a resolution of 
t' . . D the contradiction between socialism and democracy by the 
dilution of socialism to its social democratic form. 
Given its reformist goals, it is evident that all 
"third path' options cdrry in them the dangers of vacillation. 
and the risk of governments' policy so degenerating that it 
becomes structurally "caught between two stools", thereby ending 
up with the worst of all possible worlds. As eventinfolded in 
Jamaica the PNP regime was clearly caught between the demands 
of the upper 
basis of, and 
with all its 
classes. Cbnstructed on the 
alliance, tl4e party strovi 
classes and the lower 
'I 
espousing anall class 
I' 
might to avoid establishing a clear priority in 
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its class line. As economic disintegration continued and the 
pressures mounted the government ended up displeasing both 
sectors while alienating middle class support. The lower classes 
resented the pressures on their living standards which grew 
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rapidlyafter 1976, and the upper classes scared of socIalism, 
proceeded to make destabilization, sabotage, capital flight, 
and migration, its major social and political goals. While 
one can say that this development partly reflected the traditional 
vcillatory character ofttty_bourgeoisie in Jamaica, more 
generally It also reflected the political underdevelopment of 
class in general, and the division, of the countryts labour 
force into two rival trade union-political groupings. The 
extraordinary premium which this situation places on creative 
and constructive political mobilization was not fully appreciated 
by the Manley regime. 
Instead a second weakness emerged, which can best be 
described as a consistent under-estimation of the impact of 
ideological rhetoric and foriegn policy stances in a period of 
acute cold war rivalry on local politics. Such rhetoric served 
to "overideologize" the domestic struggle and consequently 
to expose it to developments in the international arena which 
it could not contend with. Whilst no doubt those who used the 
rehtoric saw its internal mobilizing appeal as a decisive 
factor in its favour, they clearly did not fully gauge the use 
to which persons hostile to the regime could put this same 
rhetoric in mobilizing opposition to the regime. In particular 
the US administration and the media skillfully used the rhetoric 
to whip up capital flight from the country, to deter tourists 
visiting Jamaica, and to swing opinion in such institutions as 
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the IMF in its direction. The fact that the rhetoric belied the 
internal social reality was of little immediate concern to 
those who promoted it and those who reacted to it. Thus Barry 
et al cites a statement attributed to Larry Burns of the 
Council 
on Hemispheric Affairs. "In the closing days of the Ford 
Administration, Kissinger had become almost manic about getting 
rid of Manley". Similarly Stone has niadethe perceptive 
observation that: 
"Mr. Manley's radical foreign policy clothed 
his relatively moderate domestic economic 
and social policies in an aura of leftist 
radicalism far removed from the reality of 
what he atempted to implement. But the 
image of a radical, marxist orientation to 
domestic social, policies was sharpened both 
by the leftist rhetoric of Mr. Manley and 
his party spokesmen and by self-serving.' 
interpretations of what was happening in 
Tamaica promoted by the North American media 
and the Jamaican bourgeoisie". 20/ 
He goes on to state that these pronouncements 
"panicked the local bourgeoisie who became 
convinced that Jamaica was heading towards 
communism. Washington made common cause 
with the Jamaican bourgeoisie in seeking 
to undermine Mr. Manley's adminstration". 21/ 
It is perhaps in its relation with the IMF that 
many of the limitations of the third path pursuéd by the Manley 
admiñistration best expressed themselves. Although Jamaica's 
foreign exchange difficulty manifested itself dramatically in 
the last four years of Manley's rule (1977-1980), its origins 
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can be traced earlier to the declne of bauxite-alumina invest- 
ments in Jamaica and the position of the industry globally, 
import price inflation occasioned by the oil-price shock of 
1973-l974, declining export production as local industries 
sach as sugar and bananas faced major structural constraints, 
the high import-intensity of the manufactu$ing sector, the 
failure to develop a significant export capability in manu- 
facturing; and reliance on tourism which was very susceptible 
to adverse publicity generated in North America. Capital flight, 
migration of skilled persons, retaliation of the bauxite companies, 
and so on, all of which were important in the last four years, 
in effect compounded these structural difficulties already 
existing. 
22/ 
A 'good starting point for appreciating what is involved 
in relations with the IMF has been provided by Bernal: 
'tAll programs of balance of payments adjustment 
involve the manipulation of macroeconomic vari- 
ables and, therefore, implicitly contain a 
specific strategy of economic development that 
takes effect during, and continues after, the 
adjustment period. The IMF's strategy .... is 
derived from its role in the capitalist world 
economy [its role] is to maintain an environ- 
ment that facilitates the accumulation of 
capital on a world scale. This requires the 
complete international mobility of capital and 
commoditiestt. 23/ 
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The IMF's adjustment strategy for Third World countries 
comprises a familiar package: deregulation, i.e., removal of 
price controls, subsidies, exchange controls and import 
licensing; devaluation of the currency; erphasis on the develop- 
ment of the privatesector as a corrective to the "inefficient" 
statist bias of the previous period; a reduced public sector; 
strict fiscal goals to be set in terms of the size of the 
government's deficit and. the amount of borrowing permitted from 
the banking system; and wage controls. The objective of the 
package is to stimulate capitalist initiatives through the 
promotion of "free markets" and the policy of rolling back the 
state serves as a means of stimulating exports and making the 
previously inefficient import-substitution sector competitive. 
At the same time the growth of real wages and living standards 
is to be contained, and if necessary reduced to a level 
compatible with import expenditure levels the country can 
"afford". This reduction is achieved through a mix of cuts 
in social expenditure, retrenchment of public sector employees, 
wage restraint, reduced government deficit and its associated 
tight monetary policies, and the implementation of "realistic 
rates of interest". The policy differences between this 
apprpach and Manley's, and their probable polticial impact has 
been neatly summarized in two tables prepared by Bernal. 
e of Society 
Dominant sector 
Ownership of the means 
of production 
Allocation of resources 
Openness 















POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT 
AND THE IMF 










capitalist state to 
invest in production, 
distribution and infra- 
structure 
Public and private 
Aid, loans, and regulatei 
foreign investment 
Increae the share of 
' abor 
Increased state inter- 
vention and planning 
One of several policy 
in stnirnent s 
Expansionary 
Dual exchange rate 




Control and subsidies 
Increased; pegged to 







Capitalist investment in 
production and distri- 
bution. State confined 
to infrastructure 
xvestment. 
Enphasis on capitalist 
savings out of profit 
Direct foreign 
investment 
Increase the share 
accruing to capital 
Laissez-faire with 
enphasis on monetary 
policy 




Flimination of controls 
Removal of import re- 
strictions and licensing 
Rerroval of controls and 
elimination of subsidies 
Decrease in real tenus 
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sue Manley Government nP 
valuation 
ge restrain policy 
duction in budget 
penditure in real tenus 
[crease indirect taxation - 
taxes on profits and property 
icentives to capitalists 
icludi.ng price increases 
ensure 20% rate of profit 
duction and elimination 
subsidies provided by the 
Ldget 
duction in the state's 
rrowing from local and 
)reign sources 
straint on (tirection and 
pansion of state enter- 
'ises 
bt repayment and repatriation 
profits and royalties mae the 
Lrst charge on available foreign 
change 
Increased cost of living 
by increasing the cost of 
iiTport s 
Reduce real income as 
the upper limit of wage 
increases was below the 
rate of inlfation 
Cutbacks in social pro- 
.-.1. ¿- o c..fls 
delays in the state sectùr 
Reduce disposable income 
Capital ists accumulate 
profits but do not in- 
vest-profit s often 
illegally smuggled out 
Pri,ce increases of all 
basic food items 
Leave loanable funds in 
the domestic banking 
syst for capitalists. 
Capitalists do not re- 
spond, state expendi- 
ture restrained 
State prevented from 
assuming a dominant 
role in the economy 
Service foreign capital 
at the expense of iuorLs 
of food, raw materials 
and spare parts 
338. 
TABLE 11.2 
POLITICAL IMPACTOF IMF POLICIEL. 
Reduce real income and 
standard of living of all 
classes except the capi- 
talists and self-employed 
professionals 
Reduce the standard of 
living of workers, the 
salariat and state 
bureaucrat s 
All classes, especially 
the poor, severely affected 
Reduce standard of living 
of all classes except 
capitalists and self- 
employed professionals 
Support capitalists at 
the expense of small 
business and wage 
earning classes 
Reduction in the stan- 
dard of living of the 
poorest 
Reduction of the ability 
of state and state enter- 
prises to perform- all 
classes adversely affected 
State impotent to meet 
demand of various classes 
Shortages of essential 
imports, especially food, 
hurt all classes and leads 
to price increases in the 
'black market' and hoar- 
ding by capitalists and 
srrall businesses. Lack 
of spare parts and raw 
material s harrers pro- 
duction and distribution 
resulting in layoffs and 
work stoppages. All 
classes hurt. 
F Policies Economic Effect Classes Affected 
Jnwrittefl derrnd for the 
;overnment to adopt a 
)ro-capitalist, pro- 
orei investment posture 
TABLE 2 continued 
Source: R. Bernal, op.cit. 
Reduced the govemnent' s 
ability to borrow fran 
progressive oil rich 
countries and to forge 
trade links with Socialist 
countries 
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Failure to realize aid 
and trade benefits outside 
the capitalist orbit. 
Destroys the credibility 
of the Democratic Soci1- 
ism and the PN, inter- 
nationally and domestically. 
Intensifies c91 fferences 
between the left and right 
in the PNP. 
:MF Policies Economic 
Effect Classes Affected 
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Given the very different trajectories of these 
approaches, 
and their varying political impacts the fact 
that Manley ultimately 
capitulated and sought to preside over 
the imposition of the 
IMP solution on the Jamaican population 
could only have led to 
the result it did, namely, the removal 
of his party from power. 
The literature emerging since 1980, makes 
it clear that as the 
struggle between the government and the IMF 
progressed, more 
and more the IMF and its backers were 
prepared to push their 
view of how Jamaica should develop to the 
point of removing 
the government, if necessary. At this 
juncture, Seaga's JLP 
prov2d to be a perfect ally in derailing 
the third path. In 
retrospect the only viable option for 
Manley, was to have moved 
at the outset for a qualitative deepening 
of the governments' 
commitment to the poor and the powerless. 
This would not of 
course bave guaranteed success, since in 
real life political 
certainties are rarely known in advance, 
but it was the only 
option available apart from capitulation 
and certain down fall. 
To have moved in this direction, 
however, would have required 
a qualitative leap in the political and 
social movement which 
he headed. This, again in retrospect 
does not seem to have been 
as impossible as some have argued. In 
the, end the crisis which 
confronted the third path through the 
IMF really permitted no 
third option or third solution at the 
time, but it did not 
rule out a transformation of the political 
movement itself. 
The IMF call was for a reversal of Manley's 
policies and the 
pursuit of the forms of' dependent capitalist 
growth typified 
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in the colonial and later nationalist 
period. The only way 
to avoid this, was to secure a hegemonic 
position for the 
mass of the working people who had always 
opposed these 
strategies. While the class alliance 
which supported Manley 
and the PNP was too fragile in the 
end to pursue a third path 
successfully there is no certainty that 
a progressive advance- 
ment of the interests of the working 
people in the coalition 
could not have been achieved, on the 
basis of an early and 
resolute decision to pursue an economic 
programme which placed 
their interests first. In te end the regime vacillated 
and 
when after years of trying to implement 
the IMF programme 
unsuccessfully, the decision wa taken 
to end all relations 
with the IMF in March 1980, it was 
already too late. 
These events in Jamaica raise two 
further sets of 
issues of considerable importance. 
One is to what extent the 
defeat of the third path can be said 
to be due to the specific 
conjuncture of events in the capitalist 
world economy at that 
time, and the other is to what extent 
basic limitations of 
Caribbean societies prevent any sort 
of solution to the problems 
of poverty, powerlessness, and underdevelOPments 
It is clearly 
true that the period of Manley's rule 
coincided with a profound 
crisis of the capitalist world economy. 
This we have already 
described. There is, however, no 
evidence to support the view 
that this crisis was so immutable in 
its effects as to prevent 
universally, social and political 
advance. Indeed it might 
be argued to the contrary, that 
the emergence of the crisis 
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after 1974, has been helpful worldwide in precipitating political 
and social movements, including the development of Manley and 
the PNP in a radical direction: 
t?] was the cumulative impact of this severe 
economic situation rather than political 
commitment per se which forced the Manley 
government to press ahead with the more 
radical of its proposed reforms". 2/ 
The conclusion must necessarily e that while the conjuncture 
of internal constraints and international crisis complicated 
events, these cannot fully explain the weaknesses of the third 
path. As Stephens and Stephens put it a crucial issue to 
determine is: 
"whether idiosyncratic and country-specific 
features of the Jamaican experiences in the 
seventies were primarily responsibile for the 
decline or whether it was due? to the very 
characteristics of the path itself". 25/ 
While in their sympathetic review of the Manley period they 
concluded that the third path achieved more than it is usually 
given credit for, the point which emerges and is important for 
us here, is that different judgements about how much was 
achieved by this approach, nevertheless agree in the rejection 
of the view of a completely determinist situation in which 
either international developments in relation to local develop- 
ments or the specific limitations inherent in Caribbean society, 
or both together, can rule out forever the prospect of meaningful 
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socLaL and political change in the region. 
In expressing this view, I am not intending to casually 
under-estimate the negative impact of either of these factors 
in the struggle for change in the region. In particular the 
internal constraints should be stressed as frequently these are 
the most underrated. Just to list them is to impress one with 
their range and severity: small size, limited national 
resource endownment, population and markets, geo-political 
location in the "back yard of imperialism", the limited capacity 
in these societies for managing radical social 
change or even broad based reform programmes over a wide range 
of social life, the non-participatory traditions of the region's 
politics, divided labour movements, pressing social problems 
(especially poverty and unemployment) which place a high premium 
on directng resources for their immediate relief, and the 
importance of foreign exchange flows to the on-going system 
of economic reproduction. By itself,any one of these constraints 
would be serious, but when combined they become particularly 
daunting. The fact, however, that Cuba was able to make a 
revolution and survive against these odds is a heartening 
consideration. It remains true, nevertheless, that the struggle 
for development continues in Cuba, and the very existence of 
Cuba has altered negatiely the chances of other states following 
this route, certainly if one were to judge from the hostility 
exhibited by imperialism against even moderate social change 
in the region. 
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Conservative reaction 
By 1980 Jamaica was in disarray. 
Political violence 
hai. left over 750 personS dead; shortages 
of basic commodities 
were widespread; labour unrest was the 
order of the day; 
foreign capital inflows had dried up with 
the us government 
providing only US$56m over the final years 
of Manlçy's adminis- 
tration; unemployment was 28 percent 
ofthe labour force; during 
1977-1980 GDP growth was negative 
and in 1980 alone it had 
declined by nearly 6 percent; manufacturing, 
agriculture and 
construction ail showed massive declines, 
with constriction 
down by 28 percent in 1980 and mnufacturiflg 
12 percent. As 
we observed earlier, capital flight, 
migration of skilled 
personnel, inflamatory news reporting, 
all added to the feeling 
of crisis and collapse. Not surprisingly, 
the people rejected 
the Manley a1dministration and voted 
in Sea,a and the JLP with 
the largest electoral victory ever 
- fifty-one of the sixty 
seats in the national parliament. 
Seagats policies were diametrically 
opposed to those 
voiced by Manley and the PNP. In the 
domestic front his 
administration has advocated the following: 
- foreign investment and not national 
ownership and 
state control was given the leading role in 
promoting 
economic growth; 
- state enterprises were to be divested to 
support the 
thrust in favour of privatizatiOn of the 
economy; 
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exports and not self reliance and import-sub-. 
stitution was to be the major focus 01' economic 
activity, and in this regard the government readily 
embraced the IMF package for stabilization of the 
economy; 
- support of the IMF package was expected to facilitate 
loans from the IMF itself, private commercial sources 
and the US government in particular; 
- the economy was made open to foreign expertize and 
skills since this was seen as a necessary complement 
to the flow of foreign capital; 
finally, as St'ne put it "the style of political 
management [with] the PNP's emphasis as intense 
political mobilization gave way to demobilization 
and a technocratic managerial style". / 
On the external front the Seaga administration promoted 
itself 
as a willing collaborator to the right-wing Reagan 
administration 
which won office in the USA at about the same time as Seaga 
did 
in Jamaica. As part of new role diplomatiç ties with Cuba were 
cut, a strong attack on the Bishop regime in Grenada was 
launched, 
and Seaga offered Jamaica as a willing ally in promoting an anti- 
leftist, prc-TTS alliance in the region. In relation to 
foreign 
policy the Seaga government has played a leading role in both 
the invasion of Grenada and the formation of the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. The result of Seaga's new line was 
a 
considerable inflow of foreign capital. It is estimated that 
between 1981 and 19811 nearly US$2 billion of concessionary 
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financing from all sources was obtained by Jamaica. From the 
US alone the government received US$679 million on concessionary 
support for the fiscal years 1980-1981 to 1984-1985. On a per 
capita basis, US support to Jamaica was the second largest 
worldwide, after its aid to Israel. These details are shown 
in Table 3 below: 
TABLE 11.3 
* U.S. Fiscal Year runs October 1 to September 30. 
Source: U.S. AID Office, Kingston, Jamaica, cited in O. Davies, 
"Socio-EconomiC Developments in Jamaica, 1980-1985'!; 
mimeo, 1985. 
In addition to this aid, it is common knowledge that the Reagan 
Administration has used its influence to secure funds for Jamaica 
through multilateral institutions like the IMF, World Bank, 
U.S. CONCESSIONARY SUPPORT FOR JAMAICA 1980/81 TO 1984135 (US$m) 
Tota' 
U.S. Fiscal Balance of Rejects PL f480 Other Housing 
Payments Food Guarantee Year * 
- - 1980/81 47.7 13.9 17.1 78.7 
1981/82 95.0 31.3 17.5 - - 1143.8 
1982/83 54.4 27.2 20.0 - 15.0 1i6.6 
1983/84 50.0 37.7 20.0 6.8 25.0 139.5 
1984/85 99.5 , 29.4 140.0 i6.o 15.0 199.9 
346.6 139.5 11)4.6 22.8 55.0. 678.5 
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and the Inter-American Development Bank. It has also attempted 
to cushion the impact of the world recession on Jamaica's bauxite, 
by purchasing for the government's stock-pile, even at a time 
when adequate stocks were on hand. 
Despite the massive support provided to the Seaga 
administration by US and other foreign capital, and its full 
cooperation with the IMF stabilization programmes asa major 
plank in its free-enterprise strategy of recovery and growth, 
the economic and social situation in Jamaica at the end of 1985, 
has not improved over 1980. To begin with the foreign exchange 
and balance of payments crisis which precipitated Manley's 
downfall has not abated. The exchange rate has continued to 
deteriorate with massive negative consequences on the living 
standards of the poor. After experimenting with a multiple 
exchange rate system introduced in January 1983 to give forml 
recognition to the thriving blackmarket in foreign currency 
which had developed by then, this was abandonned in December 
1983 when the exchange rate was unified and fixed at a par 
value of US$l J$3.30, and determined thereafter at a twice 
weekly public auction. By the end of 1985 the rate was reduced 
to US$1 J$5.50. Such a large devaluation in such a short 
pei6d has had predictable inflationary effects. In one year, 
l98, the retail price index rose by 31.2 percent, and the 
GDP deflator rose by 36.3 percent. As a result of the import 
liberalisation programme put in place by Seaga, and the 
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continuous decline in export earnings experienced through 
low output in ti-le major industries, the trade balance worsened 
dramatically, with the deficit in 198)4 reaching over 
one-half 
of export earnings. (See Table )4 for more data). Net foreign 
assets in the banking system in 198)4 was negative, and 
stood at nearly twice the negative value in 1980. The external 
debt had grown to US$3.2 billion, i.e., nearly tice the 1980 
level, On a per capita basis this debt was twice that of 
Brazil, the Third Worldts largest debtor country. This debt 
as a percentage of GDP stood at 135 in 198)4, as compared with 
82 in 1980. Finally, real output growth had stagnated with 
the GDP in real terms in 19Th being 19 percent below the l972 
level. While Seaga promised to reverse the increase in the 
public sector, where employment had doubled and public spending 
as a percentage o' GDP had grown from 22 percent in 1972 to 
)42 percent in 1980, while private se.tor employment fell by 
25 percent, his programme of divestment had 
achieved little 
positive results. 
There are many social manifestations of this failure. 
Public demonstrations (as many as 50,000 strong) have been 
mounted against the exchange-rate auction system; rioting and 
looting have occurred after gasolene price increases in 198)4; 
Manleyts party has refused to participate in the general 
elections called in 1983 on the grounds that electoral changes 
which was promised were not put in place before the elections 
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were called. Since then the Seaga administration has 
functioned as a "one-party state" in the face of persistent 
pressures to call fresh elections. Crime has been rising 
and Stone cites the result of one survey which he undertook 
in 1981 in which he found that "approximately 10 percent 
of 
the total volume ofproduce and livestock on Jamaican farms 
was stolen by highly organised criminal gangs for sale in 
urban areas". Crimes of violence had increased from 
13,000 cases in 19711. to 15,300 in 1981 and theft cases had 
risen by more than one-third between 19711 and 1981. In this 
atmosphere of economic chaos and decline, crime and corruption, 
the feeling of crisis which helped bring the PNP to power in 
1971 and then the JLP to power in 1980, still pervaded the 
society. As Stone has commented: 
"The revival of faith in the future aoused 
by the change of government in 1980 after 
the bitter disappointment with socialism in 
the 1970s had dissipated by mid-1982, to be 
replaced by a feeling of hopelessness as the 
Seaga government seemed unable either to 
solve the basic problems or to engineer the 
promised economic recovery. A mood of national 
desperation led to the embrace of any inflow 
of aid or any political or economic terms. A 
renewed and pervasive form of neocolonialism 
set in under the JLP as the country lost 
confidence in local initiatives and efforts 
as a means of pulling out of its deep economic 
problems. External influence ... had now taken 
over in a country that ten years earlier was 
boasting aggressively about taking on the 
multinationals and the world economic system, 
and breaking the cycle of dependency. The 
national mood had come full circle". 29/ 
Such then was the situation forty years after the end of World War 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As with Jamaica under Manley, Grenada 
during Ghe 
Maurice Bishop regime (1979-1983) 
acquired an extraordinary 
reputation as a progressive 
social experiment. As Fidel 
Castro once put it, Grenada along 
with Nicaragua, and Cuba 
were "three giants rising up 
to defend their right to 
independenc, sovereignitY, and 
justice on the very threshold 
of imperialism". Ambursley and 
James have also commented 
as follows: 
In four years the PRG acquired an 
inter- 
national status out of all proportion 
to 
the tiny size of the island. On account 
of Bishop's fervent and astute oratory, 
and the energy and originality devoted 
by 
the regime to Third World issues, 
Grenada 
emerged asa leading force in the non- 
aligned movement. The PRG consistently 
spoke out in support of national liberation 
movements throughout the world, and was 
audacious in its opposition to the 
aggressive 
designs of us imperialism in the Caribbean". 
31/ 
If Jamaica has been termed a 
sfnall island state where the 
problems of size made Manley's 
task of economic transformatiO 
especia'lY difficU.lt, then it is 
important to recognise that 
even on that scale Grenada would 
best be described as 
an extremely small "mini-state". 
With a population of only 
110,000 people, an area of 133 square 
miles, and a GDP of 
n 
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only US$100 million at the time of the assumption to power 
of Bishop's Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), the 
pressures of small scale in the society are indeed awesome. 
Small scale and a colonial history had combined to produce 
a situation in the early 1970s, in which over 90 percent of 
GDP was derived from traded goods and services. There 
was 
an extreme export depedence on three primary crops, bananas, 
cocoa, nutmeg, together with tourism and the wholesale and 
retail trade associated with it. Imports supplied most of 
the manufacturing goods, food, fuel, raw materials, equip- 
ment and machinery, and other capital goods. In addition 
the incomes of the local population also depended heavily 
on remittances received from relatives and friends who had 
migrated and were living abroad. The small size of the 
economy also produced severe dis-economies of ¿cale in 
provision of public services, and so raised considerably the 
average per capita cost of state activity, with the result, 
that like many of the other Leeward and Windward Islands, 
there was a historical reliance after World War II on grants- 
in-aid from the British treasury to finance state provision 
of basic services. Agriculture contributed on average 
about one-third of the GDP over the two decades of 
the 1960s 
and 1970s. During this same period the contribution of 
manufacturing never exceeded four percent of the GDP. 
Similarly, except for periods associated with hotel 
construction, 
construction activity was low, averaging less than 
five 
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percent n the five years preceding the assumption of power 
by the PRG. In 1979 when the PRG assumed power, the economy 
was in the midst of a severe depression, with per capita 
income less than what it was at the beginning of the decade. 
Although heavly dependent on agricultural pro- 
duction, extreme inequalities prevailed in the rural areas. 
Thus in 1972, farms in the size group up to 5 acres accounted 
for 89 pèrcent of total landholdings and only 15 percent of 
the cultivable acreage. Farms loo acres+, accounted for 
0.5 percent of the total landholdings and 9 percent of 
the cultivable acreage. To this we can add such prevailing 
features as the concentration of idle lands among the 
larger acreageS, the extreme fragmentation of the small 
holdirigs, and the concentration of better quality lands 
among the large holdings. Despite this, the peasantry 
nevertheless produced two-thirds of the nutmegs, one-half 
of the cocoa, and about one-third of the bananas. Processing, 
however, was not in the hands of the peasants and it has been 
estimated that as high as 90 cents in every dollar was 
assigned to processing their produce. Historically, the 
plantocracy dominated the three statutory agricultural export 
marketing organizations which were created for the nutmeg, 
cocoa, and banana crops. These organizations had exclusive 
right of purchase for the entire crop, marketed them overseas 
and after deducting their commissionS paid the prodcers. 
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Under Gairy's rule, this group was replaced by his own 
political henchmen. 
The drive to establish a tourist industry began 
in the l960s and as in other West Indian territories the 
main ownership was foreign, with a sprinkling of local 
interests, particularly planters who moved into this sphere 
of economic activity. An important aspect of the tourist 
industry which had developed was the significant number of 
foreigners who built holiday and retirement homes in Grenada. 
This deveopment had a noticeable impact on the real estate 
market, producing much land speculation and causng a 
considerable increase in the price of land. Outside of 
tourism and farming, most of the capital was concentrated 
in retailing and distribution of vehicles, food, building 
materials, household appliances, and in addition sonie 
capital was attracted to local branches of insurance 
companies, shipping lines, tour operators, and so on. 
Two other features of the economy at this time 
are worthy of note. One is, that unlike other West Indian 
territories the rate of urbanization in Grenada was unusally 
low; net rural-urban migration was recorded at only 0.6 
percent during the two censuses held in 1960 and 1970. 
A high percentage of the rural youth still lived and worked 
in the agricultural sector at the end of the 1970s, and 
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this has been explained as due to the combination of sub- 
sistence farming and the use of wage labour as a supplement 
to family labour on almost all Grenadian farms. The other 
feature of note is that in the absence of a significant 
manufacturing sector, labour was employed in many small 
establishments. The largest manufacturing employer was the 
lcal brewery which offered only 76 permanent jobs. One 
consequence of this was the underdevelopment of unionism 
in the country. The largest concentrations of the labour 
force were found on the docks and in the large agricultural 
estates. 
Economic Policy 
After a long rule based on persistent rigged 
elections, repression, and terror, the Gairy government was 
finally removed by force in March 1979. The PRG which 
succeeded it immediately proclaimed a process of revolutionary 
reconstruction of Grenadian society based on adherence to 
the principles of the"non-capitalist path" or "socialist 
orientation" Its economic programme was derived from these 
principles, and in essence may br' summed up as follows: 
- because of the severity size and nature of 
the inherited economy, a pragmatic necessity 
was to make the centerpiece of economic policies 
the construction of an airport capable of landing 
commercial passenger jets. This it was anticipated 
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would lead to a veiy rapid expansion of the 
tourist industry; 
- construction of a mixed economy based on three 
major sectors, state, cooperative and private, 
with the state sector playing the leading role; 
- improving the quality of life of the citizens 
througha comprehensive programme aimed at 
upgrading social services, and ensuring that 
other baic needs were met; 
- diversification of external trade and sources 
of investment with the particular aim of oeriing 
channels to the socialist bloc and improving 
South-South cooperation, as part of a broader 
strategy in support of international efforts 
directed at creting a new international 
economic order. 
In what follows we shall briefly discuss these policies then 
turn to an overall evaluation of them. 
An obvious weakness of the Grenadian economy at the 
time of the PRG takeover was that the growth of its tourist 
industry was severely constrained by the absence of an airport 
with facilities to handle modern passenger jet aircraft. 
Without this tourists had to be transhipped through other 
islands to smaller aircraft, and invariably this requred them 
to stay overnight in the other islands in order to make 
connections. The difficulty was that the mountainous terrain 
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of the island, permitted only one area large enough and flat 
enough with the potential for constructing a runway of the 
right length at a tolerable cosb. Even so from an engineering 
standpoint this enterprise would have involved massive con- 
struction works as it was necessary to fill in areas then 
covered by the sea. To the PRG the construction of the air- 
port was a means of breaking this constraint and its decision 
to proceed was always linked to the economic potential of 
a developed tourist industry first and foremost. Other 
linkages were recognized, but these were by-products of 
tourist development. A Bishop himself put it, the airport 
was: 
"the gateway to our future ... it is what 
alone can give us the potential for 
economic takeoff ... it can help us to 
develop the tourist industry more ... to 
develop our agro industries more ... to 
export our fresh fruits and vegetables 
better". 33/ 
The bulk of the capital, technical expertise, equipment and 
machinery for the airport project was provided by Cuba. It 
was projected that when the-airport was completed tourist 
arrivals would increase by nearly 60 percent above the pre- 
vailing levels of about 32,000 tourist arrivals. This 
expansion in number of arrivals was expected to lead to a 
tripling of gross tourist expenditures on the island. As a 
result of this increased expenditure, linkage industries would 
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expand, such as hotel and other services, domestic agri- 
culture and food supplies, local crafts, and industries such 
as clothing, footwear, furniture, etc. In the year prior to 
the establishment of the PRG tourist arrivals, excluding 
cruise ship passengers numbered over 32,000 but in succeeding 
years it fell to a low of about 23,000 persons. Initially, 
the government spoke of a "newtourism" which from a reading 
of the speeches at the time seemed to have implied the 
following: nationalization of 2oregii-owned hotels; a shift 
from luxury accommodations to more modest ones; and the 
development of new markets in Latin America, the rest of the 
Caribbean, Africa, and among non-white North Americans. The 
focus was also to be on middle class categories like students, 
teachers, the higher grades of blue-collared workers, etc. 
Further emphasis was laid on the provision of locally grown 
foods and menus in local establishments. In practice very 
little was done to promote this TtnewtourismTt prior to the 
overthrow of Bishop. Although the Holiday Inn Hotel was 
acquired and added to the five hotels taken over by the state 
which Gairy and his cronies had previously owned, the state 
sector in the industry was in a minority, since in 1983 
there were twenty hotels and eight guest houses owned and 
operated by private capital both local and foreign. All the 
state owned hotels appeared to have functioned uneconomically 
as a result of external factors, e.g. decline in tourist 
trade, and internal factors, e.g. overstaffing, weak management, 
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and inexperienced workforce Nothing was done in any 
systematic manner to promote Grenada in any of the new 
markets listed above. Indeed as time progressed, even in 
speeches of the leadership, less and less emphasis was placed 
on his sort of reform. As we shall observe in our later 
evaluation the government seemed to have been more and more 
painfully aware that there was an inherent contradiction in 
a progressive government supporting tourism, given the 
associatior which are perceived in the historical development 
of this industry in the region0 
The mixed economy strategy of the regime rested on 
three major policies, namely, those which the state pursued 
in such major areas as agriculture , public utilities, tourism, 
trade, finance, science and technology; state promotion of 
cooperatives; and the relations between the state and private 
capital. When the PRG was established the state already 
controlled 30 estates with a total acreage of 11,200, that is 
approximately nine percent of the land under cultivation. 
In 1982 a Land Utilization Act was passed which permitted 
compulsory state acquisition of leaes for ten years in 
estates over 100 acres and on larifts which were idle and 
urider-utiliZe'0 The intitutional mechanisms were handled 
through a National Land Reform Ccmission. Although this 
was the centrepiece of the land reform programme not much 
happened under this Act. In 1983 when the revolution was 
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overthrown, the agricultural sector was rio differently 
organized in terms of resource ownership than 
before, as 
less than 15 percent of arable land was r 
the hands of the 
state. The estates under state control also did not 
work 
well and in 1983 the PRG itself admitted that only 37 
percent 
of the targeted output on these estates was 
achieved. 
Apparently the estates were plagued with poor organisation 
and management, backward agricultural methods, 
and a labour 
force that was too old and inadequately trained. 
Levols of 
physical productivity were also reported as 
being consistently 
low. 
The state owned estates could, therefore, in no way 
be promoted as model farms, serving as 
exemplars to other 
farmers as part of the PRG's incentive$ to 
modernizTiofl. 
Yet this was the expressed hope1 of the PRG 
at the time. 
Moreover, in so far as tourism was key to 
the airport 
emphasis, and domestic food supplies offered the 
prospect of 
the major internal linkage with this, the 
results were 
particularly disappointing, although perhaps 
characteristic 
of the difficulties other socialist regimes 
have encountered 
with agriculture. 
In addition to the land reform measures, the state 
offered an array of other supports to agriculture: 
upgraded 
extension services, improved credits, 
better infrastructure 
by way of improved roads, water, 
and electricity, and the 
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commodity boards in the hands of Gairy's henchmen were 
returned to the farmers to be owned and managed by them; 
In the area of trade a stateowned marketing and 
import authority was created0 This provided agricultural 
inputs (fertilizers, implements, etc) to farmers at subsidized 
prices, offered guaranteed markets for farmers' output, and 
at the same time served as sole importer for such basic 
commodities as sugar, rice, cement and powdered milk. Part' 
of the function of this authority was to stabilize prices, 
particularly through the purchase of local farmers output. 
The authority was also expected to complement the work of 
the statutory export boards0 
ForeIgn owned commercial banks continued to dominate 
the financial sector, although the PRG had established a 
state-owned bank in late 1979 after it had purchased a foreign- 
owned branch bank. In 1983 it further acquired the shares of 
thelocal branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. In the 
insurance sector, private capital, local and foreign, controlled 
the eight life insurance and fifteen general insurance companies 
operating in the country for the entire period of PRG rule. 
In 1982, the government stirted a nabional insurance scheme 
offering such benefits as sickness, injury on the job, 
maternity etc. 
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Finally, two other areas of state activity should 
be briefly noted. One is that the PRG singled out science 
and technology as a crucial factor in Grenada's progress0 As 
a result much emphasis was laid on training, the provision 
of scholarships for Grenadians to study in Cuba and Eastern 
Europe, the development of agricultural extension (already 
noted), and undertaking such basic resource inventory tasks 
as land capability surveys, particularly of idle land. The 
other is that much attention was paid to the existing 
public utilities (telephone, electricity) and concerted 
policies developed in the area of the public media, internal 
public transport, and the airlines. 
With respect to the cooperatives, the following were 
the notable developments. A National Cooperative Development 
Agency was established and charged with the policy o imple- 
menting the government's policy of "idle lands for idle hands"0 
In addition, fishing and handicraft cooperatives were also 
promoted. In general it was widely admitted that the cooperative 
movement grew slowly during the period of PRG rule, despite 
government efforts. Young people preferred the glamour of 
jobs with the state", particularly the security forces, as 
this expanded rapidly after the revolution. In addition 
to this, much blame was attached to the "fierce tradition 
of independencd' of the local peasantry, in explaining 
their reluctance to form cooperatives. In retrospect 
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however, it is clear that once again excessive outside 
leadership particularly by the state, seemed to have 
dampened local initiatives and stifled the self-reliant, 
self-help motivations of truly cooperative endeavours. 
Because of the ideological complexion of the PRG, 
its policies towards private capital, particularly foreign 
private capital, were especially sensitive. Its overall 
strategy of a mixed economy approach reflected the existing 
dominance of private capital (local and foreign) 
in the 
economy arid the need it felt for the state to play a leading 
role in promoting development. In this scheme, the 
cooperatives were essentially a transitional or intermediate 
arrangement. As the government stated: 
"Our economy as a mixed economy will com- 
prise the state sector, the private sector, 
and the cooperative sector. The dominant 
sector willbe the state sector, which will 
lead the development process ... we intend 
to provide assistance to the private sector 
wherever possible, whether it be local or 
foreign, or in partnership with the state 
or with other private individuals, so long 
as it is in keeping with the country's 
economic development". 314/ 
The key elements of PRG strategy in relation to foreign 
private capital were concentrated in its retention of the 
incentives legislation in force at the time of its take 
over and its instituionaliZation of an investment 
code in 
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1983 as a further redefintion of its policy0 The code 
stressed the essential role of private capital and identified 
manufacturing and tourism as important to the private sector, 
public utilities, transport (including airlines), radio and 
television, finance, and trading in strategic sectors were 
identified as important to the state sector while it gave 
priority to local capital in retail, business, the operation 
of taxi services, auto-repair, cinemas, travel, restaurant 
and food services. It also iequired foreign capital to 
facilitate technology transfer, train local labour, develop 
an export capability, and maximize the use of indigeneous 
resources. The access of foreign capital to the local credit 
markets was restricted, but guarantees on profit repatriation 
were provided for; as well as various tax incentives (tax 
holidays, income tax rebates, exemptirns from withholding 
taxes, accelerated depreciation allowances, etc)0 The code 
also provided that nationalization could only occur after 
due legal process and with fair arid adequate compensation 
provided for. 
In seeking to improve the quality of life of the 
population and meet its basic needs, mucn emphasis was placed 
social services, particularly education and health. Free 
medical and dental care was provided, new health clinics 
were opened, while existing ones were upgraded and expanded. 
Given the dearth of local personnel the vast majority of these 
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were provided by Cuba as part of its technical assistance 
programme to Grenada0 In the field of education hundreds 
of scholarships were provided for study abroad, adult 
education prograrflflleS were introduced, and free text books, 
uniforms and lunches were offered in schools0 As a result 
as much as one-third on average of the annual current 
expenditure of the state was spent in these two areas. Out- 
side of education and health much attention was directed to 
housing where low cost materials were provided to repair 
homes, to women where ±egislation was passed to protect them 
at work, and provide maternity leave etc; and to the provision 
of national insurance, already referred to0 There was also 
a mass literacy campaign organized through a Centre for 
PopularEducation. Membership of trade unions was encouraged 
and it is claimed that during the period of PRG rule this 
membership grew from 30 to 90 percent of the labour force. 
Apart from trade unions, other mass organizations were 
established such as the local militia, and national women, 
youth, and student organizations. Organs of "popular power" 
as they were termed, were also promoted through the parish 
and local council meetings. 
In its exte''nal econoniC relations a number of 
initiatives were taken. First ties with Cuba were developed 
to the point where it became the major aid donor. Nearly 
us$60 million was provided by Cuba, mainly through financial 
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and material aid to help construct the airport. In addition, 
Cuban technical personnel played the leading external role in 
the health services, schools, army, and fishing industry0 As 
pointed out before, the PRG played a leading role in verbal 
attacks on imperialism, calls for a new international economic 
order, and denunciatiôn of IMF policies to Third World Countries0 
This approach was part of its wider foreign and regional policy 
which stressed the rights of self-determination of all peoples 
(particular emphasis being laid on surviving colonies in the 
region); respect for sovereignity, territorial integrity, and 
the legal equality of all states; resistance to efforts at 
de-stabilizing governments; and within the region moves to 
declare it a zone of pace and to accept ideological pluralism 
' 
as a basis for coexistence of states with. different social 
systems. This line of policy forced Grenada into many verbal 
and other confrontations with other states in the region, 
especially Barbados. It is apposite to note here, that in 
response the centre-piece of its economic strategy, the airport, 
was vigorously propagandized by the Reagan administration, 
around the world, and in the region, as the creation of a 
military base for Cuba and the Soviet Union, which threatened 
vital Western interests, and the security of other states 
in the Caribbean. 
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Evaluation 
One common feature of the Grenadian and Jamaican 
experiences is their confirmation of the historical 
fact 
that regional efforts at radical social reorganization 
and 
to forge new paths, particularly where these 
necessarily lead 
to the pursuit of new foreign policy and external 
relations 
options, will be met by insistent efforts on the 
part of the 
United States to destabilize the process, or 
worse0. 
SuëcesSful resistance to this depends ultimately 
on the extent 
of internal mobilization in favour of that 
process0 That 
mobilization, it is submitted, cannot be measured 
by "rented 
crowds" or "staged assemblies" in support of the 
government, 
no matter how well-intentioned. It is determined 
by the 
consciousness of the major groups in the 
society that the 
process speaks to their class interests, and 
the degree of 
dembcratic express and self-organization practiced 
by these 
groups. Moreover, given the geo-political context, 
it seems 
reasonable to infer that all efforts should 
be taken to ensure 
that verbal and ideological confrontation with 
imperialism 
does not run ahead of a developed real 
capacity to resist 
destabilizi.tion, no matter how tempting the 
mobilizing 
appeal of this approach. Any gap between 
rhetoric and 
reality can, and will be exploited, by enemies 
cf the process. 
In Grenada, not only did these unfortunate 
developments 
occur, but as I have argued elsewhere the 
impolsion of the 
revolutionary process also signalled the 
development of a 
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dangerous gap betwe'n the leadership and the led. Naive 
vanguardism and high profile verbal anti-imperialism there- 
fore conspired to exploit weaknesses already inherent in the 
structure of the society and the regime in power. The 
development of mass organizations and organs of popular 
power which the PRG offered ts an alternative to the parlia- 
mentary traditions of political democracy and not as its 
complement, was rationalized on the basis that political 
democracy was a bourgeois confidence trick. Socialism was 
therefore opposed to democracy and in the process the real 
historical experiences of the region were ignored. 
In Parts 1 and 11 of this study we were at pain o stress 
that experience reveals a deeper significance than that 
accorded by the colonial authorities to what it termed as 
8ccnstitutional advance".. The failure therefore, of the PRG 
to hold national elections and worse to deride elections 
publicly, constituted a crippling limitation which eventually 
produced the "house arrest" of Bishop, his execution, the 
seizure of power by the Coard faction as "legitimate" means 
of poiitical conflict resolution among "left" 
When the performance cf the Grenadian econoiiy is 
taken into account over the period of PRG rule the policies 
pursued seemed to have yielded modest gains. The major 
weakness was the decline of traditional agricultural exports 
(nutmegs, mace, bananas and cocoa). This contributed to a 
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decline of agriculture in the GDP by about 10 percent between 
1979 and 1982. Domestic agriculture, as we observed, was not 
particularly successful either0 Despite this poor agricultural 
performance, overall GDP grew by 2.1, 3, 3.14, ana 11 percent 
over the years 1979 - 1982. This was mainly on account of the 
rapid expansion of construction associated with airport 
building, community projects, feeder roads, buildings and 
housing0 Between 1979 and 1983 the value of construction in 
the GDP trebled. Investment as a percentage of GDP was 
high; in the years 1978 - 1982, it was 5.2, 13.6, 16.7, 30.1, 
36.1 percent respectively, and over the years 1979-1982 
airpor construction alone averaged 145 percent of total 
construction investments. Unemployment fell from 50 percent 
of the labour force to 12 percent during the PRGts rule. 
Inflation which averaged 20 percent in 1979, stood at an 
annual rate of five percent in April 1983. Most of the 
capital expenditure was externally financed, with Cuba 
playing the major role. Because the growth of the economy 
was so highly dependent on the Cuban connection, in turn 
this served to intensify the destabilization pressures 
directed at Grenada, Ii addition to Cuban support, however, 
it should b noted that the economy also depended heavily 
on 
the inflow of fuñds from such multilateral sources as 
the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development 
Bank and the European Development Fund. This overall depen- 
dence on foreign funding, although different in some ways 
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from what previously obtained, nevertheless indicates that 
the real movement of the economy away from its inherited 
characteristics was by 1983 still only marginal. 
While the pragmatic necessities to embark on the 
airport project as the centre piece of the PRG's strategy 
are admitted, it is clear that because of its direct link 
with tourism, the longer term benefit to the economy after 
the construction phase was over, would depend on the capacity 
developed elsewhere in the economy to prevent the many leak- 
ages which characterize the industry regionally. At the 
same time, eliminating the iegat!ve socio-political significLflce 
of tourism would in the long run depend on the regime's 
ability to transform the traditional character of tourism 
and integrate it more meaningfully into the national way of 
life. The;failure of domestic àgriculture to expand, and 
the further fact that the airport was nearly completed by 
1983 and no plans for the "new-tourism" were being implemented 
did not therefore augur well in terms of these expectations. 
Indeed the regime perhaps realized it, as it became increasingly 
vague and ambiguous in its pronouncements on these issues. 
It should be noted that the party out of which the PRG 
developed (New Jewel Movement) prior to seizing power 
campaigned against the negative features of Grenadian tourism. 
The real issue which emerges therefore, is whether a left wing 
regime in the Caribbean can be authentic, or whole-hearted 
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promoters of tourism as a central strategy for the develop- 
ment and transformation of the economy? The answer , from 
the PRG experience must beaguarded no0 It surely must have 
been conscious that a tourist industry, apart from the 
historical legacy which in itself is overwhelming, would 
always be exposed to hostile propaganda and is therefore an 
easy target for destabilization. Indeed, in the case of both 
Manley's democratic socialism and Bishop's socialist- 
orientation the local tourist industries were badly affected 
by hosti1 external propaganda. To support a major thrust 
in the direction of tourism would have required the regime 
to make Wpeae with the countries from which the tourists 
were sought, while continuing to expose the local population 
to life-styles it felt were abhorrent. 
The failure to transform agriculture did not only 
weaken the potential impact of the airport-tourism strategy, 
but it also had further important implications. As we noted 
previously both the state farms and the cooperatives did not 
fare well. In the end, out of concern that the only solution 
was an intensification of private capitalistfarming, the 
regime procastinated and by 1983 little was achieved in the 
most important sector of the national economy. As Mandle 
has summed it up: 
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"With cooperatives resisted, and with 
managerial incompetence hampering the 
state farms, the PRG decided to live with 
the status quo in the structure of the 
country's agriculture. It did so rather 
than adopt an agricultural reform strategy 
which would strengthen private farming 
But the fact that the government did not 
adopt such proposals meant that as late as 
1983 the PRG had not found an acceptable 
means by which to break the deadlock in 
agriculture which it had inherited"0 36/ 
The PRG's efforts to promote good relations with local private 
capital were not particularly successful. Throughout the 
period the private sector showed no real expansion. During 
1979 - 1982, piivate sector investment as a percentage of 
GDP was four percent. Except for 1980 when it reached 6.2 
percent, the percentage never exeeeded 3.. For the same 
period, public sector investment grew from nearly 13 percent 
in 1979 to about 35 percent L for a four year average 
of 23 percent. Kirton who has examined PRG policy in relation 
to private capital conc1uded that: 
"despite the wide ranging attempts by the 
PRG to promote the 'confidence' of private 
capital, and to improve the 'investment. 
climate', the dominant- response of private 
capital wa an unwillingness to operate 
beyond the performance of minimum tasks. 
From its own statements the private sector 
remained 'uncertain' and 'apprehensive' 
about futue PRG policies citing 'govern- 
ment's ideological posture' and related 
implications as major deterrents". 37/ 
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While bearing some similarity to the situation which 
obtained in Jamaica during the later years of the Manley 
administration, the more influential elements in the private 
sector did not, and indeed could not, play the same wide 
ranging political role in Grenada as it did in Jamaica. 
To begin with the PRG did not act any way to support the 
institutionalization of a multi-party political system, or 
a plurality in the sources of public communication. To play 
a political role theiefOr3. private capital would have had 
to confront the government directly and in this con'rontation, 
it would necessarily have had to act outside of PRG decreed 
legality. It is interesting to observe, that despite he 
weak political base of p?ivate capital at the time, it never- 
theless maintained strong ideological and other social 
connections to international capital. 
The failure of PRG efforts to either win or bribe 
capital in to supporting the process it directed, indicates 
clearly that in any future efforts to transform Caribbean 
societies this issue would recur as a crucial one. Ultimately, 
it is a question of confidence which stems from the consideration 
that development of the region in thc past on the basis 
of*a 
preponderant role for the motivation of private profit has 
helped to produce the very inequalities and poverty we have 
so frequently alluded to. To the poor and the powerless, 
motivating the economy primarily on the basis of private gain 
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would seem to imply the perpetuation of their inferior social 
status. The issue therefore then becomes one of determining 
how to move from private gain as the major motivating factor 
to social needs and benefits. What clearly emerges from the 
two cases examined so far is that this transition must be a 
long, slow and difficult task. It is in fact no less difficult 
a task than transforming the economic structures of these 
societies, for without transformed structures (and in order 
to transform structures also) the transition from private 
profit to social needs and benefits as the motor principle 
in economic production and reproduction, will not be sustainable. 
In conclusion we should note the recurrence of a 
difficulty already identified in our examination of Jamaica; 
that is the shortage of skills which revealed iljself during 
the process. In Grenada it was even more acute and while 
the PPLG made strenuous efforts to secure overseas training 
for Grenadians, the gestation period required on average was 
longer than the period the regime itself lasted. As a 
consequence two developments followed. One was the 
acquiitiOn of foreign skills, particularly from the Caribbean. 
Although a transitional phenomenon induced by a real shortage 
there is some evidence that a certain level of resentment to 
this developed among Grenadians. This suggests that in any 
similar situation in the future this is a matter that cannot 
be left to resolve itself on its own. The problem in Grenada 
was compounded by the natural inclination of the PRG to 
place a premium on the "ideological credentials" of the 
personnel it recruited. The second development was that in 
the face of a shortage of skills, an inevitable dilution 
of tasks took place. Thus in the area of overall social 
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regime tended to 




of national planning meant a certain loss in the efficiency 
at all stages of the planning process from analysis to 
implementation, execution, monitoring, and post-implementation 
evaluation of performance0 
and economic planning, lacking skills, the 
focus on partial planning in such areas as 
force requirements, government revenue and 
credit, th3 major crops etc. The failure, 
reconcile these plans in an aggregative or 
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III: COOPERATIVE.S0CIALISM GUYANA 
Policy 
While social experimentation in Jamaica under Manley 
and Grenada under Bishop has attracted considerable inter- 
national and regional attention, none of this has had the 
flavour of notoriety which surrounds the PNC regime in Guyana 
under Burnham, and subsequently under Hoyte since August 1985. 
The reason for this is that few accept as genuine the regime's 
claim to be motivated by tIe concerns of the poor and the 
powerless, particularly as the evidence has grown to support 
the widely accepted view that the regime is there only because 
of the combination of force and fraud which it has employed 
to rig national elections in 1973, 1980 and 1985, as we]l as 
the national referendum in 1978 which led to chaiages in the 
constitution and the postponement until 1980 of the elections 
due in that year. 
At the time of its independence in 1966, the dominant 
structural relations of the Guyanese economy, and the social 
fbrm through which they were systematically reproduced, 
portrayed many of the classic features of underdevelopment- 
dependency relations. The principal products produced were 
sugar, bauxite-alumina, and rice. Except for a small fraction 
of sugar cane cultivation (less than 10 percent), sugar was 
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grown and processed.by two foreign-owned plantations. 
Sugar 
was the dominant crop, accounting for the largest share oJ 
value-added, employment, foreign exchange earnings, 
capital 
accumulation, crop land, and agricultural infrastructural 
resources Rice, initially cultivated as a domestic staple, 
had grown into a significant export cash crop, with most 
of 
the sales to the Caribbean market0 Buxite-alUmifla production 
took place in two enciave mining areas under the control 
of 
two aluminum producinç TNCs - Alcan based in Canada, and 
Reynolds, based in the USA. The bulk of the production 
was 
under the control of the Canadian company. Export 
special- 
ization was compemented by extensive dependence on impbrted 
foodstuffs, manufactl.i.reS, intermediate goods 
(particularly 
fuels and fertilizers), and capital equipment. 
Unemployment 
was estimated at nearly 20 percent of the labour 
force, 
while the largest sdurce of employed labour (sugar) 
operated 
on a seasonal basis. 
In 1970, four years after independence the ruling 
party declared Guyana a Cooperative (socialist) 
Republic. 
A number of factors promoted this particular 
development. 
To begin with, as in other territories in the 
region, *hile 
impressive rates of growth in per capita product 
were recorded 
in the 1960s, most of the acute problems of 
poverty and 
dispossession were still very much in evidence. 
Second, the 
broad mass of the population had had a particularly 
militant 
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anti-colonial -tradition. This militancy is reflected in the 
early maturing of relatively highly developed trade union 
structures in the country0 Third, the tradition of militant 
anti-colonialism and the trade unionism was both product 
and producer of a situation in which large sections of the 
work force were influenced by Marxist ideas and functioned 
within organizations that claimed a Marxist-Leninist leader- 
ship0 This is seen in the history and development of the 
People's Progressive Party (the first Marxist party to win 
free and fair elections in the hemisphere) and of its associated 
trade union, the largest in the country and the one which has 
organised labour on tht sugar plantations since the 1914Js. 
Fourth, because effective opposition to the PNC state occupied 
the "left" of the political spectrum, in order to ue the state 
to transformiitself into a national bourgeois class, meant 
that it had to adopt a popuIar socialist rhetoric if this 
process was to be made acceptable to the masses0 
In concrete terms, the declaration of a cooperative 
socialist republic supposedly enshrined four major policy 
initiatives of the state. The first of these was the 
nationalisation of foreign property in arder to assert more 
national control over the economy. By the mid-1970s the main 
producing sectors (sugar, bauxite-alumina), the import trade; 
public transport; alcohol, drug manufacture, small scale 
foundarieS, and shipyards operated by TNCs; significant 
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sectiois of distribution and communications, were a11 
brought under state ownership. After the completion of 
nationalization of sugar in 1976, the government boasted 
that it now "owned and controlled 80 percent of the economy 
of Guyana"0 These nationalizations followed the traditional 
patterns outlined earlier, i.e., emphasis on fair and adequate 
compensation, the government taking initiatives to nationalize 
when the companies were in distress and threatened closure 
and post-nationalization contracts to cover management, 
technology, licensing fees etc. 
The second principal feature of co-operative socialism 
is its incorporation of a declaration by the government 
that henceforth the strategy of national development would 
be embraced in a programme of feeding, clothing and housing 
the nation0 This, it was claimed, substituted the "private 
profit" motive with the social goal of making "the small man 
a real man". This programme was embodied in the 1972-76 
development programme and was from the outset heavily 
propagandistic. Thus it was that the 1972-76 development 
programme, which was supposed to have incorporated this 
basic principle of economic planning, first appeared as a 
public document in draft form in July 1973, and has never 
been revised and presented is a document for public scrutïny. 
Moreover, as we shall see later, the actual course of 
production bore little relationship to the objective of 
"feeding, clothing and housing the nation by 1976" which the 
draft proclaimed. 
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The third feature of co-operative socialism is that 
given a tri-sectoral national economic structure (private, 
state and co-operative), the co-operative sector should be the 
dominant sector. It is through co-operative ownership and 
control that the socialist foundations of the society are to 
be laid. Historically the co-operative sector in Guyana has 
been and remains a very miniscule part of the national economy. 
But even among institutions designated as co-operative and 
founded by the state, e.g. the Guyana National Co-operative 
Bank, these do not function or operate on co-operative 
principles, whateer the formal co-operative ownership 
structure may appear to be. Many of the economically 
significant co-operatives formed through private initiative 
also operate on capitalist principles. Thus many co-operatives 
employ wage labour, as membership does not mean automatic 
enfranchisement and the owners of the cc-operatives then 
proceed to accumulate on the basis of exploited wage labour. 
Because of tax concessions afforded to co-operatives many 
enterprises find the co-operative a convenient form for private 
accumulation. In addition, many co-operatives .are organized 
with. specific and limited objectives in mind, e.g. a land 
co-operative may be formed in order to acquire a piece o2 
land, but after the land is acquired it is then sub-divided 
and exploited on an individual basis. 
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The fourth feature of co-operative socialism is its 
claim that, as part of "socialist doctrinen, the ruling party 
the Peoples National Congress (PNC) is "paramount't over all 
other parties and over the state itself, As the government 
did not come to power either on the basis of free and fair 
elections, or as the result of a popular social revolution, 
this is in effect a thinly diguised proclamation of a 
'dictatorship The pôlicy of paramountcy was enshrined in the 
creation, in1973/74, of a new government department, the 
Ministry of National Development and Office of the General 
Secretary qf the PNC. As the name suggests, the PMO party 
office was merged into a department of the state and financed 
through public funds, The state thereafter rapidly proceeded 
to make it clear that there could be no legal or constitutional 
change of government. The rigged elections in 1973, the 
postpoñement of elections due in 1978 and the rigged elections 
in 1980, are an indication of how earnestly the process of 
fascistization of the state developed. A truly authoritarian 
state has since been entrenched in Guyana. However, before 
examining how this degeneration of the polity occurred, it 
is essential for us to make an important observation n these 
developments outlined here. 
The features of co-operative, socialism outlined 
above were combined with certain publicly self-advertised 
"radical" foreign policy initiatives by the state: the 
recognition of Cuba, support for the MPLA in Angola, 
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militant anti-apartheid rhetoric, support for the" Arab 
cause', support for a New International Economic Order, 
visits to and contacts with Eastern Europe and China, and 
so on. When examined closely however, many of these pro- 
nouncenients can be seen to have been merely propagandistic. 
Thus support for the MPLA came only during the final stages 
of the war, the Guyana government having all along given 
its support to the CIA-backed group: UNITA. Recognition 
of Cuba was also undertaken as part of a broad-based 
Caribbean initiative embracing regimes of differing outlooks 
united on the basis of the need to assert an independent 
and separate identity for the region. 
However, despite such evidences of the real worth 
of government propagandizing in the area of foreign policy, 
the acts of nationalization plus socialist and other 
progressive 
rhetoric produced a number of theorists who argued about 
the 
ttradicalization' of the regime. These were jo5ned 
by the PPP; the same party which, after the 1973 elections, 
had launched a programme of "passive resistance and civil 
disobedience", begin in 1975 to proclaim a policy of "critical 
suppoi't' for the government because of the 'radical turn" 
the regime was taking. 
The new position held by the PFF reflected its 
formal adoption of the line of argument contained in the 
Havana Declaration of 1975, which as I have pointed out, 
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was the acceptance by communist and workers' parties of 
the 
hemisphere of the application of the "non-capitalist thesis" 
of revolutionary democracy to the region. I have developed 
a critique of this line of argument elsewhere, and while 
space does not permit the repitition of these arguments 
here, it is importanttO note two major points at this 
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stage. - One is, that the alleged radicalization of 
the state in Guyana was accompanied by anti-democratic 
measures, some of which were indicated above, for example, 
rigged elections designed to deny the will of the electorate. 
At the broader democatic level, these developments included 
the suppression of human rights, trade-union rights, the 
rule of law, and the traditional "independence" of the 
judiciary, etc., in the society0 It was clear, therefore 
that theorists of the radicalization of the tate did not 
see radicalization as being premised on the increased 
acces 
of the working class and peasantry to the development of 
their own forms of democratic organization through which 
their power could be exercised. On the contrary, radical- 
ization was interpreted here as consistent with the 
reauction of the limited access of the masses of the working 
people to these rights and in this view therefore, radical- 
ization and democratic development were in real opposition. 
Second, the line of argument ignored the internal class 
struggle and the role the state must necessarily play in 
the consolidation of a hegemonic class in the capitalist 
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periphery. As indicated in Chapter 9 in the periphery, the 
state is not only an object of class conquest, thereby 
constellating in its structure a dominant class, but in the 
complex circumstances of an underdeveloped bourgeoisie and 
working class it is the principal instrument for the long- 
run consolidation of one or other class as the dominant 
class. In this sense, therefore, radicalization can be 
measured only in terms of the possibilities opened up for 
working-class advance in the new state structures and a 
broadening of the democratic base of the society. This 
is a necessary', if not sufficient, condition for the 
cohsolidation of the position of the emergent working class. 
As events have shown, nationalization in Guyana has 
aided the expansion of the state in all three of the dimensicns 
mentioned earlier (bureaucracy, ideology and military). In 
so doing it has increased the capacity of the ruling PNC 
to asset its forms of authoritarian control over "civil 
society".. This process, however, required other accompanying 
developments, and it is to these we turn. 
Degene'ation and Social Decay 
Guyana has been in a state of continuous crisis 
since 1975 and the manifestations of this are numerous. 
Consider the following: 
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negative rate of growth of real product since 
1975 wih the result that per capita real income at the end 
of 1985 is less than that of 1970 and more than one-third 
below that of 1975; 
dramatic increases of malnutrition, and deaths 
from deficient nutrition related illnesses, particularly 
evident in public institutions (hospitals, prisons, institutions 
for the aged, the disabled, etc); 
widespread and endemic shortages of foods as 
well as othé' basic items of consumption; 
shortages of raw materials, with the result that 
for the past decade industry, on average, has been utilizing 
only 30-40 percent of rated capacity. In addition electricity 
>outages scheduled for March 1986 at the time of writing averaged 
36 hours per week for all, districts in the country. Unschedul 
interruptions also occurred; 
double digit inflation rates; 
unemployment estimated at over one-half the 
labour force following on large scale public sector retrench- 
ment s; 
a virtual collapse of all the public utilities 
to the point where this constitutes a major ol5stacle to 
production; 
the dramatic deterioration of social services; 
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drastic increases in crime, corruption, 
clientilism, graft and nepotism in public and private life 
to the point where they constitute themselves as a major 
factor of production (the fifth!) or non-production 
on external account: massive external debt, 
a rapidly deteriorating balance of payments deficit, (in 
excess of one-quarter of GDP for the period 1976-1984), and 
a deteriorating exchange rate; 
the emergence of a vast parallel market for 
all items; and 
m) a migration rate which in the most conservative 
estimates exceeds three-qiarters the rate of natural increase 
of the population. Many estimates refer to an absolute 
decline in the population since 1975. 
An important feature of the crisis, is the way in 
which the economic dislocation has unfolded, and has generalised 
itse]fC. into other areas of social life. This development has 
centered on two aspects Of the social system already referred 
to, that is the po3t-independence period has witnessed a 
rapid expansion of state property and state intervention 
into economic life, and at the same time the government 
,which has promoted this since independence, came to power 
through a well documented Ango-American (CIA) manoeuvre in 
the 1960ts and since then power has been held without free 
and fair elections. Consequently, the regime has always 
lacked legitimation. The way in which these aspects of the 
society has determined the generalisation of the crisis 
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will be elaborated on later. At this 
juncture it is important 
to recognise that the economic aspects 
of the crisis require 
a special understanding, since it 
does not reproduce the 
typical export_oriented Third World model. 
The assumption 
most people not familiar with the economy 
of Guyana would 
make is that the economic crisis has 
been caused by the 
larger economic crisis of the 
world economy in evidence since 
the mid-1970S. Whileit is a truism that 
no country has 
been able to escape unscathed from this 
world crisis, the 
particular feature of the Guyanese 
economy is that the crisis 
in its export sector has not been 
directly produced by 
shrinking exprt markets and falling 
prices. the. 
selected data in Tables 11.5-11.7 
show, the levels of 
output in the agricultural sector have 
been substantially 
below that of either rated capacity 
levels in these industries 
or peak output levels j.chieved many 
years ago. Thus, while 
current annual output of sugar is 
under 250,000 tons, at 
the time of nationalization the government 
had claimed that 
capacity of the transnational was L150,000 
tons. The peak 
output level of 369,000 tons, had been 
achieved as along 
as 1971. In the rice sector, 
annual output in 1985 was 
156,000 tons, while the capacity of 
the industry ha been 
estimated at 250,000 tons with a 
peak output of 212,000 
tons being achieved in 1977. In 
both these industries 
preferential contractual export markets 
paying premium prices 
have not been satisfied. Sugar 
obtains a quota and a premium 
price under the EEC-ACP Protocol, as 
well as for sales to the 
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TABLE 11 5 
Real Growth of GD? (compound (%) per annum) 
1970-1975 1975-1980 1981 1982 1983 198k 
Total GDP 309 -0.7 -0.3 -i0.k -9.6 5.5 
Sugar 0.9 -1.3 10.9 - 38 -12.6 -3.6 
Rice 24 O9 -2.2 .15.6 -19.2 23.8 
Mining -2.3 -503 -l1»4 -31.5 _22,L 47,0 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































USAO In the case of rice, export markets in the Caricom 
region are not serviced, although the industry receives a 
premium price currentl in excess of two-thirds above the 
world level. In the bauxite industry, the key feature is 
the virtual monopoly of world sales of high grade calcined 
ore which Guyana enjoys. In the 1960s and early 1970s out- 
put accounted for 90% of the world market. Currently, the 
industry can only supply 4O-5O% of the world demand as the 
output of 1985 (1485,000 tons) was about two-thirds of th 
peak level attained in 1975e The Chinese product which 
has replaced Guyana's in world markets is admittedly inferior, 
but the reliability of supply has been far superior to that 
of Guyana, leading to the displacement of the latter's sales. 
In the absence of any significant diversification of the 
production structure in Guyana, the decline in the basic 
industries has negatively influenced economic growth. For 
the period 1970-75 the real growth of GDP averaged 3.9 per- 
cent, between 1975 and 1980 it averaged -0.7 percent and in 
1981-1983 growth rates were minus 0.3, -10.14; -9.6, and plus 
5.5 respectively. The data on growth of GDP are shown in 
Table 11.5. 
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It is the specific decline in the operiting levels 
of the export sectors with opportunities for the sale of 
their products existing (in the absence of any real 
diversi- 
fication, and in itself hampering that process) which 
has 
been the main cause of the country's acute foreign 
exchange 
and balance of payments difficulties. While 
other factois 
such as reduced inflows of private investment 
capital as 
confidence in the economy has waned and compensation 
payments 
for enterprièes nationalized are important, th'y, 
are not 
decisive. Because of this I have labelled the economic 
aspects 
of the crisis as a production crisis, i.e., as one in 
which 
output and productivity declines are directly 
linked to basic 
deficienCeSifl the structure of production, and 
are not due 
to contracting opportunities for profitable 
external sales. 
Selected monetary and price data are shown in 
Table 11.7. 
These reveal an external debt in excess of $1,000 
US, per 
capita; a current account deficit on the balance 
of payments 
in excess of one-quarter of GDP in current prices 
for the 
past four years; large annual increases in money supply 
and 
a price level in l98 nearly triple that of a 
decade ago and 
70 percent above that of 1980. A similar rapid 
expansion of 
internal debt can be noted, while within the 
decade the 
emulative current account deficit on the balance of 
payments 
of nearly $1 billion US since 19714, has 
resulted in net 
international reserves which peaked in 1975, 
standing at 
minus US$663. million at theend of 198t. 
The causes of the basic deficiences referred to 
are many, and here only some of the major ones are listed: 
an unplanned, uncoordinated expansion of the state 
sector, principally by way of nationalization between 1970- 
1976; 
the operation of political "diktat? in the stat 
sector, in the narrow sense of state property being used to 
serve the interests of the ruling elites. This has not only 
reduced the spheres of operation of in economic calculus in 
resource management but has also led to the nepotism, 
corruption, and the alienation remarked upon earlier; 
the rapid outward migration oÍ skilled personnel 
at all levels, leading to exceptional turnover rates of 
managerial and skilled perations; 
poor industrial relations as employer-employee, 
government-workér conflicts have grown apace; 
y) the actue foreign exchange shortages which'have 
affected maintenance, delayed production etc; 
vi) inadequate monitoring of projects, (itself affected 
by lack of personnel), leading to huge cost overruns, and 
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widespread delays in the physical completion of projects0 
An important point to observe in the tables cited 
in the text is that the deterioration of the production 
structures began with the expansion of the state sector in 
the early 1970s. It is, however, not being suggested here 
that it was state control of the economy per se, that is in 
the a priori sense that "state control is always inefficient" 
which is responsible for this deterioration. The relation- 
ship is important to the analyses because of the specific 
nature of the state and the political configuration in 
Guyana since independence. Whil space again precludes me 
from developing this point at length, its importance can 
nevertheless be gleaned from the following observations: 
The present Tegime which holds state power did 
not originally acquire same as the result of a popular man- 
date either in the form of a system of "free and fair 
elections and elections free from fear", or because of a 
"popular revolutionary overthrow of the colonial power". 
To the contrary, as it was indicated earlier the independence 
settlement through which it came to power was based on the 
general exclusion of the then dominant political ,organisation - 
the PFF. This exclusion is important in view of the militant 
anti-colonial tradition of the Guyanese people and the fact 
that the PFF had a Marxist-Leninist leadership. 
In light of the above circumstances, and in 
view also of the left complexion of the political opposition, 
the regime has sought its own legitimacy through advertising 
ibseif as a radical, progressive, Third World socialist 
regime. This propaganda reached its high point in the formal 
declaration in 1970 that Guyana has henceforth going to be 
a "cooperative socialist republic". 
The deterioration of the production system and the 
severe decline in living standards which have accompanied 
nationalization, have negated the achievement of basic needs 
goals, leading to the erosioi of the propaganda appeal of 
cooperative socialism . This has forced the regime t 
resort to the systematic use of force and fraud to maintain 
its rule. The former has been used to defeat all popular 
expressions) and the latter through the entrenchment of 
rigged elections to parliament, local authorities, trade 
unions, and so forth, has ensured that the principle of 
freely elected representatives does not become established 
political practice. 
There are two other important aspects of the 
processes indicated above0 One is that political power is 
being used to serve the class project of converting the 
petty bourgeoisie who wield this power into a big indigenous 




this has continued apace, principally through 
the 
appropriation of the relatively large amounts 
of monopoly 
rent present in a situation of such widespread 
shortages and 
scarcities of virtually all commodities. 
A substantial 
proportion of this wealth has been 
converted into foreign 
absets as political uncertainty grows. The 
second aspect 
of this process is that the large state 
sector has expanded 
the potential for nepotism by the government, 
as well as 
the scope for the intimidatory use of economic 
processes. 
Thus not only can the tlfaithful be rewarded 
but of equal 
importance, a host of administrative economic 
decisions can 
be used to control iissehters". 
The expansion of state property has been accompanied 
by an increasing bureaucratisation of 
economic and civil 
life. In keeping with the claim to party paramountcy 
this 
has also led to increasing ideologiZat1ofl 
with the national- 
ization of the public media being used to promote 
state 
ideology and administrative restraints (e.g. 
refusal of 
licences to import newsprint, printing equipment 
etc) to 
severely restrict publication of opposition as 
well as 
independent views. As these two developments 
have occurred 
another feature of special importance has 
been the rapid 
expansion of the country's security services, 
making it 
on a per capita basis the largest of the 
hemisphere. Linked 
with this development has been the expansion 
of armed groups 
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attached to members of the party leadership, the military 
training given to youth activists of the party, and the 
training and arming of religious cults associated with the 
ruling party. 
In the face of the increasing political orientation 
of state administration, this rapid bureaucratisation, 
ideologisation, and militarization of state functions has 
led to a preoccupation with security at all levels or the 
state, as well as an increasingly partisan politicisation 
of economic functions. Thus when the economic crisis first 
manifested itself in a major balance of payments crisis in 
the mid-1970s and critics remarked on its serious implications 
the government lightly brushed aside this as opposition 
propaganda and proceeded to print mony and expand state 
credit as if the phenomenon was 2.essentially temporarSr. I, 
also took many years after the event for the government's 
major propaganda plank of the cooperative republic "feeding, 
clothing and housing the nation by 1976" to be admitted 
as a failure. Yet the evidence of this abounded years 
earlier. 
Arising out of these analytical observations I 
have argued in the work cited at the beginning of this 
section, for the existence within the society of a response! 
reaction mechanism which can be described as a repressive 
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escalator. This derives from 
the observation that the 
production crisis and the mismanagement 
of this in terms 
of both its internal and international 
dimensions have been 
5f_reinforciflg. This in turn is based 
on two considerations, 
namely, repression or the rejection 
of political democracy 
which is seen as the ruling regime's 
solution to the crisis, 
and the increasingly popular resistance 
to the im5ositiOn 
of power as it is contellated in the 
resent state. As a 
result the economic crisis, qua productiOn 
crisis, has 
generalised itself into a social 
and political crisis, calling 
into question the very character 
of the state. Since there 
is no legal or consitiUtiona means 
for changing the regime 
in power the society is confronted 
with a fundamental and 
inescapable dilemma. 
The "repressive escalator" f the 
state has 
developed in three main phases, 
each phase serving to ripen 
the contradiction between oppression 
(seen as a ruling class 
solution to the present crisis), 
and popular resistance to this 
and eteriOrating conditions of 
social life. In Stage 1, the 
government's effqrts to enforce a 
reduction in the real wage 
in order to reduce import 
demand, to halt domestic inflation, 
and to overcome the countryt s 
foreign exchange and balance of 
payments difficulties as part 
of its efforts to solve te 
production crisis were resisted by 
the workforCe and their 
organisations. This resistance 
centered in the state, which 
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had become the major employer of wage labour0 Those 
control of the state sought to repress the discontent and 
their main focus was on the containment of workers' rights 
inherited under the existing system of industrial relations. 
This option is chosen rather than a general election for 
the obvius reason that the government came to power without 
one, and did not want to risk one. In this stage the 
repressive interventions followed three major lines. First, 
the right to work was undermined as political dismissals and 
victimization of agitatig workers proceed apace, then the 
right to strike was undermined under the invocation of the 
doctrineof the politicai?stri1ie . Under this doctrine 
any strike which the government does not approve' as being 
industrial is deemed 7political" and as such is treated as 
"subversive" activity. Finally, the corporatist solution 
pursued in Latin America was adopted, as the state, reinforced 
by its dominant employer status, manipulated the composition 
of the executive (and membes also) of the trade unions in 
order to determine the final composition of the national 
Trades Union Congress and other central decision-makïng 
bodies. As the central trade union council, fell under state 
directiom they were given more tand more responsibility to 
represent the separate individual unions which may be less 
amenable to a corporatist solution. 
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Stage 2 followed because as the work force 
was 
repressed, but the economic crisis was not 
resolved , this 
spilled over into the repression of legality 
and human rights 
for all citizens. This progression has 
followed, simply 
because it is impossible to separate the rights 
of trade 
unions and trade unionists form the larger 
exercise of the 
rights of all or any citizen within a framework 
of justice0 
In this stage the strdggle was heavily centered 
in the courts, 
and the church, human rights, and independent 
social 
.organisatiofls linke with the workers struggles. 
One important 
by-product of'this stage is the blurring of the traditional 
cia]2 boundaries within the workforce and a rise 
of worker- 
solidary, as revealed in several major industrial 
actions 
in 1977, 1978, and 1983. 
In the final Stage 3, attacks on trade unicins, human 
rights, the courts, etc0, become highly politicized 
as economic 
disintegration proceeded apace. Opposition 
formations, 
whether freely or not, rise in defence of democracy. 
The 
government is increasingly threatened as its 
unpopularity 
among citizens and the alienation of the 
workforce grows. 
At thLs juncture repression was extended to all 
opposition 
as well as independence social/political groups. 
To ensure 
its control a process of rapid consolidation 
of an authorit- 
arian state form took place. In particular 
the state was 
constitutionally restructured in 1978 when instead 
of national 
o 
elections due in that year a Referendum was held to determine 
whether or not to adopot a new constitution0 This was 
"approved" and the new constitution promulgated in l98O 
This constitution gave legality to the dictatoral form of 
government. In this stage political assassination 
and direct repression of popular manifestations become 
routine. There is not only the continued rapid growth of 
the security aparatuses of the state in the face of economic 
decline, but a rapid rise in the influence of the political 
elements within these bodies - an importanl development 
in the consolidation of authoritarian control of the state. 
At this juncture the crisis of production is 
totally political, and the political form and nature of the 
state becomes the primary constraint to regenerated production 
and the restructurirg of national capita. Those iho control 
the state in their own self-interest necessarily deny this 
and through control of the media seek to lay the cause of 
the crisis everywhere but on their own shoulders. It is 
out of this process, however, that widespread acceptance 
grows within the community to the notion that a political 
solution has to precede the implementation of an economic 
one. 
Parallelling this repressive escalator are a 
number of vicious circles which operate both within and outside 
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the sphere of production, inhibiting the restructuring of 
the country's productive base. Principal among these are: 
j) the need for the security apparatuses increases 
at the same point in time as the ability of the state to 
finance this from revenues is reduced. This is nevertheless 
ssentia1 and so the funds available for the productive and 
social sectors are reduced to finance it. Moreover the 
increasing orientation of the state to its own security 
operates as a drag on its produàtive potential. All these 
reinforce the dilemma of increasing output0 
The shortage of consumer goods which follows from 
the extreme restriction on imports increases inflationary 
pressure, which reduces real wages and adds to the central 
core of an unstable work and industrial relations system. 
Malnutrition, poor health care, inadequate public transport 
all effect the morale of .the work force and directly their 
producivity as well. 
Restriction on public sector borrowing, necessary 
for obtaining IMFWorld Bank Group credit, has reinforced 
the development of relations between the government and the 
IMF-World Bank Group between 1978-1981. The inability of 
the government to meet the targets agreed on in its four 
IMF-World Bank arrangements since 1978 has forced the - 
suspension of all these agreements. The failure to obtain 
1403. 
balance of payments support funds, presently operates as 
a serious constraint on the flexibility of the state. 
iv) As external indebtedness has grown. and arrears 
accumulate, the ability of the government to borrow abroad 
is further reduced. This worsens the crisis conditions at 
home, because government cannot call on foreign savings to 
cushion declining domstic incomes. In turn, this intensifies 
the external debt problems and reinforces the vicious nature 
of the circle. 
y) Becaise sources of government's revenues dwindle 
when GDF falls, resort is made to tax increases in an effort 
to rnprove yields. This, however, further depresses economic 
activity and increases the tendency towards price inflation. 
The government is then forced to turn to reductions in its 
outlays, which in turn raises the cycle once more, since this 
affects tti growth of output and incomes negatively. 
Vicious circles like the ones outlined above serve 
to demonstrate the fact tIiat at this point in time the 
production crisis is literally feeding on itself. This 
selffeeding reinforces the operations of the repressive 
escalator, a procees that generalizes the crisis. At this 
point, also, the government, rather than being in a position 
to solve the crisis, has itself become a part, as iel1 as 
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a major contributory factor to its continuation and 
worsening in the society. 
The concept of the 'repressive escalatorU which 
I have introduced as being an integral feature of the crisis 
leading to the emergence of an authoritarian state form and 
the sequence of repression then popular reaction, more 
repression and so on, should not be construed in a mechanistic 
way - despite the use of the idea of stages (for simplicity? 
in presentation. The link between one stage and another 
reflects the unfolding of the underlying dynamic of repression 
- resistance - repression. This is a dialectical relationship 
and should not be construed as marking a process of automatic 
advances from one stage to another. Those who repress do 
not do so anticipating the result to be even more resistance, 
to the contrary. Similarly, those whc' resist do not do so in 
order to invite more repression0 If these occur it is because 
the determinants are to be fouñd in the social relations 
prevailing at the particular juncture and not because of 
the intentions of the various actors. The stages outlined 
are therefore not self-contained entities. 
No automatic link is also presumed in the analysis 
presented here between continued immiserization of the 
population, and failure to overcome the economic crisis with 
the willingness of the masses to revolt. To make such an 
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assumption could easily be fatal for those who play a leading 
role in organising resistance. The social disintegration 
highlighted in this chapter has inevitably affected the 
social-psychology of the masses, and already there are many 
evidences of these negative features, e0g., a growing 
resignation and sense of helplessness among the population, 
a growing indifference, if not cynicism, towards" political 
struggl', and extraordinarily high levels of migration. 
The final conclusion we can arrive at here is, 
that although wrapped in socialist/progressive rhetoric, 
the regime in Guyana by its systematic repression and denia 
of the rights of the broad mass of the population has created 
a state structure which is antithetical to the interests 
of the poor and the powerless. The social experiment which 
the ruling strata have set in motion, unlie those of Grenada 
and Jamaica, has not been motivated by the concerns of the 
dispossessed. The lessons which this offer for the mass of 
the West Indian peoples are those which reveal that despite 
the ideological appeal of Westminister parliamentarianismtt. 
among the population, the potential for authoritarian and 
facist-type degeneration of the body politic clearly exists. 
When we add this to the experiences of Grenada, it is clear 
that the masses of the region must lay singular emphasis on 
the deepening of the political democratic forms which they 
have fought for in the past, if 1n future social experimentation 
Q 
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is not to degenerate into dictatorship - whether of the 
right or the left. The development of this emphasis by 
the poor and the powerless in the expression of theirseif- 
interests is indeed a real possibility. For being in the 
main descendants of slavery and indentured servants they 
are, as a group, as well placed as any other people on 
earth to appreciate the importance of personal freedom. 
Their commitment to democracy can be second to none. 
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CHAPTER 12: NATIONAL EXPERIMENTS: THE "CONSERVATIVE" 
OPTION 
I: Intensification of the Capital-Import Model : Barbados 
In contrast of the national experiment which were 
examined in the previous chapter, none of the governments 
in Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago which had held power since 
their independence has professed a break with past policies 
or indeed advocated a radical approach to the problems of 
underdeveloPment. The emphasis has been on an intensification 
àf the capital-import strategy of development which had 
evolved during the colonial and early nationalist periods 
after World War II. Barbados has been widely proclaimed 
within the region as a "success story", in that the 
crises" which have gripped the other West Indian territories 
over the past decade have not been very evident there. 
Despite the recession of 1981-1983 there has been little 
of the persistent and acute balance of payments, foreign 
exchange, external debt, and inflationary problems which 
have charact.eriZed the cases examined in the previous 
chapter. Since independence in 1966, Barbados has been able 
to avoid any significant dependence on the IMF for balance- 
of-payments support funds, and a consequence it has not 
resorted to any of the stringent deflationary and exchange 
rate adjustment policies characteristic of this dependence. 
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As we shall see, however, success in avoiding the acute 
manifestations of periodic and cyclical crises, has not 
been matched by a structural transformation of the economy 
and the problems of poverty and powerlessness remain very 
acute. 
The oldest British colony in the region, Barbados 
has, unlike the others, developed with a significant white 
resident planter group. Although always a minority of the 
-population, by the l930s this group controlled the dominant 
sugai industry and much of the distribution and services 
trades. Instead of the classic imperial form of domination 
by international monopolies which characterized colonial 
investments in this period, local capitalist monopolies 
prevailed. - The l960s and early 1970s was a pe'iod 
of significant growth in the Barbadian econo?ny. Between 
l96-t and 1971, Jainarain estimated an annual growth rate 
of 11.5 percent. Indeed for the long period 1956-1971, 
he has estimated the annual growth rate to be as high as 
9.5 percent. Per capita national income in 19614 was about 
60 percerTt above that in 1956; while for the long period 
1953-1971 Barbados had the highest per capita national 
income growth rate in the West Indies; measured at current 
prices. By 1971 only Trinidad-Tobago with its oil based 
economy had a higher per capita income than Barbados, and 
even so it was less than ten percent higher. 
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Underlying this growth in incomes were certain important 
changes in its industrial structure0 In 1956, sugar which 
accounted for just over 26 percent of the GDP was the main 
industrial sector, but declined rapidly, and by 1971 it was 
contributing less than 8 percent to G.D.P. At the same 
time the manufacturing sector had expanded rapidly, growing 
from just under 8 percent of G.D.PO, to just over 12 percent 
in the same period. Tourism also expanded rapidly, with the 
result that the contribution of services to the GDP had 
-grown from just over 8 percent in 1956 to just under 18 per- 
cent in 1971. Over the period for which data were available, 
Jainarain estimated a gross investment ratio of nearly 33 
percent for the years 1956-1960, somewhat in excess of the 
25 percent, for the years 1960-1964. Borrowing from abroad 
accounted for LI7 percent of the gross investment in this 
period. Unemployment was the most serious manil2estation 
that rapid growth had not brought about all round development 
as was anticipated by the authorities. The percentage of 
the labour force unemployed in 1960 and 1965 was just over 
12 and 15 percent respectively. In 1970 the figure was 
somewhat reduced; but was still q.te high at 9 percent. 
The dependence of the labour fore on the performance of 
tourism and export agriculture ii employment has produced 
considerable short-period fluctuations in its level, 
following on cyclical, crop failure, and other periodic 
factors which influence activity in these sectors. 
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Policy 
There are five major elements to the economic 
policies pursued in Barbados since independence0 First, 
economic policy has been portrayed as a technocratic 
pragmatic, rational, and therefore ipso facto a non-ideolo- 
gical matter. Indeed it has been a constant assertion by 
the ruling elites in that country that coipbining ideology 
with economics is a certain recipe for disaster, and the 
best examples of this are the very countries studied in the 
previous chapter0 While it is clearly an ideological 
position to assert the non-ideological nature of received 
economic doctrine, one consequence of taking this view has 
been, that although strongly conservative in outlook and 
programmes, successive Barbadian governments have not 
attempted to propagandize the virtues of thei: economic 
approach in either regional or international debates. This 
low keyed approach stands in contrast to Seaga's conservatism 
and in many ways has blended better with the technocratic 
image which post-independence governments have sought to 
project. Second, the colonial-early nationalist strategies, 
with their outward orientation and heavy reliance on imported 
capital were accepted in the main by all the pos't-independence 
governments. Emphasis was laid, therefore, on how to make 
these received strategies more effective. In this regard 
three major foci have been developed since independence. 
l6 
One has been to stress the crucial importance of management 
in successful economic development. This stress has led to a 
considerable expansion of training facilities in this field, 
and at all levels froi supervisory to professional. In addition 
increased numbers of overseas scholarships and training awards 
have been made available to Barbadians0 Another focus has been 
to provide for the systematic development of skills at all 
levels within the country at large0 Thus a number of measures 
have been taken to improve the training of operatives in all 
the mador sectors of the economy, and examples of these have 
beei 
already ctiscussed under separate heads when we considered 
such matters as tourist and manufacturing development in 
the region. The last of these foci has been the studied 
cultivation of an outlook which is constantly seeking to 
anticipate global economic changes which the country might 
exploit, particularly with reference to changes in North 
American and European markets. It was the cultivation of 
this outlook which it is claimed that has led Barbados to 
the "timely development" of such areas as off-shore banking, 
export_processing zones, and tourist diversification in the 
region (Venezuéla) and in non-traditional areas in Europe 
(West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, etc,). 
The third element of post-independence economic 
policies has been the promotion of political and social 
stability as a vital economic necessity. Although in fact 
the social climate is extremely hostile to radical ideas as a 
reading of the daily press would quickly indicate, there is 
still a strong appearance of "democratic tolerance"0 
1l7. 
Much propaganda is made of the virtues of Barbados' two- 
party system, its long parliamentary traditions (the claim 
is made that it is the third oldest parliamentary system of 
the former Brisith empire), the absence of political violence, 
and a judiciary and police force that is respected, reflecting 
the fact that the "rule o law prevails"0 Barbados success 
in cultivating this image has been possible, largely, because 
the two political parties have accepted this framework and 
both project it. As would be expected, these parties are 
not significantly different in either professed ideology or 
social composition. The main line of competition which 
separates them is which group is best suited (educated! ) to 
manage the on-going social and economic system. As the 
Governor of the Central Bank once apt'ly pi't it at a seminar 
in Jamaica during November 1985, comrnemortl ng the twenty- 
fifth anniverary of the Central Bank of Jamaicta, "the 
two parties manage conflict between each other and one would 
never push the other to the wall, unlike the situation which 
obtains in many other Caribbean territories, and that is a 
key to Barbados' success". The formation of a Marxist party 
in 1985 marks the first overt departure from the middle 
ground the two major parties have traditionally ccupied. 
The fourth element of post-independence policy 
has been the introduction of measures which would facilitate 
the inflow of foreign capital. We have already examined 
1418. 
these in relation to tourism, manufacturing, and off-shore 
finance industries. It is important only to recall here 
that Barbados has placed much emphasis on the development 
of export processing zones, and in this sector, the sub-sector 
which it has especially encouraged has been electronics. 
The result of this policy isthat by 19814 the EPZS contributed 
nearly 90 percent of export earnings (see Table 12.1). Since 
much of this is the fabrication of imports in enclave areas, 
as we have already noted the net effect on foreign exchange 
earnings and employment has not been nearly as significant. 
A good 'indication of thib area of economic policy can be 
seen in the six basic ingredients which the Governor of 
the Central Bank referred to as being necessary for a 
successful off-shore financial center: a good record of 
political stability, a liberal and efficient public adminis- 
tration, a reliable judicial system, a well, de'e1oped infra- 
structure of public utilities, the availability of a suit- 
able work force, and a congenial social and cultural 
climate. These ingredients do not only sum up well 
the character of the model which was being pursued, but 
reveals the- self-reinforcing character of the different lines 
of policy being indicated here. 
The fifth element of policy has been the very care- 
ful attention which all the post-independence governments 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and basic services. The result is today, Barbados probably 
enjoys the best public utilities and most comprehensive 
level of social services in the region. As it has been 
put: 
"The quality of the island's roads, air and 
sea ports, housing stock, tourism plant, 
communication, educatibn and health 
facilities, industry and its electronic 
sub-sector; non-sugar agriculture, the 
media and forms of entertainment have all 
undergone such transformation as to have 
placed Barbados high among the better-off 
countries of the Third World". 5/ 
The fact that governments of a conservative cutlook have 
done so much to improve the quality of life of the citizenry 
at large, even though motivatec t, the n t. make Barbados 
an attractive investment locatThn for forinrs, hais 
contributed greatly t the de-fsing oi iltensiris in 
the post-independence period. 
As part of the open-economy model successive 
Barbados governments since independence have encouraged 
an export orientation to industry, particularly within the 
regional market. The result is that over the period 19C0- 
198f-1, as much as one-quarter of domestic exports were sent 
to the Caricom markets. Domestic exporters are encruraged 
through a credit insurance and guarantee scheme a ll as 
an export promotion corporation which provides technical 
1421. 
and marketing assistance to them. As we shall see in 
the nexc chapter, serious difficulties in the operation 
of Caricom has caused a significant setback to Barbadian 
manufacturers. 
The overall importance of the open-economy 
model which has oeen pursued in Barbados has been stressed 
by the Governor of the Central Bank in a recent interview: 
in the 1960s and 1970s when tb' n- 
ventional wisdom in the Caribbean was 
towards closure of the system Barbados 
did not go in that direction. It is. 
now evident that as a result of serious 
difficulties in recent years those who 
had sought to close off their economies 
are now turning around. Barbados has no 
need to reverse direction. Whereas others 
in emotional terms had deeme1 linkages 
with the outside world to be a terrible 
thing, Barbados has found such linkagcs 
ver: useful in practical terms. I think 
that the open system approach ha he1pc 
this country considerably". 6/ 
With the coming to power of the Bishop regime in Grenada, 
Seaga in Jamaica and Reagan in the United States, the 
level of verbal and ideological confrontation in the 
region peaked in the early 1980s. Despite the practiced f 
low key style of successive post-independencL 8overnments, 
the Adams administration f ouid itself in Ieated verbal 
confrontation with Bishop in Grenada, and began more and 
more to raise its profile and doing so by overtly projecting 
't 
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US foreign policy interests in the region. This culminated 
in the central role Barbados (along with Seaga's Jamaica) 
played in the US led invasion of Grenada in 1983, and as we 
shall see in the final chapter, subsequent efforts to 
militarize the region. The result is that from a studied 
low key profile Barbados has been catapulted into playing 
a leading rolein the anti-Marxist, anti-radical political 
formations arising in the region, undr US sponsorship. 
With the low keyed approach compromised and jeopardized, 
in recent months there has been increasing propaganda 
about the virtues of privatization, democracy, our "way 
of life" and Western, particUlarly American,virtues. Given 
the formation of ita first Marxist political party referred 
to above, a certain polarization in politics seems very 
likely at this juncture., whie the recent sweeping victory at 
the polls c)Í' the former opníCm prty also opens up new 
possibilities. 
Evaluation 
On the wholse, the period since 1970 has been 
one of considerable growth in real output in Barbados. 
While its GDP at current market prices stood atFDS$325 
million in 1970, by 1975 this had increased to BDS$813 
million, and in 198g the figure stood at BDS$2.3 bi11io2. 
(See Table 12.2) Per capita GDP in current prices stood 
at US$109 in l98. As we have already observed, this 
TABLE 12.2 
BARBADOS: GDP 1970-1984 
- 
1423e 
1970 678 s.. 9.9 
1975 1,504 9.5 103 6.6 
19814 4,109 2.8 127 6.3 
Per Capita Sugar Manu- Construct- 
GDP (Current Contri- facturing ion Contri- 
market prices) bution to contribut- butionto 
US$ GDP (%) ion to GDP (%) 
GDP (%) 
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growth has been accompanied with a significant expansion 
in the public utilities and basic social services, so 
that in general the quality of life for large sections 
of the population has considerably improved since independ- 
ence. Underlying this development has been a certain degree 
of diversification of the economy's industra1 structure. 
The diversification already observed in the period up to 
the 1970s has continued and today is reflected in the 
further decline of sugar, which presently contributc3 less 
than three percent to GDP and only ten percent of domestic 
exports, and the robust expansion of manufacturing and 
tourism. These changes are 2eflected in the external 
sector of the economy where manufactu:ed exports as a 
percentage of domestic exports has a' ed 85 pe it 
between 1981-19814 (see Table 12.1). .n the iu of 
the 1960s nd 1980 manufactu b 
percent per annum. As we know, most of this exp' rion 
has been in the enclave industri t up under the various 
incentives shcemes, with the fastest growing sectors being 
clothing and textiles, and electronics and elertrical 
equipment0 By 1985, there were 23 enclave ntries 
operating under the aegis of the Barbados i .-trial 
development authority. Meanwhile the num f tourists! 
visitors visiting the island had also growI rapidly, 
rising from over 220 thousand in 1975 to nearly 370 
thousand in 19814, an increase of over two-thirds. 
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The wages index of BarbadosrevealS a vigorous 
expansion in wages, as the index increased from 32 in 
1970 to loo in 1980, and 1141 in 19814 (see Table 12.1). 
However, the retail price index rose by 142 percent between 
1980 and 19814 which was about the same as the wages index, 
indicating no improvement in the real wage. Indeed going 
as far back as 1970 the wages index has just kept âhead 
of the retail price index. While the growth of the index 
therefore is a "money illusion" it nevertheless refects 
an achievement not matched elsewhere except in Tri 
Tobago, since the 1980s has generally witnessed a fall in 
real wages and the standard of living for the oroad mass 
of the Caribbean peoples. 
The positive record of a r1apid overall g wth 
of national income and a char2ging industria truture 
has to be qualified in relation to four considcations. 
The first of these is that the diversition of the 
economy which has been achieved, is r:re 3parent than 
real, since there has been no signifcar. development of 
a real capacity in the economy to ge erate growth auto- 
nomously and to provide for a structural tran3formation 
which permanently eradicates poverty. The reason for 
this is that much of the expansion has hinged on tourism 
and export processing zones two sectors that have shown 
particular vulnerability, not only in the region, but 
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world wide. Tourism has been vulnerable to changes in 
taste, variations in the level of economic activity in 
North America, and Europe, cross-currency rates, (parti- 
cularly the US dollar against European and Japanese 
currencies), and adverse media reports in Europe and North 
America. Because of the last mentioned item, Barbados 
governments have been at pains to cultivate the image of 
open hbspitality and political stability already remarked 
upon. The other sources of vulnerability, however, remain 
and these have affected the industry, leading to considerable 
annual swings in the number of visitors and their 
expenditures. In addition, we have.) already seen in 
Chapter 5 the enclave character, limited internal linkages 
generated, and the footloose nature of firms established 
in the EPZs. Given the capital restructuring now taking 
place among the transnational corporations there is no 
indication that the weaknesses mentioned there would 
lessen. Already the electronics industry has been hard 
hit by these changes. Moreover, in both tourism and 
the EPZ industries, low Barbadian wages are an important 
attraction to the firms, so that there is a built-in factor 
containing wage levels to those which would make them 
competitive with wages in other similar economies. 
Given the vulnerable character of these new 
industries it is important to note that the expansion of 
these industries has not been accompanied by a phased 
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reduction of sugar as the data may suggest. 
To the 
contrary, all the evidence points to a situation 
in which 
the decline in the sugar industry has been 
due to structural 
weaknesses which persist (and which are Caribbean-wide 
in 
scope) rather than the result of deliberate 
choice. Indeed 
these structural weaknesses portray the 
broader weakness 
of agriculture in the region which we 
analyzed in Chapter 7. 
The increased dependence of the economy on 
imported food, 
beverages, feed, fats and other agricultural 
materials, 
can be seen in Table 12.1 where we find that 
the value of 
imports of these products has trebled since 1970, and 
currently average about US$93 million annually. 
Marked seasonal and cyclical variations 
characterize employment in these industries 
and this adds 
to the social burden creatEd by the all 
too familier 
West Indian social sickness - persistently 
high levels of 
open unemployment. In 198k, 18 percent of the labour 
force 
in Barbados was unemployed. In any context 
this would 
be a colossal social tragedy, but it is 
made worse by the 
absence of any significant unemployment relief. 
The 
position taken by successive governments is 
that unemploy- 
ment is not a temporary, transitional 
phenomenon but a 
structural and endemic feature of the 
economic system, 
so that unemployment relief becomes "unaffordable". 
As 
with other West Indian territories the 
approach has been 
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one of letting employment/unemployment take care 
of itself, 
as a by-product of an emphasis on the growth of 
incomes 
and output0 No systematic attack on unemployment as 
a 
social problem of first priority has ever been mounted0 
RecognitiQn of the limited nature of the diver- 
sification together with the structural nature of the large 
scale unemployment problem has led both government and 
opposition to question the successes behind the rapid 
expansion of GDP. This as borne out indirectly in their 
widely publicized resistance to the re-classification 
of 
Barbados to "least needy" statusby the World Bank which 
has come about because of its high level of per capita 
income. The governmerL has tended to stress the small 
size of the economy, its open character, and the 
fragile 
nature of tourism and EPZ industries. They have argued 
for more time to build up the stock of social and 
human 
capital in the country as the platform of a qualitatively 
different kind of diversification. In particular they 
have been quick to indicate that the recent international 
recession (1981-1983) came close to bringing diaster to 
Barbados, for during this perio tourism, agriculture, 
and EPZ activity all suffered significant declines. 
Indeed 
in real terms, per capita GDP fell by seven percent 
between 
1980 and 1983 and it was not until 198'4, on 
account of 
the revival of economic activity in Europe and 
North America, 
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that a real growth of over two percent was achieved. 
The open strategy pursued in Barbados since World War 
II 
and intensified by successive governments since independence 
are the product of a particular set of social circumstances, 
many of them already hinted at0 For 350 years until 1966, 
unlike all the other West Indian territories Barbados 
was 
ruled by the British alone. This together with a 
substantial 
resident planter class has created structures in which 
"white" 
capital, that is descendants of the original planter 
class, 
is economically dominant Th the country, although 
the vast 
iiajority of the population is black. Thus whereas in the early 
19th century the whites constituted 20 percent of the 
population, 
by 1970 the white elite was only four percent 
of the population 
(and the "mixed" group four percent also). Simultaneo4sly 
therefore, class and racial inequality and domination has 
grown 
up within the economic structures of the society. This 
has 
led to a popular consciousness which prides itself in 
describing Barbados as "Little England" and in which imitation 
of British traditions, customs, and practices, have 
been 
particularly. important to the dominant elites. Within 
the underciasses strong resistance to this cultural and 
ideological domination has not been articulated0 
This is so lamentable that in a country where 96 percent 
of the population are descendants of slaves, and four 
percent slave owners, the local presb could have 
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a long series of debates in 1985 about whether Barbados 
should celebrate the 150th anniversary of the abolition 
of slavery along with other West Indian territories! 
Most 
of the letters opposed the celebration on grounds that 
there was "no point in looking back to the past, since 
all Barbadians are now equal". To talk of the slave 
past 
was steen by most writers as stirring up racial hatred! 
It is indeed this kind of logic, a logic which effectively 
denies Barbadians a sense of what happened, of their 
own 
history, which allows the peculiar Barbadian blend of 
seeming democratic tolerance and a virulent hostility to 
radical ideas to coexit. It is instructive therefore 
to note a statement cited by Gomes and circulated by the 
President of the Employers' Federation in Barbados in 
1970, in response to the Black Power upsurges which were 
sweeping the region and which as we indicated was an 
important turning point in the region's political develop- 
ment: 
"events have made us focus our attention 
on the serious state of affairs of unrest 
which exists in the arei. While all eyes 
are on Trinidad & Tobago; there cannot be any 
doubt that ftiany of the Caribbean territories 
harbour the same explosive elements. Nor 
can there be any doubt that many of those 
,sho are currently championing the cause of 
the underprivileged, who claim to represent 
the interest of Black dignity in their 
struggle against past oppression, imagined 
or real, are preaching a philosophy which is 
very akin both in content and in its termin- 
ology to that preached by communist revolut- 
ionaries as exemplified by the late Che Guevara. 
7/ 
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If we do not know what motivates 
such a movement, we must find out 
how to counter it; because we do 
know that the result of it, if 
successful, is the end of democracy". 
The statement not only refers to "past oppression, imagined 
or real" b'it clearly takes the Cold War line of linking 
claims "to represent Black dignity" as communistic, and 
anti-democratic. 
As with other Ca'ibbean states one of the most 
notable consequences of post-independence' policy has been 
the promotion of a local bourgeoi&ie linked to the growth 
of a domestic manufacturing sector. Although firm data 
are not available, this expansion seems to have favoured 
the already dominant elements of "white capital" which 
have diversified into these areas. Additionally, a group 
of mixed and black businessmen has already began to arise 
around these new activities. Professionals (lawyers, 
accountants, engineers, economists, etc) have also as a 
group done quite well by this expansion. However, these 
elements of local capital remain as junior pa'tners in the 
larger struçture of internationale capital which continues 
to offer the main momentum of the economy. The political 
ruling class really manage this system. It is they who 
perform the "house-slave role" and in terms of the overall 
economic, political and cultural objectives of the model, 
they have done better than all the other Caribbean states. 
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The broad mass-of the populaton appear to accept the view 
that progress is being made and to accept the cultural 
forms which go with it. Resistance is still isolated, 
despite the formation of a Marxist party. Increasingly, 
however, political debate will have to encompass a wider 
and wider polar range, and out of this the repressed 
consciousness of the mass of the population ill yet, 
re-assert itself. It is my prediction that this develop- 
ment is likely to occur irrespective of the actual course 
of economic events. The chances are, however, that a 
model of expansion and accumulation which is so contingent 
on the course of accumulation elsewhere will inevitably 
$ 
expose the economy to severe shocks and disruptions. 
Ji - -'J-). 
II: Trinidad & Tobago: Oil "boonVan' bust" 
Background 
Since its independence in 1962 Trinidad-Tobago 
has been under the political rule of one party, the People's 
National Movement (PNM), and until his death in 1981, Eric 
Williams led the party and headed the government0 Unlike 
Guyana, however, which since its independence has had the 
same uninterrupted rule by one party, in Trinidad-Tobago 
there has been free and fair national elections s required 
under the Constitution. Except for the near successful coup 
in 1970 when the Black Power protests in the region reached 
their apogee, and the subsequent boycott of the elections 
by the opposition parties in 1971, the two party parliamentary 
system of politics seems to have worked adequately. 
Trinidad-Tobago is the only West Indian country wdth a 
substantial petroleum sector, and not surprisingly the 
central feature of the model of development pursued after 
the 1970s has been the use and mis-use of the completely 
unanticipated windfall gains produced by the Arab oil 
embargo and subsequent events in the "good oil years". 
It has been estimated that between 19V1 and 1983, Trinidad- 
Tobago received windfall oil revenues totalling US$10 
billion, and overall oil revenues were nearly US$17 
billion. Recent events in the world petroleum industry 
have, however, shaken the foundations of the economy and 
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revealed yet another instance of a Caribbean econOmy 
following the boom and bust of a product cycle. Caught 
up in the prosperity of a product cycle boom it is easy 
to forget its inherent transitoriness, and once again 
we have the example of those who control the windfall 
gains when they are occuring, assuming that this is a 
permanent state of affairs0 As Eric St Cyr has observed: 
ttCarjbbean countries have never failed 
to generate sizeable economic surpluses, 
as the fortunes of 'King Sugar' in the 
18th century must attest, and more 
recently the post war bauxite boom in 
Jamaica and the massive oil booms in 
Trinidad & Tobago ... our problem is that 
institutional and structural factors have 
combined to see it expatriated or less 
than optimally deployed at home". 8/ 
Despite its petroleum base, in the years receedlng the 
dramatic rise in oil prices the economy of Trinidad-Tobago 
was not faring too well. While during the period 1955- 
1961, growth in real terms was of the order of ten percent 
per annum, thereafter positive growth in real terms did 
not continue. Between 1962 and 1965 the economy hardly 
grew, and while for the years 1966-1968 there was a 
slight increase in the rate of growth, by 1969-1970 the 
slide set in once again. Unemployment in 1970 stood at 
12.5 percent of the labour force. As we have observed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the FNM in Trinidad & Tobago strongly 
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of u. . . . . . . t, 
supported the policy industrialization by invitation 
from the middle 1950s onwards. However, the high capital 
intensity of the import-substituting industries which 
were actually established, together with the relatively 
small-scale nature of their operations, resulted in very 
little net labour absorption. The res'ilt was that this 
sector as a whole employed altogether only about three- 
quarters of the 25 thousand and more persons employed 
in the traditional suga industry. During the period 
1958-1973 the government published three national plars 
which served as the framework for economic policies over 
these years. The first of these which covered the period, 
1958-1962, was called the "people's charter for economic 
and social development" and was prepared principall1 by 
Sir Arthur Lcwis. As we observed in previous chapters, 
whileLewis advocated a combination of import substitution 
and export-promoting industrialization as the major thrust 
for the West Indian economies, the structure of incentives 
which was put in plac e and the rrnufacturing experience of the region was 
heavily focussed on the local market. During the second 
plan, (19614_1968), state intervention in economic life was 
advocated as a more prominent feature than ever before. 
The results we observed in Part 2 where we noted the wide 
range of institutions and laws which were introduced to 
support private capital formation (local and foreign) 
and to provide infra-structure for industrial and agricultural 
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development, as well as improved basic social services 
in such important areas as health and education0 In 
addition, there was state acquisition of a number of 
commercial activities, including such basic areas as 
sugar, oil and selected concerns in the import-substitution 
manufacturing sector. By 1972, some twenty-one enterprises, 
were under state control, and it was often stressed at 
the time, that although the government was conservative 
and pro-capital in its outlook, it was sufficiently 
nationalist and pragmatic to have created in Tr'inidad-'l'obago 
during the 'early l97.Os the largest state property sector 
in the Caribbean, except for Cuba. The state then employed 
about 30 percent of the labour force. It is significant to 
note that all the interests acquired by the state at this 
time were done without any ideological recourse to such 
labels as "taking the commanding heights of the ecOnomy" 
or "expropriating the expropriators". 
The similarities in this period between PNM policies 
towards the major sectors of the economy (manufacturing, 
agriculture, tourism and other services) and those of other 
Caribbean territories are too striking to bear repetition 
here. What should be noted, is that by the third five 
year plan, (1969-1973), the import-substitution model was 
showing signs of rapid exhaustion and regional integration 
was strongly promoted in this plan as a way out of the 
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impasse created by past industrialization experience. 
With real incomes falling and deep social unrest manifest 
in the early 1970's the oil boom came as a completely 
unanticipated blessing to the established political and 
economic interests in the territory. As Farrell has 
oted: 
"The economic policies of its government, 
centering initially on attracting invest- 
ment and subsequently on import sub- 
stitution, failed either to generate 
genui:ie industrialization and tranform- 
ation, or to deal with the problem of 
growing unemployment. The result was the 
1970 Black Power rebellion which shook 
the natin to its foundations and 
threatened at one time to topple the 
government. Eric Williams' administration 
managed to weather that storm, but between 
1970 and 1973 the economy cont1ed to 
decline ... and Eric Williams announced his 
imminent retirement from the Prime Minister- 
ship and political life. Then came the 
Arab oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil 
prices. These events, with generous 
assistance from expanded oil and gas pro- 
duction based on new reserves ushered in a 
decade of the long oil boom". 9/ 
Policy 
When considerd at the aggreative, macro, 
political economy level of formulation, the development 
strategies and policies pursued by the PNM government in 
Trinidad-Tobago after the 1970s have differed little in 
their main essentials from those pursued in many other 
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parts of the region. The effective differences 
where they 
do exist, derive principally from the huge 
economic wind- 
fall which oil generated in this period and 
which was of 
course specific to Trinidad-Tobago. This 
observation 
should not be surprising for as we have argued 
before) in 
the countries of the region the period since 
independence, 
(and indeed in some cases before, i.e2, during the periods 
of 
internal self-government), control over the 
machinery of 
state has resided in the hands of one or other 
favoured 
sections of the petty bourgeoisie and other inte"ediae 
strata. This group has generally sought to 
use this 
control to pursue the larger class-project of 
creating 
an indigeneous big_bourgeoiie in these countries. 
Without exception, this process has facilitate&bY 
historical ciicumstances already considered 
in this book, 
particularlY those which hive prmttcd the post- 'olonial 
state to play what may be elassed as 9xceptiona] 
.roles" 
in almost all areas of West Indian social 
ilfe. The 
marked expansion in the state property sector 
of Trinidad 
and Tobago which, as we observed above, preceeded 
the oil 
boom, is but one indicator of this. In 
Trinidad and 
Tobago the period after the 1970s witnessed 
the use of 
state power by these elements to reinforce capitalist 
relations within the national economy and to 
promote the 
continued integration of the country into the international 
system of capitalist accumulation and 
reproduction. 
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The windfall gains were used to promote this project. 
Such an overall policy thrust, however, could only have 
been predicated on the continued capacity of the ruling 
strata to demobilize and de-politiCiZe the masses and so 
contain the development of alternative foci. Their 
demonstrated capacity in this direction has been striking, 
particularly since its chief architect, Erci Williams, 
as both historian arid anti-colonial politician, had done 
much to stir the consciousness of the poor and the powerless 
not only in Trinidad and Tobago, but further afield in the 
wider Caribbean area 
4 
It is from this background that the policies 
de\eloped to utilize the windfall oil gains e best 
understood. A it emerged five major thrusts were 
developed by successive PNM administrations in the wake 
of the oil boom. First, t1 vigorous role whicT the state 
had been playing in economic affairs since independence 
was considerably intensified. This time, however, the 
principal orientation was not towards import-substituting 
industrialization (although policies in this area were 
continued) bt instead emphasis was laid. on the utilization 
of oil revenues by the state to create large-scale resource 
intensive export industries. Because the oil boom coincided 
with the discovery of huge natural gas reserves, the 
export industries favoured were those which can broadly 
414Q 
be classified as energy intensive. Second the mechanisms 
used to bring this new sector into existence were centered 
on collaborative arrangements between the state and 
transnational corporations0 Thus in this period a wide 
array of such devices were to be found ranging from 
traditional joirt ventures at all levels from exploration, 
production, technology and marketing, to using TNCs as 
project managers, contractors, consultants, and suppliers 
cf tehnical services. There were also the usual marketing 
and management contract arrangenents in the new er.. piises 
and of particular importance joint arrangements for approach 
o bank consortia to raise loan fiiiance. The booming oil 
reverues of the country gave Trinidad and Tobago an edge 
over other countris in this fegard, and the TNCs were not 
slow to exploit this factor. The result was a loan finance! 
equi.ty ratio of 3:1 on average in the new enterpris. 
The new complex of activiAes which were developed 
centered on fertilizers, chemicals, and iron and steel. In 
order to achieve this a huge industrial complex was developed 
in the South of the country at an area called PointT Lisas. 
It is important to note that the idea for this development 
did not originate with the government, but instead first 
surfaced as a proposal by businessmen active in the South 
Trinidad Chamber of Commerce. Their intention was to 
stimulate port development and heavy industry in the South. 
The government's first involvement was indirect and in a 
sense unintentional. At the peak of the disaffection 
manifested in the Black Power protests, the government 
acquired in 1970 majority shares in the largest agricultural 
enterprise and largest employer of labour in the country, 
the Caroni sugar estates. The remainder of the shares were 
acquired in 1975. As it turned out Caroni in turn held 
shares in the Point'Lisas' development company formed by the 
southern, businessmen, which it had acquired in exchange 
for land which it had ceded to the company for the port 
development and the proposed industrial complex. With the 
sudden windfall oil revenues, and the near simu1tneous 
discovery of huge natural gas reserves, the government 
turne& to this proposal as the best means of monetizing 
the natural gas reserves. The Point Lisas project became 
its mnjor developmèntal tthrust and the largest outlet for 
state capital expenditures in the period. 
The complex of Point Lisas involves three major 
activities. One is the construction of a huge industrial 
estate with not only excellent transport, power, 
telecommunications, and infra-structural facilities, 1ut 
the creation of a new port (Point Lisas) which could handle 
trade in huge volumes. The second activity centres on the 
development of a chemical fertilizer industry based on the 
natural gas reserves of the country. This fertilizer 
industry in turn has four major components. One is 
Federation Chemicals (a subsidiary of Grace). This firm 
firstcame to Trinidad in the late 1950's when Grace set up a 
wholly owned subsidiary to manufacture nitrogenous 
fertilizers. The original intention was to exploit the 
regional market created by the short-lived West Indian 
Federation, but when this collapsed in 1962, i.ts focus was 
shifted to exports in the world market. With the discovery 
of natural gas large scale fertilizer production operations 
commenced in its plant in the1970s.The second component consists 
of two joint venture operations between the state and 
TNCs. These are Tringen a joint state/Grace operation set 
up adjacent to Grace's original plant, and Fertrin a joint 
state/Amoco operation, with Amoco itself a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil. By 1981 Trinidad-Tobago was already one 
of the world's largest produ9ers of feitilizers with a 
capacity then in excess of 1.2 million tons per annum. 
The third component is the government's decision to set 
up in 1984 its own operations to produce fertilizers.and 
methanol. It uses some of the ammonia produced from 
Fertrin a feedstock for producing urea0 Fertrin operates 
the urea enterprises under a management contract and the 
product is marketed by Agrico Chemicals, the large US 
chemical TNC. Between 1980 and 1984 the capacity of this 
sector had grown by a factor of 2.6, with export earnings 
at nearly TT$440 million being more than 7 times larger 
442. 
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than earnings from sugar, although onlyafraction (one- 
tenth) of the value of oil exports. The third and final 
major activity at Point Lisas centers on the government's 
iron and steel making enterprise (ISCOTT) which produces 
sponge iron, billets, and rods fromimported lump ores 
and pellets. This company was originally intendd to have 
foreign partners, but for a multitdue of reasons these 
backed off as economic problems with the venture loomed 
large. Reportedly it is currently making a daily loss of 
half-a-million dollars, andthe government is still 
assiduously searchThg for a suitable TNC to manage the 
enterprise, and hopefully to acquire equity in it as well, 
It has been estimated that about US$i6 billion has been 
invested by the state in the Point Lisas complex. While 
the above constitutes the preponderant activities of the 
complex, a number of minor industrie have developed 
around it. 
While these state activities have overshadowed 
both the traditional import substituting manufacturing 
favoured before the oil boom, and the EPZ type investments 
now in fashion in the region, the third thrust of policy 
has been in fact efforts to develop these two sub-sectors, 
as an ancillary as it were to the major thrust in large- 
scale, export-oriented resource intensive investments. 
It is therefore important to note that between 1959 and 
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1980 over 700 establishments were created in the traditional 
import-substituting areas, and these employ approximately 
20,000 persons. Some of these establishments produce 
cement, household appliances, radios, televisions, and motor 
vehicles. The result of this has been the emergence of a 
significant indigenous bourgeoisie centered in these 
operations and located in four large economic groupings: 
Neal. and Massay Group (motor vehicles, building 
materials, machinery distribution, real estate 
and finance. It also has a number of subsid- 
taries in the rest of the region and the group 
is reputed to be the largest indigenous 
economic grouping in the West Indies). 
- Mc Enearney Aistons Group (motor vehicles, 
building materials, engineering services, 
publishing, finance, supermarkets and other 
retail and wholesale outlets. It also has 
Caribbean subsidiaries). 
- Geddes Grant Group (principally trading. This 
group is the most international of the four, 
as it operates in 6 West Indian countries as 
well as the Br'itain. About one-half of the 
trading which accounts for nearly 90 percent 
of its turnover, takes place outside of 
'Trinidad-Tobago). 
- Kirpalanis Group (a private company owned by 
one family, unlike the others which áre public 
concerns. Its main activity is department stores, 
( 
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light manufacturing, principally footwear 
and textiles, and some finance). 
It has been estimated by Sandoval that for the period 1979- 
1981, the combined sales of these groups averaged about 
one-sixth of the non-oil GDP. The economic importance 
of the group j lIsted above in descending order. 
The fourth thrust of PNM policy followed from 
the consideration that one of the immediate consequences 
of increased petroleum prices was a rapid expansion of 
central government revenues from this source. This 
peaked at over two-thirds of all government revenues 
collected. Apart from financing the capital budget, 
a significant proportion of this was diverted towards 
providing transfers and subsidies0 Together these 
exceeded )4Q percent of government current expenditures 
and one-tenth of GDP at current market prices) in the 
198.0's, as compared with 16 percent in 1953, 17 percent 
in 1963, and 27 percent in 1973. A levy which was 
introduced to finance unemployment relief works as a 
result of local protests in the 1970s raiscd over TT$1400 
million in 1980, with over three-fourths of this coming 
from the oil sector alone. 
The fifth and final major thrust in the policy 
of utilizing the surpluses generated by oil was the 
LL6. 
improvement of basic services provided by the state owned 
and operated utilities and an upgrading of the delivery 
of social services to the population. Thus the telephone! 
telecommunications system was completely refurbished, 
considerable (but still insufficient) road construction 
took place to cope with the traffic congestion, the water 
supply, electric power and related facilities were improved, 
along with public transport, postal services, public ware- 
housing, docks, and airport facilties. Despite the 
considerable investments of public funds along this broad 
rangé of public facilities the pace of physical expansion 
did not keep pace with the pressures created by the growth 
in incomes and the perceived requirements of the population, 
given their new levels of affluence. The result is that 
many who have visited Trinidad in this period have "?eported 
the impression of consideile phyal corstion and, 
the overloading of public facilities. Much of this may be 
due to the omnipresent traffic jams which characterize 
almost the entire country. In social areas there were 
also many major investments, particularly in education, 
health, recreation and housing. In physical terms some 
of the more spectacular of these are the Mount Hope medical 
complex which is advertized as one of the best of its kind 
in the hemisphere, a modern stadium for sport and recreation 
which has attracted several world class events and many 
housing complexes, even though a housing shortage continues 
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and land/property prices have been rising rapidly. The 
emphasis in all of this seems to have been on big building 
projects with the result that landscape of many neighbour- 
hoods in the country have undergone major physical 
transformations. 
Evaluation 
As a result of the oil boom and the construction 
activity associated with the new enterprises considered 
above, between 19714 and 1982, total GDP in Trinidad-Tobago 
measured at factor cost in current prices grew by a factor 
of nearly 5, that is, from $TT14 billion to over $TT19 
billion. Over the same period, per capita incomes in 
current prices grew at a slightly iower rate, that is, 
from $TT3,937 to $TT19,682. Almost all of the expansion 
centered on the performance of the oil sector. Excluding 
some smaller companies each of which produces less than 
one percent of total output, there are four major oil 
companies in Trinidad-Tobago. Until 1985 two were 
subsidiaries of TNCs, that is, Texaco Trinidad and Amoco 
whose parent is Standard Oil. In 1985 ttie government 
purchased a significant share of Texaco's operations. 
The third company is a joint venture between the state 
and Tesoro of Texas which was formed in 1969 after BP 
11118. 
pulled out of Trinidad. Significantly as with Caroni the 
government intervened at the time to protect the employment 
of BP's fifteen hundred workers and when all else failed 
it resorted to state acquisition of BP's assets. The 
fourth major company came into existence after the government 
takeover of Shell and the creation of its first wholly 
owned oil company, Trintoc in 19711. In addition to the 
above,TeXaCo, Tesoro, and Trintoc are equal partners in an 
off-shore oil venture, TRINMAR. Texaco's share in this 
continue since thL change indicated in 1985. The distribution 
of production of domestic crude is as follows: Texaco 8 
percent; Amoco 51 percent; Tesoro 13 percent; Trintoc 
5 percent; and Trinmar 22 percent. 
By 1977 Amoco was the 
largest producer of local crude. Unlike the other TNCs 
it entered Trinidad-Tobago Ifl 1968 in search of crude, a 
product in which it as sliJrt in is World-wide operations. 
Texaco which produces less than one-tenth of the local 
crude 
is there mainly for tne refining of imported crude. At 
the 
moment most of the domestic crude is produced in off-shore 
fields (approximately three-quarters). 
While domestic crude is produced, as we have 
already noted in Chapter 7, the traditional focus of the 
oil industry in Trinidad-Tobago has been its role as an 
off-shore refining centre. Originally the transnationals 
which undertook these investments wereattracted by 
lower 
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processing costs, the political stability of the country 
(which was presumed to stem from the fact that it was 
still a colony), its geographical proximity to the American 
east coast where most of the oil (residual fuel) was 
consumed. Initially, most of the imported crude came from 
Venezuela (this was typical of other off-shore type operations 
in the region), however, with the increase in tanker sizes 
and the consequent decline in freight rates crude has been 
brought in from the Middle East, Africa and Asia for refining. 
Crude imports peaked in the early 1970s at over 290,000 
barrels per day, but currently there is very little 
importation less than 12 percent of 1980? s imports. 
Domestic crude peaked at 230,000 barrels per day in 1978, 
but in the wave of recent difficulties it has declined to 
a current average of 160-170 thousand barrels per day. 
In 198)4 there was a small increase in output over 1983 
(6 percent) the first time an increase was recorded 
since 1978. Domestic production of crude is less than 
three-tenths of one percent of world output. 
The structure of the industry which has emerged 
is one in which the country both produces and exports crude, 
while at the same time importing crude for processing. This 
has developed because of specific company interests as a whole. 
Most of the oil refined and exported is residual fuel, 
while most of local production c-ornes from off-shore fields. 
after there was a decline and 
figure once again exceeded 40 
f450. 
The contribution of oil to GDP peaked 
at t18 per- 
cent, averaging 411 percent for the period l9711-1977 
There- 
it was not until 1980 that the 
percent. Petroleum has also 
dominated the export trade accounting 
for over 90 percent 
of its export earnings. since 1982, however, the 
oil economy 
has been in the doldrums with the 
prospects at the time of 
writing particularly depressing. Since 
that year the economy 
has had negative rates of growth of GDP 
in real terms, with 
the decline in l983-985 being minus 3.8, 6.3, an 108 percent 
respectively. 
oreign exchange reserves peaked 
in 1981 at ove' US$3.2 billion, i.e., about 
four times the 
value at the end of 1975, but by the end of' 1985 
this total 
was down to US$1 billion. The external 
debt although not 
as economically significant as in 
other West Indianterritorie5 
stood at US$1 billion at the end of 1985, about 
.ouble 
the debt at the end of 1982. Foreign debt servicing 
which 
cost only 2.5 percent of exports of goods and 
services 
between 1970 and 1983, has since trebled. Government 
fiscal 
operations which showed huge surpluses on 
current account 
(averaging 50 percent of current 
revenue in the years 
1980-1981) declined substantially after that 
pertod, resulting 
in an overall deficit on current 
and capital account for 
the first time since the oil boom. 
For the years 1982-1983 
this overall deficit averaged 13 
percent of GDP at current 
market prices. By 198L, this was reduced to under 7 percent 
GDP as government tightened its fiscal operations. Oil's 
contribution to government revenues has decline rapidly 
since 1980-1981 when it averaged about two-thirds of total 
revenue. Over the period 1983-1985 this averaged 4O per- 
cent of total revenues. Total exports which peaked at nearly 
TT$l0 billion in 1980 had declined to $TT503 billion by 
1985. Oil exports at over TT$9 billion in 1980 was less 
than half that amount in 985 ($TT14.2 billion) and as a 
percentage of total exports had fallen from 93 perce rit in 
1980 to 8OE percent in 1984. Selected data for the years 
1980-1985, are shown in Tables 12.3 and 12. 
Data on crude and refining throughput i1 Trinidad- 
Tobago which are shown in Table l2. indicate the drastic 
falls in refining throughput levels as well as the c.lecÏmne 
in domestic crude, as the petroleum/market has weakeneci. 
Currently the refining capacity of the local industry i 
several times larger than the local crude available, and 
with a dramatically softened oil market, the effects on 
the local industry have been disastrous. In evaluating 
the experience of Trínidad & Tobago iii is important to 
recognize that declining output in the oil industry reflects 
a number of basic changes taking place within the structure 
of the industry at both the international and local level. 
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of petroleum market which has created the"bust" in the 
oil prices. Second, the high price structure created by 
OPEC in the 1970s and again in 1980-1981 resulted in 
concerted efforts by the US to reduce its 
dependence on importedresidual fuels for its public 
utilities by encouraging a switch to coal. As its demand 
was reduced this led to the emergence of significant over 
capacity in the region's refining sector which was oriented 
towards serving this market- Third, the traditional 
specialization of the region on residual fuel is a 
specialization on the cheap end of the oil barrel and 
not the more expensive end of the distillates and lighter 
fuels such as gasolene. As a rsult this sub-sector of 
1ess 
the region's operations has been resilient to the advere 
effects of collaçsing oil prices. Fi 1ly, as we have 
observed the whole developmentof tL l sector ir 
country has been made subservient to tii Logic of gJ:baL 
prof it maximization and balancing stratic interests of 
the TNCs. At the moment this is undergoing a major 
re-structuring in which the original attractions of the 
region do not command the same prenda. 
The fortunes of large natural gas/fertilizers 
enterprises have on the whole been mixed in recent years. 
When in 1981 the country had an output capacity of over 
1.2 million tons per year of ammonia, it was the 
t 55. 
largest exporter of the product. With cheap natural gas 
and a world hungry for food this appeared to be a strategic 
cornering of a major market and encouraged the more than 
doubling of capacity since then0 However, the industry 
has encountered some protectionism in the metropolitan 
markets which has aggravated recessionary declines in 
fertilizer imports0 In addition major competition has 
emerged from new sources, mainly Mexico, the USSR and the 
Middle East0 At the moment the country continues to be a 
major supplier of fertilizers and methanol to the US. 
Finally, we must also bear in' mind the long run threat to 
synthetically derived fertilizers, posed by scientific 
discoveries in the field of direct nitrogen fixation. 
These threaten to have the same disruptive effect oil 
based fertilizers had on guano production in South America. 
Because the industry is highly capital intensive, abuut 
$2.5 - $3.0 million per job) highly protected/subidizd, 
and of an enclave export nature, domestic returns in the 
form of employment,, tax yields and internal linkages are 
low. It has been estimated that domestic value added in 
this sector is as low as 13 percent and direct employment 
1ess than 0.30 percen. 
--'/ 
The rapid development of the new energy intensive 
export sector, is not only inherently limited by the 
markéting and other technological threats referred to here, 
56. 
but in general has been insufficient to compensate for 
declining oil production and prices, the neglect of domestic 
agriculture, and the limitations of the manufacturing sector 
highly dependent as i is on external sources for raw 
materials, intermediate and capital inputs, licences, 
patents and know-how as well as privileged access to 
protected local (and regional) markets. Moreover the new 
energy intensive sector has significant income as well as 
foreign exchange leakages because in the first instance 
it was constricted mainly Withforeign contractors, skilled 
personnel hardware and soft ware, and extensive resort 
to loan financing in the international market wh4ch has 
helped to increase the country's external indebtedness. 
The TNCs naturally have encouraged this development since 
in part it provides a hedge against risk, experience 
showing that Third World countres hav' found it I'arder 
to default on loans than to nationaii7e foreign 
represented in local facilities. 
In the waké of recent negative developments, 
government policies have followed the classic pattern of other 
Third World oil producers, i.e., cuts n public expen±tre, 
restrictions on imports, lay-offs and retrenchment of 
employees in the state sector, removal of subsidies, 
tightening of bank credit, and a more active system of 
foreign exchange mangement. Thus as the data in Tables 
12.3 and 12»1 reveal oil revenues declined by nearly 
1457. 
one-third between 1980 and 198 5 and total revenue which 
averaged TT$6.6 billion in 1981-1982 was down to $TT6.4 
billion 1984-1985. 
State expenditures declined from the peak of 
$TT905 billion in 1982 to $TI7.5 billionin 1985 
ost of the cuts 
were in capital, expenditure, which had increased at an 
annual rate in excess of 140 percent between 1974 and 1981 
and dclined by over 50 percent for the two years 1983- 
1984. In addition subsidies fell in 19814 after increasing 
at an annual rate of over 50 percent between 1979 and 1982. 
Oil exports fell by over one-half between 1980 and 1985 
and this resulted in policies aimed at a contraction in 
imports which resulted in a decline of about 40 percent 
in the priod. Foreign exchange control mechanisms were 
put in place nd tiwrds the end of 1985., the exchr' rate 
was put on a dual rate system and devalued by t 
for most imported commodities, Many of these policies, 
particularly attempts to tighten on non-essential imports, 
capital flight, and luxury consumption at home came 
late , since most of the losses had already,been ine'"d 
in the height of the oil boom, when as the calypso boasted 
Trinidad & Tobago was a place where ttcapitaism gone mad". 
- Despite the massive windfall gains unemployment 
in 1985 stood at 15 percent of the labour force, with the 
huge investments at Point Lisas yielding less than one per- 
cent of total employment. In this way, the situation in 
Trinidad & Tobago was no different from that of the rest 
of the Caribbean in that unemployment was still one of the 
major social illnesses and was not being treated directly 
as a problem in itself, but was left to solve itself as 
a by product of growth in exports and incomes. The neglect 
of domestic agriculture and the traditional export staples 
are reflected in the output figures in Table 12.1. Between 
1980 and 198k the output of sugar fell by over 0 percent 
to an all time low of 65,000 tons0 The output in l981 
was just over one-quarter of output levels achieved since 
World War II. As with other sugar producing territories 
.2 
in the region, this decline cii.d not reflect a phased with- 
drawal from sugar but the mismanagement and mal-organisations 
of the industry at all levels. Cocoa production at 1307 
metric tonnes in 1985 was also less than one-third of 1975 
output, while coffee output in the same year was about 
one-half of 1975 output. Citrus production also shows a 
declIne. The ovrall result is that by 
l98, per capita consumption of imported foods was estimated 
to be as high as $uS800 per annum - a reverse of the 
situation 20 years ago when the country was a net exporter 
Í159. 
of food! Domestic food supply is currently estimated at less 
than one-third of domestic consumption. While this situatlon 
has developed, at the same time the TNCs have secured strategic 
control of the countryts food processing $ector and have generally 
prospered, particularly in such areas as dairy milk (Borden and 
Nestle), feeds and grain (Central Soya, Pillsbury, and Inter- 
national Multifoods), juices, biscuits, preserves, and concentrates 
(Unilever and Nabisco),beer (Guiness and Heineken), pepsi-cola, 
coca-cola, and fast foods outlets (Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried 
etc). 
In the case of the domestic assembly/manufacturing sector, 
despite operating under the aegis of state protection output 
performance since 1980 has been mixed. This is in part due to 
the recession which has come about, and in part it has also been 
due to the failure of these products to capture significant shares 
of the regional market. Thus as the data in Table 12.11 show the 
production of radios in 1985 was substantially below the level 
of 1980, while television production was up by over one-half. 
Gas cookers was about one-seventh below 1980 output. In 
contrast motor vehicles output grew substantially from under 
12,000 in 1980 to nearly 23,000 in 1984, to fall by nearly 
one-half in 1985. Domestic cement output has expided significantly 
since 1980 to the point where importation of this product had been 
completely replaced by 19814. It has been frequently claimed that one 
460. 
of the major factors which has affected the regional export 
capability of the manufacturing assembly sector in Trinidad 
& Tobago has been the high wage/high cost inflationary 
economy which has materialized with the oil boom. This 
factor is also blamed for the weak performances of the 
traditional export crops, although the evidence abound 
that other circumstances may be of at least ial importance. 
The 50 percent devaluation introduced in 1985 in the wake 
of recent difficulties was designed mainly to rectify the 
situation produced y inflationary wage increases and 
an ovrvalued exchange rate. 
In addition to an overall economic evaluation of 
the pros and cons of the huge Point Lisas type invetents, 
one factor of tremendous importance which has arisen and 
must be taken into account in an overall evaluation of PNN 
strategy is the nature of the relationship which has 
developed among the political leadership, top state 
employees, and the TNCs corporate leadership. Considerable 
evidence of bribery, corruption, nepotism and criminal 
negligence in the disbursement of public funds have been 
unearthed over the years. A reading of the press over 
the years reveals a number of scandals involving the pur- 
chase of aircraft for the national airline, the prc.posed 
construction of a horseracing complex, ISCOTT, the 
handling of import licences, foreign exchange remittances, 
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customs administration at ports of entry, to name a few. 
One estimate provided to the author is that as much as 
one-quarter of the windfall oil revenues has been wasted 
on account of these considerations. If to this we add 
th gross inefficiencies in project preparation and 
feasibility analysis which have been disclosed and are 
revealed in the remarkable c'ost overruns of these projects, 
the social cost df the investments has been unbelievably 
high. As an example the final cost of ISCOTT's installation 
was nearly two-thirds higher than the original estimate. 
By way of conclusion would secm that four major 
lessons have emerged from the experiences of Trinidad & 
Tobago. The first of these is that even with windfall gains 
of the magnitude obtained by Trtidad & Tobago, economic 
transformation n the region is not an easy task. The 
intractable nature of elements of the economic and si 
system should not be under estimated. Th historical 
tendency to systemically reproduce a divergence between 
resource use and production as well as consumption and 
the basic needs of the broad mass of the region's popuiai4on 
has been formed by centuries of slave and colbnial domination. 
Difficulties of this magnitude do not simply yield to 
abundant foreign exchange; or indeed to any other abundant 
resource, It is for this reason that the observation 
made earlier is relevant, that is the system which has 
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developed in the region has had similar prodcut-cycle. 
gains in the past with no basic resolution of this contra- 
diction0 As a result we have to conclude that pro-capital 
conservative policies during the oil boom masked the basic 
structural weakness of the economic rather than removed 
them. 
The second lesson is that ultimately the 
responsibility for the use (or mis-use) of resources in a 
eriod of windfall gain lies with the classes, strata and 
groups who control the state and those who own, and control 
thmean of production. It is the link between these 
various social elements which keeps the momentum of the 
system going - particularly in this instance its historical 
tendency to marginalize the interests of the poor and the 
powerless in the framing of economic and soial strategr. 
It was this class leadership which pioneered the drive for 
energy intensive industries, and it is important tc recognize 
that although this drive was framed as a strategy to trans- 
form the economy and the society as a whole, it was in fact 
a strategy to transform the country's petty bourgeoisie 
into a b*ig industrial bourgeoisie. It is therefore no 
coincidence that the Point Lisas proposals originated as 
an ambitious businessmen venture and only with the oil boom 
the initiative was taken over by the state. As it has 
turned out the massive investments in this sector dJd not 
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only lead to a substantial siphoning off of public funds 
into the private hands of the corrupt leadership, but it 
brought prosperity mainly to a range of increasingly 
important local petty-bourgeoisie interests: sub-contractors, 
engineers, architects, financiers, accountants, real estate 
operators, property developers, and so on. These developed 
their service operations into lucrative business ventures, 
multiplied local, financial interests, and promoted consumer 
financing, the securities ex'thange, real estate dealerships, 
and other associated land and housing development scheries. 
It is not surprising also that scandals and rip-offs were 
not only associated witu the Point Lisas project, but mair 
of these financiers were hevily involved in dubious deposit 
raising and loan schemes. The dominant local classe, 
however, were prepared to accept their junior status in the 
system of internatical apitalism. Thugiut he period 
they vigorously pursued links with the transnationals and 
welcomed state initiatives in this direction. Since these 
groups had many links with North America and Europe (more 
often than not 'holding' resident status in these parts as 
well as in Trinidad and Tobago) they were the major 
propagandists of the virtues of an 'bpen system",. This, 
however, was very restrictively interpreted and trivialized 
to mean little more than (their!) unrestricted access to 
foreign exchang0finaflCe personal travel and conspicuous 
consumption at home, as well as to hold their assets, 
The result of all this was a colossal social waste of 
resources. 
A third lesson is that despite the disappontments 
an energy-intensive industrialization drive would 
seem 
inevitably to have a role to play in any foreseeable 
economic transformation of Trinidad & Tobago. The reason 
for this is that with its abundant natural gas resources 
(among the ten leading countries in the world) a drive 
to develop this sector must play a role in any long term 
transforiiiatiofl strategy. Some opponents of the waste of 
resources which this sector has already entaile(, have 
rejected any idea of an energy-intensive industrial thrust 
on the grounds that what a resource is, is what is needed, 
and not what one possesses, and from this viewpnt t should 
be noted that in the world eccwmy energy ii nsive 
industries of the sort being promoted in Trnidad & Tobago 
(especially iron and steel) are in structral decline 
so that it is a mistake to pursue their development. The 
emphasis which they recommend is the nee.d to find out what 
the world wants and then seek to provide that, butS not to 
develop merely on the basis of what you have and think is 
abundant: 
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"The essential conception behind Point 
Lisas was not only seductive but 
intuitively seems both logical and 
and correct. The basic idea was that 
Trinidad and Tobago was rish in natural 
gas and that it should make 
maximum use of this abundant and cheap 
resource0 More specifically, it should 
go into industries which were energy 
intensive and gas intensive0 Trinidad 
and Tobago would have a natural compara- 
tive advantage in such industries ... this 
notion which seems intuitively correct 
is exactly of a piece with several other 
famous examples of notions which seem 
intuitively correct, but are in fact false 
the truth about industrialization and 
what industries a country should get into 
is .. counterintuitive. The truth is 
that for a small country which has to 
export, the first criterion in the list 
needed for deciding on what to get into 
haso be what is in remand In what 
areas is demand on a secular upswing. 
Those are the commodities to try to get 
into. Your cheap and abundant resource 
may or may not be ,relevant to such areas. 
If it is, great, if it is not, then that 
cheap and abundant resource is not as 
valuable as you might intuitively think 
it is. It is important not tc confuse 
the usefulness of something with its 
value". 12/ 
I have quoted Farrell above at length because the reasoning 
is typical of a type of "progressive" outlook which 
instinctively recoils against the great abuses of the Point 
Lisas project and rejects it. The reasoning 'nowevcr, 
particularly as expressed in the above quote cannot sustain 
the position taken by such persons. he a1lacy or it 
is that the world economy is replete with exampic of 
countries discovering just such an abundant resource and 
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"creating't a world demand for it through skillful develop- 
ment, promotion, and marketing. World demand is not a 
static conception. The Caribbean can influence the formation 
of this, as indeed any other country. The mistake of 
throwing the baby out with the bath water must therefore 
be avoided at all costs. What seems to be required is a 
line of development that does not make the energy-intensive 
sector the central thrust or an end in itself, but sees 
the development of this sector exclusively as a means of 
extending the net foreign exchange earning potentil of 
Trinidad-Tobago's resources. From this vantage point, 
strict criteria developed around this requirement shuld 
determine what form of development the natural gas should 
take. This should then be combined with )plans fo the 
effective use of the foreigr -hange so aco. d before 
one can determine the Uj ur OtiT of expi 
or monetizing this resource. From the data available me 
tuis does not seem to have been the rationale in the 
feasibility studies for the project. Net foreign exchange 
earnings did not weigh as heavily in the investment 
decisions as projected indutrial diversification brought 
about by this type of development. This type of indu3traai 
development, however, is similar to the processing of 
sugar, or the production of alumina, since it is not geared 
to the needs of local and regional people and as an 
extension of this the world market, but seems to be 
directed 
abroad as another typical Third World export industry 
project based on an abundant natural resources. 
The final lesson to tbe drawn is that the 
perpetuation of economies vulnerable to adverse shifts in 
world demand of this magnitude is to the particular dis- 
advantage of the poor and the powerless, since in the 
downard adjustments of economic activity and decline in 
real incomes, which are then deemed "necessary", they will 
be forced to carry Ghe dis-proportionate burden. Retrench- 
ment, cuts in social expenditures bythe state, removal of 
subsidies and increases in domestic prices, devaluation and 
its impact on the price level, all have placed their burdens 
first on foremost on the underciasses of the society. The 
effect of this is all the more significant when it is taken 
into account that in the boom years depite the focus on 
the social sector and public utilities, it is estimated that 
the distribution of income showed little improvement. In 
their text Barry et al cite a figure of the top ten percent 
of households receiving one-third of the income, while the 
bottom O percent get only 10 percent In the period 1975- 
1976 Using his own calculations on the basis of the 1980 
census, Ramsarar. concluded that "there is no reason to 
believe that the situation has improved significantly 
since". The decline in incomes is likely, given other 
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circumstances to bring with it an increase in social tensions, 
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particularly as many hold the view that the past ability 
of the ruling classes to maintain their rule has depended 
on the rapid growth in wealth of the ruling classes in the 
country to the point where enough crumbs have fallen to 
the poor, thus relieving them of the need to implement 
major measures in this area. As Sandoval points out: 
"the triumvirate formed by the state, 
the local and foreign bourgeoisie has 
evolved without major friction up to 
1981. Each part has found room to 
manoeuvre at the economic level. This 
has been possible because of the 
availability of economic surplus which 
has so far remained buoyant in terms 
cf volume and va]ue". 
He then goes on to war±i that: 
"the propects for contiited buoyancy 
are, however, not clear". 14/ 
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CHAPTER 13: SMALL COUNTRIES IN A BIG WORLD : METRO- 
POLITAN VS CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION 
I Introduction 
The Caribbean sea. embraces the world's largest 
concentration of small and mini-states. This balkanization 
of the region isa direct outgrowth of the pattern of pene- 
tration, conquest, and settlement of the area which was 
outlined in Part I of this study. If we exclude minor 
European possessions such as those of Denmark, four major 
European-empire systems have historically operated in the 
region, each promoting its own exclusive monopoly zones by 
means of tight control over metropole-colonial relations. 
With frequent changes in possessions following in the wake 
of continuous Europen wars of rivalry, what eventually 
emerged was a bewildering array of small island possessris 
speaking different languages, practicing different religions, 
and developing different customs in the wake of the over- 
arching influences of the particular metropolitan power 
whose influence prevailed over the others. With European 
settlers, African slaves, and Asian indentured workers 
being the principal ways of settling the region up to the 
end of the 19th century, what emerged in the 20th century 
was a region comprised of a number of ethnic groups: 
Hispanics, Africans, Indians, Europeans, and indigenous 
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Amerindian peoples. Also, with considerable racial 
intermingling taking place, a strong "creole" group also 
emerged. The movement for independence in the 19th and 
20th centuries resulted in a number of independent states 
being formed, and although this considerably weakened the 
separateness and exclusivity of the influence of the Euro- 
pean imperial powers in the region, it was substituted by 
the 20th century expansion of US imperialism. With its 
colonial possessions and Cold War dealings in the region 
(Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Cuba and Grenada under 
Bishop) the United States has strengthened the barriers 
historically dividing the region. 
Although imperial policy, ethnicity, religion, 
class and culture have fostered the growth of obsessive 
individualism and encouraged deep divisions wirh te 
region, paradoxically, long before neo-classicai- customs 
union theory was developed in the 1950's and began to 
promote the welfare improving effects of freer trade 
among groupings of countries as a "second-best" option 
to free trade in the world as a whole, there was recognition 
that there could be benefits from economic cooperation in 
the region. As Gordon Lewis pointed out: 
"the recognition of the semThal truth that 
only a unified Caribbean, economically and 
politically, can save the region from its 
fatal particularism is at least a century 
old". 1/ 
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The premise of this view is that 
there was a history and 
culture of unity within the region, 
even though it was 
manifestly true that the legacy 
of divisions and diversity 
prevailed. From this starting 
point, it was claimed that 
operating as a group each unit's 
capacity to survive, and 
perhaps even protect or promote 
its interests in a "big 
world" where war and violence 
are endemic, would be 
enhanced. This view was even 
more strongly expressed in 
relation to the very small countries, 
or mini-states, as 
they are now termed. Historically, 
these views on the 
potential of economic cooperation 
were expressed by a wide 
variety of interests, 
the 
(and even to Colonial 
ranging from colonial officials 
Office itself from time to time) to 
individual planters, writers, and 
even early labour leaders 
in the region; a good example 
of the last being Cipriani-'s 
resolution in support of economic 
union at the 1926 
regional labour conference which 
was passed with only the 
delegates from Guyana (British 
Guiana) expressing 
reservations. 
To observe this "seminal truth" 
as Gordon Lewis 
terms it, hweVer, should not mask 
the fact that the notion 
of integration which was promoted 
by these various sectors 
was more often than not inconsistent 
in both form and 
content. Thus it was that the 1897 
Royal Commission proposed 
a federation of Barbados and 
the Windward Islands, while the 
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Closer Union Committee of 1932 
proposed a "loose grouping" 
of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands. Again, while the 
1882 
Royal Commission had proposed 
an "ultimate federation" 
of the region, that established 
in 1897 opposed such 
"strong 
unity", and indeed even 
objected to the earlier proposal 
of a unified civil service. 
The Caribbean Labour Congress 
of 1938 which supported integration 
included Bahamas, Belize 
and Guyana fl their proposals, 
but the Moyne Commi zion of 
the same period saw integration 
as a far of "ideal and 
made it a puint to stress 
the difficulty of providing 
adequate transPortation and 
cheap effective communication 
to 
service such wideareaifec0flbm1c 
union was tobe meaningful. 
of striking significance 
also, is the fact that all 
the 
views of thiS period confined 
themselves to the British 
possessions in the area. 
II: West Indian Federati-ofl 
The Colonial Initiative 
The end result of all, this 
was that after 1958 
under British goveInmeflt 
urgings, guidance, and tutelage, 
a Federation of ten 
West Indian islands was formed. 
This 
lasted for four years, 
it being formally dissolved 
in 1962. 
The birth and demise 
of this short-lived experiment 
in 
integration is instructive 
and although we cannot obvioUSly 
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go into anydetail in this text, for our 
purposes there are 
two major lessons to be learnt from 
this experience. The 
first and foremost of these is that 
plans to integrate the 
region from above, particularly if 
they take the form of, 
and are largely confined to, creating 
a new administrative 
agreement among existing go\ernmental 
structures, are 
bound to end up in failure. Historical 
divisions within 
the region, combined with ruling class 
interests which are 
not organically lrked to those of the 
broad mass of the 
region's working people and peasants, 
are a certain recipe 
for disaster. The Federation of 1958 
was promoted as 
dmjniStratively convenient , particularly to 
the imperial 
power which found dealing with a 
multiplicity of small 
states as independence approached a 
real burden. It was 
thIs motivation which led the British 
government to 
promote the idea 0ftapPr0P1ae5s of 
federation in the 
region and to link it with the împlicit 
recognition that 
it was a route to constitutional development 
and possibly 
independence of the region. As Gordon 
Lewis has again 
observed in his study of this 
period: 
"British opinion ..,. throughout viewed 
federation, not as a vehicle for West 
Indian self_government, but, over- 
whelmingly, as a problem of colonial 
administra-t ive convenience. Examination 
of the voluminous documentation of 
that 
opinion in Westmini-ster debates, royal 
commission reports, Colonial Office 
memoranda and the published correspondence 
between the Colonial Secretary and 
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individual West Indian governors shows 
that the most persistently recurring 
reason evoked in support of federation 
was the greater economy and the improved 
administrative efficiency it was supposed 
federation would bring about". 3/ 
Important as administrative economies nay be in a unified 
as distinct from fragmented region of small states, in 
retrospect it is clear that this could hardly sustain a 
social project of this magnitude. 
The second major lesson to be drawn from the ill- 
fated federal experiment is that although integration 
arrangements may be expressed in legal instruments (treaties, 
agreements, institutions, laws, etc) the real capacity to 
sustain the process of integratThn depends upon the extent 
of development of internal social forcc: n favour of it. 
Again I would argue that in the West Indies the best measure 
of this development is the nature and extent of the involve- 
ment of the poor and the traditionally powerlessness in the 
region in the process. The thrust of this observation is 
that integration cannot be measured laiei' by institutional 
mechanisms, important as the perfection of these are to the 
eventual success of the process of integratio}. The 
observation made here is reinforced if we were to consider 
two examples of particular significance to the region. The 
1177. 
first is that the British Empire itself, in so 'ar as. it 
brought together the territories under one Crown into one 
framework of legal, commercial, and financial ties with 
common preferential margins, regimes of exchange rates, 
capital movement arrangements, investment laws and so on, 
could only be considered a form of integration ii' this 
were measured solely by the extent of the instituional 
bringing together of the countries. Yet the historical 
experience has been that in the period of strvggle for 
independence, both the ruling classes in the region, as 
well as the "forward't sections of the British ruling classes 
saw the dismemberment of its empire as a necessary prelude 
to progress in the direction of genuine unity and integration. 
By similar parity of reasoning it may be argued that in 
today's neo-colonial world, th» TNCs which spread across 
the region have a de facto control and integration of 
resources that is quite considerable. A major thrust of 
this work has been, however, that if the development of 
the region is made primarily subject to the logic of the 
corporate interests of the TNCs ir the region, then in 
fact its further disintegration and disunity would prevail. 
The root of the argument therefore is that the 
best approach to evaluating the process of regional 
integration is through an analysis of the social (class) 
content of the process. In other words we must proceed 
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by asking such questions as: whose class interests 
does 
the integration movement advance? Does it alleviate 
unemployment, redress social inequities in income and 
wealth, or does its benefits mainly swell the profits of 
the TNCs? Does it struggle against dependency, distorted 
production structures, and the regionTs peripherl1zation 
in the global process of accumulation, or does it reinforce 
the absence of autonomous and internally articulated 
sources of expansion? Does it bring an end to uneven 
capitalist development and polarized çrowth? Whose 
interests 
are best served in the expansior of ra regional trade 
and nvestnlent? Such questions go to the heart of the 
social issues and the lesson to be drawn from considering 
the failure of the federal experiment is that our 
assessment 
of Caricom which follows, mu ,oceed on the basis of 
this method. 
The Federal experircflt foundered in 1961 when 
Norman Manley then Premier of Jamaica decided to hold a 
Referendum to determine whether Jamaica should continue 
to participate. Among. the m'y reasons for this develop- 
ment two ttood out. One was ;he alienation of the Jamaican 
people, as indeed the rest of 'e West Indian masses from 
the process of negotiation which were taking placc at 
the 
"top". This permitted the Opposition to painting a picture 
which portrayed Jamaica as being forced to carry the 
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"burden" of the smaller poorer states, as 
Brit&n gave up 
its responsibilities to the area and off-loaded 
it to 
Jamaica. If this occurred, then it was argued 
that the 
benefits of Jamaica's new found wealth, bauxitealumina 
and tourism, would be diverted from the masses 
of Jmtcaan 
people and used to subsidize the poorer slands0 
The 
second reason for this development was that 
the policy of 
industrialization by invitation was gaining 
considerable 
momentum in Jamaica and It wa argued in business 
and 
political circles at the time that although 
a strong 
federal government would provide the framework 
for an 
enlargement of the market, its polici 
might negate the 
advantages the government of Jamaica had already 
secured 
in dealing with foreign capital. Not 
surprisingly, sImilar 
views also pre\ailed in Trinidad at the time. 
As 'ie then 
Secretaiy of the Caribbean Lbour Congress observeth 
"The reason for this change of policy 
was that Mr. Manley's whole conception 
of how to industrialize had changed. 
He now saw industrialiZati3fl not as a 
process to take place und local owner- 
ship and against the intei sts of 
imperialism, but as a proc ss actually 
to be performed by foreign investors 
He therefore no longer wanted strong 
federal government with power to control 
investment in the entire area. Instead 
he wanted a weak central government, so 
that he would have the right to pursue 
an independent policy of attracting 
foreign capital by tax and other incen- 
tives to Jamaica". I 
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When Jamaica withdrew after the Referendum, Eric 
Williams 
made his famous pronouncement on behalf of Trinidad: 
one 
from ten leaves nought0 
The ability of the local political elites to 
change positions derived from the fact that by 1959 
both 
Jamaica and Trinidad had received internal self-government 
from Britain and it was no longer their belief that 
federation was a necessary route to independence. 
Britain 
was clearly exhausted by war anda rapidly disintegrating 
empire. Independen forD the West Indies, except 
possibly 
Guyana where a strong Marxist-led party had emerged 
was 
more or less there for the taking. Previously I had 
sunmxed up the argument as follows: 
"when these lessons are put togethei 
what we find emerging as a fundamental 
conclusion, is that the West Indian 
Federation collapsed because it was 
conceived essentially as a colonial 
arrangement to protect colonial interests. 
This, however, was introduced at a time 
when the masses were on a strong offensive 
against colonialism and the petty- 
bourgeois leadership of the period had 
airedy been cmmitted to the struggle 
for constitutional independence. This 
did not imply by any means a fundamental 
breach between the interests of imperialism 
and the nationalist interests of the ruling 
political elites, On the contrary ... to 
the extent that the petty bourgeois 1ea1er- 
ship represented the interests of national 
capital, they were against colonialism and 
colonial arrangements". 5/ 
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As ironic post-script to the analysis of this section is 
that Demas a former Secretary-General of Caricom and present 
head of the Caribbean Development Bank in expressing his 
strong pro-integration views tried to revive as late as 
197'1 the view that integration was a route to independence, 
only by then for the smaller states: 
"the best wáy for the non-independent 
countries to sever their constitutional 
links with the United Kingdom would 
seem to be either through the creation 
of an independent state taking the form 
of political union among the Leewand & 
Windward IsThnds, or, preferably, a 
political union embracing all the 
English-speaking countries in the Eastern 
Caribbean". 6/ 
It was, however, too late for imperial wishes and 
bureaucratic goadingst0 have their way. 
III: From Carifta to Caricom 
After the collapse of the West Indian Federation, 
annual meetings of the heads of governments were held to 
try and preserve areas of cooperation, some of which had 
in fact preceeded the Federation (e.g. University of the 
West Indies), as well as to explore other areas of 
cooperation, outside a formal federal structure. By 
December 1965, a situation was reached whereby the 
governments of Antigua, Barbados and Guyana agreed to form 
a modest three-country Caribbean Free Trade Association. 
Three years later on May 1, 1968, the Treaty came into 
force and within three months this was expanded to permit 
the participation of the original ten of the Federation, 
plus Guyana. Later Belize (l974) and the Bahamas (1983) 
joined. Two factors favoured this development. One was 
that the government in Guyana had come to power through 
electoral manipulation undertaken in connivance with 
British and American authorities and Burnham no doubt saw 
in the Caribbean a "population counterweight" to the 
ethnic advantage which he presumed Cheddit Jagan and his 
party held in Guyana. Integration was therefore, something 
of an alteinative to the rigged elections which were to 
follow. The second factor favouring this deve1oprnt was 
that Britain was about to join the EEC, and when that 
came about the preferential status which the region 
enjoyed in the UK market as well as any moral claims 
to her resources would have been in severe jeopardy. This 
therefore prompted a collective effort to put political 
pressure on Britain to settle with the region as a 
condition of entry to the EEC. 
The Carifta arrangement which came in force in 
1968, represented a minimum degree of integration in that 
its principal integrative mechanism was the phased freeing 
of intra regional trade. No requirement was there for 
the region to have uniform external trade arrangements, nor 
to promote a common market for the other productive factors, 
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labour and capital. Carifta was, in other words, 
neither a customs union, nor a common market, but instead 
a mere free trade zone. The arrangement also did not have 
included in it any compensatory mechanisms to cater for 
the likely mal-distributional effects on the smaller and! 
or poorer territories of a regime of freer trade within 
the region. A1though the Caribbean Development Bank 
was estàblished in this period (1970) it was not formally 
part of the integration structure and was seen solely as 
a device for raising cheap capital outside the region. 
In so far as the region's production structure is oriented 
to export sals in metropolitar) markcts and it is here 
therefore, that ucompetition among the territories would 
confine itself if free trade markét principles were to be the 
sole guide for the integration movement, it was correctly 
aiiticipated that the gains from such trade were likely 
to be at best, very minimal. In order, therefore, to 
artificially promote a competitiv' structure within the 
region a long list of commodities was deemed to have 
been produced in the region and so eligible for free trade, 
whether they were or not, and this list was appended to 
the agreement. As we shall see latei this provision was 
carried over to its successor arrangement, Caricom, and 
was not abandonned until 1981. 
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It did not take much astuteness for the 
architects of Carifta to realize that the agreement 
could 
not have survived for long in the form it was0 Shortly 
thereafter, it was replaced by a new arrangement when in 
1973 signatories to the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
established 
the Caribbean Common Market and Community (CARICOM). 
This 
new arrangement heralded as a 
tideepening of the integration 
process" was unlike its predecessor based on three 
pillars, 
namely: 
(i) A Common Market which provides for trade 
and 
economic cooperation based not only on free trade as 
in 
the earlier agreement, but with a common external 
tariff, 
the commitment to the progressive removal of non-tariff 
barriers to trade, harmonized fiscal incentivs, and free 
intra-regioflal capital movements. No ¿xplicit 
provisions 
were made for the free movement of labour. In 
practice 
the customs tariffs of Belize and Montserrat continue 
to 
exist as anomalies in relation to this general rule, while 
Article 28 of the Annex of the treaty contains a 
provision 
which allows countries to reverse these mechanisms and 
impose restrictions on trade and capital movements if 
there are serious balance_of-payments difficulties. 
Furthermore, the uniform external tariff of CARICOM 
co- 
exists with a common external tariff arrangement among 
the 
sub_grouping of the smaller countries (Leewards and 
Windwards) 
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which operate in the larger body through a joint 
initiative in the form of the Eastern Caribbean Common 
Market. 
Functional areas of cooperation based on a 
number of inter-Ministerial Committees in areas such as 
health, education, labour, finance, agriculture, industry, 
transport, energy, mining and natural resources, science 
and technology, as well as agreed programmes to develop 
production and distribution structures for food and 
industry, along with cooperation in the development of a 
communications and transport infra-structure to se'vice 
the region. In addition to these, there is provision or 
ad hoc cooperation in such areas as legal affairs, 
information, and women's affairs. 
The coordination of foreign policies. This 
provision is boasted as being unique in integration 
arrangements, although the EEC treaties do contain 
provisions for political cooperation, subsuming in these 
cooperation in foreign policy. There is no other 
integration treaty with the formal Incorporation of the3pcffIc 
requirement to coordinate foreign policies. 
7/ 
The Caricom agreement operates through two 
principal organs and a number of institutions, associated 
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institutions, and subsidiary committees and agencies0 
The two principal organs are the Reads of Government 
Conferences which are supposed to be held annually, but 
only seven annual meetings have been held between 1973 
and 1986, and the Common Market Council of Ministers. The 
former has overall responsibility for the development of 
the integration movement and is the highest decision making 
authority; the latter has general responsbility for 
supervising the operations and development of the common 
market areas of the agreement. The main institutions of 
the community comprise a number of Prmanent Standing 
Commitees f Ministers, each of which is charged with the 
responsibility of formulating policies and performs all 
tie necessary functions required to achieve the objectives 
of the Community in its respective sphere of competence. 
In addition to these institutions, a number of' regional 
bodies are deemed to be associate institutions, these 
include the Caribbean Development Bank, the Caribbean 
Examinations Council, the Council of Legal Education, the 
University of Guyana, the University of the West Indies, 
the Caribbean Meterological Organization , and the West 
Indies Shipping Corporation. There are also a number of 
permanent subsidiary committees which have been created 
in areas such as customs administration, statistical 
services, air transportation, airfares and rates, tax 
administration, national planning; agricultural marketing, 
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and oils and fats production and sales. Finally, 
in 
this review of the institutional arrangements note 
should 
be taken of the sub-regional grouping of the 
smaller states 
which form the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States. 
This was established in 1981 and was predated by the ECCM 
referred to above which was formed in i968 In both the 
Caricom arrangement and the OECS there are secretariats. 
Caricom's is locatedin Guyana, while the OECS' has its 
main 
common market offices in Antigua. 
IV: Performance 
Trade 
Despite the apparently complex and far ranging 
associations implicit to the description of Caricom 
in 
the preceeding section, the common market arrangements 
still form the central core of the agreement. 
While these 
arrangements were supposed to represent a 
deepening of 
the integratiOflProcess, moving from a free trade 
zone 
to a common market for productive factors 
based on a 
harnoflizatiofl of external tariffs, tax and 
incentives 
regimes, etc, the fact of the matter is that intra- 
Caricom trade during the period 1973-1985 has never 
moved beyond the 9-10 percent of total trade established 
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during the Carifta years. In 
absolute terms, however, 
this trade has grown from US$7 million in imports in 
1967, the year before Carifta came into 
force, to 
approximately US$330 million by l98. As the data in 
Table 13l show, there were annual fluctuations in the 
ratio of intra-regioflal imports to total 
imports, the 
figures ranging from 7.5 percent to 9.8 percent between 
1973 and l984. For domestic exports the range 
for the 
same periodwas larger 8.1 to 13.1 percent. As it would 
be expeLted, the trading pattern which 
has emerged in 
Caricom reflects the patterns of the 
regional economy 
already revealed. First, exports of oil 
from Trinidad- 
Tobago is the major traded commodity 
accounting for 
about 40 percent of regional trade 
and 75 percent of its 
exports to the region. In turn 
the prosperity of Trinidad- 
Tobago has resulted in its import 
market growing from 
about one-seventh of total regional 
imports in 1973 to 
about one-third in the 1980's. Indeed jf petroleum is 
excluded, it accounted for about 
one-half of regional 
imports in the 1980's. Second, rice has continued to be 
the significant traded agrtcultUral 
item in the region, 
although declining production in 
Guyana has seen dramatic 
fal1;S in this in recent years0 Between 1981 and 1982 
rice 
sales fell by one half from about US$27 
million (or 8% 
of total imports) to $US15 million. 
A third significant 
feature is the growth of intra-regiOflal 
trade which has 
TABLE 13.1 
CARICOM TRADE AS A % OF TOTAL. TRADE (Selected Years) 
IMPORTS DOMESTIC IMPORTS 
Year Year & 
SOURCES: Caricom Bulletin and Caricom Perspectives 
(Various Issues). 
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1967 5.0 1967 6.3 
1973 7.5 1973 10.3 
19714 7.1 1974 7.3 
1975 8.6 175 8.3 
1976 7.6 1976 88 
1977 7.8 1977 8.1 
1978 8.0 1978 8,6 
1979 9.3 1979 9.2 
1980 9.8 1980 8.7 
1981 9.6 1981 9.9 
1982 8.9 1982 12.0 
1983 9.2 1983 13-1 
1984 9.8 Q 198'4 11.7 
Lo. 
occurred in the output of the new import-substitution 
sectors. This has had two aspects to it. One is the 
significant growth of trade among the larger and more 
industrially developed territories (Jamaica, Trinidad- 
Tobago and Barbados) and the other is the import- 
substitution activities based on the regional market 
which 
have been located by some TNCs in the smaller OECS states. 
The result has been that while the larger states accounted 
for about 80 percent of jtra-regiOflal trade, the regional 
market for the exports of the OECS countries had increased 
from eleven percent of its total exports in 1973 to over 
O percent in the 1980's and most of this was 
"manufactures" 
and non-traditional agricultural crops. 
Although Trinidad-Tobago's market is the larges 
in the region, there is a marked asymetry in that its 
domestic exports to the region only ranged from 7-11 
per- 
cent of its total exports, between 1973-198k. For Barbados, 
the regional market was more significant, representing 
21428 percent of its total domestic exports between 1973- 
1980 (except for one unusual year, 1975, when 
it was only 
18 percent). Over the years 1981-1982 the figure 
averaged 
31percent, but in 1983 there was a drastic decline 
t 
21 percent. Before we examine this drastic decline in 
intra-regioflal trade in recent years, it should 
be 
observed that between 1973 and 1981, Jamaica's exports 
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to the region averaged only 14-7 percent of its domestic 
exports, but had risen to 11 percent over the years 1981- 
1982. Guyana's protracted economic distress distorts the 
significance of this figure, however, for the period 1973- 
1982 the ratio of regional exports to total 
exports ranged 
from 13-18 percent. 
In recent years, one of the most striking 
occurrences has been a marked decline in intra-regional 
trade. Between 1981 and 19814 the value of intra-regional 
imports fell from us$L156 million to US$335 million, a 4 
decline of over one-quarter. Several factors important 
to an understanding of the integration process are 
responsible for this result and we shall refer to these 
briefly here. First as eeonom difficulties have multi- 
plied in Jamaica and Guyana their exchange rates have 
depreciated0 As we observed previously Jamaica moved 
to 
a multiple rate system as well as devaluing the currency. 
Between 1977 and 19814 the exchange rate of Jamaica fell 
from J$1:US$1.l to J$1US$O.20. In 1985 the exchange 
rate of the Jamaican dollar at one of the weekly auctions 
fell as low as 15 cents US. At the same time the Guyana 
dollar fell in value from 39 cents US in 1980, to P214 
cents 
US. The effect of these developments was to considerably 
dislocate intra-regional trade. Secondly, as we have 
also previously discused, in the wake of the economic. 
crisis, these two countries in particular have imposed 
serious restrictions on both global imports and those 
from sister Caricom states. Thus between 1981 and l98L, 
Jamaica was able to halve its imports from Caricom. This 
led to retaliation in the form of restrictions on Caricom 
imports into the more successful Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago markets. Thus in Trinidad & Tobago a system 
of import/licenring as introduced, which required exchange 
approval for all foreign transactions, includig those 
within Caricom. In Barbados the government let its 
currency float against the Jamaican dollar as a response 
to what it termed Jmaica's 'discriminatory treatment' 
of its exports to that country. As economic difficulties 
also emerged in Trinidad & Tobago and Barbados (although 
to a far lesser extent than Guyana and Jamaica) protectionist 
sentiment grew. The consequence of this resort to protection 
of the national markét as the first line of defence, was 
to intensify the process of contracting intra-regional 
trade. To make the disaster worse, the community's sole 
trade facilitating mechanism, the Community Multilateral 
Clearing Facility (CMCF) collapsed in 1983, as it reahed 
the limit of its credit granting powers: US$100 million. 
At that point Guyana alone was indebted to over US$96 
million, with Barbados being owed US$60 million by Guyana. 
As this debt has not since been repaid, the community now 
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strictly balanced trade, particularly in relation to trade 
with Guyana. However, since that country's difficulties 
are reflected in an inability to produce, this has 
operated as a strong downward drag on intra-regional trade. 
While each of the above mentioned factors had 
a significant negative impact on intra-regional trade, the 
overriding circumstance which haE preIispo sed the Community 
to these developments is in fact the continued weakness and 
vulnerability of the region's economy. As we have already 
seen in sorne detail, national policies in the region have 
produced a considerable duplication nf protected high-cost 
import substitution enterprises, and now each of these 
enterprises seeks to ekploit the regional market where 
possible in ordr to benefit from possible scale economies. 
When difficulties occur, the resort to protection by 
individual governments seems to them the only logical 
recourse if these inefficient local producers are to 
survive. Moreover, in so far as this type of structure 
of production is generally very import intensive, it is 
in fact very vulnerable to external shocks. The result of 
this is that there are severe limits to the benefits to be 
derived from trade and market oriented cooperation in the 
region, given its inherited production structures. 
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The system of rules by which ti e trade arrange- 
ments of Caricom operate, were from the very inception in 
favour of protecting the positions of the newly created 
manufacturing sectors in each of the national economies. 
The principal device for doing this was the creation of 
an origin system based on the "value-added criteron"0 
This stated that if 50 percent of the value of a product 
was created in the region, then it qualified to be treated 
as a local product. This was then foll.wed by a long list 
of basic materials which existed in the Carifta agreement 
and which made exceptions to this criterion. Thus I made 
the observation earlier: 
"Both in its implementation and conception 
(and here a close study of the Treaty is 
relevant), rebent integration efforts have 
sought consistently to underwrite, protect, 
and advance the positions of the MNCs in 
the region. Thus Schedule II (Appendix of 
the Treaty) gives a list of products which 
are always to be treated as having been 
produced in the region, irrespective of 
where in fact they have been actually pro- 
duced: 
'These materials may always be regarded as 
originating wholly within the Common Market 
when used in the state described in this 
list in a process of production within the 
Common Market'. 
This is then followed by twelve foolscap 
pages listing products ranging through 
apples, grapes, rye, barley, oats, semo- 
lina, linseed, wheat, paper, silk, wool, 
iron, steel in all forms, copper, nickel, 
tungsten, zinc, printing and writing paper 
etc. Some of the items are so general as 
to include hundreds of sub-categories, one 
example being the item: "all other non- 
ferrous base metals, whether wrought or un- 
wrought". 8/ 
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After much criticism, in 1981 this system 
was modified 
the 
First, basic materials list of exceptions 
was reduced and 
permitted to be used only by the 
smaller territories of the 
OECS sub_groupingo Secondly, specific 
consideration. was 
given to the natural produce of the region, 
which was 
declared eligible for preferential 
treatmen, as wellaS 
the products exclusively produced 
from these, e.g., minerals, 
agricultural products, livestock and 
marine products. Third, 
the criterion was introduced wher&Dy 
a product had to be 
ttsubstantially transformed?t, if it 
was to qualify for Caricom 
benefits. Measures of this are either 
specified in certain 
processes, or require the product 
to move from one level 
of classification in the Custom& Cooperation 
Council 
Nomenclature to another. This fact, 
however, that these 
regulations have iiot threatened a 
single significant 
producer which was trading under the 
old rules is proof 
enough that there has been no actual 
substantial trans- 
formation of requirements under 
the rules of origin. Once 
again there is a further talk in 
business and government 
circles about the need for further 




The areas of functional cooperation listed above 
cover many fields and some of these have resulted in 
important new regional institutions or initiatives. These 
include the formation of a regional secondary schools 
examinations systems, a regional news network (CANA), the 
establishment of a technical assistance program to help the. 
smaller states, coope2atiLn. in health training, and the 
institutionalization of a regional festival of the 
creative arts . Without doubt, however, the major target 
area for regional cooperation has been product ion, and 
here the focus has been cri the development of a coordinated 
regional programme for food and industrial production. 
In the area. of food production, however, although there 
have been limited joint efforts in training and human 
resource development, research, and intra-regional 
marketing, the main hope of building up a regional capacity 
to replace imported food is far from realization. As the 
Secretary-General of Caricom himself has observed very 
recently: 
'tseveral reviews of various sub-sector., 
needs have been undertakén and efforts 
made to build up institutional arrange- 
ments, essentially in the form of the 
Caribbean Food Corporation, to intervene 
directly in the food production situation. 
Much of this had its Impetus in the 
resolve, during the first half of the 197,Ots, 
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to make theflegion more self- 
sufficient in food and thus réduce 
the regional food import bill. 
Regrettably, however, the first 
twelve years of Caricom have not 
produced any serious dent in the over- 
all food import bill, and if anything 
it has been increasing". 9/ 
A similar frank observation was made by him about cooperation 
in the area of industrial programming: 
"In the area of industrial programming, 
the first twelve years of Caricom have 
come and gone without seeing the first 
formally recognized regional industries 
going into productic"i". 10/ 
This position echoes that of the Group of Experts appointed 
by Caricom to deliberate on the future of Caricom: 
"Efforts to programme industrial production 
on a regional basis have been slow and 
disappointing". 11/ 
The real significance of the two observations cited above 
stems from the consideration that efforts in these 
directions are seen by its proponents in the integration 
movement as fundmental corrections to the inherited 
patterns of regional production and consumption, as well 
as the limitations of post-war industrial experience and 
the neglect of agriculture. In this view regional 
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industrial programming is intended to promote the 
development of basic industries, foster the growth of a 
capital goods sector, generate technological development 
and the spread of skills, and in so doing provide the basis 
for an integrated, autonomous system of regional production. 
Such a regional approach is expected not only to draw upon 
the benefits of a wider regional market, but also provide 
a larger catchment area for natural resources and skills, 
through regional planning. In other words the proponents 
of this view have seen in this effort an attempt to 
approach the earlier positioi advocated by Brewster and 
Tho2nas, that integration "should not be limited to those 
conditions which govern the exchange of goods, but should 
also include in its perspective the integrated production 
12/ 
of goods . - In the Brewster and Thomas formulations, 
integration could not be judged (nor should it be), 
primarily by the extent to which previously imported manu- 
factures were produced in the region, but instead by the 
extent to which it harnessed basic resource inputs and 
developed the requisite skills and technology to meet the 
needs of the Caribbean people and so reduce the wide 
diparity between the inherited structures of domestic 
demand and domestic resource use which was systematically 
reproducing itself through time, on an extended scale. 
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Significant for our purposes, is the fact that 
the Group of Experts who deliberated on the future of 
Caricom had come to the conclusion that industrial production 
(and employment) was key to the success of Caricom. 
"It is our view that to a very con- 
siderable extent the success of 
Caricom hinges on the extent to 
which the operation of the Caricom 
arrangements leads to increased 
industrial production and employ- 
ment in the countries of the 
region". 13/ 
In similar vein, proponents of agricultural programming 
vrithin the integration novement have seen this as a 
transformation device, that is a means of implementing a 
regional food and nutrition plan targeted at achieving a 
regional production of a minimum of 80 percent of the 
energy and 60 percent of the protein consumed in the 
region, and making available along with imports on a daily 
basis the minimum recommended per capita dietary allowances 
of protein and energy for the region's, population as a 
whole. This is to be achieved through a restructuring of 
regional output and demand and through collective efforts 
a. greater regional self-sufficiency. In turn these required 
increased output of food and other agricultural products 
for the local and export market, a marked reduction of 
post harvest losses, adequate marketing, and improved 
food processing. The supports for all of these were to be 
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put in place through a massive collective effort of self- 
reliance: research, training, storage, transportation, land 
reform, credit, availability of vital inputs, etc. 
The failure of Caricom to achieve any of the 
major objectives' of the food, and nutrition plan, when 
combined with an equal failure to achieve anything 
significant in the area of industrial programming has meaht 
that Caricom has been unable to function so far as a 
medium for transforming the regional econQmy, even from 
the standpoint of its own piincipEil architects. 
Coodination of Foreign Policy 
It has been claimed that tue idea of ir.luding 
the coordination of foreign policies as a specific feature 
of the Caricom treaty grew out of earlier regional experiences 
in negotiations with the EEC, (which led to the formation 
of the African-Caribbean-Pacific croup), the region's 
negotiations with Canada for a successor arrangement to 
the Canada-West Indies Agreement of 1925, and the Law of 
the Sea negotiations which were of particular importance 
to the island territories of the region. These experiences 
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certainly showed that a collective voice carried more 
weight than that of the térritories separately. As a 
result it was possible for the four independent territories 
to take joint action in 1972 and break the US isolation of 
Cuba in the region, by recognizing that country as a specific 
assertion of the regionTsthindepefldeflcefl and its right to 
pursue a "Caribbean identity" through fraternal relations 
with all Caribbean states. Since the formation of Caricom 
in 1973 the major areas- of coordination of foreign policies 
have been as follows: 
j) joint work in the promotion of the interests, and 
protection of small island states in the international 
community, especially protection from the threat of 
1private mercenary invasiOn 
a joint call for the declaration of the Caribbean 
as a Zone of Peace; 
regional support for the view that ideolcgica 
pluralism ts an irreversible fact of international relations 
and should not therefore constitute a barrier to t-ie 
strengthening of the mechanisms of Caricom (Declaration 
of the Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Foreign 
Ministers, St. Lucia). 
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iv) regional support for Guyana and Belize in their 
territorial disputes; 
y) a joint statement condemning destabilization 
which it was alleged was being directed at Manley in Jamaica 
and Burnham in Guyana; and 
vi) a unified reaction of a somewhat critical nature 
to the limited perspective of Reagan's Caribbean Basin 
Init at ive. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the combined 
cLcumstances of a heightened cold-war betweer1 tL US 
and the USSR following Reagan's presidency, confro.ií 
in the region as reflected in the differences whi 
at the time of the invasion of Grenada, US support& ,tacks 
on Nicaragua, the near simultaneous rise to power of itgan 
and Seaga, have undermined any progressive orientatiou 
or regional concensus on foreign policy issues. The 'e.sult 
has been that at the Hea.ds of Government meetings held 
since the in'vasion of Grenada, there has been studied 
efforts to avoid controversial foreign policy issués. 
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Before leaving this topic it should be noted 
that the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers which is 
responsible for the coordination of foreign policy is, 
unlike other functional inter-ministerial committees, not 
given any decision-making authority. In part this is 
attributable to fears about giving a supra-national 
status to Caricom, and the fact that as with most other 
Third World countries independent relatiOns with other 
states in the world system is seen as the highest 
expression of sovereignity . This position is further 
reinforced by a provision of the Treaty which requires 
that the changing of any of it provisions must be on the 
basis of a unanimous decision of all the participating 
countries. 
V: Evaluation 
The process of economic integration among a 
group of countries is never a neutral one, since that 
process represents more than the simple coming together 
of a group of countries. All actions in the pursuit of 
integration are directly or indirectly linked to one or 
other set of social (class) interests. It was from this 
peTspectiVe that we arrived at the position in an 
earlier 
section of this chapter that the West Indies Federation 
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did not, and could not have survived, 
because it sought 
to advance the social (class) interests 
of the old 
colonial order, at a time when this was 
already defeated 
by the rise of the anti-colonial and 
nationalist movements. 
In similar vein it might be argued 
that the present 
integration arrangements are ultimately 
an expression of 
the social (class) interests of the 
present political 
leadership fl the region, the emerging 
national bourgeoisie 
which it has helped to found with its 
ufactUring'p0licie5, 
and the TNCs which have dominated 
the economic structure 
of the area. It is because of this 
social (class) content 
that the movement from Carifta to 
Caricom, which is 
represented as a deepening of the integration 
prcess in 
fact has done little more than 
pursue two economic 
objectives, both of which essentiallY 
consolidat at the 
regional level, the capitalist framework 
and market relations 
developed at the individual territory 
level. Put in a 
nutshell, these objectives are: 
j) liberalizing trade, 
harmonizing incentives, 
financing intra-regional transport 
and communications, with 
the a uniform market 
at the regional level 
for the emerging local bourgeoisies 
and their TNC counter- 
parts to exploit; and 
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ii) harmonizing the interests of the various 
national bourgeoisies with the hope that they would support 
a regional programme of providing incentives so that the 
larger market would induce government and TNC participation, 
not only in the final touch assembly industries, where 
these may become necessary, but more fpcuse. in the 
intermediate and capital goods sector. 
The pursuit of these twin objectives has not been 
easy, and indeed Caricom itself has emerged as an arena of 
struggle for secti')rlal e'onomic interests within it. The 
contradiction of both harmonizing and contending interests, 
in the arrangenent, however, is not unusual, since this 
pattern of development characteriZ all capitalist 
endeavourS. Going by that experience what we can say is 
most likely to eventuate is that the indigeneous capitalists 
in those territories where capitalism is already most highly 
developed, will emerge as the dominant section in the 
integration movement, even though itself holding a sub- 
ordinate status in relation to transnationalcapital. This 
means that the integratofl process will yield conflicts 
between local, regional, and transnational capital,! uneven 
development, polarized rowth, and an inequitable distribution 
of the costs and benefits of such growth. Something of 
this sort was no doubt anticipated and that is why the 
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agreement incorporates compensatory mechanisms' as a 
means of encouraging the OECS states to participate. Among 
these mechanisms are: priority access to soft loans 
provided by the CDB, a technical assistance programme 
specifically focussed on their needs, and generally they 
have been provided with longer time frames for implementing 
all the harmonizing arrangements of the Treaty, e.g. 
the common external tariff. 
The sectional economicinterests which exist in 
Caricom are. themsels an important element in the present 
difficulties facing the integration movement. This has been 
manifest in tvo developments, namely, disagreements among 
various national capitals, and disagreements between 
regional capital and the region's political establishments. 
Examples of the former are to be found in the many 
protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbour and retaliatory measures 
which were introduced as the economic crisis worsened. 
These peaked when the Trinidad & Tobago's Manufacturers? 
Association (TTMA), the dominant ecoiomic group in Caricom, 
ca] led for the suspensioii of Caricom trading arrangements 
and its replacement with a system of bilateral arrangements: 
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"The TTMA has been advocating for two 
and a half years the temporary 
suspension of the trading arrangements 
of the Caricom Treaty in order to enable 
a review of these arrangements to take 
place, since current economic conditions 
in the region are significantly different 
from those obtaining in 1973 at the 
formation of Caricom. The instruments of 
trade liberalization in the Caricom Treaty 
are totally inadequate to meet current 
conditions. The TTMÂ's position is 
certainly not one of panic but derives 
from a thorough examination of the trading 
situation... The multilateral nature 
of the treaty prohibits effective measures 
actièn is therefore being taken on a 
bilateral basis". 114/ 
The article then goes on to cite examples. 
There is little 
doubt, however, that given the weight of the 
Trinidad & 
Tobago's market in Caricom, bilateral arrangements 
could 
hardly do less than enhance that country's position in 
the region, and those of the dominant economic 
groups, 
An example of the disagreements between regional 
capital and the political establishment 
surfaced in the 
strong rebuke given by the President of the Caribbean 
Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) in 
his address 
to th Jamaica Exporters Association in June 1985: 
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"At every Heads of Government and Caricom 
Ministerial meeting several decisions are 
taken re the improvement or intra-Caricom 
trade and trading relationships. Yet 
very few, if any, of these decisions are 
implemented at the national level"0 
After citing examples from the Nassau 
Summit in 1985, he 
concludeS 
"this is a serious indictment on our polticial 
leaders and suggests very strongly that at 
the political level, Caricom faces serious 
problems which necessarily impact on intra- 
Caricom trade. These problems include: 
lack of communication, lack of unity, lack 
of commitment on the part of some leaders, 
too much self-interest, and the power 
of national sovereignity over regional 
decisionS". 15/ 
The factional economic interests which 
have hampered the 
development of Caricom are paralleled 
by similar 
factionalism in the political sphere. 
In a period of 
consolidation of nation states, the 
region's ruling 
classes have operat''d on the basis of two 
sets of rules. 
One is to foster economic integration 
in so far as it 
serves their wider class project, and 
to do so whilst 
minimizing the threat of the emergence 
of any supra- 
national authorities. I1he other 
is to cooperate as far 
as possible, in both political and 
security terms so as 
to protect the political status quo 
including in this 
conception the traditional positions 
of opposition parties. 
With such rules in operation the Caricom 
treaty could hardl 
16/ 
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represent more than a minimal form of agreement, certainly 
when judged from the historical imperatives which lie 
behind the need to integrate. The result is that the 
legal provisio'S of the Treaty have been designed to be 
compatible with a wide range of external economic and 
political relations. Thus several countries unabashedly 
advertize the fact that they have client-state relations 
with US imperialism, even as they represent Caricom as a 
serious effort at regional collective self-reliance, 
economic independence, diversification, and structural 
transformation of the region's economy and wider society. 
As the Cold War has intensified and Reaganism has moved 
aggressively in the area, we find today that the earlier 
positions on pluralism, the Caribbean as a zone of peace, 
and so on,,have been more or less silently abandonned. In 
the wake of the Grenada invasion, and Reagan' Caribbeai 
Basin positions a rapid ideologisation and militarization 
of the region are now in train. This issue, however, will 
be taken up in the concluding chapter which follows this. 
In any evaluation of the Caricom experience, 
one should recognize that the economic crisis facing the 
region has had marked political fall-out, particularly in 
one area already referred to, namely, the growth of beggar- 
thy-neighbour policies of protectionism and retaliation. 
Underlying this development are the economic disparitiss 
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witlin the region, particularly the 
skewed population 
distribution in favour of Jamaica, the 
skewed current 
resource availability situation (oil) in 
favour of Trinidad 
and Tobago, and the long-run resource 
advantages possessed 
by Guyana. These disparities will 
always create a 
predispOsitiCl to conflict within the integration 
process, 
unless the region's ruling classes and 
strata are 
capable of acting in consonance with, 
at the very least 
thc long term "nationalist" interests 
of the area. 
Thus Jamaica with about half the region's 
population ha ever since the ddys oi 
the West Indies 
federation been sceptical about the real 
benefits to 
be derived from regional i1itegratiOn. 
Thus under Manley 
they focussed their efforts on the 
wider plane of South- 
South cooperation, and now under Seaga 
North-South 
cooperation is the strategic economic 
imperative. Trinidad & 
Tobago with its new found oil wealth had 
also felt that 
it should call the tune, certainly 
it paid the piper; 
the result was that the failure of 
the Caricom Heads of 
Government to meet for seven years between 1976 
and 
1982. This ha a lot to do 
with Eri'c Williams' pique 
over the fact that despite Trinidad 
& Tobago's. 
generosity to the region, other states 
were pursuing 
policies detrimental to its interests. 
Thus he publicly 
world trade. Ultimately, however, the limitations in 
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referred to the regiont s failure to support BWIA as the 
regional airline, his inability to get a joint aluminum 
project going with Guyana and Jamaica, using these two 
countries bauxite resources and his own couiitryts natural 
gas. Indeed, the final rift occurred when in the midst 
of protracted discussions on the regional aluminum prpject, 
Jamaica announced it was in the process of. negotiating 
a similar arrangement with Mexico. 
An evaluation of Caricom to date must place 
particular emphasis on the fact that it came into existence 
at about the same time that the global crisis of capitalism, 
and particularly the shock of high oil prices were being 
most acutely felt. Such a timing was indeed inopportune. 
However, it cannot be overlooked that the provision of 
the Treaty made the process itself unduly susceptible to 
these external shocks. The arrangements do not include 
any provisions to deal with recessionary conditions in 
the arrangements reflects the limitations of the countries 
which comprised the grouping, and their unwillingness to 
commit to the integration process what was required to 
make it an agent of economic transformation. Thus an 
earlier observation I have made still stands, that is: 
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"ultimately the weaknesses of Carl-Corn 
are the weaknesses of the nation 
states which have created it. If 
at 
a national level the TNCs dominate 
at a regional level they cannot 
but 
do otherwise .. the fact of operatiflg 
regionally cannot by itself resolve 
the basic national issues of ownership 
and control by the people over 
the 
means of production, of the struggle 
to develop a just, humane, and 
socialist society, or the need to 
effecti-vely secure the development 
of 
social andpolitical life. In other 
words, regionalism does not do away 
with classes and the historical- 
materialist base of social development". 
17/ 
A similarly severe judgement 
has been made by one of the 
key architects of the system, 
Dr Eric Williams: 
"it is now clear beyond any possibility 
of doubt that Caribbean integration 
will 
not be achieved in the forseeable 
future 
and that the reality is continued 
Caribbean disunity and even perhaps 
the 
reaffirmation of colonialiSm". 18/ 
This was expressed in evident 
frustration over efforts 
to promote unity as Williams' 
saw it, and was a major 
factor in his government consistent 
avoidance of any 
effortt to convene the highest 
organ of the Community for 
seven years. 
Essential,theref0 as regional integration 
is 
to the permanent eradication 
of the systemic reproduction 
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of poverty and powerlessness among the broad mass 
of 
the region'S people, efforts in this direction as 
expressed 
in the Caricom agreement, do not live up to this 
expect- 
ations. To be successful, the process has to be 
linked 
to another economic strategy, model, and path 
of develop- 
ment than that which has been pursued. For without 
far- 
reaching and effective policy coordination in 
such critical 
areas as, currency rates and foreign reserve 
management, 
monetary and fiscal policies, the movement of labour, 
the 
creation of regimes cf coordinated production, 
exchange 
and consumption, the benefits of integration will 
be, if 
positive, quite minimaJ, and then the flow 
would be 
directed primarily towards the ruling minorities 
of the 
region. ExperieflC would also seem t suggest 
that at 
the present historical conjuncture the emergence 
of 
certain limited forms of supra-nationalism is essential 
for progress. Among these I would stress, a 
regional 
court system, a regional parliament with some 
minimal 
authority, a human rights commission, common codes 
of 
labour and employment practices, and progressive 
freedom 
of movement within the area. There is o course no 
iinediite prospect of any of' this, and so an advance in 
the process of integration, that is its qualitative 
deepening, would seem in the long run to depend very much 
on agents of change, outside the 
established power 
stctUres these are, the Caribbean Conference of 
Churches, 
of intellectual workers, the contacts and relationships 
being developed among such popular organs as trade unions, 
cooperatives, voluntaiy professional and trade associations, 
political parties (of the right and the left). These, 
combined with the practice of legal and illegal inter- 
island migration for work, educaton, and pleasure, the 
family ties which alreàdy exist and develop with each new 
wave of contact, the shared elements of culture in such 
areas as calypso, theatre, and literature, are key to the 
cultivation of a consciousness not only abut the essentialty 
of unity to he region, but also to its naurand he role 
it must play in transforming the regional economy and 
society. At the moment the penetration o2 North American 
ideology, particularly through the electronic media, the 
press, and the school system is the leading edge of cultural 
"development" in the region. Just as the penetration of 
its transnationals and its economic dogmas abo't the 
efficiency of the market place and the private pursuit of 
private gain are the leading edge of economic "development" 
and economic policy prescription. A balkanized region is 
unfortianately, very easy prey to these new forms oft 
dependency. Caricom offers no alternative to this; it is 
an institution of the past, not of a new Caribbean 
society. 
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CHAPTER 1: CRISIS, REACTION, RESPONSE 
THE CARIBBEAN CIRCA 1986 
1. Crisis 
Throughout the Caribbean, the term most widely used 
to describe prevailing conditions is "crisis"; this in itself 
being an indication of the widespread manifestations of 
economic disorder. The recognition of crisis conditions by 
all social layers, however, masks major disagreements over 
the interpretation of the nature of the crisis, its root 
causes, and proposed solutions and remedies. At one level 
of social reality the crisis has been portrayed as reflecting 
internal and external monetary imbalances, and here stress 
is placed on such variables as the rate of inflation, 
government budgetary imbalances, balance-of-payments 
difficulties, lack of foreign reserves, currency overvaluation, 
and external iiidebtedness. Evidence to support this inter- 
pretation is seen in the fact that for the Caricom region, 
the combined balance-of-payments deficit on current account 
(including unrequited transfers) was nearly US$1.5 billion 
at the end of 1q85, with the foreign debt being over 
US$9 billion, that is, over US$1,800 per capita. The 
gçowth in debt has been accompanied by huge losses in foreign 
reserves, particularly in Trinidad-Tobago the region's 
largest holder, while the chronically ill economies of 
Jamaica and Guyana have been in recent years effectively 
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bankrupt due to the mammoth size of accumulated arrears. 
In several countries double digit inflation rates have 
occurred over the past five years, and overvaluation of 
the local currencies has forced several devaluations, 
produced a variety of experiments in multiple exchange rate 
systems, and have also ledto stringent controls on foreign 
exchange movement. With declining incomes, government 
budgetary deficits have also climbed rapidly and these have 
fuelled inflationary 'pressures while inflation in turn has 
discouraged local savings, encouraged capital flight, and 
set in train pressures for higher wage settlements which 
have encouraged the wage-price inflationary spiral. 
While there is a great deal of truth in the above 
description, it clearly does not go far enough. To egin 
with, it does not recognize the extent to which internal 
and external monetary imbalances in the regional economies 
reflect a deeper crisis of growth and development, which 
in turn means that effective analysis of the crisis has to 
be situated in a wider socio-political framework. Consider 
that the picture portrayed by these imbalances acquire a 
deeper significance when we take into account that for most 
of the region real rates of growth since the 1970s have been 
negative or very modest; for the region as a whole per capita 
real income in 1986 is certainly not higher than it was in 
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1970, and for some economies (e.g. Guyana) it is estimated - 
to be as much as 60 percent lower. Furthermore, as we have 
already seen, over this period the regional economies have 
become no less vulnerable than they were before, this failure 
to diversify being only in part due to rising protectionism 
in the North, for it also reflects the continued internal 
misdirection of savings and resources. The narrow productive 
base of the region's economy, the internal, dis-articulation 
of its production structures,its small size, openess, and 
dependence on foreign capital, technology, and skills, ensure 
that monetary imbalances will always have a special significance 
that'is unlikely to be captured in the standard North American 
or European textbook-type discussions which confine the 
analysis to these monetary phenomena. 
In any effort to seek a broader/deeper interpretation 
of the crisis in the region, it is important to distinguish 
uetween the condition which we may describe as permanent or 
on-going crisis, and periodic crisis. The former represents 
the basic elements of soclo-economic structure, and their 
historical form -and motion which we have already elaborated 
at dome length in this study. This permanent or on-going 
crisis can be accentuated at certain historical conjunctures, 
frequently in the form of periodic interruptions to the 
process of capital accumulation when profit rates in the region 
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decline, overseas markets contract, disproportions endemic 
to the consumption/production structure become more acute, 
internal demand and confidence in the economy decline, and 
so on. These points of accentuation produce the periodic 
crisis with one of its surface manifestations being the 
emergence of acute monetary imbalances. At the same time, 
however, it should be recognized that from time to time the 
conflation of internal and external social processes provoke 
the "possibility's (sbress possibility) of either a qualitatively 
deeper entrenchment of the old order, or a radical 
(revolutionary!) rupture with the past. These conjunctures 
constitute periods of general crisis, the best known examples 
being the collapse of the slave system in the region, the 
collapse of indenture in Guyana and Trinidad-Tobago, and the 
widespread crisis of the 1930s. It is my belief that the 
current crisis has this general character to it, but whether 
or not it would yield important socio-economic transformations 
or a re-confirmation of the existing neo-colonial order, is 
far from predictable. 
The basis for my judgement about the general 
character of the crisis derives from its profound all-round 
charact'r, the feature which has led to the widespread 
acceptance of the notion. Many of these features have been 
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referred to from time to time n the text, and to 
recapitulate very briefly among the most important are: 
- the "scissors squeeze" pressure on land resources 
occasioned by the disintegration of domestic foods-systems 
and difficulties with the traditional export crops on the 
one hand, and on the other, the rapid rise of TNC agro- 
processing industries based on imported inputs; 
- a worsening distribution of income, wealth, and 
access to productive resources intensified by the structural 
adjustment policies pursued in some countries; 
- a massive, persistent and growing unemployment raté, 
variously estimated in the regionts economies to be between 
15-50 percent of the labour force, accompanied b3 increasing 
underemployment; 
- woefully inadequate social security provisions 
for the unemployed, the aged, and the infirm; 
- high rates of outward migration of the labour 
force, particularly those with skills, as economic conditions 
worsen; 
- the growth of huge underground/parallel/informal 
sectors which divert entrepreneural tale:: , allocate much 
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f the available foreign exchange to its own priorities, and 
encourage the corruption of public officials and disregard 
for law; 
- the deepening process of corruption, nepotism, 
and clientilism, marked by the heavy penetration of drug 
dealers/traffi6kerS into the highest political circles in 
countries like the Bahamas, Jamaica, Turks & Caicos, Cayinan 
Islands, Barbados, and Trinidad-Tobago; 
- the massive capital flight and high turnover 
of assets in the region; 
- a weakened trade union movement in the face of 
increasing unemployment, declining living standards, and 
widesprcad poverty; 
- the recent rapid penetration of foreign values, 
culture, media, etc, in the region, symbolized in the 
tt satellite dish" culture to be found in every island, no 
matter how small; 
- the systematization'of repression and political 
murder as techniques of social control; 
- the institutionalization of the practices of 
ftraudulent elections, and electoral rigging in some countries; 
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- the heightened impact of class and non-class 
factors in social life as living standards decline for the 
broad mass of the region's people; 
- accelerated foreign control of domestic resources, 
despite programmes of localization and nationalization pursued 
by several governments; 
- the impact of the war in Nicaragua and the 
invasion of Grenada, particularly as we shall see in the 
increasing militarization of the region; 
- the historical record of the failure of the 
Caribbean "right" and the private sector to solve the problems 
of poverty and powerlessness; and 
- to the above can be added the context. of global 
crisis. 
It should be made clear, that no automatic link is intended 
between the deepening of the crisis identified here and the 
willingness ornot of the population to revolt against their 
wof'sening circumstances. To make such a link, could easily 
be fatal for those who play a leading role in organizing 
resistance to declining living standards, and in the struggles 
for a new Caribbean society. The reason for this is that 
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social disintegration in the region has also 
negatively 
affected the social psychology of the masses. Some 
evidence 
of this is seen in the post-Grenada trauma which 
has immobilized 
some sections of the population who traditionally 
have supported 
the left, the turn to migration as a solution to 
poverty at 
home, and. a growing indifference, if not cynicism, 
towards 
political efforts to challenge the status quo. As 
we shall see 
the United Statest perception of the crisis, 
and the 
solutions it has offered, has played a particularly 
pernicious 
role in the present context. 
ii Reaction/Responses 
There have been five major clses of respons .,o the 
crisis and each of these will be examined in 
turn. These have 
been: the pursuit of structural adjustment; a 
ttnew!? emphasis 
on private capital and initiative; the search 
for a new eernal 
context of trade and aid to replace the loss of 
earlier colonial 
connections and also to reinforce the thrust 
towards privatization; 
the militarization of the region; and the acceptance 
of an 
ideology which presents the solution in terms of a 
de facto 
re_coloniZatioçl of the regioii by the United 
States. 
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A. IMF/World Bank-type "structural adjustment" 
We have already considered in some detail the 
stabilization measures and structural policies of the IMF- 
World Bank, and their roles in the crisis in Jamaica under 
Manley and Seaga, and in Guyana. Here it is necessary only 
to stress that these policies are basd on an interpretation 
of the crisis which confines it to the level of internal 
and external monetary imbalances, with at best, token 
recognition of the growth and development sourcesof these 
difficulties. It is for this reason that the standard 
package of policies is always prescribed: wage restraint; 
devaluation; tight money supply and restrictive creuit; 
reduced government deficits; removal ibsidies and 
reduction of social expenditure by the state; deregulation 
of the ronomy and primary empiasis on the role of mrket 
prices ; privatization of economic activity and wooing of 
foreign capital. It is also for this reason that these 
policies have been successful nowhere in the region, even 
in the highly favoured situation of Jamaica which has been 
touted as a Third World model of successful Reaganomics. 
The impact of these institutions and other 
regional ones on the development of stabiLzation policies 
as a solution should not be underestimated. The World Bank 
has up to mid-1985 loaned the region over TJS$l.1 billion, 
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while the IMF has had several stand-by and extended fund 
facilities arrangements in the region, although some of 
these were cancelled because of failure to meet targets. 
The wide ranging impact of tne IMF on regional policy 
formation stems from its wide ranging responsibilities for 
the promotion of exchange rate stability, international 
trade and monetary cooperation, along with its short-term 
support programmes for balance-of--payments correction. The 
World Bank's influence is also considerable, since it 
presently chairs the important Caribbean Group for 
Cooperation in Eonomic Development (CGED). In this capacity 
it coordinates assistance among aid donors, the multila eral 
institutions, and 20 Caribbean countries. In addition to 
this the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Inter- 
American Development Bank (1DB) have also provided resources 
for the region. The CDB has loaned abut us$600 million, rrore 
than three-quarters of which has been raised from outside 
the region, while the 1DB has, in the four year period 1981- 
l98 loaned the five Caricom states which are members, 
nearly US$350 million. It has also provided US$30 million 
to the CDB for further on-lending. 
The impact of all these institutions on solutions 
to the crisis cannot be measured merely in terms of the 
large sums they have disbursed. Their additional roles, 
combined with their perspectives of development, reinforce the 
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capital-import dependency strategy of developrr'nt. As far 
as can be discerned the differences between their approach 
and that of most regional governments is largely one of 
emphasis and tactics. The latter, in so far as they may 
have to face the electorate , are usually the ones most 
eager to temporise on the harsher prescriptions of the 
stabilization solutions - even if they are convinced of the 
logic behind it. In this symbiotic relationship, increasingly 
the politicians try to use these multilatera' institutions 
as the "whipping-boy", that is, present themselves to the 
public as "hapless victims of IMF-World Bank pressure". 
The record of failure of the stabilization measures already 
detailed in Part 3, has led to the search fnr means to 
promote growth rather than restrict economic activity in 
the effort to correct internal and external monetary 
balances, and out of this the privatization thrust and the 
growth of EPZ5 have been spawned. 
B. PrivatizatiOn 
As we have already noted in some detail Ch er 9, 
there have been strong social pressures leading to an 
expanded role of the state in the economy of the region. 
This 
is reflected in the growth of the state property sector, the 
proliferation of institutiOnS, laws, and regulations governing 
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economic activity, and the elaboration of strategies and 
models of development which lay primary responsibility on 
the state. The view of the Reagan administration in 
the 
US is that underdevelOpmeflt in the region is largely 
attributable to the limited development, role, and 
respc'asibilities exercised by the private sector in the 
regiont s economic activities. It has therefore undertaken 
to exercise its considerable influence to ensure 
the 
organization of the region's bourgeoisieUnder US leadership. 
For this purpose it as used the carrot of large inflows 
of 
capital, skills, and technology from the US private sctor, 
and its tremendous inf±ùence to encourage the flow of resources 
from international institutions and friendly governments 
into the region's private sector. C'ganizationaI, this 
effort has been focussed on the devlopmeflt of two major 
institutions, the Caribbean-Ceflt - 
(CCAA) and the Caribbean AssociT :: Ofl]1T' C 
(CAIC) 
The CCAA was originally estL1 shed in April 1980 
as part of President Carter's T Li'S to deal ' the 
crisis conditions in the Ca'îL. n-Central Ainer.L 
and their impact on the region' iations with u.S. 
Privately funded from corporate and iniiidual it 
grew out of the earlier Committee for the Caribtai headed 
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by Robert West Jnr., Chairman of the Board of Tesoro 
Petroleum and Mervyn Dymally, originally from Trinidad- 
Tobago and at the time Lieutenant-Governor of California. 
In 1983 it entered into an affiliation with the Americas 
Society, a New York based group made up of several private 
sector organisations concerned with US relations in the 
hemisphere. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Americas 
Society was elected chairman of the CCAA in 1983. The 
main objective of the group is to organize the U$ private 
sector to help in the promotion of a vibrant private sector 
in the area. In this regard it pursues a wide range of 
promotional activities: 
- it organizes conferences, trade and investment 
missions from the US into the region; 
- it fosters links between private see tr 
organisations in the region (chambers of commerce, manu- 
facturing associations, trade groups, etc), and similar 
institutions in the US. Thus it has a twinning programme 
for regional chambers of commerce and those in the US and 
in the first year of operation (1981), twenty-five of these 
were put into effect; 
- it sponsors the famous Miami Conferences in 
the Caribbean, considered to be "by any yardstick the most 
important regular gathering of businessmen, bureaucrats, 
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government leaders, and academics from the Caribbean 
Basin, the US and beyond". Several heads of governments 
in the region attend thse annual gatherings; 
- to facilitate its work programme, it has 
created the Caribbean Basin Information Network (CBIN) a 
data base on exporters, importers, investment opportunities, 
joint venture schemes, etc. The CBIN has access to Control 
Data Corporation's data sources; 
- the group is a sponsor of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI); 
- and finally, the group has played a major role 
in revitalizing the UAIC. 
The CAIC which was founded in 1963 had become by 1980 a 
moribund institution: 
"founded with high hope tn 1963, [it] has 
had a chequered history. Alwaya hamstrung 
by chronic underfunding, arid its effective- 
ness impaired by the lack of a Seretariat, 
it struggled as bese as it could; dependi 
upon who was President, and how much time 
could be spared from personal interests". 3/ 
Under the auspices of CCAA the CAIC was revitalized in 1981 
and a secretariat created in Barbados. The CAIC's main 
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functions areto: 
promote institution building in the region; 
- sponsor training of private sector executives 
mainly through USAID and in cooperation with the US Chamber 
of Commerce Institute; 
- promote privatizätion in various fora, sponsor 
seminars, and become an effective lobby; 
- undertake selective research on regional 
economic matters. 
In addition to he above the CAIC s promoted the formation 
of the Caribbean Financial Services flrpor a private 
financial institution geored to prorno' t 
Its equity US$2.3 million) is held iaci. 
industries (one-third) and commercial baik vflici provide 
the remainder. In addition USAID haz provided 1on term 
funds (US$12 million) for loans and technical assistance 
(US$0.4 million). The CAIC has promoted close links with 
the CDB, and the Caribbean Prccct Development Faci3itr 
(CPDF). The latter was est in 1981 under t: 
auspices of UNDP. It is mana: by thcJnternatioral 
Finance Corporation with a mandate to assist businessmen 
in the region to raise money for new productive investments 
532. 
in the range of US$0.5 million to US$5 million. This came 
out of a recommendation of a Task Force on Private Sector 
Activities sponsored by 1DB, USAID, CDB, the Netherlands 
Government and Canadian CIDA. 
In a short space of time these institutions have 
become powerful arbiters of the course of Caribbean 
development. For our purposes two central observations are 
relevant at this point. Tht first is that the ultimate 
ambitions of these institutions seem to require the creation 
of forms of neocolonial relations more in keeping with the 
global capital restructuring which is currently taking, place 
among US TNCs and various US government's conception of the 
strategic significanc of the area a he pfcent phase 
of the development of imperialism. T J'ÎjOflS were 
very thinly disguised when Peter Johr of CCAA asserted 
"Those places can't get along without 
outside investment, outside tecthnology. 
Alone they are not viable; they will in 
the end have to become something like 
offshore states of the United States". I/ 
The second observation is that what er the limit. 
public sector development, historically tue private sector 
has no better record in relation to the concerns of the 
poor and the powerless. This hold true for both the United 
States itself and the West Indian territories. Without 
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any direct reference to the historical role of the US in 
the development and continued coloñisation of the region, 
Dymally, one of the co-originators of the CCAA could himself 
obserre that: 
"1 consider what is happening in the US 
under the present administration to b 
diabolical. I cannot think of a stronger 
word to express my feelings ... and this 
is the cup of milk that the US would offer 
you. In the past five years the Reagan 
administration has come very close to 
pulling down upon the 1'eads of the American 
people the social systems so painstakingly 
erected over the previous fifty years". 5/ 
He then goes on to cite an earlier speach in which he 
pointed out that "an administration that has shown no 
compassion for its own poor and disposzessed cannot fool 
the Caribbean people thit it intends to hei.. - poor 
and disinherited of another region. Having 
given the context of US governmental aetions in th' region 
he argues that: 
"what the White House believes is most 
threatened - and what must be protected 
at all costs - are US business invest- 
ments ... and this private sector, this 
monied, elite group of people who oisy 
humanitarian concerns in favour of the 
military, in order to resist the Communists 
and thereby safeguard their econoniic 
interests, - this same private sector, you 
say, is going to help 'stabilise democracy?. 
Now, I ask you: Is a pervasive military 
presence conducive to stability? I that 
the hallmark of democracy? 
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Do you think US soldiers are playing 
war games in the Eastern Caribbean 
because of a commitment to domestic 
tranquility? ... I would suggest to 
you that the private sector is suspect 
as a partner. It is suspect because 
the private sector, by-and-large, is 
the problem. It has been the problem 
throughout our turbulent history in 
these islands. Three hundred years of 
racism and greed have now brought the 
world to the brink of fiscal and nuclear 
disaster. Still, some of us are willing 
to look to these same sources for our 
salvation". 7/ 
I have quoted Dymlly at some length not only beeause he is 
a congressman and has played a role in the development of 
CCAA, but for two other reasons as well. One is to indicate 
that not a single reiii. - private sector represent tive 
in the region has come anywhere close to matching this 
frankiss or forthright self-criticism in any public fora. 
The other is the open admission of the link between the 
private sector thrust ar1d the military-security interests 
of the US in the region. 
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C. Trade and Aid : CBI, CARIBCAN, and Lome' 
Caribbean Basin Initiative 
Because the US government views the economies 
of the region as too small to achieve self-sustaining growth 
it has all along recognized that exports would be the key 
to their long term viability and in the Spring of 1982 
President Reagan proposed a package of aid,trade, and 
investment incentives, which after a turbulent passage 
through Congress finally became law in July 1983, ne 
Caribbean Basih Economic Recovery Act of 1983, popularly 
knwn as CBI. The original package had three components 
to it: 
- one-way duty free entry to the US market 
Caribbean-made products for a period of 12 years with ,cetain 
key exceptions, e.g., textiles and clothing, footwear and 
leather goods, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum derived 
products. There are stipulations which define whether the 
products are Caribbean-made or nr 
- tax c'edits to encourage US businesses to 
invest in the Caribbean, and also to encourage -'ism to 
the region by giving credits for the use of CBJ de'-nated 
convention sites, and 
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- supplemental aid provisions which for the 
first fiscal year was put at US$350 million. 
In addition to the above the OBI was to be aimed at ensuring 
cooperation between beneficiaries and the US government in 
control of narcotics trafficking, fair compensation for 
expropriated US property, the putting in place of extra- 
dition provisions between the US and CBI designated countries, 
and the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties with 
the US. As evmnts turned ou.t the tax credit provision 
for new investment in the region was not included in the 
'Act. The Act as It was finally passed irireased the duty- 
free access of the region about 8-15 perciL. on the 
coverage of he existing US Generalised Sh- of Preferences. 
Significantly, trade in sugar was excluded arid as a result 
of the US governments reduction of sugar quo'a 
estimated that the loss from this already exceeds so fa 
the gains from new access under the OBI. The aid provision 
of US$350 million is also small in relation to the Caricom 
region's current balance of payments deficit of US$1.5 
billion, and its estimated need fo-r external financir of 
nearly US$5 billion fo'r the period 1982-L±. y... tais 
provision is expected to provide aid for ¿f uaribbean and 
Central American countries, with morc nan halt i.,ui90 
million) going to four Central American countries, and 
about one-third of the remainder to Jamaica alone. 
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Because the CBI is the central economic mechanism 
in the US government's approach to a solution of the 
region's crisis, certain aspects of this strategy should 
be recognized. First, in contrast to the obvious need to 
promote cooperation in the region, the CBI operates on a 
bilateral basis and creates the opportunity for playing 
off one Caribbean country against another. It by-passes 
all the established regional institutions (CARICOM, CDB, 
1DB, OECS) and unlike other sister arrangements (e.g. Lome') 
makes no provision for the creation of an institutional 
framework for its administration. In this regard the OBI 
also fails to give even "t9ken acknowledgement" to the 
idea of equality among partners. Second, its divisiveness 
is reinforced by the exclusion of countries on pol. tical 
grounds: Cuba and Nicaragua. This test of ideological 
acceptability is exclusively determined b .ie US. Third, 
it makes no concessions to the differing levels of 
development which exist in the region, and consequently 
offers no special mechanisms for attending to the problem 
of the "least developed't states unlike practice in other 
trade and aid arrangements. Fourth, the CBI has to be seen 
in the context of the special emphasi s n' nrivati?ation 
of economic activity which the Reagan administration 
propagates. The thrust is to widen the scope for r'--' 
penetration of US private capital into the region. The 
- example of growing EPZ-type activity and the Puerto Rican 
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proposals on production-sharing and twinning arrangemLnt 
which have previously been considered indicate the sort of 
development US capital envisages. The stress on privatization 
may. also account for the fact that the CBI effectively 
disregards the issue of social infrastructure and societal 
support structures in the region, presumably on the premise 
that these fall primarily in the portfolio of government. 
The aspect of the CBI, however, which is perieps 
the most critical is its link to the military-security 
conceptions of the US. As many critics have observed, the 
CBI, (like the Alliance for Progress in Latin America in 
the 1960s) has been prompted by Cold War consideratiors. 
This was largely confirmed by Schultz in l9i4: 
"When President Reagan first proed 
the CBI three years ago, he had 
mind more tha.n a partnershipbet'cn 
the US and the Caribbean basin to 
promote trade and investment. His 
was a broader vision of a peaceful 
and prosperous Caribbean in which 
people could realize their aspirations 
and build better societies for them- 
selves and their children". 9/ 
After expressing these lofty sentiments he then goes. ..i 
to state: 
"From the US point of view, the CBI's 
underlying premise is that the Caribbean 
Basin is vital to our security and to ou» 
social and economic well-being. It is 
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indeed, our third border. Economic, 
social, and political events in the 
Basin have a direct and significant 
impact in the United States". 10/ 
Schultz was indeed echoing President Reagan who had 
earlier declared in a speech to the Organization of 
American States (February 1982) that the Caribbean Basin 
"is a rital strategic, and commercial artery for the US '. 
He cited the fact that nearly half of US trade, two-thirds 
of its imported oil, and over half of its imported strategic 
minerals pass through the region, encompassing the Panama 
Canal and the Gulf of Mexico. Statements such as these, 
coming from the highest level of decision-makers in the 
US strongly indicate that the CBI is likely to remain more 
as an extension of the US' Monroe Doctrine - Manifest 
Destiny style imperialisL of the past, than the search for 
a new order or a new way forward. Such an agenda, therefore, 
as with previous ones, places US interests at the top most 
priority. In so far as this is the case, propaganda not- 
withstanding, the CBI will contribute little, if at all, the 
transformation of the status of the poor and the powerless. 
What is more likely to occur, is the deepening entrenchment 
of the interests of the minority as tbc rc on becomes even 
more integrated into the orbit of US capitai . 
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CARIBCAN 
Disappointment over CBI has been 
widespread in 
the region, even though there has 
been much publicity 
on such proposals as the export 
of winter vegetables, and 
sugar-cane based ethanol. This 
has led government officials 
to turn to Canada for improved 
access to its market, and 
out of this has come the proposal to 
establish Caribcan 
sometime in 1986. Basically this proposal 
envisages two 
things: 
- preferential one-way duty-free 
trade for 
pro icts defined as Caribbean-made 
with a limited number 
of exceptions. It is proposed to 
cover nearly 100% of 
current Canadian imports from the 
English_speaking 
Caribbean. (This will in addition 
to the Caricom countries, 
include Anguilla, Bermuda, the British 
Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands and the Turks and 
Caicos); 
- a doubling of Canadian aid between 1982 
and 
1987 (i.e. from approximately US$28.5 million to US$57 
million). 
Trade in textiles, clothing, footwear, 
luggage, handbags, 
leather garments, lubricating oils, 
and methanol is 
considered to be "sensitiVes' 
and subject to certain 
5l 1. 
escape clauses. By the middle of 1986 a series of 
seminars was held in the region by the Canadian government, 
in order to brief businessmen on the potentialities of the 
proposed scheme. Judging on comments so far there is 
every likelihood that Caribcan will receive a better 
reception than the CBI. This reflects the lower profile 
of Canada in the region, lesser fears in government circles 
about its big-power ambitions, and the fact that the scheme 
is tailor made for the English-speaking Caribbean. 
When Prime Minister Trudeau met West Indian leaders at a 
summit in 1983 he had promised an initiative and had also 
proclaimed that: "Canada has consistently chosen to 
address hemispheric tensiorE from their economic and social 
causes, being equipped neither by ambition nor by capacity 
to pursue military solutions or grand t::Legic design&t. 
He might have added that over a century local 
legislatures had taken steps to unify their territories 
with Canada, as was the case with Barbados, Jamaica arid the 
Leeward Islands grouping in 188)1. Later on the Bahamas 
proposed itself as part of the Canadian Confederation, and 
as recently as 197)1, the State Council of the Turks & Calcos 
Islands "asked" that their territory be annexed by Canada. 
There is little doubt that Canadian political liberalism, 
combined with its middle power status, make it appear to 
be less threatening to the region. There is, however, 
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on the part of the Canadian ruling class, as indeed among 
its population at large much ambiguity in its attitude to 
the region. Should it be a junior partner of the US in 
the region? Is it Britain's "surrogate", following on the 
collapse of empire? Should the relations be primarily 
economic, in that an opportunity exists for easier Canadian 
access to the region's markets and resources lthan either 
the US or the UK? Or is there in any meaningful sense a 
special historical relation? Whatever, primary considerations 
eventuate, the Canadian economic presence in the region has 
been quite substantial: mining, tourism, forestry, trans- 
port, manufacturing, finance, and consultancy services. 
Even here, however, the underlying ambiguity expresses 
itself, in that some of the important Canadian companies 
in the rgion are themselves subsidiaries of US companies 
(e.g. Alcan, Commonwealth Holiday Inns), reflecting the 
branch-plant character of the Canadian economy, and its 
junior role in the circuit of US capital. 
These considerations apart, and even assuming 
the best of intentions, it is difficult to see how Caribcan 
will be able in the foreseeable future to contribute 
significantly to the transformation of the region's 
economy. Indeed, it would have achieved much, if in light 
of the growing protectionism in the North, it does not 
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become like the CBI or the Lome convention, riddlel with 
exceptions which significantly retard the export 
possibilities of the region. 
The Lomb Convention 
The idea that incentive packages of trade, aid, 
and investment are capable of resolving the crisis of 
poverty and underdevelopment in the Caribbean is as old as 
the Furopean empires founded in the rEgion, and nowhere is 
this idea more clearly expressed than in the Lome Convention, 
which is a direct descendant of t1e mercantilist arrangement 
of empire. The Convention, first entered into effect in 
1975, unites the EEC and its ex-colonial territories in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) in an agreement 
which includes trade preferences and aie. It developed 
from the EEC's decision in 1957 to set up a European 
Development Fund to be used to encourage development in its 
then predominantly African colonial territories. After 
independence, the arrangements were forma?ied in 1963 
in the Yaounde Convention. By 1973, howe , Britain had 
become a member of the EEC and its ex-empir territories 
expressed an intention to join the Convention. In the 
course of negotiations it came to be realized that the 
ex-colonies could improve their bargaining positions if 
they operated as a unit, and so the ACP grouping was 
formed. A new fLre-year Convention was signed at Lome, 
Togo in 1975, and this has been renewed twice, in 1980 
and 1985, while the ACP countries participating has grown 
from 46 in 1975 to 66 today. 
The Lome Convention has been ambitiously promoted 
by the EEC as an effort at "historical redress" for its 
colon.al exploitation of these territories, and the boast 
has been made that it is the only agreement Thich brings 
together the industrialized countries of the North and 
the poor countries of the South as "equal partners" in the 
search for a new international economic order. The main 
provisions of the Conventior.s center on two features: 
- one-way duty free access to the EEC countries 
for ACP made products, subject to certain exceptions where 
special regulations apply (e.g. sugar, rum, bananas, rice, 
beef). As with the CBlinLome I primary emphasis was placed 
on this arrangement for expanded trade to solve the 
problems of the region; 
- aid which has increased from ECU 3.5 billion 
in 1975 to ECU 8.-5 billion for the period 1985-89. This 
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aid package includes twoinnovatory mecJanisms STABEX and 
SYSMIN which together dispense about one-sixth of the 
resources 
he former provides compensation under certain criteria for 
a loss of earnings from exports to the Community and, in 
certain cases to the rest of its world. The criteria 
include the general requirement that the product(s) 
involved must represent at least 6 perent of the claiming 
country's exports, and earnings must also fall by at least 
6 percent, both occurring during the claim year. The 
figure is reduced to 1.5 percent ior land locked, island, 
and least developed countries, and sorne of the Caribbean 
countries benefit from this. SYSMIN provides aid where 
there is a fall in the apacity of ACP states tc ::port 
copper, cobalt, hosphates, managese, bauxite-a1Tha, 
tin, or iron ore. The criteria for applicability include 
the requirement that 15 percent of total export earnings 
should be derived from the mineral concerned, with a 
special arrangement of 10 percent for landlocked, island, 
and least developed countries. About half the total aid 
is in the form of grants to individual AC? states and 
there has been much disputation over the terms and conditions 
under which it has been granted as both the ACP states and 
the Community struggle to influence the uses to which these 
funds should be put. 
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Despite the innovatory mechanisms, the Lome 
Conventions have failed so far to deal effective].y, either 
with the periodic crisis of the region manifest since 
Lome I, or to make any noticeable dent in the underlying 
crisis conditions of poverty and underdevelopment. As 
one commentator has graphically put it: 
"Ten years after Lome, it is now patently 
clear that the Lome process is a falling 
curve with the break-even point out at 
the end of each successor agreement 
coming to represent a new status-quo 
that is considered satisfactory mainly 
from the standpoint of declining 
development commitment and a world 
economic ituatffon not supportive of 
development". 12/ 
This view has been echoed by the regional trade union 
mnvement in its recent policy proposals: 
"In spite of some ambitious features, 
the record cf the Convention in several 
areas has been a disappointment. Un- 
fortunately, the implementation of Lome 
coincided with the start of the world 
economic recession and has not proved 
to be the hoped for engines of develop- 
ment". 13/ 
There is little doubt that the record reveals a dis- 
heartening picture. To begin with EEC assistance L 
fallen in real per capita terms. Trade between the EEC and 
the ACP show a decline from 6.3 to 14.5 percent between 
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1976 and 1983 for EEC imports from these states as a per- 
centage of its total imports. Moreover, despite the pre- 
ferences, EEC imports has over the years remained stable 
at 19 percent of its total imports from all developing 
countries. At the same time, the EEC's balance of trade 
surplus with the ACP states has grown from ECU 3.5 billion 
to ECU 14.14 billion, between 1976 and 1983. STABEX has 
also suffered from insufficient funds, a situation worsened by 
declining prices in recent years. These have been further 
compounded by the failure to establish effective international 
commodity arrangements. Concern has also been expressed 
about the restrictive product coverage of STABEX, the 
EEC's huge agricultural surpluses, the disincentives which 
exist in its special arrangements for products such as 
sugar and bananas (which are crucial to the Caribbean), 
its restrictive use of the rules-of-origin rardstick to 
determine ACP made products, and the existence of safe- 
guard clauses in which the EEC can suspend the Convention 
and protect a threatened activities. 
Successive Lome Conventions have generally been 
unable to counteract the deepseated, and growing protect- 
ionism in the North, and the promise of easy access to the 
Community's market has remained illusory. The claims made 
that Lome would usher in a new era of partnership in 
development can hardly be sustained. Anyone who has followed 
the regular rounds of negotiations between the EEC and 
ACP countries, and has also studied the dispensing mechanisms 
of the various funds, would know that the usual donor- 
recipient relationship which characterizes other aid 
institutions prevails. The ACP countries, and for our 
particular purpose the Caribbean states among them, can 
expect from these arrangements no quick fix or easy solution 
to their problems. Even in the most propitious circumstances, 
external arrangements can only support a programme of 
economic and social transformation. By themselves they 
cannot generate the social momentum needec to remove 
internal ccnstrants and liberate the poor and the powerless 
In a world system structured as ours is, historical redress 
begins at home when the priorities of the historically 
dispossessed take precedence over all others. 
D. Militarization 
If the trade preferences3 aid, and special 
facilities of CBI, CARIBCAN and ACP are the "carrot" to 
draw the region into particular North-South axes, Western 
geo-strategic interests and those of the US in particu]ar 
require that themilitary "stick" should be used. Although 
from the time of the Cuban revolution in 1959 US security 
concerns about the region were prominent in its external 
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policies, in the closing years of the Carter administration 
a US military offensive in the region began to take shape. 
This was prompted by the advances of popular forcas in 
Nicaragua and Grenada. Thus in 1979 the Caribbean Contingency 
Joint Task Force was formed and headquartered at Key We$t. 
In 1980 there were 129 US naval visits to 29. Caribbean 
ports. 
In 1981, the Department of Defence re-organized and upgraded 
its regional defense system into one US Forces Caribbean 
Command which unified the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task 
Force and the Antil].es Defense Command in Puerto Rico. 
This was.then put on the same footing as one of three full 
scale NATO Atlantic Commands. Routine training of the 
Atlantic Fleet was also located in the Caribbean. In 1982 
.n exercise called Ocean Venture was held, which was then 
eputed to be the largest peace time naval manoeuvres since 
iJorld War II. This was, repted several times. and this 
year's (1986) exercise was hsed in rrt on Grenada! By 
1981-i the Caribbean Basin had 21 US military installations 
and a troop strength close to 30,000 persons, with an 
additional 9-10,000 shipborne troops in the region. 
While this new military assertiveness has been 
linked to developments in Grenada and Nicaragua it is 
important to bear in mind that it is essentially a continuation 
of a long established tradition of US force in the region, 
in pursuit of its geo-strategic interests. Prior to the 
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Cuban revolution the US government had already made at 
least 147 military interventions against Central America 
and the Caribbean, with 38of these pre-dating the Russian 
revoltuion. The expansionist designs of the Monroe Doctrine 
Manifest Destiny conceptions of US foreign policy which 
we have already considered, were not born out of the anti- 
communism of today's rhetoric. That the US main concern 
is geo-strategic is revealed in the very concept of the 
Basin, a notion whose significance is best apprted 
from the standpoint of a global assessment of he US' 
ability to play its role as a world power. Earlier we had 
indicated the importance of the Basin in the movement of 
strategic materials into the US and its vital link role 
in the US North and South Atlantic fleets. This consider- 
ation, along with the existence of Cuba whose military 
capability is rapidly growing as well as its links 
Soviet Union, has required the creation of sufficiert 
force in the Caribbean theatre to neutralize it. The 
is no doubt to encircle Cuba with a string of military 
bases, which is what more-or-less exists today. Additionally 
there is the expectation that a strong military presence. 
combined with demonstrations of its capability, would serve, 
to contain the left and deter social upheavals which ma 
lead to new governments which may seek to challenge US 
interests. Given its global role all these objective 
are best served with an "economy of power". 
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In order to facilitate its objectives the TJS 
has encouraged the militarization of the region. The 
US invasion of Grenada in which all but three OECS states 
participated along with Jamaica and Barbados, was a 
critical turning point in its pursuit of this goal. 
Prior to 1980 only Jamaica was a significant recipient of 
US military aid. After the Grenada revolution aid was 
stepped up and in Barbados for example 98 percent of all 
the miliary aid it had ever received from the US up to 
1983, had come during the years 1980-1983. In several 
islands no militar' aid was in fact ever received before 
1981. Thus in fiscal year 1981 oriy US$0.2 million in 
military sales, assistance and training programmes were 
recorded, but by fiscal year 1986 this had grown to nearly 
US$19 million with about us$8 million going to Jamaica. 
Much of the aid has gone into the traiuing uf special 
services units among the various islands police forces, 
(80 permanent members in each island) and commando groups 
in the standing armies of Barbados and Jamaica to cope 
with insurgencies. This arrangement has been formalized 
in the formation of an Eastern Caribbean Security System. 
In September 1985 military exercises were held to est the 
ttreadinesst of the system to stave off threats fi 
"externally backed forces". US, British, Jamaicai; tid 
Barbadian forces participated in these exercises aloigSide 
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the OECS states which were operating in the framework of 
the Defense and Security Committee of their treaty. 
Although these developments have emanated rom 
US global strategic concerns, the ambitions of the regional 
leaders to use these forces against internal enemies has 
been barely disguised. Thus Bird, Premier of Antigua, on 
the occasion of signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 
1982 with Barbados, St Vincent, St Lucia and Dominica to 
form a Regional Defense Force, stated: 
"the whole idea behind the defense 
force is that if you get through 
today on your own island, don't 
forget there will be forces in all 
the other islands and you will have 
to answer them". 
A month later he added: 
"in this region we cannot afford to 
have another Cuba or another 
Grenada". 15/ 
After the invasion of Grenada in 1983, St Kitts-Nevis and 
Grenada itself ,subsequently ¿oined, facilitating the 
incorporation of these arrangements with the Eastern 
Cariûbean Security System. 
This concern with internal insurrection was 
echoed by Adams in Barbados, and further strengthened 
in his call for a standing army of 1,500 persons so as to 
reinforce existing arrangements. As he stated the aim 
the . 
was to protect region from external agression and domestic 
revolution". 
Coming from Adams this was indeed a dangerous 
eall. Tg-1 çn1u hc h 1d Fvhdrs int,û nThvjn the S--- 
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principal proxy role for US military interests in the 
Eastern Caribbean but he had already set the precedent 
of sending his country's troips to St Vincent to aid the 
government in a domestic dispute, to Dominica to prevent 
a coup, and had stationel force off the island of St Lucia 
during its troublesome elections. Fortunately his proposals 
raised so many hornets nests that it was ignored by his 
benefactor. 
If the ideology of privatization calls for a 
restriction of the state in the economy, militarization 
is a drive for the enlargement of its mi1itar-security 
arms in social life. The result fs as Tiryakian observes: 
"The various US security related 
actions in the Caribbean during 
the 1980s indicate a clear pattern 
of militarization. Washington's 
conduct reveals that in the economic 
sphere its worfis have spoken louder 
than its actions while militarily its 
actions have undoubtedly spoken 
louder than words. Thus the US seems 
to be offering baby carrots and 
wielding a big stick". 17/ 
However, one development ihich the regional leaders have 
not. yet fully appreciated, is that ifl seeking to convert 
US security ambitions into the protection of their interests 
against internal revolts, particularly those inspired by 
the left, theî are elevating the role and status of the 
military in the society. In this new role it would be 
naive to assume that the ilitary will simply be content 
to pride themselves as derenders of the system. As 
experience elsewhere has shown, increasingly they will 
become impatient at the "pclitician's incompetence" to 
resolve social and economic problems "peacefully", as 
these multiply. Soon, thereafter, the appeal of 
"discipline" as the solution to prevailing difficulties 
becomes very attractive. With fragile party systems, 
short-lived popular instilutions, and a long tradition 
of colonial authoritarianism and commandism, it is easy 
for this appeal to lead t direct intervention. The 
solution therefore, which militarization seems to offer, 
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i.e., the containment of social conflict, may well 
generate an entirely new range of problems. That this 
scenario is not too far fetched may well be gleaned 
from its role in Guyana as supporter of corrupt 
authoritarianism. 
One final observation at this stage. If the 
CBI's approach has seem to play one country off against 
another (the "hi]ateral" crrot), then militarization 
has used a regional approach (the "multilateral" stick), 
recognizing imp7Licitly the limitations of going it alone. 
Ideologization 
Historically, the role of ideology has been to 
win people to certain positions or world views of social 
reality. In this way it helps to define in periods of 
crisis not only the range of permissible solutions, but 
the preferred solution. In this regard the Caribbean has 
been no different. It has always been a battleground of 
world views. Thus the struggles of the slaves for their 
personal freedom was not only a struggle in the social, 
political, and economic spheres, but also enjoined strong 
contestation about the very definition of "man" as a 
political and social being.- From this analogy we can see 
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the link between the military and economic solutions 
offered by the US clearly i.n its 
ideological initiatives in the region. We have already 
acknowledged this in part when we considered the relation- 
ship between privatization as a modeç strategy, and 
ideology of development and the CBI proposals of the US. 
Similarly, in the military-security sphere, anti-communisrn 
covert actions, and destabilization of unacceptable regimes 
show the close association of ideology to this solution. 
Thus ideology has played a critical role in mobilizing 
regimes to arm themselves with US support to counter the 
"totalitarian alien threat of commun' sm". It has also 
been used to rationalize destabilization and covert actions 
against "ünfriendly" governments. Thus a chorus of negative 
publicity about Grenada and Manley's Jamaica were pivobal 
in disrupting these countries' tourist econom.es and 
bringing pressure to bear on their governments. The naval 
rnoeuvres and bellicose statements about Soviet-Cuban 
bases have also been similarly shrouded in Cold War 
ideological rhetoric. 
It would be a mistake, however, to confine our 
discussion of ideology only to its overt propagandistic 
form. It is also conveyed through cultural, educational, 
and other socializing mechanisms and it is through these 
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indeed that the considerable influence of the US is 
most strongly felt in the region. Two areas where this 
is very evident is labour and the media. Thus AIFLD has 
been involved in the training of over 25,000 West Indian 
trade unionistsin various seminars, courses etc held in 
these territories. Additionally twenty are traried ln the 
US annually. AIFLD which was formed in 1961, receiveb 
95 percent of its funding from USAID, and s conceived as 
a tri-partite venture between government, labour, and big 
business. By this very fact it defines a certain range 
of societal options acceptable by "free" trade unionism. 
This replaced the Caribbean Labour Congress which disin- 
tegrated following the split in the WFTU and the formation 
of the explicitly anti-communist ICFTU, which for much 
of its history has been Western labour's standard bearer 
in "labour' struggle against comunim". 
The impact of this organizational structure, 
which has come about largely through US influence, has been 
in the direction of narrowing the range of exposure, 
actions, and interests of regional trade uhionists. The 
approach has been to define "Comnunist ideas" as the enemy 
of "free" trade unionism and democracy. Thereafter, all radical, 
progressive tendencies in the labour movement which cannot find 
full expression in the existing framework are deemed "communist" 
and by extension enemies of "free", "democratic" regional trade 
unionism. Fortunately, the influence of 
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this line of reasoning on regional trade unionism Iias not 
been as monolithic as was expected, for considerable 
evidence exists of much surviving concern both among the 
rank and file and the leadership of the region's trade 
union movement for the poor and the powerless. This has 
encouraged a constructively critical approach to the 
experiences of other social systems. In this regard the 
social successes of Cuba has had a considerable influence, 
despite the continuous propaganda battles. 
In the media the penetration of US ideas is 
more complete. Thus Cable News Network is regularly 
available on many local television stations. There are 
also numerous satelite dish owners and private companies 
pirating US channels for local re-distribution. 
18 / 
It is claimed that in several islands as many as 13 
channels receive programmes from the US. Indeed the 
belief in the region is that there could hardly be any 
other part of the globe where penetration by foreign media 
into local communities can be so complete. To strengthen 
this already strong grip, the Voice of America Caribbean 
Basin Project plans to spend US$50 million on eleven 
additional transmitters in the Caribbean Basin; and 
adding medium wave to their existing short-wave broadcasts. 
In addition to this penetration of the regional media, 
there exists a very centralized ownership in all the 
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territories. Thus the national daily in Guyana is a 
government and party organ, the Gleaner of Jamaica belongs 
to a member of the famous '21' families who dominate the 
economy, and the two dailies, the Guardian and Express of 
Trinidad-Tobago are separately owned by the two leading 
local conglomerates in the island. These locally owned 
media tend to be very conservative and very anti-socialist 
Frequently they paint hostile pictures of socialism as 
shortages (Manley's Jamaica, Guyana), corrupt authoritarianism 
(Guyana) domination (Cuba). In this regard they help to 
contain the range of expression of social discontent in 
terms of alternative systems. If to these we add the 
fare provided by local cinemas and the weekly news 
magazines (Newsweek, Time, etc) there is a continuous 
and overwhelming exposure to the US, world view of events 
around us. 
This ideologization has helped sustain the 
retreat from the more liberal and tolerant views of the 
region as a zone of peace and the acceptance of ideological 
pluàrlisrn. By straight-jacking regional perception into 
a Cold War context it has hampered the growth of a Caribbean 
perception of the region's identity and the social tasks 
which await to be undertaken. It has tempted ome of the, 
region's leaders to be spokepersons on the global 
confrontation of ideas and systems. It has therefore raised 
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the profile of the region inthe arena 
of world politics. 
At this stage therefore, it reinforces 
the solution of 
an incorporation of the region into a new 
empire system 
of the US based on an off-shore status of 
anufacturiflg 
activities to replace the Far East, as many 
argue the 
OBI is intended. 
The most recent indicatr of the extent 
of 
ideological penetration has been the formation 
of the 
Caribbean Democratic Union in 1986, the 
regional arm 
of the Caribbean Democratic Union. 
The original signatories 
were leaders of ruling parties in Jamaica, 
Dominica, ï 
Grenada, Montserrat, Be1ize St Kitts, St 
Lucia and 
St Vince 
This new grouping is seen as a political 
defence 
against communism and advocate for 
in the 
region. The significant feature of the 
new grouping is 
its Cold War origins and ties to the two 
main political 
parties of the United States. No secret 
is made of the 
fact that the conservative ideology 
of the grouping finds 
the international organisation of the 
social_democratic 
parties (Socialist Internation) "too soft 
on communism'!. 
Given that a few of the region's parties, 
some of which 
have formed governments belong to the 
Socialist Inter- 
national, the conservatism of the new 
grouping threatens 
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to be very strident indeed. One 
provision which is 
worth noting is that the signatories 
have introduced 
the concept of mutual assistance 
for members facing 
elections. precedent in this 
regard was already set 
in Grenada (1984) and Dominica (1985) 
when the conservative 
parties threw their weight behind 
Blaize and Charles. 
The prospect of open interference 
in the internal affairs 
of member states seems to be lurking 
behind this new 
development. Here again the thrust 
is to use ideology 
to create a level of consciousness 
which defines the 
crisis in such narrow terms as to 
rule out the develop- 
ment among the masses of a conception 
of social change 
that reaches far beyond the status 
quo. 
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CHAPTER 15: flONCLUSION: ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT? 
In this final chapter I shall not attempt to 
summarize what has already been said. Indeed much of what 
has been presented here is a very terse summary of many 
complex issues and areas of analysis covering a region of 
considerable variety. Instead I shall conclude this work 
by offering a few gneral observations on the conception 
of development as this seems to me to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the framing of policies aimed at the 
successful transformation of the region. It would be 
impossible, and in any case unwise to atterrpt to write 
recipes for the future. One of the ideas which has 
motivated much of the critica]. analysis) of this work has 
been that development is about people - in the concrete 
context of their existence, which itself is largely 
influenced by inherited social conditions and the motion 
and rhythms which underlie these. Even though therefore, 
people make history with their daily lives, they do not, 
and indeed cannot expect to start with a "clean slate" as 
it were. If however, development is about people then it 
is they who ultimately should choose the path tos be pursued. 
Ideas and suggestions may be offered by individuals and 
groups, but the test of their efficiency ultimatly lies 
in the willingness of people to adopt them as part of 
their daily existence. 
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One thing which this study should have made clear is the 
large extent to which the depressing circumstances of 
poverty and powerlessness characterize the daily lives of 
the broad mass of Caribbean people and stand in contrast to 
the privileged life styles of the small minority who make 
up the rich and powerful. The existance of this is a 
clear reminder of how easyit has been for social forces 
of underdevelopMent and dependency to reproduce themselves. 
Two and a half decades after Jamaica first became independent 
economic policy in the region is still largely guided by 
the view that development equals a "satisfactory" rate of 
increse of per capita product. While ifferent actors 
have indicated different measures of what rate is to be 
deemed "satisfactory", it is only recently that the popular 
forces have sought to challenge this view, and even here 
the attaGk on it has not been frontal. Instead the attack 
has taken two lines. One is to advance the view that 
accepting a given definition of what is a satisfactory rate 
of growth of per capita product, that we still need to 
know whether the chosen rate can be sustained before we 
can be in a position to pass judgement as to whether 
deveJopment is occurring or not. In posingthe issue 
this way some ancillary questions are also raised: 
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Is the rate of increase of per capita national product due to 
the fortunate existence in the national territory of some non- 
renewable resource currently in great demand on a world. scale, 
e.g0, oil? If so, what are the reserves of these resources and 
their, current and projected rate of exploitation? How far into 
the future can favourable demand conditions be projected? Is 
the "satisfactory" rate of increase dependert on the transfer 
of resources from abroad to the ¿ountry concerned? And, if so, 
what is the prospect of its continuation? Is per capita natibnal 
product increasing because of the mass migration of persons out 
of the national territory? And, !f so, what are the prospects 
for the continuation o-' the political and social conditons wich 
make this possible? The second line of attack has been to 
indicate that this formulation of development ignor9s the problems 
of growing unemployment, a worsening distribution of income and 
wealti, and the persistencè of poverty in the region, despite 
historically unprecedented rates of increase of per capita 
national product in the 1950's and 1960's generally, and Th 
Trinidad-Tobago in the 1970's and early 1980's. The 
response of the centre and liberal tendencies among the ruling 
strata has been to introduce social and political considerations 
to the analysis of development. But here the dominant 
tendency is to introduce these as adjuncts to the interpretation 
of development and to confine the level of treatment to at 
best the institutional level. 
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Unlike our approach, class and social relations are not 
treated as integral to the interpretation of what is meant 
by development, so that in this formulation the issue, 
development for whom; is never directly confronted. 
Raising the issue in this way however: development for 
whom , leads one on to recognize immediately that how in 
fact development is interpreted and defined goes a far way 
towards determining the development path which is to be 
pursued, as well as determining the criteria which must 
inform strategies and policies for future development. 
As we have repeatedly argued in this text The 
reality is that in the circumstances of the Caribbean, 
development cannot be satisfactorily studied in isolation 
of the region's concrete historical context. The question 
of alternative paths of developmenthas to be raised inthe 
context of the concrete manifestation on a world scale of 
a group of countries which has been aptly described as 
underdeveloped, as distinct from undeveloped which might 
have been the condition of Europe before the development 
-of capitalism. Underdevelopinent, when used as a 
description of the condition of the region then refers 
to the consequences of the long historical period 
(16th - 18th century) during which capitalism, as a mode 
of social production, had internationalized itself and 
created a world market. In the Caribbean, we have pointed 
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out that the internationalization of the capitalist mode 
of production has resulted in the development of two 
important sets of divergenciesin the system of reproduction 
of the material conditions of social life. The first of 
these is the divergence between the pattern of resource 
use and the demand structure as it exists, and as it is 
likely to develop as commodfty relations become even more 
generalized and 'entrenched in the national economy. And 
the reason we advanced for this was that European conquest 
and settlement of the territories resulted first in the 
overthrow of the communal and other pre-capitalist pro- 
ductioi relations which dominated the Cribben, and 
thereafter, systematically garnered domestic resources for 
the servicing of overseas markets ir. Europe and elsewhere. 
Thus the development cf tropical agriculture, mineral 
productiOn' for c.xport, tourism, the EPZs, etc., all reflect 
this orientation with the consequence that local demand 
was, and continues to be, by and large satisfied by imports. 
The export sector has become highly specialized in the 
production and sale of a narrow range of output to one or 
two major capitalist markets. As we saw the second divergence 
is that as the market economy has developed, ability to 
purchase in the market has become the principal determinant 
of consumption with the result that since col'onialization 
the needs of the broad masses of the population have not 
influenced production in any significant way. Except for 
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residual subsistence sectors, commodities available írom 
both local production and imports, are allocated on the 
basis of purchasing power and in the context of widespread 
poverty and uneployment most of the available commodities 
service the needs of the relatively better off classes and 
groups. 
Around this dynamic of reproduction of the material 
needs of the society as a whole has grown up the complex of 
politial, social and legal relations (patterns of ownership 
of productive forces)'; institutions ana other decision- 
making structures and organizations; ideas and ideologies 
elaborated on in this study. It is therefore, only from an 
undtrstanding of this expression of the condition of under- 
development that notions of what constitutes development can 
be derived. 
what therefore do I mean when I refer to develop- 
Eizht 
ment? 'thesesare advanced. First, in direct contrast to 
what prevails, development for me takes place when production 
is oriented towards satisfying the basic needs of the masses 
at large. By'the masses I simply refer to all those "who 
do not have any power in society derived from property, 
wealth, religion, caste, expertise or other sources not 
widely shared". To these minority attributes we can 
add political party affiliation where applicable. In the 
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past too few have benefitted at the expense of too many. 
Re-distribution, social equality, and a participatory 
political process are the only reliable cornerstones of 
such another development. In this way the concerns of 
the poor and the powerless become the central focus 
of 
development and not an incidental item on the agenda 
of 
export competitiveness, industry, new techno]ogy on any 
such disembodied abstraction. That i to say production 
for the basic needs of the masses implies a systematic, 
COnSCiOUS, deliberate, and planned attack on poverty, 
for the deliberate removal of poverty becomes a determinant 
of what is produced. In other words the elimination of 
poverty is not treated as an incidental consequence of 
production, as when profit is the main determinant of out- 
put. The needs referred to here are personal, (food, 
clothing, housing), and public/colleC.ive (health, 
sanitation, education, culture, recreation, etc), and 
they are also, as would have been inferred from the list 
given, both material and non-material. 
Second,develOPmeflt in the region can only take 
place when it is planned that the satisfaction of these 
basic needs are to be generated through the effective 
exercise of the right to work. By this I mean not only 
that all those who want jobs should have them but also: 
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the right to a job without coercion as to place or 
type of job, given the particular skills; 
a framework of industrial relations which permits 
free collective bargaining and effective 
representation, (as distinct from nominal), within 
bargaining units; 
a work process that allows for effective worker 
involvement and control; 
the protection of health and guarantee of 
education and training for all workers for the 
tasks they are engaged in. 
The objective here is to situate work in a self-realization 
process. Tn other words work is seen here as both an end 
and a means of development. 
Third, given the authoritarian and commandist 
traditions of the region, the reproduction of the material 
conditions of life should be based on self-reliant and 
endogenouS patterns of growth. In view also of the 
historical formation of underdevelopment and the resultant 
pattern of producing what is not consumed locally, and 
consuuhing what is not produced locally, combined with foreign 
ownership and domination of national production, this is the 
only sustainable pattern of growth. As such it is premised 
on a neeed to reverse dependency relations and to situate 
development in the Caribbean in the context of the capacity 
of the people of all regions to develop themselves. 
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- Fourth, deve]opment also requires that the work 
process should be based on the democratization of power 
in 
society combined with the effective, as distinct from 
nominal, exercise of fundamental rights, e.g., the rights 
to 
free expression and organization, respect of indivirii1'S 
privacy, the abolition of repression and torture, an 
o 
on. This democratization of power also refers to 
the 
democratization of the decision-making structures 
of society 
Here, two requirement for its achievement are an 
equitable 
distribution of wealth and income and of equally 
vital 
importance, equitable access to the use and 
management of 
society'S resoUr-es. A democratization of power i 
also 
not possible without equitable access to information, 
since 
the effective possession of information is 
necessary if 
sound 1ecision. are to be made and control from 
below, or 
popular partipatiofl in the process of development as it 
is sometimes termed, is to be efficient, 
while reflecting 
the requirements of the largest possible majority. 
Fifth, development is also conceived by me in the 
context of the preservation of environmental 
stability and 
an end to the degradation of the 'environment 
which has 'so 
far accompanied the growth of national production 
in our 
societies. This conception is situated in an 
unequivocal 
acceptance of our global and universal responsibilities 
to sustain life. 
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Sixth, development in our region is impossible 
witht the state playing a leading role. This conclusion 
serve to increase the significance to be attached to a 
partiipatory political process, along with strong 
orgaIsational and representational roles for the produers 
in siety. It is no secret that the recent onslaught on 
the tate by advocates of privatization has successfully 
exploited obvious weaknesses and limitations in the 
deve]itnpment of post-independence states in the Carthben. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that those very advocates 
of privatization turn to the state to promote the CBI, 
or to negotiate with the US government when difficulties 
arise with it, even as they uphold this arrangement as the 
prenier example of the role of privatization in contemporary 
Carithean economy. It still continues o be the case also, 
that ihen competition from abroau adversely affects their 
operaitions, that this same private enterprise lobby turns 
to their governments for protection! The truth is that 
goveiment intervention or non-intervention per se is a 
meaningless category, for its social sigiificance derives 
entirely from the purposes of governmental action, and the 
class and social interests which it serves. It is pure 
fantasy to believe that political freedom can be reduced 
to, or is in some way dependent on, the operation of 
unrestrained market forces. The interpretation of develop- 
ment advanced here is intended to subject the functioning 
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of the state as well as the development ofthe society as 
a whole to what has been aptly termed, the "logic of the 
majority". As Xabier Gorostiaga has succently put it: 
"economic and political transformation 
cannot be carried out for the majority 
unless it is part of a project imple- 
mented by the majority ... the majority 
must be the subject, and not thé object 
of their own history". 14/ 
Seventh, a realistic notion of development in the region 
must begin with the stark reality of the hostile environ- 
ment of our living in imperialism's backyard. The conclusion 
we arrived at in the previous chapter is mirrored in 
Gorostiaga' s analysis: 
"Whatever may be the ecormic logic of 
US policies towards Central America 
and the Caribbean, it is clear that 
geopolitical considerations predominate. 
Historically, the region has always been 
considered 'America's backyard'. So 
long as the area was thought to be secure, 
the US could afford to ignore it; but any 
threat to the status quo has always 
triggered an imrnmediate response. US 
military intervention in the region has 
been more frequént than in any other part 
of the world ... the underlying assumption 
of US policy towards the region appears to s 
be that its own geopolitical interests are 
incompatible with the emergence of genuinely 
independent states". 5/ 
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Given this "incompatibility ' the future scope 
for development in the region is ultimately bound 
up with 
the survival and eventual success of the social experiments 
of Cuba and Nicaragua. This view does not imply either 
the acceptance of Cubanization o' 1'Ticaraguianization, 
of the 
region, or some bastard combination of the two. All 
it 
suggests is that the survival of the very notion of 
experimenting to build new Caribbean societies is indissolubly 
linked to the survival of the two surviving experiments 
- 
Grenada having already gone. A regional alternative 
thus 
remains high in the priorities of any thrust towards 
the 
real develdpmeflt of the region. Such an alternative 
must- 
challenge those mechanisms which seek to facilitate 
the 
absoiptiOn of the region into the USA, even as 
the USA 
itself pursues the larger projects of "integrating" 
Canada and Mexico into it, and the 
1! submission" of Central 
America through undeclared war against popular 
forces; what- 
ever form t1iey may take. 
Eight, the criticisms of Lome, Caribcan, and the 
CBI, made in the previous ehapter do not mean the 
rejection 
of the importaice of the external context to the 
successful 
development of the region. To the contrary, 
for although 
the internal social structures and their development 
form 
the primary force in the development of the 
region, they are 
not the only one, so that the path of development 
chosen 
576. 
cannot be separated from the international 
context. Thus 
both the previous policies of "open invitation" 
to foreign 
capital and the ItnationaliZatiofl" of foreign 
capital took 
place in a world context which delimited the 
real possibilities 
of those policies. The interface of internal 
development 
(i.e. internal class struggle), and the 
international 
context (i.e. the operation of capitalism on 
a world scale) 
is crucial to any consideration of development 
strategies. 
It is for this reason that proposals 
designed to offer a 
global challenge" to existing structures 
are so important. 
Surely if multilateralism can be restored, 
prices and incomes 
of primary commodities stabilized, 
lttransparentt' contils 
over the TNCs are instituted, disarmanent 
occurs and the saved 
resources are then spent on redistribution 
and restructuring 
of global producing and consuming structures,"bettermY 
neighbour" policies replace 
t'beggaryour_ne1ghbour" ones 
and so on, the world would be a better 
place and development 
that much easier. The sad reality is 
however, that multi- 
lateralism is in retreat and unilateralism 
is dominant; 
protectionism in the North is the order 
of the day, while 
monetarism and laisser-faire policies 
are prevalent in both 
the North and South. In this context 
therefore, the inter- 
iorizatiOn of the accumulation 
process is all the more key 
to successful transformation. 
Given, however, the small 
size of the region's economies, 
the only realistic avenue 
for reducing the social costs 
of small size is once again 
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the development of a regional alternative as an 
essential 
element of the process of national transformation. 
Because the pattern of actual consumption in 
the 
region does not reconcile with the basic 
needs of the broad 
mass of the population.(reflect1 the unequal 
distribution 
of wealth and income, the forms of urban 
and rural develop- 
ment, and the poverty and dispossession 
of large social 
groups, particularly, the peasants and the 
urban poor), and 
the pattern of resource use is not dynamically 
econciled 
with resource ndowflmeflt,(ref1eCtig the 
fact that in the 
past the imperative for bringing resources 
into prodction 
derived largely from the needs of international 
capitalist 
expansion), it i clear that the configurations 
of a trans- 
formed economy must be based on the construction 
of a 
process of accumulation founded on the priorities 
required 
to ensure the eventual reversal of 
these divergences. In 
other words, the procsS of accumulation has 
to be 
founded on the logic of a dynamic convergence 
between social 
needs and the use of domestic resources. 
In the long run 
this requires as a minimum the development 
of a capability 
within the productive forces of producing 
the commodities 
used directly or indirectly in the production 
of all 
other commodities. These can be 
termed the "basic goods" 
of society. 
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The only group of countries which in recent 
times 
has attempted such a planned or forced transformation 
of 
their economies, the USSR and other socialist 
economies of 
Eastern Europe, China etc, had approached 
this task through 
the development of an agricultural system 
aimed at supplying 
domestic food and raw material needs and the 
development 
of a heavy capital goods industry. The 
latter is the now 
famous Department I in the Marxian Scheme 
of material 
reproduction. This gave them a capacity 
not only to produce 
the basic goods or commodities used in 
the production of 
all other commodities, but the factories 
and scientific- 
technological infrastructure required to 
produce the factories 
which produce these commodities. 
In the small peripheral economy which is 
typified 
in the Caribbean, this is not feasible 
because of size 
constraints. The Department I conception 
is therefore not 
adequate. The conceptUaiiZatiofl of a 
basic goods sector 
is therefore advanced as the appropriate 
alternative. A 
survey of the worldS consumptiOn support this, 
since it shows 
that out of millions of products currently 
consumed, a short 
list of raw materials,.about one dozen, 
iron and steel, 
textiles, glass, leather, paper, plastics, 
industrial 
chemicals, etc., accouñt for more than 90% 
of all the manu- 
facturers we consume. The list of 
basic foods is similarly 
short. The pattern is revealed in both capitalist 
economie6 
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and the socialist countries. For the small peripheral. 
economy it is therefore necessary to subject the logic 
of accumulation to: 
- agricultural production oriented towards 
supplying the needs of the population in the 
first instance, and export specialization 
following as an extension of this. Their 
needs include food as well as raw materials. 
- The development of a capacity to produce basic, 
materials as a key element of a necessary 
strategy of industrialization. 
- Raising the lEvel of economic and technical 
competences (not necessarily increasing output) 
in the entrenched agro-export sector. This 
is necessary to lower costs and enhance 
foreign exchange inflows, to support the 
process of diversification, to extend the 
use of an internally developed scientific 
capacity to production, and in the process 
exploit the scope for innovation leading not 
only to lower costs but newer products based 
on old lines of production. 
Unless the logic of accumulation is made subordinate to the 
plitical-sociaÏ priorities of transformation the very process 
of accumulation will not be interiorised within the society. 
Aiid, unless this is done the material dynamic underlying 
social life would not complement the interiorisation of 
political and social change. Additionally, such a configuration 
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within the economy is consistent with its participation 
in the world system in a manner which does not make it a 
victim of that system's systematic reproduction of inequalities. 
Centrally associated with this formulation is the idea that 
it creates a social basis (its orientation towards needs), 
as well as a material basis, (its emphasis on domestic 
resources) for the development of a scientific and technological 
capability in the sphere of social life. Oné of the striking 
characterisicsof the small peripheral economy is that 
even in its area of specialization and comparative 
advantage" in the world economy, it does not have highly 
developed technical - scientific competences. An essential 
task of economic construction must be to create this. 
However, this can only be created in a material environment, 
and within a logic if accumulation which explicitly 
accommôdates it. 
Given the nature of the Caribbean economies, their 
transformation will. be, inevitably, an extended social 
project. It is necessary, nevertheless, to incorporate a 
more or less definite conception of the main economic 
configurations of the economy which the society is working: 
to construct as early in the proc3ss as possible. This 
conception should be, moreôver, elevated to the level of 
a popular conception and not remain simply the possession 
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of the political leadership and the technocrats and managers 
of the economy. The only way to ensure the project is to 
root its conception in the. culture of the popular forces. 
The vital importance of this sense of .the long- 
run configurations of the economy under construction, is 
thát it creates points of reference with which to test and 
measure the performance and development of the economy since 
there are no purely technical tests of the transformation 
of an economy. The urgency of this point is underscored 
by the existing crisis condition in the regio' and the 
world economy n genral. Without a sense of where the 
community wants to go there is a danger that crises, inter- 
ruptions aid reversals when they do occur, will elevate 
their own demands for a quick resolution to the end product 
of the process of development itself. 
Linked with this point is the recurring need to 
conceptualize as they develop, the various phases and stages 
in the reconstructión of the new material basis of social 
life - bearing in mind that these are always structurally 
linked through the configurations incorporated in the long 
run project of transition. 
582. 
This formulation neither implies nor requirés 
an inevitable centrally planned and directed process. To 
the contrary, it seeks to articulate between the 
conceptualization of a popular participative democracy in 
political and social life and the process of transformation 
of Caribbean society. 
583. 
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